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 Abstract 
This thesis contends that while Charlotte Brontë’s novels are not typically associated 
with humour, they are nonetheless centrally concerned with the politics of laughter. I 
investigate Brontë’s serious and sustained use of laughter imagery to challenge cultural 
constructions of femininity and subvert the gendering of rationality and emotion. In 
doing so I highlight how laughter’s capacity to tyrannise or marginalise underpins her 
disquiet about men’s abuse of power, and shapes her concern with the experience of the 
social outsider. Situating historical theories of humour and satire alongside those of 
physiognomy, physiology and mental health, my research revises current ideas both 
about the significance of laughter in the nineteenth-century imagination and about 
Brontë’s methods of characterisation. While showing how laughter features as a source 
of oppression throughout her writing, I also argue that she makes radically apparent its 
expressive power, deploying laughing and smiling faces to dispute or destabilise 
constraining gender ideals. Chapter One attends to cultural context circa 1830-60, 
providing analysis of laughter in periodicals, in philosophy and in pseudo/scientific 
thought, and discussing Charles Dickens and William Makepeace Thackeray in 
particular detail, in order to position Brontë in relation to these influential writers. 
Chapter Two traces the transition from despotic to empowering laughter between 
Brontë’s early writings and Jane Eyre, Chapter Three examines the psychology of facial 
expression in The Professor, and Chapter Four locates Brontë’s ultimate rejection of 
contemporary norms and expectations in the changing face of laughter between Shirley 
and Villette. I conclude by considering the wider cultural significance of Brontë’s 
marked ambivalence towards laughter at a time when, despite our conventional 
impression of the Victorian era as earnest and unamused, attitudes to laughter were 
emphatically celebratory rather than sceptical.  
  
Acknowledgments 
Firstly I would like to thank my wonderful supervisor, Ella Dzelzainis, for guiding me 
through the last four years with untiring patience. Thank you for keeping me on track 
while always pushing me to make the most of my ideas – this thesis could never have 
come together without your advice and encouragement.  
I am also grateful to James Procter, for providing much helpful feedback, and to 
Christie Harner, for kindly reading my work and scrutinising its physiognomic features. 
Hearty thanks go to Helen Stark, Beatrice Turner, Leanne Stokoe, Nicole Bush, Chris 
Wright, and Amy-Claire Scott – not only for their invaluable comments and 
suggestions, but also for their friendship and support. And thank you Lewis Briggs, for 
keeping me in good spirits whenever everything seemed too serious.  
This thesis is dedicated with love and gratitude to my supportive parents, Robert and 
Elizabeth Bradbury. 
 Contents 
 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………... 1 
    
Chapter One – ‘Merry Hearts’ and ‘Soured Minds’: Laughter in Literary 
Culture, 1830-60    
Introduction………………………………………………………………...……… 17 
Part I……………………………………………………….………………..……... 23 
Part II……………………………………………………….………………….…... 46 
    
Chapter Two – ‘A Freezing Spell’: Subverting Superiority in Jane Eyre and the  
Early Writings   
Introduction………………………………………………………….…….……….. 78 
Part I……………………………………………………………….……….……..... 82 
Part II………………………………………………………...……………………... 98 
Part III……………………………………………………….………….………….. 111 
    
Chapter Three – Mastery, Mockery and ‘Phases of Physiognomy’ in The  
Professor   
Introduction………………………………………………………….…….……….. 136 
Part I……………………………………………………………….……….……..... 142 
Part II………………………………………………………...……………………... 152 
Part III……………………………………………………….…………………....... 176 
    
Chapter Four – ‘Not ill-natured, but … too significant to be generally thought  
amiable’: Morbid Laughter in Shirley and Villette              
Introduction……………………………………………………………….………... 195 
Part I……………………………………………………………………….……...... 197 
Part II……………………………………………………………………………….. 217 
    
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………... 259 
    
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………... 268 
1 
 
Introduction 
While gender and power have long been recognised as prominent concerns for Charlotte 
Brontë (1816-55), the importance of laughter in her novels may, at first, seem rather 
more unlikely. Yet not only is laughter present in these novels – recurring so constantly 
and so vividly that it is astonishing it has escaped critical notice – but it is absolutely 
central to her treatment of more familiar themes. This thesis investigates nineteenth-
century representations of laughter and argues that they carried considerable ideological 
weight, providing Brontë with the imagery through which she confronts dominant 
assumptions about gender. Laughter’s capacity to tyrannise or marginalise underpins 
Brontë’s disquiet about men’s abuse of power, and shapes her concern with the 
experience of the social outsider. At the same time, through her depiction of laughter as 
strategic behaviour – as a form of power which her characters employ in the interests of 
self-defence or assertion – she dramatises their response to oppression and isolation 
while challenging conventional notions of normal and deviant femininity. As both an 
oppressive and an expressive force, emerging alternately as a method of social control 
and as defiant self-determination, laughter is far more than simply an overlooked motif; 
attention to its role demands revision of well-established Foucauldian readings of 
power, selfhood and the language of the body in Brontë’s writing. This thesis 
demonstrates that the gendered politics of looking and being looked at – an engrained 
concern of Brontë scholarship
1
 – are intensified but also significantly disrupted by the 
no-less pervasive dynamics of laughing and being laughed at.  
                                                          
1
 This is particularly true of Villette, in which, as Jill L. Matus writes, ‘references to the gaze, glance, the 
exchange of looks, shafts of the eye, observations, and sight abound.’ See Matus, Unstable Bodies: 
Victorian Representations of Sexuality and Maternity (New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 
132. The most rigorous and important analysis of Brontë’s rendering of subjectivity, the body and the 
gaze has been undertaken by Sally Shuttleworth in Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), which I will turn to presently.    
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 These underlying dynamics have gone unrecognised, I would suggest, because 
of the critical tendency to study laughter in close connection with comedy and comic 
writers, or to treat it as synonymous with humour. As Robin Jones remarks, ‘the 
association of laughter with Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre seems an incongruous 
endeavour at first. Readers do not respond with hilarity to the novel.’2 However, while 
Brontë’s reputation for humourlessness is certainly unjustified (Regina Barreca has 
demonstrated that her writing is ‘laced with unsettling and powerful uses of humor’) 
this thesis is not concerned with her subversive witticisms, nor her ability to raise 
hilarity – instead, I attend to the thematic importance of the laughter and smiles that 
appear throughout her writing.
3
 The embittered observation of Lucy Snowe, watching 
from the sidelines towards the end of Villette, that the laughing Paul Emanuel is ‘a little 
despotic perhaps, determined to be chief in mirth ... proving indisputably his right of 
leadership,’ captures the ambivalence with which Brontë represents laughter – ‘joyous’ 
                                                          
2
 Robin Jones, ‘The Goblin Ha-ha: Hidden Smiles and Open Laughter in Jane Eyre’, in New Perspectives 
on Women and Comedy, ed. by Regina Barreca (Philadelphia: Gordon and Breach, 1992), pp. 201-12. 
Jones’s essay is an exception to the lack of acknowledgement of laughter as a theme in Brontë’s fiction. It 
offers some useful insights, which I shall discuss in Chapter Two, but her approach to laughter is largely 
ahistorical. She loosely connects it with humour and describes its capacity to reveal or challenge 
patriarchal expectations in abstract terms, rather than crediting authorial intent.  
3
 Regina Barreca, Untamed and Unabashed: Essays on Women and Humor in British Literature (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1994), p. 61. Brontë was judged humourless by Leslie Stephen, for 
instance, who opines that ‘Miss Brontë has as little sense of humour as Milton or Wordsworth’; she ‘is 
always in deadly earnest.’ [Stephen], ‘Hours in a Library’, Cornhill Magazine, 36 (1877) 723-39 (p. 730). 
Such claims have often been disputed, however. Apart from Barreca, critics to have commented on the 
humorous side of Brontë’s fiction include (to name just a few) Janis McLarren Caldwell, who discusses 
her comic deployment of phrenological language in Literature and Medicine in Nineteenth-Century 
Britain: from Mary Shelley to George Eliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 108-10. 
Kate Millett describes Villette as ‘one of the wittier novels in English and one of the rare witty books in 
an age which specialized in sentimental comedy’, Sexual Politics (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
1969; repr. 2000), p. 147. For Judith Williams, Brontë’s novels illustrate the power of humour to combat 
tyranny or to ‘defeat dangerous illusion.’ See Perception and Expression in the Novels of Charlotte 
Brontë (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1988), pp. 24-5, 117-8. And in ‘Charlotte Brontë’s “New” 
Gothic’ (1958), Robert B. Heilman analysed her ‘humorous modifications’ to the Gothic genre – her 
‘introduction of comedy as a palliative to straight Gothic.’ See The Nineteenth-Century Novel: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Stephen Regan (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 212-5 (pp. 12, 15).  
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behaviour typically has an aggressive edge, and produces feelings of pain or anxiety.
4
 
Though her protagonists turn increasingly to laughter as a means of registering protest 
or articulating dissent, it more frequently figures as a source of fear and dread, or of 
distaste and annoyance. To make sense, however, of the uneasiness with which Brontë 
probes the psychology – and the physiognomy – of laughter, it must be read not in 
isolation but against a background of broad enthusiasm for mirth and merriment.  
 This may seem a surprising claim to make, since the perception of unsmiling 
Victorians is a persistent one (Merle Tönnies describes ‘an age that is popularly 
understood today as the quintessence of stiff upper-lip austerity’, while Jennifer 
Wagner-Lawlor evokes ‘the general image of the Victorian period as morbid and 
dour’).5 The history of attitudes to laughter is a deeply revealing one, bound up with the 
history of attitudes to the body and its relationship with the mind. Yet within the varied 
contested accounts of how social and philosophical ideas about laughter have changed 
through history, there remains scant acknowledgment of the celebration and moral 
endorsement of impulsive, full-bodied laughter which prevailed in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, in stark contrast to the more negative sentiments that emerged later. 
Thus, in contextualising Brontë’s objections to laughter this thesis will also fill a 
historiographical gap.
6
 In Chapter One, I argue that early Victorian discourse (over a 
                                                          
4
 Charlotte Brontë, Villette, ed. by Herbert Rosengarten and Margaret Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 466. 
5
 Merle Tönnies, ‘Laughter in Nineteenth-Century British Theatre: From Genial Blending to Harsh 
Distinctions’, in A History of English Laughter: Laughter from Beowulf to Beckett and Beyond, ed. by 
Manfred Pfister (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 99-119 (p. 99). ‘Introduction’, The Victorian Comic 
Spirit: New Perspectives, ed. by Wagner-Lawlor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. xiii-xx (p. xiii). Both 
critics evoke these stereotypes to dispute them – Wagner-Lawlor by way of introduction to a book about 
comedy in the period; Tönnies in a discussion of laughter at the theatre.   
6
 As Manfred Pfister writes: ‘The history of laughter is the history of [the] norms circumscribing, and 
giving a social shape to, the anthropological impulse of laughter in a particular society. And these norms 
change significantly from one period and one society to another.’ Pfister, ‘Introduction’, A History of 
English Laughter, pp. v-x (p. v). In Chapter One, then, I examine the norms circumscribing and shaping 
laughter in early nineteenth-century society.  
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period I have very approximately defined as 1830-60) idealizes bodily or ‘open’ 
laughter while demonising it in its subtler, restrained forms – in clear distinction to 
more characteristically ‘Victorian’ attempts later in the century to control and contain 
bodily excess. Common generalisations, such as Jure Gantar’s reference to ‘the highly 
moralistic Victorian era, when tactless laughter was frowned upon even more so than 
under the Puritans or during the Enlightenment’, fail to identify this dramatic shift from 
the advocacy of irrationality and self-abandonment to the advocacy of restraint.
7
 But 
this is not to say that there was nothing controlling or ‘moralistic’ about the 
championing of unrestrained laughter, which, I will argue, was conceptualised as 
morally pure, emotionally healthy and socially acceptable precisely because of its 
‘openness’, and its roots in body rather than mind.  
 The bearing of this on the gender ideology of the age is profound, though not 
immediately apparent. Rather than making a case for an unexpectedly relaxed, funny or 
fun-loving era, I am concerned with the didactic undertones of the commonplaces that 
writers typically invoked, which in sanctifying the innocence and naturalness of 
laughter placed heavy stress on its communal, non-threatening, unthinking qualities 
while stigmatising laughter which suggested individualism, intelligence or discontent. 
In its valorisation of heart over head, such rhetoric served to elevate conventional 
‘feminine’ characteristics, denigrating anti-social reserve and cynicism generally but 
more particularly damning these traits in women, whose ‘hearts’ were more 
emphatically expected to be in the right place, and to be demonstrable through 
spontaneous, natural laughter. Instead of women’s laughter being uniformly feared and 
forbidden (Nina Auerbach asserts that ‘a woman who laughed was a woman who went 
                                                          
7
 Jure Gantar, The Pleasure of Fools: Essays in the Ethics of Laughter (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2005), p. 60. For the fear and suspicion excited by bodily laughter later in the 
century, see Mackenzie Bartlett, ‘Laughing to Excess: Gothic Fiction and the Pathologisation of Laughter 
in Late Victorian Britain’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London, Birkbeck, 2009).  
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too far’8), censorship took the form of insistence that women did laugh, but should 
laugh nicely – with the importance of uncomplaining cheerfulness being keenly 
stressed. The widespread assumption that a cheerful mind would keep the body in good 
health was an optimistic doctrine likely to frustrate anyone who, like Brontë, struggled 
with both low spirits and poor physical health. As Beth Torgerson explains, ‘early 
Victorian concepts of medicine maintained a direct relation between the physiological 
and the psychological ... increased or diminished “animal spirits” could affect the whole 
bodily economy, as could excessive emotions or lack of emotions.’ Torgerson notes that 
‘of the two extremes, the Victorians seemed much more concerned with controlling 
excessive emotions through their ideal of self-control.’9 But my findings suggest an 
exception to this rule; in respect to laughter there was, earlier in the period, a distinct 
lack of anxiety about excessive ‘animal spirits’, and a suspicion of those who could 
exercise self-control. For Brontë the privileging of bodily and emotional health is 
connected to oppressive constructions of the feminine character, playing into the wider 
rhetorical devaluation of women’s powers of intellect and self-discipline. When her 
female characters self-identify as morbid or deviant (not through gloomy sobriety but 
through tabooed sneers and secretive smiles) they are positioning themselves in 
subversive opposition to an ideal of healthy sociability that exerted particular pressure 
on women.  
 Thus, I suggest, there are two senses in which laughter casts a ‘despotic’ shadow 
in Brontë’s fiction: in its most obviously threatening form, it encapsulates masculine 
                                                          
8
 Nina Auerbach, Romantic Imprisonment: Women and Other Glorified Outcasts (New York: Columbia, 
1985), p. 278. Again, it is comedy rather than laughter per se that Auerbach is suggesting ‘was more 
radically tabooed in Victorian women than sexuality was’, it being ‘too early’ to ‘laugh at powerful men’, 
but the image of glum earnestness that she draws on (she gives both Brontë and Victoria herself as 
representative ‘sternly serious’ women) is misleading, given the disapproval of such rigidly unamused 
faces which held sway earlier in the era.  
9
 Beth E. Torgerson, Reading the Brontë Body: Disease, Desire and the Constraints of Culture (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 11, 141 (n.11).  
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self-control, knowledge and aggressive power; less obviously, laughter that is 
seemingly innocent and inclusive is associated with the pressure to conform – by 
displaying robust health and high spirits, or feminine feeling. (These twin evils may be 
loosely distinguished under the headings of mockery and mirth – terms I will have 
recourse to in illustrating the opposition between the two modes of laughter in Brontë’s 
novels.) In resisting the contemporary naturalisation of cheerfulness and good-hearted 
merriment, Brontë rejects conventional models of femininity but also raises doubts 
about the reality underlying representations of benign, non-threatening masculinity. The 
disapproving stances her characters take towards laughter are complex, inconsistent, and 
informed by their awareness of both the moral significance and the oppressive social 
functions of laughter: its role in perpetuating gender stereotypes (on the page) and the 
imbalance of power between the sexes (in life). Associating it alternately with crushing 
masculine power and with stifling sentimentality, Brontë does not simply ‘frown’ on 
laughter; the value she places on mental strength over bodily impulse stems not from 
transcendent earnestness or prudish decorum but from scepticism regarding the vaunted 
benignity of laughter, her perception of it as coercive or false.  
 The Foucauldian implications of my analysis should by now be apparent: on the 
one hand, the rhetoric of healthy laughter produces ‘docile bodies’, with thoughts and 
feelings safely checked and exposed to view through laughter.
10
 But on the other hand, 
laughter in Brontë’s fiction can itself perform the act of surveillance, penetrating into 
the interior states of others; Lucy’s sense that Graham Bretton’s smile brings ‘surging 
up into the mind all one’s foibles and weak points: all that could lay one open to a 
laugh’ suggests the power of ‘masculine’ laughter – in much the same way as the male 
                                                          
10
 Michel Foucault’s term in Discipline and Punish (1975), trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 
1991), p. 135. The particular aptness of this phrase (docile bodies) to women’s social condition has been 
explored by, amongst others, Sandra Lee Bartky in ‘Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of 
Patriarchal Power’, in Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory, ed. by Katie 
Conboy, Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury (New York: Columbia, 1997), pp. 129-54.    
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gaze – to enact exposure, to intimidate and mystify without any obvious show of 
authority.
11
 As I will elucidate in Chapter Two, the fear of being ‘laid open to a laugh’ 
has a powerful effect on the psyche of Brontë’s female characters, whose wariness of 
laughter results in anxious self-policing. In her early writings, this amounts to 
diminished self-respect and subjection to male tyranny, but in a marked and fascinating 
development over the course of the novels Brontë increasingly has her heroines discard 
the vulnerability attendant on feminine laughter, instead subversively appropriating for 
themselves the potency of the knowing sneer – in the process moving from ‘healthy’ 
normality to anti-social deviance.  
 This reading is of course strongly influenced by Sally Shuttleworth’s 
authoritative work on Brontë, which draws on the ideas of Foucault and on nineteenth-
century psychological thought to explain the power struggles in the novels, which centre 
‘on the ability of each partner to read, unseen, the hidden secrets of the other.’ As she 
summarises: 
The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new economy of individual and 
social life, centred on the regulation of the forces of the body and controlled through 
surveillance. A new interiorized notion of selfhood arose and, concomitantly, new 
techniques of power designed to penetrate the inner secrets of this hidden domain. 
Psychiatry and phrenology emerged as sciences, dedicated to decoding the external 
signs of the body in order to reveal the concealed inner play of forces which 
constitute individual subjectivity.
12
 
However, the workings of laughter as portrayed by Brontë cannot be neatly 
accommodated into this picture of ‘interiorized’ selfhood and the interpretive prowess it 
demanded. In its self-conscious performativity, I argue, laughter’s intervention in social 
                                                          
11
 Brontë, Villette, p. 96.  
12
 Shuttleworth, p. 3.  
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exchanges disrupts the subject/object relationship, turning our attention from the 
process of reading the (passive) body to the act of expressive performance – or, in its 
pointed display or externalisation of ‘inner secrets’, from the importance of self-
protection to the importance of self-projection. My thesis will demonstrate Brontë’s 
interest in the ways that laughter can be used to deliberately make visible and impress 
‘individual subjectivity’ on others, thereby wreaking havoc with notions of stable, 
essential identities and collapsing the distinction between (male) despots and (female) 
victims. In Chapter Three I explore this via a paradigmatic shift: from physiognomy 
(the study of fixed features) to pathognomy (the study of expressions).
13
  
 Certainly, Brontë’s preoccupation with the appearances of laughter must be read 
in the context of the nineteenth-century craze for, as Shuttleworth puts it, ‘decoding the 
external signs of the body.’ As Thomas Carlyle exclaimed, ‘How much lies in Laughter: 
the cipher-key, wherewith we decipher the whole man!’14 As I have outlined, laughter 
in this period was held to be revealing of human character and moral worth, but 
Brontë’s close attention to laughing faces highlights that this was an interpretive 
endeavour which rested on the details of facial expression as well as on laughter’s 
broader connotations in the nineteenth-century literary imagination. Brontë’s 
deployment of phrenological and physiognomical ideas has been discussed in detail by 
Shuttleworth amongst others, but the related practice of ‘pathognomy’ has been largely 
neglected or subsumed beneath the umbrella of physiognomy, so that it is an obscure 
term not only as applied to Brontë but in literary criticism more widely. Yet, I suggest, 
it invites a focus on the depiction of mobile rather than static appearances which throws 
new light on the power dynamics in Brontë’s novels, revitalising the behaviour of her 
                                                          
13
 Detailed explanations of these different terms, their historical background and their significance in 
nineteenth-century literature will be given in Chapter Three. 
14
 Thomas Carlyle, Sartor Resartus (originally serialised in Fraser’s Magazine, 1833-4), ed. by Kerry 
McSweeney and Peter Sabor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 26.  
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characters and the interactions between them. It is firmly established that for Brontë, as 
Janis McLarren Caldwell notes, ‘bodies ... are insistently significant, and her narrators 
and characters are often adept readers of bodily meaning’15 – but whether critics focus 
on her interest in phrenology or physiognomy, they are dwelling on the ways in which 
her characters are ‘adept readers’ (or adept hiders) of bodily meaning, instead of adept 
performers and manipulators.  
 However, while in some ways a turn to pathognomy seems to provide the 
necessary lens through which to ‘decipher’ laughter, a closer look at its aims in 
nineteenth-century practice soon reveals a crucial point of difference between Brontë’s 
rendering of expression, and the way in which it is understood by pathognomists. In 
Charles Bell’s influential Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression (1824), ‘the actions 
and expressions of the body betray the emotions of the heart’ – they enable man to 
‘communicate with his fellow-creatures, by that natural language, which is read in the 
changes of his countenance.’16 While Brontë is certainly drawn to the communicative 
potential of laughter (its ability to convey superiority or defiance) it is not for her a 
‘natural language’ expressing ‘the emotions of the heart’, so much as a social and self-
conscious language, through which ‘emotions’ are suppressed rather than betrayed. Bell 
is interested in how ‘uncontrollable states of feeling’ might ‘produce’ a smile by their 
impact on the muscles, or bring about ‘the condition of a man convulsed with laughter 
[who] is incapable of a voluntary act.’17 Charles Darwin, too, was interested in the 
                                                          
15
 Thus, for Caldwell, her interest in bodily appearances is ‘demonstrated by the frequent use of the 
language of phrenology, in which bumps and indentations of the skull were thought to mark qualities of 
character.’ See ‘Physical Health’, in The Brontës in Context, ed. by Marianne Thormählen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 335-43 (p. 341). See also Nicholas Dames’s chapter, ‘Amnesiac 
Bodies: Phrenology, Physiognomy and Memory in Charlotte Brontë’, in Amnesiac Selves: Nostalgia, 
Forgetting, and British Fiction, 1810-1870 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 76-124.  
16
 Charles Bell, The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts (London: 
George Bell, 1877), p. 181.  
17
 Ibid., pp. 134-5.  
10 
 
involuntary workings of laughter, dismissing that which is ‘employed in a forced 
manner’ to ‘show the offending person that he excites only amusement.’ ‘Real’ laughter 
for Darwin ‘primarily expresses mere happiness or joy.’18 For Bell, the language of the 
expressions is God-given, while for Darwin it had evolved and could be traced to 
natural instincts, but for both the expressive purpose of laughter is unconscious and 
unmediated by the mind. Their business is with what Brontë describes in Villette as ‘the 
smile of feeling, rather than of conscious power.’19 Thus, the art (or science) of 
pathognomy in nineteenth-century practice was understood ultimately as another means 
of reading inner states through their bodily manifestations – laughter is (to borrow 
Carlyle’s term) the ‘cipher-key’ which hands power over to the skilled interpreter while 
rendering the laugher passive, subject to scrutiny and to the uncontrollable (e)motions 
of the body.  
 Brontë’s alternative focus – not on the ways in which the feelings or ‘passions’ 
act on the body, but on the power of the will to control and direct appearances – is 
crucial to understanding her conception of mental strength as key not only to subverting 
power relations, but to subverting gender norms. When her women laugh ‘naturally’, 
the laugh is soon tainted or undercut – their joy renders them vulnerable to male 
sarcasm or scorn. But in Villette, Paul Emanuel’s ‘smile of pleasure’ transforms his 
countenance ‘from a mask to a face’, presenting an ‘illuminated sign of milder [and] 
warmer feeling.’20 Such moments of ‘feminine’ subjection to milder and warmer 
feelings render Paul transparent, legible, and manageable, thus working to empower 
Lucy – who is herself prone to self-possessed sneering and sarcasm. Lucy frequently 
                                                          
18
 Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (New York: D. Appleton, 1872), 
p. 212.  
19
 Brontë, Villette, p. 370.   
20
 Ibid., p. 321.  
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‘delegate[s] the trouble of commenting ... to my countenance’; ‘not that it behoved or 
beseemed me to say anything; but one can occasionally look the opinion it is forbidden 
to embody in words’ (by permitting a ‘slightly freer action than usual to the muscles 
about my eyes and mouth’).21 Similarly when Rochester accosts Jane with the demand: 
‘It would please me now to draw you out: to learn more of you – therefore speak’, Jane 
is defiantly silent but not passive: ‘Instead of speaking, I smiled: and not a very 
complacent or submissive smile either.’22 Slyly subtle as these displays seem, they 
indicate not ladylike discretion but a controlled demonstration of mysterious knowledge 
that is usually coded masculine, with Brontë drawing persistent attention not only to the 
deliberateness with which laughter is used as a replacement for the voicing of 
subversive or aggressive thoughts, but to its superior effectiveness in conveying them. 
As I will suggest in Chapter Two, Brontë’s heroines (Jane particularly) are often 
associated with their passionate outbursts, spontaneous feelings and longing for human 
contact, but their laughter – in defiance of contemporary idealisations of impulsive, 
affective mirth – frequently signifies their detachment, their recourse to cool 
calculation, and their refusal to be ‘drawn out.’ 
 This leaning to art over heart is, moreover, the reason why some of the most 
frequently cited theories of laughter are of limited usefulness to this study (except where 
they are historically significant). Theorists and philosophers have typically sought to 
explain the underlying psychological causes of laughter, approaching it (as Bell and 
Darwin do) as a natural human instinct or impulse. Freud, for instance, explains 
laughter in terms of abstract ‘psychical energy’, as a force which demands discharge or 
                                                          
21
 Brontë, Villette, pp. 308, 330 (Brontë’s emphasis).   
22
 Brontë, Jane Eyre, ed. by Margaret Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 132-3.   
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release (‘Reason – critical judgement – suppression – these are the powers it fights’).23 
It is an understanding of laughter which might at first glance seem particularly 
applicable to Brontë, who, according to Michael Kearns, is attentive to: 
the springs of mysterious mental phenomena which are now usually associated with 
‘unconscious’ mental processes ... the importance of sensations felt to be welling up 
from some subterranean source, the importance of sympathy with the external world, 
and the importance of feeling connected with other human beings.
24
 
Yet these observations do not hold true of Brontë’s interest in laughter. Aside from her 
scepticism regarding its sympathetic, communal qualities (‘the importance of feeling 
connected with other human beings’), laughter in Brontë’s novels is for the most part 
socially motivated, materialising not from subconscious depths but through self-
conscious performance. In this sense, I am concerned with how the psychology and 
meanings of laughter change when represented in fiction, rather than theory.
25
  
 Similarly, since this thesis does not at any point take for granted laughter’s anti-
patriarchal (or anti-establishment) power, I am cautious of familiar formulations of 
laughter as an inherently radical force. For instance – as will be discussed in Chapters 
                                                          
23
 Sigmund Freud, The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious (1905), trans. by Joyce Crick (London: 
Penguin, 2002), pp. 144, 134. As I will discuss in Chapter One, Freud’s Victorian predecessors, Herbert 
Spencer and Alexander Bain, more explicitly rooted laughter in the body in their physiological versions 
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One and Two – Bakhtin’s influential concept of the carnivalesque draws on the image 
of eruptive, irrational, bodily laughter; Cixous fixed on the mythical image of the 
laughing Medusa to envisage ‘volcanic’ femininity (‘Your body must be heard. Only 
then will the immense resources of the unconscious spring forth’).26 Such 
understandings of laughter are largely inapplicable here because, like her characters, 
Brontë tends to employ laughter with purposeful intent. It figures in her novels not as an 
abstract sign of subversive triumph but as the primary means through which power 
continually changes hands (or rather, faces), being solidly located in the details of 
minutely dissected day-to-day behaviours. Besides, the celebration of physicality (as 
apparent in both Bakhtin and Cixous) is precisely what Brontë resents – in her 
valorisation of (in Rochester’s words) ‘that which the brain conceives’ over ‘that which 
the heart experiences’, she is reacting against a cultural climate which, contrary to what 
we might expect, was oppressive not in its gloomy severity but in the way it pushed the 
image of the laughing body to the centre of social life.
27
  
 Of course, such an assessment is not unproblematic. The dualism between mind 
and body, intellect and emotion is obviously a false one, which sidesteps many of the 
complexities of nineteenth-century psychological thought.
28
 While I am indebted to 
Judith Butler’s work on gender and performativity, I evoke ‘the Cartesian distinction 
between freedom and the body’ that Butler criticises, in my claims for Brontë’s 
conception of the body as, essentially, a medium or instrument that is subject to the 
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will.
29
 I maintain these distinctions, and this model of the mind/body relationship, 
because the polarisation of heart and head in nineteenth-century descriptions of laughter 
is strongly marked and significant, and because – although her use of psychological 
language is in many respects sophisticated – Brontë’s writing generally is characterised 
both by its binary oppositions, and by its faith in willpower. Nonetheless I do, especially 
in Chapter Four, address the ways in which her novels work to break down the 
dichotomies that they otherwise uphold.  
 Furthermore, by locating Brontë’s subversive tendencies in her gestures towards 
the anti-social and the anti-emotional, this thesis in places runs contrary to the trends of 
the ‘affective turn’ in literary criticism – particularly, perhaps, in my identification of 
Dickens (in Chapter One) as central to the sentimentalising of hearty merriment that 
Brontë viewed with such scepticism. In explaining this scepticism, I position Brontë to 
an extent within the high Romantic realm of ‘internalized, intellectualized, and 
individualistic emotional response’, which, as Juliet John has argued, is opposed to the 
‘principles of communality and cultural inclusivity’ that have traditionally been 
sidelined or devalued by critics.
30
 And yet, the edgy, unsettling, even perverse smiles 
cultivated by Brontë’s unconventional protagonists cannot be simply dismissed as 
symptoms either of snobbery or of introspection. In situating these shows of 
‘intellectualized’ feeling within their cultural context, I mean to demonstrate the ways in 
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which contemporary representations of laughter did largely rest on a head/heart 
dichotomy which crystallized the familiar demarcation between (masculine) 
transcendent rationality and (feminine) embodied emotion, giving strong symbolic 
shape to Brontë’s perception of the literal, habitual means by which men asserted power 
over women. In other words, Brontë subverts on both a literal and a symbolic level the 
‘theories of gender division’ identified by Shuttleworth which ‘contrasted male self-
control with female subjection to the forces of the body’ – at stake in laughter is no less 
than the choice between ‘mental control’ and ‘physiological instability.’31 Moreover, in 
tracing her concern with laughter’s strategic power, I will be illustrating Brontë’s 
conception of it as a manoeuvre which – rather than expressing private, Romantic 
depths – plays an active role in the processes of self-invention and social interaction.  
* 
Chapter One is in two parts, laying the contextual groundwork for my reading of 
Brontë’s novels. The first gives an overview of theories and philosophies of laughter, 
highlighting the resounding firmness of early- to mid-nineteenth-century opinion on the 
side of positive rather than negative traditional views, then relating this pro-laughter 
consensus to the gender ideology and the literary mores of the age. In the second part I 
focus on Brontë’s contemporaries Charles Dickens (1812-1870) and William 
Makepeace Thackeray (1811-1863), demonstrating that their (more obviously 
humorous) fiction both shaped and responded to debates about laughter, and clarifying 
Brontë’s misgivings (implicit as regards Dickens, but explicitly applied to Thackeray) 
about the two poles of mirth and mockery that these writers represent. In Chapter Two I 
explore Brontë’s attempts to subvert the politics of (female) mirth and (male) mockery 
in Jane Eyre (1847), through a series of role reversals that contrast with the more 
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convention-bound representations of laughter in her earlier writings. In doing so, I chart 
a transition in her writing from Romanticism to realism, and from male dominance to 
female defiance, via an elucidation of laughter’s relationship with power. This will 
prepare the ground for my discussion in Chapter Three of The Professor (1857), 
Brontë’s first-written but posthumously published novel. Though comedy is not the 
subject of this thesis, in this chapter I highlight how Brontë’s humorous treatment of her 
Professor leads to a sophisticated analysis of his touchiness about being laughed at – 
and his resultant need to turn this mockery back on his tormenters. Overturning 
established analyses of this novel as being primarily about the protagonist’s interpretive, 
physiognomical skills, I identify him instead as an active player whose masculine power 
is established through the expressive face, as well as the steely gaze.  
 In Chapter Four, I argue that Shirley (1849) reveals a crisis in Brontë’s attempts 
to conform to the cultural endorsement of mirth (and its correspondent valorisation of 
conventional femininity), as the laughter of her heroines is gradually undermined by 
masculine mockery. However in Villette (1853), mocking laughter is the protagonist’s 
most powerful tool, and the author’s most profound critique of her society’s norms and 
expectations. In this final chapter, then, I address the extent to which there is resolution 
of the conflict in Brontë’s writing – between the moral impetus to purify and humanise 
laughter (an impetus which peaks in Shirley) and the deep suspicion of, and alienation 
from, moral laughter as it was conventionally upheld (as is crystallized in Villette). In 
my conclusion, I revisit the oppressive cultural climate detailed in Chapter One and 
reflect on the historical significance of the challenges that Brontë raises. But I also 
consider the wider value of an approach to laughter that takes it so very seriously, 
proposing that – insofar as it permeates everyday behaviour and conversation – laughter 
retains its underestimated potential both to oppress and to express, beyond its 
manifestation in the faces of nineteenth-century fiction. 
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Chapter One                                                                                                                    
‘Merry Hearts’ and ‘Soured Minds’: Laughter in Literary Culture, 1830-60 
 
Introduction 
In a recent book on ‘Dickensian laughter’, Malcolm Andrews asserts that ‘ringing 
laughter is an act of defiance to those ... whose puritanical or genteel habits have 
suppressed open enjoyment ... Laughter is an anarchic force, physiologically as well as 
culturally, [which] battles with the forces of repression.’1 Such claims about laughter’s 
uplifting, rebellious qualities are widespread in modern times, alongside related ideas 
about the particular properties of women’s laughter, and its ability to take on the ‘forces 
of repression.’ Thus, the ‘unsolicited laughter of women spells trouble to those in 
power’, writes Regina Barreca; it is ‘anarchic and apocalyptic.’2 Laughter may be 
buoyantly joyful or wildly bitter, but in either case it tends to be characterised as a force 
to be reckoned with, a grand, bold and affirmative act. Surely, then, it is all the more to 
be celebrated when it breaks loose from the confines of the Victorian period, with its 
strict ideas about propriety and order?
3
 
 In fact, despite the general enthusiasm for ringing, transcendent laughter, this 
thesis will not be in the typical celebratory strain – primarily because early Victorian 
writers (the men ‘in power’) were themselves keen not to repress laughter, but to 
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 Malcolm Andrews, Dickensian Laughter: Essays on Dickens and Humour (Oxford: Oxford University 
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encourage its free expression. While later intellectuals showed a suspicion of laughter 
more in keeping with stereotypical traits of earnestness and prudery, Brontë’s novels 
fall into a period of nineteenth-century history (circa 1830-60) which, I argue in this 
chapter, resolutely trumpeted the merits of unsophisticated, eruptive, corporeal laughter; 
pre- and early-Victorian sentiments were far removed from the later ideal of the stiff 
upper lip. It is important to recognise that in this distinct cultural climate, the norms and 
ideals against which Brontë contends are not oppressive in the ways that might be 
expected – power, as perceived and resisted by Brontë, does not always take a stern, 
authoritarian form. Thus, while the laughter that takes shape in her novels can 
absolutely be defiant, challenging and subversive, it had no reason to be affirmative, 
spirited or even radical in the way that, in accordance with popular clichés about the 
nature of laughter, modern readers (and critics) might prefer. 
 More precisely, the laughter that Brontë eschews, but which was otherwise 
viewed in this period with complacency, is that which loudly proclaims its origins in the 
body – just the sort that is most often upheld as liberating or subversive. The connection 
Andrews makes between physiological and cultural anarchy derives from Bakhtin, who 
influentially divided medieval culture into two extremes: the ‘official’, ecclesiastic 
culture, which he characterised as rigid and repressive, thoroughly serious and 
unlaughing; and pitted against this the Carnival, or popular culture, ringing with 
boisterous laughter and all that the official culture sought to suppress.
4
 According to this 
model the body and its eruptions (notably the ‘belly laugh’) are synonymous with 
rebellion and revolt, and subject to control by the socially powerful. Manfred Pfister, for 
instance, claims that: 
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Sex and laughter are, of course, related to each other ... They are both closely linked 
to our corporeal nature, in particular to the ‘lower bodily stratum’ [Bakhtin’s phrase]. 
In the course of history, sex and laughter have frequently found themselves in direct 
opposition to, and therefore repressed by, dominant notions of what is pure, sublime 
and sacred.
5
 
Claims like this, however, fail to take into account the ways in which bodily laughter has 
been sanctified, celebrated and recommended throughout history quite as much as it has 
been frowned upon – often to the point where it becomes meaningless to talk of its 
taboo-busting or revolutionary nature. The assumption that laughter has traditionally 
been forbidden is further apparent in the summary offered by Ingvild Saelid Gilhus: 
In the philosophical discourse on laughter in the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
century, humour and laughter were repeatedly criticised for their hostility, 
irrationality, and irresponsibility ... Theories of laughter became generally critical 
and restrictive ... the eruptive sides of bodily life were not revealed in public, and 
uncontrolled outbursts of laughter were condemned as vulgar ... Because the body in 
Western culture was degraded in relation to the soul, laughter with its anchorage in 
the body was also devalued against superior reason ... In the twentieth century, 
however, there has been a fundamental reassessment of laughter ... theories of 
humour in the twentieth century are almost uniformly positive in their evaluation of 
laughter, regarding it as a means to make human beings whole and in harmony with 
their bodies and with society.
6
 
But the ‘positive’ evaluation that Gilhus claims for the twentieth century describes 
exactly the consensus held at the time that Brontë was writing; ‘uncontrolled outbursts’ 
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– laughter ‘with its anchorage in the body’ – was no more disapproved of than it is 
today, but rather was considered a guarantee of ‘wholeness’ and social harmony.  
 In order to make sense of Brontë’s resistance to the cheerfulness that 
predominated, it will be necessary to explore the brightly positive understandings of 
laughter that were in circulation, since they remain current and, appearing innocuous 
enough, may seem an unlikely source of provocation.
7
 While the following chapters 
focus on concrete (that is, physiognomically grounded) laughter and its psychological 
motivations, this chapter attends to the idea of laughter in a broader cultural and 
philosophical sense, examining its ties with humour, satire and wit, as well as with 
scientific and traditional theories, in order to demonstrate the ideological weight carried 
by literary representations of laughter. In tracing the development of popular ideas on 
the subject, I demonstrate how polarised ‘types’ of laughter were equated both with 
literary forms and with ‘types’ of personality, revealing much about an individual’s (or a 
writer’s) sociable or anti-social, healthy or morbid tendencies. In Part One I review how 
the construct of ‘hearty’ or bodily laughter came to be revered in the first half of the 
century (in sharp contrast to later Victorian views), arguing that it was discursively used 
to shame or shut down expressions of social discontent, which were pejoratively tied to 
non-hearty laughter. I conclude by suggesting how, unlikely as it may seem, this 
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policing of laughter was effective at encouraging feminine docility, carrying moral 
messages that were particularly pertinent to women and the female body.  
 In Part Two I demonstrate just how firmly entrenched was the categorisation of 
laughter along lines of (healthy) body and (sick) mind by considering how it is played 
out in the novels, and careers, of the two great ‘humorists’ of the age, Dickens and 
Thackeray. Identifying these writers as key representatives of hearty and non-hearty 
modes of humour, I propose an interrelationship between theme and style by 
considering the effect of their fictional renderings of laughter on their literary 
reputations, while showing how their modes of satire coloured those representations. 
Firstly, I discuss the immense influence of Dickens and his early novels in consolidating 
the dominant ideal of jolly, non-intellectual, and morally sound laughter. I stress that 
(contrary to Andrews’s claims) he was the rule rather than the exception in his 
championing of ‘open enjoyment’, but he was also an important figure in spreading and 
sentimentalising pre-Victorian positive evaluations of the hearty laugh.
8
 I do not 
characterise Dickens as a ‘feminine’ writer, but rather highlight the ways in which his 
novels bridged full-bodied laughter and smiling sentimentality, epitomising the wider 
validation of heart over head, physical impulse over mental control, and animal over 
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intellectual energies, that Brontë writes against.
9
 Thackeray’s writing, in contrast, was 
perceived by many to be tainted by an unhealthy satirical tone – and this, likewise, is 
reflected in the imagery in his novels. But having explored how Thackeray’s attention 
to the unpleasant side of laughter set him at odds with conventional preferences, I note 
that Brontë, too, had severe misgivings about the leaning towards ‘head’ over ‘heart’ 
that his satire displayed, due to its tendency to victimise women – its flaunting of 
masculine intellect over feminine feeling.  
 Thus, in this chapter I will be pinpointing two senses in which laughter casts its 
‘despotic’ shadow. Firstly there is the pressure (both social and literary) to conform, to 
be cheerful and content – the sentimental weight attached to wholesome, ‘feminine’ 
(though not necessarily female) laughter, with its insistence on sociability and 
emotional openness. Secondly there is ‘masculine’ laughter: tyrannical, intimidating, 
intelligent, linked to the cruelty of satire, and represented for Brontë by Thackeray. The 
two modes of laughter are connected in that the targets of satirical laughter are precisely 
the emotionally ‘open’ (vulnerable), innocent subjects that are produced by laughter of 
the first category. Clearly, this assessment relies on what might be regarded as crude 
terms of opposition (those of mirth and mockery) yet in setting it up in this way I seek 
to highlight the patterns of conventional thought that inform and account for the 
conflicted loyalties – the fluctuations between adherence to and rejection of gender 
norms – that underwrite Brontë’s use of laughter imagery. While she regularly raises 
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earnest objections to male contempt for or humiliation of women, her novels work not 
only to criticise or curtail it but, increasingly, to overturn sentimental expectations, by 
assigning sharp, knowing laughter of the ‘Thackerayan’ stamp to her heroines. In 
outlining historical and literary context, this chapter aims both to shed light on the 
significance (and the tyranny) of laughter in early to mid nineteenth-century thought, 
and to prepare the ground for an accurate reading of laughter in Brontë’s writing. 
 
I 
In her study of late Victorian Britain, Mackenzie Bartlett describes how laughter 
became a focus for social anxiety, due to its ‘overdetermined suggestions of violent 
primitivism, extreme emotionality, madness [and] sexuality.’ She describes an era 
which dwelt on ‘the “dark” side of laughter’, with laughter being increasingly 
pathologised and associated with ‘fear, malevolence, and insanity.’10 What Bartlett does 
not point out is that this was a reaction against an earlier discourse, which loudly 
celebrated laughter as a healthy and moral form of expression. This is not to say that 
there was no ‘dark side’; specifically what was promoted was non-intellectual laughter 
which demonstrated good nature and warmth of heart, while sneers, sniggers and smirks 
(tending to be expressive of discontent or detachment) were vilified. Interestingly, this 
is in stark contrast to Bartlett’s account of the alarm aroused by primitive and 
emotionally charged laughter; whereas in the fin-de-siècle climate that she depicts it is 
laughter’s affective, unintelligent and bodily connotations that were viewed as 
suspicious (in connection with fears about women and the ‘degenerate’ underclasses of 
society), earlier in the century it is indulgently full-bodied, full-feeling laughter that is 
endorsed, with ‘dark’, sinister or troubling laughter being characterised as dispassionate 
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and restrained. In other words, the nineteenth century saw a profound shift in the way 
that laughter was perceived and represented as a threat to social order and stability, and 
in the rhetorical tactics that were employed to control it. In the first part of this chapter I 
will explore how, throughout the first half of the century, the body’s role in laughter 
was positively emphasised, as a means of censuring and discrediting laughter which 
seemed to emanate too alarmingly from the ‘mind.’  
Overview: the rise and fall of the hearty laugh 
In an enthused 1831 article in Fraser’s Magazine, William Maginn declared we should 
be grateful ‘to roaring, ranting, laughing, riotous Nature’, listing the effects of laughter 
as ‘[s]haking sides, unheard of sounds, (rising from the chuckle to the giggle, from the 
giggle to the irrepressible roar,) sighs, sobs, (from over exertion,) twitches of the 
muscles, twinkling eyes, running over with tears.’11 What he describes might appear to 
be a picture of anarchy, the human body out of control, yet his delight with the idea is 
characteristic. No credence is given to the Bakhtinian link between bodily and social 
disorder, according to which such boisterous excess should be regarded, from a 
conservative perspective, as highly undesirable or disconcerting. Likewise in a famous 
example from Sartor Resartus (serialised in Fraser’s,1833-4), Thomas Carlyle portrays 
the undignified bodily display of Teufelsdröckh in extravagant and idealised terms: ‘he 
burst forth ... tears streaming down his cheeks, pipe held aloft, foot clutched into the air 
– loud, long-continuing, uncontrollable; a laugh not of the face and diaphragm only, but 
of the whole man from head to heel.’ But, while ‘no man who has once heartily and 
wholly laughed can be altogether irreclaimably bad’, laughter less hearty and 
wholesome is derided – as in the case of those who ‘are able to laugh, what can be 
called laughing, but only sniff and titter and snigger from the throat outwards; or at best, 
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produce some whiffling husky cachinnation, as if they were laughing through wool.’ 
‘Of none such comes good’, the Editor warns.12 The inability of these sniffers and 
titterers to laugh ‘from head to heel’ is portrayed in terms of physical dysfunction, or 
obstruction (‘laughing through wool’), and these repressed utterances are a reflection of 
their personal and moral inadequacy. 
 This relish for the full-bodied, audible laugh can be traced to the eighteenth-
century debates which raged over laughter’s compatibility with good morals and polite 
manners. Notoriously, in 1748, Lord Chesterfield warned his son that ‘frequent and loud 
laughter is the characteristic of folly and ill manners; it is the manner in which the mob 
express their silly joy at silly things; and they call it being merry.’ According to 
Chesterfield, ‘there is nothing so illiberal, and so ill-bred, as audible laughter ... not to 
mention the disagreeable noise that it makes, and the shocking distortion of the face that 
it occasions.’13 That ‘shocking distortion’ which Maginn details with such approving 
gusto for Fraser’s is regarded by Chesterfield with horror: the insubordination of the 
body is akin to the insubordination of the mob – laughter must be suppressed in (and 
by) polite society. Opinions in this line were bolstered by a puritanical tradition of 
insistence on the religious impropriety of laughter,
14
 and by Thomas Hobbes’s oft-cited 
claim (1651) that we laugh out of a sense of superiority over the object of our laughter – 
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suggesting that the human sense of humour has its roots in malice, pride, or savage 
instincts which the civilized man should endeavour to control.
15
 
 Increasingly, however, and largely motivated by indignant opposition to such 
gloomy sentiments, more favourable interpretations of laughter came to dominate. In his 
1960 study of the ‘amiable humorist’, Stuart Tave charted the transition from stern, 
disapproving views of laughter, through a process of lightening up, towards a happier 
emphasis on the virtues and benefits of wholesome humour and hearty laughter – the 
completion of this shift being marked by the arrival of Dickens.
16
 Tave records the 
emergence of the amiable or genial humorist, a type of either writer or fictional 
character, whose kindly, sympathetic and distinctly middle-class laughter could be 
variously distinguished from that of the ‘rakes and the wits’,17 from the polished smile 
of aristocratic etiquette, from the laughter of mob brutality or Hobbesian arrogance, and 
from the indecent ribaldry or mean-spirited lampooning of satire.
18
 This malleable 
figure retained celebrated status well into the nineteenth century and was constantly 
invoked in defence of laughter, although precisely what he signified – whether amiable 
humour is properly enjoyed through genial laughter or mild smiles – underwent 
adjustments. Thus, Robin Gilmour implies (briefly) that the preference for open 
laughter over polite smiles truly arrived with emergent Victorian ideals. Chesterfield, he 
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explains, ‘was especially ridiculous to Dickens and Carlyle, who had encountered the 
same thing in the Regency dandies and responded to it with the cult of the hearty laugh, 
an essential feature of manliness.’19 But this ‘cult’ could alternatively be identified as a 
hangover from the Romantic privileging of nature over artifice, or, to present a rather 
different perspective, as emerging from Regency habits of rowdy excess.
20
 Hearty 
laughter is thus best understood as achieving legitimisation through an accumulation of 
cultural developments, as a reactionary outburst which gained momentum from 
eighteenth-century sentimentalism and the rise of the middle-classes, then from a 
Romantic rejection of stiff formalities, and then again as an expression of a no-
nonsense, middle-class manliness from the 1830s.
21
  
 The elevation of natural, spontaneous or bodily laughter over laughter that 
carried the suspicious whiff of intellect was closely related to debates which pitted 
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‘humour’ against ‘wit.’ This was a popular topic which, again, derived from the 
eighteenth-century movement to promote good humour and moral laughter by 
sentimentalising the figure of the humorist, and denigrating the clever wit or the 
aggressive satirist. According to the consensus that developed from this, ‘wit’ was 
deemed more intellectual but of a morally dubious and potentially misanthropic nature 
while, in Carlyle’s words, ‘true humour’ springs from the heart rather than the head, and 
‘its essence is love.’22As elaborated by Peter Bayne in an 1872 article (by which time 
the assessment is critically somewhat outdated, but still familiar enough): 
The distinction between wit and humour may be said to consist in this, that the 
characteristic of the latter is nature, and of the former art. Wit is more allied to 
intellect, and humour to the imagination. Humour is a higher, finer, and more genial 
thing than wit. It is a combination of the laughable with tenderness, sympathy, and 
warmheartedness. Pure wit is often ill-natured, and has a sting; but wit, sweetened by 
a kind, loving expression, becomes humour.
23
  
Although it is the superiority of humour over wit that received the most formal 
attention, it is inseparable from the related preference for kindly humour over the bitter 
‘sting’ of satire, and for genial over ill-natured laughter. Because of its roots (bodily and 
sentimental) in the ‘heart’, the hearty laughter of the humourist – for all its potential 
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boisterousness – was ‘sweetened’, tame and non-threatening, where the artificial smiles 
of the thinking wit, or politically-minded satirist, signalled trouble.
24
  
 As Part Two will explore in more detail, critics favourably compared Dickens 
with Thackeray, in whose writings (notably Vanity Fair, serialised 1847-8) many 
detected a sharp, cynical tone which they felt to be in contrast to Dickens’s abundance 
of genial feeling – Dickens displayed that ‘tenderness, sympathy, and warmheartedness’ 
which was the necessary justification of laughter. But Thackeray gave proof of having 
mellowed when he delivered his 1851 lectures on the ‘English Humourists of the 
Eighteenth Century’, which praised the benign characters of Goldsmith, Fielding and 
others, contrasting these amiable humourists with what Thackeray denounced as the 
angry, cynical wit of Swift. Similarly, in his 1845 Wit and Humour, Leigh Hunt 
describes Swift as a great wit, but morbid – ‘not a healthy man’, ‘the victim of diseased 
blood and angry passions.’25 The inference here (which I will expand on presently) is 
that the true humourist’s blood is healthy and free from disease, the ‘humours’ of 
mankind being, as one Blackwood’s reviewer explains, ‘inseparably blended with their 
affections ... and their whole moral as well as natural being.’26 Moral laughter was 
assumed to spring naturally and spontaneously from the heart or the ‘humours’ of the 
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healthy body; cold, ill-natured wit, in contrast, was associated with the subtlety and 
polite artifice of the smile, often concealing bitterness and corruption (‘diseased blood 
and angry passions’). Accordingly these images of smiles and laughter were attached to 
abstract ideas of humour, wit and satire, as a way of vividly personifying literary styles.  
 As documented by Robert Bernard Martin, there was a gradual shift in critical 
taste in the Victorian era, whereby the earlier preference for ‘amiable, sentimental 
humour’ gave way (from around the 1850s-60s) to ‘an acceptance of intellect as the 
basis of comedy’, a movement Martin labels the ‘triumph of wit.’27 Correspondingly, 
expressions of distaste for the full-bodied laugh, and preference for the dignified smile, 
become more frequent. In 1856, George Eliot agreed that ‘wit is apt to be cold, and thin-
lipped, and Mephistophelian in men who have no relish for humour’, but countered that 
‘broad-faced, rollicking humour needs the refining influence of wit.’ Eliot’s disapproval 
of the kind of humour that would ‘shake the diaphragm of a coal-heaver’ makes it clear 
that the stylistic compromise she calls for here is tied up with a class-based suspicion of 
humour in its embodied form – the physical display of laughter is in need of ‘refining.’ 
The beginnings of a transition from ‘broad-faced’ geniality to ‘thin-lipped’ restraint is 
thus apparent.
28
 For George Meredith, lecturing on comedy in 1877, many of the old 
truths about laughter as a sign of healthy vitality and warm feelings remained current: 
he compared ‘agelasts’ (non-laughers) with ‘dead bodies, which, if you prick them, do 
not bleed’, and coined ‘misogelast’ for the laughter-hater, who ‘soon learns to dignify 
his dislike as an objection in morality.’ He also reaffirmed that the satirist is ‘often a 
social scavenger, working on a storage of bile.’ But Meredith perceived wit and the 
intellect to play an essential part in good comedy, and he confirms the imaginative 
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move away from unthinking bodily excess by declaring that laughter, ideally, should be 
‘of the order of the smile, finely-tempered, showing sunlight of the mind, mental 
richness rather than noisy enormity.’29  
 Amongst such calls for balance and moderation, the misogelasts alluded to by 
Meredith were becoming more vocal – one George Vasey, for instance, described (in a 
book dedicated to the problem) how laughter had become ‘a habit which is extremely 
prevalent, and which ... is regarded with unanimous complacence and approbation.’ He 
notes that comedians have made ‘princely incomes by their successful efforts in 
stimulating the pectoral muscles and shaking the diaphragms of their numerous 
readers’, and laments that ‘laughter is generally thought to be so natural, so convivial, 
so exhilarating, nay, even so healthy, that the monitorial proverb of “laugh and grow 
fat” has become as familiar in our mouths as household words!’30 Such disapproval 
would become increasingly common (if not always so extreme) towards the end of the 
century. At the same time, Vasey’s hysterical insistence on the ‘complacence and 
approbation’ with which laughter was regarded seems to suggest that the ‘cult of the 
hearty laugh’ continued to hold considerable popular (if not critical) sway, and thus that 
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enthusiasm for unrestrained merriment had to some extent proved after all, like 
Teufelsdröckh’s outburst, ‘loud, long-continuing, uncontrollable.’  
 
Health and spirits  
In order to investigate the social purposes served by the championing of hearty laughter, 
it is important to address Vasey’s complaint about its vaunted healthiness, which is a 
consistent feature of articles on the subject. The tone is set by the New Monthly 
Magazine in 1822, on the healthy benefits of the ‘hilarious roar’: 
 As to performing this operation in one’s sleeve, it is a base compromise; no more 
comparable to the original than is a teeth-displaying simper to that hilarious roar 
which shakes the wrinkles out of the heart, and frightens old Time from advancing 
towards us. [Laughter’s] delicious alchemy ... converts a tear into the quintessence of 
merriment, and makes wrinkles themselves expressive of youth and frolic.’31   
According to the Mirror (1834), ‘the healthiness of laughter has never been disputed, 
even by the most snarling cynic’,32 while for Chambers’ Edinburgh Journal (1848), 
‘Laughter is good for the health; it is provocative to the appetite, and a friend to 
digestion.’33 ‘Laugh and grow fat’, as well as ‘laugh and grow old’ are indeed 
frequently quoted maxims, while ‘Laughter is a healthy exercise’, elaborates Maginn for 
Fraser’s: 
It shakes the system, disperses the morbid humours, extinguishes envy, annihilates 
the spleen, puts the blue devils to flight, and spreads summer and sunshine, and 
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cordiality, wherever it appears. [Therefore] to all who do not wish they were ‘a little 
thinner,’ we recommend a loud, a hearty, a continuous roar.34 
 Maginn’s deployment of old-fashioned physiological concepts to reinforce his point is 
both characteristic and illuminating – it is a reminder that pro-laughter discourse on 
medicinal grounds had a long history, which was commonly drawn on by nineteenth-
century writers to give their assertions the weight of both historical and pseudo-
scientific authority.
35
 It also highlights the blend of moral and physical improvements 
being advocated: laughter ‘shakes the system, disperses the morbid humours, 
extinguishes envy, annihilates the spleen.’ 
 Another enthused advocate of healthy laughter was Thomas Hood, whose 
preface to his Hood’s Own: Or, Laughter from Year to Year (1838) details ‘a system of 
Practical Cheerful Philosophy’ which equates laughter with good health (despite Hood’s 
illness at the time of writing). He employs all the standard medical tropes, claims to 
have ‘converted a serious illness into a comic wellness’, and advises his readers to 
laugh, even when too ill to eat or drink. ‘Gentle reader, how do you like this Laughing 
Philosophy?’ he asks, adding the familiar wisdom: laughter ‘expands the chest, enlarges 
the heart [and] quickens the circulation ... A fico [fig] then for the Chesterfieldian 
canon, that laughter is an ungenteel emotion ... a laugh is but the full-blown flower of 
which a smile is the bud.’ Persisting with the medical theme Hood concludes by 
introducing his book, ‘like certain practitioners, who not only prescribe but dispense 
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their own medicines.’36 As well as reaching back to ancient truths, the insistence of such 
tracts on the inherent healthiness of a good laugh closely resembles modern 
commonplaces – advice in this upbeat vein, supported by new scientific theories, 
experiments and anecdotes, is today ubiquitous.
37
  
 Healthy laughter is expressive of moral character: it is an expansive, side-
splitting opening up of the self, in contrast to the buttoned-up, tight-lipped restraint of 
the ‘agelasts’ who when you ‘prick them, do not bleed’ or worse, the smiling cynic who 
keeps himself, and his thoughts, to himself. It is not hard to see how the latter 
manifestation could be construed as more undermining to social unity than laughter 
which, however rollicking and unseemly, renders the self transparent and connected to 
those around him. Laughter characterised as ‘inward’ is suggestive of morbid 
introspection as opposed to healthy expression. Maginn, arguing in the Tory Fraser’s 
that laughter is ‘a healthy exercise’, demonstrates the essentially conservative drive 
behind rhetoric which celebrates the warm-heartedness of humour and laughter, 
bringing implicit, and often explicit discredit on the alternative cool-headedness that 
engendered more bitter satire and wit, less complacently jolly laughter. He draws on this 
in the anti-Byron backlash, pitting sensible, cheerful laughter against the perceived 
morbid Romantic temperament, with its spirit of moody restlessness: 
Democritus, the laughing philosopher ... lived laughing for a hundred years, and then 
died unlamenting. What misanthrope or Megrim of modern times can do as much? 
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Are all the grim affectations of Childe Harolde worth an ounce of laughter? Not a 
grain! They do good to no one ... They make us lean, stupid, ungrateful.
38
 
Essentially, healthy laughter is happy laughter, proof not only of moral goodness but of 
contentment with one’s lot. Both the leanness and the ingratitude of the misanthrope can 
be linked to his lack of good cheer; the ‘enlarging of the heart’ brought about by 
laughter is both physical and metaphorical – a cure for sickness, for ill-nature and, by 
extension, for grumbling discontent.  
 Often, these panegyrics on laughter seem to have little to do with humour, and 
everything to do with the healthy expression of morals and the authentic self; the result 
is a peculiarly earnest insistence on frivolity.
39
 Although ‘Victorian intellectuals insisted 
on the reality of a spiritual life higher than that of the body’, Bruce Haley notes, ‘in one 
way or another they all thought physiologically: they adopted the well-knit body as their 
model for the well-formed mind, and the mind-body harmony as their model for 
spiritual health.’40 In Bentley’s Miscellany (not insignificantly under the editorship of 
Dickens), ‘Laughter – good, hearty, cheerful-hearted laughter – is the echo of a happy 
spirit,’41 while an 1845 piece in the Mirror affirmed that ‘Laughter is a social act. It is 
joy that loves to show itself, and that would kindle joy and mirth in another’: 
[Laughter] leads us to the whole man, and to that mysterious union of soul and body, 
which we know, and yet do not understand ... for what is laughter, but either the 
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mind or the heart speaking by the excited muscles and changed appearance of the 
face, the feeling of the heart excited by some thought of the mind, the proof and the 
expression of the mutual sympathy of soul and body.
42
 
This argument is unusual in the detail of its attempt to bridge the mind-body divide, 
looking at the impact of ‘some thought of the mind’ on the muscles and face, but it is 
ultimately typical in its final equation of mind with its older meaning of ‘soul.’ As with 
Maginn’s understanding that the shaking of the system puts the blue devils to flight, or 
Bentley’s description of laughter as ‘the echo of a happy spirit’, bodily laughter was 
perceived to express a spiritual vitality, rendering it not just endearingly wholesome and 
sociable, but sacred or sublime. Morally sound laughter was an unthinking impulse, 
originating in the heart (and diaphragm) but one which demonstrated the health of the 
soul, and the harmony or ‘sympathy of soul and body’, as well as creating social 
sympathies (‘kindling joy and mirth in others’). It is when the intellect comes into play 
that a less harmonious dualism emerges – laughter is generally characterised in terms of 
body or mind, rarely in a state of balance or complementarity, and its healthiness is 
likely to be questionable when it originates too conspicuously from conscious mental 
activity.  
 In some ways, secular scientific advances at mid-century gave new validation to 
the belief in laughter’s benefits. While the ‘Relief Theory’ of laughter (referring to the 
idea that laughter can be explained as the release of pent-up internal energy, operating 
as a safety valve of sorts) is usually attributed to Freud, much of the groundwork had 
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been laid earlier by Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain.
43
 Unlike Freud’s, their ideas 
were predominantly physiological, foregrounding the physical body (and thereby de-
emphasising the significance of the thought process involved), so again, there is no very 
thorough attempt to bridge the mind-body divide. What Spencer’s and Bain’s theories 
addressed was not so much the healthiness of laughter as its inevitability, as a bodily 
reaction. Though not concerned with value judgments – with sentimentalising or 
discouraging laughter – they validated popular belief in its essential naturalness; as a 
necessary eruption of the body, caused by rechannelled nervous energy, laughter was 
uncontrollable, and not something which ought to be suppressed.
44
 
 An early article by Bain in the Westminster Review (1847) presents the case 
thus: 
The outburst of laughter is nature’s provision for relieving an incompatibility of 
mental and bodily states, that would otherwise be painful in the extreme. There are 
attitudes and movements of the system that, if occurring simultaneously, pull the 
same organ opposite ways, and produce the most terrible agony.
45
 
In Bain’s description, the indignity and inconvenience of laughter are fully recognised: 
‘the chest is violently collapsed by convulsive expirations, that shake the whole frame’, 
while the ‘features of the face [suddenly] shake and vibrate ... The entire moving system 
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of the body is under strong agitation.’ But, more worryingly, there are people ‘that want 
the laughing nature, from some physical or mental singularity.’46 Non-laughing people 
are in this way singled out as unnatural. The impulse to laugh is normalized, the 
emphasis on its natural spontaneity takes on a decidedly literal import, and (while 
George Vasey’s book is full of sobering anecdotes about people who laughed 
themselves to death) it is here restraint rather than indulgence that would be inadvisable, 
perhaps dangerous.  
 The concept was not restricted to scientific discourse, but can be found echoed 
in more informal articles, too. In 1865 in the Saturday Review for instance, the physical 
origins of laughter are cited as an excuse for laughter which erupts in inappropriate 
circumstances. This is laughter which comes, 
simply because the system requires it. There is much that starts from the diaphragm, 
and thence [ascends to the brain]. Things not ludicrous in our normal state are made 
ludicrous to supply a need ... physical rebellion against gloom and depression which 
watches, in spite of the man’s self, for relief to the overwrought nerves. There are 
times when the body craves for laughter as it does for food.
47
 
Of course, ideas about laughter as relief – ‘in spite of the man’s self’ – had been in 
circulation (and the phrase is fitting) before they received elaborate psychological 
endorsement. Theories of nervous tension correlate with established confidence in 
laughter’s role relieving pressure on the heart, keeping the blood flowing; the 
formulation of laughter as necessary expression was already central to its reputation for 
promoting health, while laughter that was ‘inward’, repressed or obstructed was 
associated with corruption and either pent-up or frozen emotions. Laughter’s 
                                                          
46
 Ibid., p. 37.  
47
 ‘Laughter’, Saturday Review, 20 (1865), 446-7 (p. 446). 
39 
 
relationship to the ‘system’ is neatly played on by Dickens in the Pickwick Papers 
(1836-7), where he hints at the wider implications of diseased laughter for social health: 
[He] laughed again – not a noisy boisterous laugh, but a silent, internal chuckle, 
which Mr. Pickwick disliked to hear. When a man bleeds inwardly, it is a dangerous 
thing for himself; but when he laughs inwardly, it bodes no good to other people.
48
 
 
‘Rosy cheeks and laughing eyes’: hearty femininity  
As should by now have become obvious, laughter in the above accounts is assigned 
almost exclusively to men and the male body. The consistent emphasis on the male 
experience is particularly apparent in an 1852 article in Chambers’ Edinburgh Journal, 
which describes ‘Genuine laughter’ as ‘a spontaneous effort of nature’: 
a regular guffaw; that explosion of high spirits, and the feeling of joyous excitement, 
which is commonly written ha! ha! ha! This is altogether unknown in babyhood; in 
boyhood, it exists only in its rudiments; and it does not reach its full development till 
adolescence ripens into manhood.
49
 
Again, the writer analyses laughter in terms of physical necessity, putting forward a 
sympathetic diagnosis of non-laughing people: 
There are some people who cannot laugh, but these are not necessarily either morose 
or stupid. They may laugh in their heart, and with their eyes, although by some 
unlucky fatality, they have not the gift of oral cachinnation. Such persons are to be 
pitied; for laughter in grown people is a substitute devised by nature for the screams 
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and shouts of boyhood, by which the lungs are strengthened and the health 
preserved.
50
 
Given the impossibility of imagining ‘a regular guffaw’ outside the context of ripened 
‘manhood’, this rather begs the question: how were women, and more particularly 
ladies, supposed to laugh? And if corset-bursting ‘explosions’ of high spirits were 
unthinkable, how were they expected to preserve their health? 
 The writer does go on to add that the ‘sweet laugh of a woman’ is ‘bewitching’: 
it is ‘like the sound of flutes on the water. It leaps from her heart in a clear, sparkling 
rill; and the heart that hears it feels as if bathed in the cool, exhilarating spring.’ It is 
also ‘like a silver bell, with power to scare away the ill spirits of the mind.’51 Laughter 
is figured here in distinctly spiritual rather than physiological terms: it ‘leaps from her 
heart’ instead of starting in the diaphragm, strengthening the lungs, or producing ‘strong 
agitation of the body’s moving system.’ And it is implied that its benefits act on the 
(male) hearer, rather than the laugher herself. Nonetheless, laughter is still perceived to 
act as a potent, purifying or cleansing force – if not boisterous then certainly open and 
audible, in contrast to the simpers, smirks and ‘inward’ laughter that are common cause 
for concern. Using Hood’s terms, it is the ‘full-blown flower’ and not the ‘bud’ that is 
desirable.
52
 
 Indeed, the rules determining healthy laughter are far more closely applicable to 
women than my survey so far has implied: for all the male-centred examples employed, 
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the preaching that underlies the insistence on hearty laughter is particularly pertinent to, 
and even aimed at, the women it seems to sideline. This fact is obscured largely because 
extremity and excess are the most celebrated features of the hearty laugh, and larger-
than-life examples are naturally masculine – it is generally fat old gentlemen, whether 
specific literary legends or generic humorists, who may be safely pictured in 
convulsions, and who are the chosen emblems of good cheer. The amiability of these 
gouty characters renders the lusty laugh notably harmless and endearing – though 
accompanied by enough eating and drinking to hint at male camaraderie and good 
living, and conveying healthy disdain for prudery or affectation (an indulgence which 
appears to enhance rather than jeopardise the good health of these figures).
53
 Clearly, 
while ladies may laugh ‘in their heart, and with their eyes’, it would be inappropriate for 
them to laugh ‘from head to heel.’ Nonetheless, laughter need not be ‘full’-bodied to 
adhere to the fundamental requirements of desirably good-humoured, bodily laughter. If 
middle-class women were not encouraged to be rowdy in their merriment, they were 
expected to laugh with spontaneity, not reserve; for all its explosiveness at the extreme 
end of the scale, this is never inconsistent with the qualities of gentleness, softness, 
warmth and amiable innocence that were attached to the humorist and his laughter. In 
the case of women, the nurturing mildness of these qualities are likely to be stressed – 
the heart rather than the lungs will be evoked, and often a warm smile will replace an 
‘oral cachinnation’ – but crucially this smile must be a demonstration of feeling; ‘open’, 
expressive and unselfconscious. Ideal feminine laughter in this sense produces the same 
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transparency, the same opening-up of the self, as its more graphically physical 
masculine variants. Provided decorum is preserved, the healthy female laugh must be of 
the heart (and thus, the body) not the head – it is rendered non-threatening not 
principally because of its non-violence, but on account of its lack of an independent 
thought process.  
 The implications of this, the persuasive rhetoric that was used to enforce 
feminine cheerfulness at the expense of female intelligence, and the extent to which the 
ideal of innocent good humour amongst men was itself a myth which cloaked and 
facilitated the reality of patriarchal power, I will demonstrate further in subsequent 
chapters. For now, it should be evident that the language used to sanction healthy 
laughter, and to censure its corrupt alternatives, was peculiarly suited to the familiar 
myth of women’s spiritual-yet-bodily nature, through which they were discursively 
contained and subjected.
54
 The very terms of the humour/wit debate are implicitly 
gendered along traditional lines: associated with culture, intellect, and (often) 
aggression, ‘wit’ is troped masculine, where, while embodied humour may be male (the 
humorist), in the abstract it is unmistakeably feminine. The elevation of humour, it must 
be remembered, is on the grounds of its naturalness, unpretentiousness and harmless, 
tender appeal. Spencer advised that intellect is of little value in a woman, ‘[but] rosy 
cheeks and laughing eyes are great attractions. A finely rounded figure draws admiring 
glances. The liveliness and good humour that overflowing health produces, go a great 
way towards establishing attachments.’55 As this reminds us, the roundedness, rosiness 
and flowing spirits of the jolly gentleman are also the prized features, and qualifications 
for maternity, of the desirable woman (who has not been unnaturally restrained by 
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intellectual studies). As Sally Shuttleworth emphasises, unobstructed circulation of the 
menstrual cycle was considered key to healthy female physiology in nineteenth-century 
medical discourse.
56
 The regulation and policing of female bodies that she records was, 
I propose, carried over into literary insistence on the healthiness of female laughter, 
which in a similar way was expected to display ‘overflowing’ good humour, easy 
fluidity of spirits – and to be free from symptoms of repression or obstruction.  
 Seen in this way, the encouragement of lively female laughter appears less a 
sign that social strictures at this time were more lenient or light-hearted than they have 
been given credit for, and more a means of superficially resolving contradictory 
nineteenth-century beliefs about the female condition. Jane Wood has pointed to ‘the 
dilemma at the centre of [middle-class] women’s lives; namely the obligation to 
suppress or conceal emotion whilst recognizing restraint itself as the cause of ill health.’ 
That is, habits of ‘inwardness’ were construed simultaneously as pathological and as a 
hallmark of virtue, leading to a fundamental contradiction ‘rooted in the matter of the 
dividing line between required and morbid behaviour.’57 The symbolic openness of 
laughter and smiles, I propose, offered a partial resolution to the ideological 
contradiction that Wood identifies, insofar as feminine merriment was conceptualised as 
socially acceptable, but also as healthy expression. In reality, the expectation that 
women should put a bright face on their sufferings must have led to further forms of 
repression (‘I was used to wearing a placid smiling countenance when my heart was 
bitter within me,’ records Anne Brontë’s Agnes Grey.)58 But since feminine 
cheerfulness was supposed to be natural, not forced – spontaneous, not an effort – in 
                                                          
56
 Shuttleworth, pp. 76-8, 88-91.  
57
 Jane Wood, Passion and Pathology in Victorian Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
15, 53. 
58
 Anne Brontë, Agnes Grey (1847), ed. by Robert Inglesfield and Hilda Marsden (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 127.   
44 
 
theory it functioned as a vent for feelings; as necessary emotional release. Figured as 
defeating rather than simply suppressing or concealing bitterness and discontent, 
idealisation of the ‘smiling countenance’ enabled feminine virtue to be imagined in 
conjunction with a seemingly uninhibited healthy body – in symbolic opposition to the 
morbid dangers of repression and ‘inwardness.’  
 Thus, the observation of physiognomist Johann Caspar Lavater, that ‘Woman 
laughs, man smiles; woman weeps, men remains silent’ appears logical – despite those 
celebrations of immoderate laughter which imply that it is a masculine activity – 
following assumptions about women’s lack of control over their bodies.59 The silent 
smile requires masculine restraint, where laughter and tears are affective impulses that 
women cannot (and should not) resist. Gesa Stedman sheds further light on what at first 
glance seems incongruous – the (early) Victorian encouragement of laughter – by 
describing nineteenth-century policies of expression and repression in terms of balance: 
‘being too open-hearted and willing to express one’s emotions without any restraint 
whatsoever’ was unacceptable, Stedman summarises, but ‘the absence of all emotional 
expression not only implied the unhealthy absence of all feeling, but also rendered it 
impossible to judge what kind of class an individual belonged to, and what type of 
character he or she represented.’60 As we have seen, in early nineteenth-century 
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discourse it is the latter set of concerns that inform the ideal laugh; ‘being too open-
hearted’ is not an issue. The ‘dangers of emotional expression’ were balanced (and in 
the case of laughter outweighed) by the factors that made emotional expression 
important and desirable: ‘it serves as relief, it is a medium of human sympathy, it is 
expressive of the beautiful and therefore pleasing [and] it enables the reading of another 
person’s mind.’61 These reasons are obviously pertinent to the accounts of laughter 
considered above, which stress the value of laughter as relief and as a medium of 
sympathy – and they take on further applicability to women’s laughter in highlighting 
the perceived benefits of somatic expression for the display of the beautiful and 
pleasing. But also relevant is the issue of legibility – the importance of women’s free 
and spontaneous laughter in enabling her to be read, judged and controlled.  
 The evocation of laughter towards disciplinary ends may be glimpsed in Harriet 
Martineau’s Deerbrook (1839), a serious novel in which the moral worth and strength 
of the central characters is consistently demonstrated by their cheerful and contented 
laughter. It is their untiring readiness to laugh merrily at all opportunities, and especially 
in the face of adversity, or in response to the sourness or cynicism of others, which 
illustrates their essential soundness of disposition, and their ability to rise above the 
petty follies and bitter feelings of their social circle. The moral development of the 
secondary heroine, Hester, is highlighted through her increasing willingness to give 
over grumbling and instead laugh at her misfortunes; significantly, she learns from her 
husband (Hope) who is emphatically jovial – often to a somewhat strained pitch – in 
direct proportion to the direness of his circumstances.
62
 As the second part of this 
chapter will suggest, the novels of Dickens perfectly capture the amenability of such 
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wholesome, positive mirth to the conveying of conservative messages, and to the 
upholding of the feminine ideal.
63
 Dickens’s biggest laughers – his Tony Wellers, John 
Browdies and Lawrence Boythornes – laugh uproariously and corporeally, but his 
women do join in, if not with such vividly described gusto. He championed what might 
be described as fire-side mirth; laughter of the heart and of the hearth. Preserving the 
‘manly’ spirit of boisterous good fun in the Fielding and Smollett tradition, he replaced 
risqué raucousness with family-friendly humour, resulting in a domestication and 
sentimentalizing of hearty laughter, and of the figure of the humorist, more thorough 
and influential than had yet been effected. In doing so, Dickens established not just a 
jolly mood or an appetite for humour, but an ideal way of laughing, through images 
which – in their rendering of lightheartedness as at once compulsive and compulsory – 
epitomise the oppressive optimism that is represented as so problematic in Brontë’s 
novels.  
II 
Laughing faces: Dickens and the ‘right sort of merriment’ 
George Orwell, in illustration of his claim that ‘when one reads any strongly individual 
piece of writing, one has the impression of seeing a face somewhere behind the page’, 
came up with a revealing mental picture of Dickens:  
He is laughing, with a touch of anger in his laughter, but no triumph, no malignity. It 
is the face of a man who is always fighting against something, but who fights in the 
open and is not frightened, the face of a man who is generously angry.
64
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Orwell here balances Dickens’s ‘anger’ (at social injustice) with the open generosity of 
his character; the ‘fighting’ spirit of his satire is made noble by the earnestness of his 
feelings, his lack of concealment – a transparency which enables Orwell to visualise his 
writings in terms of a particular kind of face. This is a characteristically laughing face 
because Dickens’s novels are comedic, but the laughter is without any trace of 
Hobbesian ‘triumph’ or ‘malignity’, as Dickens’s style of comedy is essentially good-
natured, free from egotistical aggression or bitterness. 
 Right from the beginning of his career, Dickens was equated with laughter in 
much the same way that Orwell would seize on this laughing image as a representative 
one. As one early critic observed, this was laughter that caught on fast: 
Our readers cannot fail to have observed the sudden turn for the comic, which has 
recently discovered itself in the literary public ... The appetite for the jocose, the 
farcical, the extravagant, is immoderate. It is no longer ‘Laughter holding both its 
sides,’ but ‘Laughter literally unable to hold its sides.’ Accordingly, the magazines 
have become as funny as it was in their power to become; and, although it is very 
hard to be funny to order, and fun of that sort is generally very hard, there never was 
such a quality of obstreperous mirth brought into the market before ... There is no 
doubt that this sudden taste for crowding upon the sunny side of the road, was 
originally generated by a facetious gentleman who, for some months, escaped 
detection under the name of ‘Boz’.65 
Despite the reviewer’s seeming disapproval here, the review is on the whole an 
admiring one which embraces the ‘immoderate’ new appetite for humour which, ‘there 
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is no doubt’ had been inspired by a single figure – Dickens was early recognised to have 
been influential in bringing ‘the jocose, the farcical, the extravagant’ to the centre of 
literary life.
66
 As Malcolm Andrews recognises, ‘Dickens’s genius as a humorist was 
the result of his skilful and strenuous cultivation of a community of readers who would 
laugh with him, and who would come to relish his particular idiosyncratic humour’ – his 
‘principal mission in the mid 1830s was to convert his audience to “Dickensian” 
humour.’67    
 Aside from its distinct formal features, the humour that Dickens so successfully 
generated and made popular was most often acclaimed – from the 30s until after his 
death – for its warmth and innocence (the latter judgement implying both good nature 
and respectability). Although some would come to find this warmth and innocence 
tedious, while others felt on the contrary that it was disappointingly lacking in the later 
novels, still he remained the nation’s most cherished humorist, remarkable for having 
‘such a store of laughter – legitimate, open-hearted, good-natured laughter’, as Ruskin 
wrote.
68
 He was ‘never attracted for a moment towards any prurient or unhealthy field 
of laughter’, and he ‘stirred the sympathy of masses ... and always stirred healthy, 
generous emotions, [modifying] the Literature of his age, in its spirit no less than in 
form.’69 Dickens’s rejection of any ‘prurient or unhealthy field of laughter’ was 
inseparable from his ‘open-heartedness’ – he stirred ‘healthy, generous’ sympathies and 
emotions instead of embittered ones, avoiding an unhealthy satirical tone as carefully as 
he avoided impropriety.  
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 Before considering the conflict between Dickens’s good-natured laughter and 
his politics, it must first be pointed out that, in praising his style of humour through 
reference to the spirit of his ‘laughter’, the critics (as Orwell would do in the twentieth 
century) were implicitly responding not just to the tenor of his jokes but to the treatment 
and presentation of laughter itself in the novels. Dickens consolidated his reputation and 
influence through images of precisely the kind of laughter that his novels were 
renowned for generating. This was laughter that crossed gender and class boundaries, 
the charismatic characteristics of the amiable humorist (usually a portly gentleman) 
being extended to lower-class figures such as Tony Weller, and scenes of male 
camaraderie giving way to domestic, mixed-gender circles like the following from the 
Pickwick Papers: 
Meanwhile the round game proceeded right merrily ... the whole table was in a 
perpetual roar of merriment and laughter. There was one old lady who always had 
about half a dozen cards to pay for, at which everybody laughed, regularly every 
round; and when the old lady looked cross at having to pay, they laughed louder than 
ever; on which the old lady’s face gradually brightened up, till at last she laughed 
louder than any of them. [Then] the young ladies laughed afresh, and the spinster 
aunt seemed disposed to be pettish; till, feeling Mr Tupman squeezing her hand 
under the table, she brightened up too ... whereupon everybody laughed again ... And 
Mr. Winkle came out with jokes [and] everybody laughed at them very heartily ... 
And the benevolent clergyman looked pleasantly on; for the happy faces which 
surrounded the table made the good old man feel happy too; and though the 
merriment was rather boisterous, still it came from the heart and not from the lips: 
and this is the right sort of merriment, after all.
70
  
It is surely through such descriptive scenes (in which Mr. Winkle’s jokes remain 
unspecified) that Dickens established his reputation as champion of  ‘the right sort of 
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merriment.’ Bitter feelings and discord are swallowed up by this all-encompassing 
‘perpetual roar of merriment and laughter’; everybody laughs at the old lady who looks 
cross until she is laughing with them, with the mere increase in volume enough to 
overcome dissent, as if by force of persistence. It is repeatedly stressed that ‘the whole 
table’ or ‘everybody’ is included; any sense of competitiveness is banished from the 
game, while the boisterousness of the laughter is sanctioned by the ‘benevolent 
clergyman’, to whom the merriment inevitably spreads.71 
 Such laughter – heart-warming, highly contagious, and often independent of any 
humorous cause – recurs with an emphasis in Dickens’s early novels. The hearty 
laughter of Kit Nubbles in the Old Curiosity Shop (1840-1) makes his little brother 
laugh, ‘and then his mother laughed, and then the baby crowed and kicked with great 
glee, and then they all laughed in concert, partly because of Kit’s triumph, and partly 
because they were very fond of each other.’72 Kit’s ‘triumph’ is quickly dissolved into 
the broader laughter of familial love and good feeling, emptied of smugness. The 
laughter is oddly emphatic in its very inoffensiveness, but it does serve its purposes – 
when Mrs. Nubbles falls prey to the Methodists, Kit recalls her to reason by 
commanding her to be cheerful: 
‘Just hear this! Ha, ha, ha! An’t that as nat’ral as walking, and as good for the health? 
Ha, ha, ha! An’t that as nat’ral as a sheep’s bleating, or a pig’s grunting, or a horse’s 
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neighing, or a bird’s singing?’ [...] There was something contagious in Kit’s laugh, 
for his mother, who had looked grave before, first subsided into a smile, and then fell 
to joining in it heartily ... Kit and his mother, laughing together in a pretty loud key, 
woke the baby, who, finding that there was something very jovial and agreeable in 
progress, [began] to kick and laugh most vigorously... After recovering twice or 
thrice, and as often relapsing, [Kit] wiped his eyes and said grace; and a very 
cheerful meal their scanty supper was.
73
 
Despite it being ‘nat’ral as a sheep’s bleating’, Kit sustains this hilarity on the basis of 
quite literally nothing, launching into his laughter on the pronouncement of ‘Just hear 
this!’ His authoritative rescue of the family through good example is underscored by his 
smooth transition from joviality to (reasonable) religious gravity, taking charge to say 
grace. Just as the pettishness of the spinster aunt in Pickwick is resolved by the amiable 
pressure of Tupman’s hand, and just as Martineau’s Hester learns to laugh from her 
husband, so Kit is able to guide and persuade his adult mother through his brightening 
influence.
74
 Moreover, he ensures that their ‘scanty supper’ is a cheerful one – being an 
upbeat rather than grumbling family, the Nubbles are easily made content, being 
sustained by wholesome laughter. 
 As Dickens’s novels became less benignly humorous, so his descriptions of 
laughter became less insistent, less vivid – a fact which is as relevant to his increased 
commitment to serious social themes as the perceived comedic decline that 
accompanied it. As Philip Collins suggests, part of the reason why Dickens began 
receiving an ‘onslaught’ of ‘sustained critical rejection’ from the 1850s was that ‘the 
sense of social “purpose” was increasingly insistent in the novels from Bleak House 
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onwards, while the humour was less abundant and genial, and many critics resented the 
loss of the latter and found the new “darkness” gloomy and the political implications 
pernicious.’75 The darkness of tone reflected the author’s increased indignation, but 
along with the lighter touches disappeared (or rather faded) the ‘happy faces’ that had 
been so prominent in the earlier novels – depictions of well-contented merriment 
(cheerful enjoyment of scanty suppers) proved incompatible with social protest, and 
with the fiercer satirical tone that this demanded.
76
 In a ‘Remonstrance with Dickens’ 
(1857), E. B. Hamley lamented the days when Dickens was a humorist, instead of a 
social reformer: 
Formerly, his impulses came from within ... A booby who aims at being thought a 
thinker [assures him] that his greatest strength lies in [addressing social problems] 
and straightway Dickens, the genial Dickens, overflowing by nature with the most 
rampant hearty fun, addresses himself to the melancholy task. [Thus] the old natural, 
easy, unconscious Pickwickian style has given place to one to which all those 
epithets are totally inapplicable; and the characteristics of which, always to us 
unpleasant, are growing more prominent in every successive work.
77
 
Writing for the Tory Blackwood’s, Hamley captures the insinuations of Dickens 
criticism at its most condescending, characterising the author as non-intellectual, 
naturally and unconsciously ‘overflowing’ with genius, but easily misguided. 
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Essentially Hamley feminizes Dickens, and in doing so underscores the ‘feminine’ 
qualities of the genial humour that he was supposed to represent.
78
 The epithets ‘natural, 
easy, unconscious’ and the notion of coming ‘from within’ apply equally to the 
‘Pickwickian style’ and to the hearty laughter that the early novels are at such pains to 
portray. And the article’s conservative position is not hard to detect: Dickens’s move 
from feeling to thinking, from fun to melancholy, results in an ‘unpleasant’ tendency 
towards seditious grumbling. 
 While the early novels are certainly not lacking in radical satire, there is an 
incompatibility between the ‘open-hearted, good-natured’ laughter with which they 
caught the literary imagination, and their drive to correct social wrongs. As I suggested 
in the introduction to this chapter, it is popularly assumed that there is a natural equation 
between laughter (especially of the boisterous, spirited sort) and insurrection or 
subversion, yet this does not always hold up to scrutiny. Sally Ledger has pointed to the 
‘political power of laughter’ in Dickens’s novels, specifically in his courtroom scenes, 
drawing on Bakhtin’s conception of the carnivalesque. She notes that ‘the disruption of 
official, authoritative discourse by the laughter of the lower orders has a long history in 
radical culture, a history that would echo down the years in several of Dickens’s 
novels’, and cites instances where ‘festive laughter erupts in the official sphere, 
breaking down strictly erected boundaries between official and unofficial discourse, [so] 
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that a radical effect is produced.’79 Certainly, Dickens does evoke laughter in such a 
context – notably the witticisms of Sam Weller and Jack Dawkins cause disruptive 
eruptions of anti-establishment laughter – but these instances are not the most frequent 
nor the most characteristic; it is not the ‘innocent’ laughter with which Dickens, 
especially at this stage in his career, was so strongly identified.  
 The case of urchin Charley Bates in Oliver Twist (1837-9) provides an 
indication that Dickens’s favoured species of laughter is essentially inoffensive and 
non-political, and that ‘belly laughter’ for Dickens is more suggestive of well-rounded 
bellies than of hungry ones. Whereas the more artful Dodger, for all his mischievous 
ability to raise laughter, is himself ‘of a rather saturnine disposition, and seldom gave 
way to merriment when it interfered with business’, Charley frequently bursts into 
uncontrollable fits of boisterous laughter on the slightest or no provocation.
80
 Not so 
clever as the Dodger, his ‘irrepressible ebullitions of mirth’ and ‘violent roars’ are 
suggestive of his tender feelings and easygoing temperament, for which he is ultimately 
rewarded, where Dawkins is punished.
81
 Repelled by the murder of Nancy, Charley is 
converted to ‘an honest life’, turning his back on the leering faces of the criminal 
underworld: ‘He struggled hard [but] having a contented disposition and a good 
purpose, succeeded in the end; and, from being a farmer’s drudge ... is now the merriest 
young grazier in all Northamptonshire.’82 Charley rises up (and settles down) in the 
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world without having to be sobered or subdued, as might be expected from such a 
narrative. On the contrary, his eruptions of mirth, far from serving as grotesque 
symptoms of lower-class depravity or imbecility (or as proofs of canny political 
consciousness) are meant as evidence of his innate good nature and healthy lungs, 
paving the way for our final view of him as a respectable member of society, prosperous 
and merry in a wholesome rural setting. Healthy body, healthy morals and social 
contentment are once again inseparably exhibited in hearty laughter. 
Deviant faces: the wrong sort of merriment 
If hearty laughter as depicted by Dickens is not politically charged in any satisfyingly 
subversive way, still, who could possibly take objection to Mr. Pickwick, who laughs 
‘so heartily that it would have been quite delightful to any man of well-constituted mind 
to have watched the smiles which expanded his amiable features as they shone forth 
from beneath the night-cap’?83 The answer lies in that appeal to the reader – the man of 
presumed ‘well-constituted mind.’ Before coming specifically to Brontë’s likely reasons 
for hostility towards merriment as represented by Dickens, this section will address the 
ways in which laughter in Dickens’s novels might be read not just as tame and non-
incendiary but as actively oppressive and coercive – putting a darker slant on the point 
made by Andrews, that ‘not to be in on Boz’s jokes implied exclusion from the circle he 
was so successfully drawing round him ... Those who could somehow withstand the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
laughing’ (pp. 125, 374), though it similarly lacks composure (p. 132), is clearly indicative neither of 
health nor good cheer. She laughs loudly but ‘without merriment’ (p. 371), with a ‘deadly white face’ (p. 
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awakened, and her reason being deranged). When her laughter is ‘forced’ it is a poor disguise for her 
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separable from tears (pp. 318, 329). 
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humorous onslaught were to be pitied: indeed as the years rolled on and Dickens 
changed the culture of humour, were such people desirable as one’s companions?’84 
Certainly, I contest, there is an aggressive element to Dickens’s moral crusade, not so 
much in its ‘humorous onslaught’ but in the terms it sets for social inclusion and 
normalcy.  
 ‘Amiable’ and ‘delightful’ Dickensian laughter has its dark opposite. Indeed, 
laughter is evoked almost as frequently to illustrate evil as it is to emphasise goodness: 
it is the defining habit of corrupt characters such as Daniel Quilp and James Carker, 
whose threatening grins routinely come into play when their evil thoughts are at work.
85
 
Dickens’s characters must be incorporated into the united groups, the laughing circles 
that he assembles, or else they fall into the wrong camp – either stiffly serious, or a 
malicious villain, and either way in need of being taken down a peg. Vilifying or 
ridiculing those who do not fall in with ‘the right kind of merriment’, Dickens’s 
language of laughter essentially works to marginalise misfits, demonising anti-social 
feeling in such a way as to allow for no middle ground. In simplifying and polarising 
extremes of feeling (good and ill) Dickens bluntly consolidates the taboo around anti-
social personalities and tendencies towards satire or bitterness: ‘In short, the poor 
Nicklebys were social and happy; while the rich Nickleby was alone and miserable.’86 
As I argued in Part One, the positive formulation of (morally) healthy laughter was 
effective at damning any ‘unhealthy’ variant, and this is nowhere more rigorously 
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accomplished than in Dickens’s works. As he festively pronounces in A Christmas 
Carol (1843), ‘there is nothing in the world so irresistibly contagious as laughter and 
good-humour.’87 This healthy contagion is portrayed as relentlessly inclusive and 
expansive, but it necessarily has its outsiders. 
 Juliet John observes that ‘the inwardly focussed individual in Dickens’s work ... 
is almost always deviant or at the least morally conflicted. To Dickens, mental and 
social health depended on directing one’s energies away from the self.’88 The language 
of ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ energies runs through nineteenth-century descriptions of 
laughter, with ‘open’ laughter being directed outward not only in its bodily force and 
the sound it carries as an expression of feeling, but also in its sociable nature – it reaches 
out and spreads to others. Suppressed or understated laughter and smiles suggest a 
morbidly introspective, and therefore anti-social personality, or at least unhealthy habits 
of broody over-thinking. And the inability to laugh naturally and spontaneously is not 
just criticised but pathologised by Dickens: while inward laughter in Pickwick is 
ominously compared to inward bleeding, David Copperfield is horrified to observe that 
the crafty Uriah Heep ‘had not such a thing as a smile about him, and that he could only 
widen his mouth and make two hard creases down his cheeks, one on each side, to stand 
for one.’ Uriah, who later laughs ‘as heartily as it was in his nature to laugh’ is 
condemned as a thoroughly unnatural being, whose artificial performance cannot hide 
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his lack of a smile (and so, of human sympathy). Instead of being passively doubled up 
by the natural force of laughter, he ‘double[s] himself up with laughter. With perfectly 
silent laughter. Not a sound escaped him.’89 His essential deviancy is conveyed through 
laughter that is falsely demonstrative but also curiously obstructed, alternately reflecting 
dried up human impulses, and frustrated, pent-up bitterness.
90
 
 Nicholas Nickleby (1838-9) is particularly emphatic in its establishment of a 
laughing community, outside of which is Ralph Nickleby, possessor of ‘a smile, which, 
in common with all other tokens of emotion , seemed to skulk under his face, rather 
than play boldly over it.’91 He is infuriated by the honesty and warmth of Nicholas and 
his genial employers the Cheeryble brothers, from whom emotions are positively 
exuded, illuminating and playing boldly over the face. On first encountering one of the 
brothers, Nicholas is struck by his ‘clear, twinkling, honest, merry, happy eye’, the 
‘pleasant smile playing about his mouth’, and the ‘simplicity, kind-heartedness, and 
good-humour lighting up his jolly old face’, so much so that he ‘would have been 
content to have stood there and looked at him until evening, and to have forgotten 
meanwhile that there was such a thing as a soured mind or a crabbed countenance to be 
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met with in the whole wide world.’92 This is the ideal against which the villainous 
Ralph’s ‘soured mind’ and ‘crabbed countenance’ are measured, and his unfitness for 
the wide world is resolved by his suicide – not before he resentfully reflects on his 
alienated nature, recalling ‘with a bitter smile’ the comparisons people used to draw 
between his brother and himself: ‘He was open, liberal, gallant, gay; I a crafty hunks of 
cold and stagnant blood.’93  
 Dickens’s villains usually remain villains, their behaviour dictated by the ‘cold 
and stagnant blood’ running through their veins, but he does allow for changes of heart 
– Scrooge, notably, finds the contagion of good humour ‘irresistibly’ catching, 
providing proof that ‘soured minds’ may be redeemed and absorbed by the warm moral 
embrace of laughter. But they are won over wholeheartedly or not at all – Dickens’s 
lack of an emotional middle ground means that his insistence on ‘the right sort of 
merriment’, in all its gushing sentimentality, carries a kind of imperative force, while 
anything that savours of the bitter, the crafty, the ‘skulking’ is necessarily perverse. And 
while Dickens is the best representative of this idealizing strategy, his language reflects 
and exaggerates the wider tendencies of early to mid nineteenth-century discourse, as 
summarised in the first part of this chapter.  
 Given this coercive and pervasive emphasis on sociable laughter, Brontë’s uses 
of language and imagery must be understood in terms of the stubborn resistance that 
they evince. Firstly, where Dickens draws a line between his bad and good men, with 
the good ones mild, merry and non-threatening, Brontë consistently represents the 
threatening signs of villainy as they could surface in ordinary male countenances – as I 
will discuss in the next chapter, the sneering physiognomy of her sinister Angrian 
                                                          
92
 Ibid., p. 428. 
93
 Ibid., p. 421 (Dickens’s emphasis). 
60 
 
tyrants reappears throughout the later novels in the faces of her ‘good’ men. These men 
are imbued with a combination of admirable and unsettling traits, always with a 
disturbing emphasis placed on the cruelty or malice lurking in their laughter, so as to 
convey scepticism regarding the reality of good-natured masculinity. Secondly, Brontë 
more broadly rejects the prescriptions and usual vocabulary of healthy laughter, 
especially as they pertain to women, leaning to coolness over warmth, and cunning over 
artlessness, in depicting the laughter of her heroines. It is not merely that she avoids 
images of Dickensian excess, preferring the understated – her avoidance extends to the 
mild, soft, pleasantly cheerful smiles that hearty laughter is related to. Having said this, 
Brontë’s novels have long been recognised as a conflicted blend of conformist and 
subversive leanings and, sure enough, they do contain plenty of instances of adherence 
to comfortable norms. With the exception of Lucy Snowe, her heroines laugh warmly 
and openly, or learn to do so, by way of displaying their sociable and feminine qualities; 
hearty laughter when it emerges (most prominently in the case of Caroline Helstone and 
Shirley Keeldar) is a signal of their, and their author’s, concession to popular taste. But 
Brontë diverges frequently and unnervingly from this model, introducing the satirical 
sneer to faces where it is definitely not supposed to appear, and these divergences are 
conspicuous and significant.  
 Brontë’s recorded opinions of Dickens’s writing, compared with the many 
comments she made in letters about Thackeray, are few – we know that she read his 
work, we know that she had reservations about it.
94
 Without trying to fill the gaps with 
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precise speculation about those misgivings, which were probably mixed with more 
positive responses, it can be fairly stated that highly suggestive contrasts arise in any 
comparison of the outlook of these two writers, and these are nowhere more clearly 
apparent than in the differing perspectives with which they portray laughter. The 
laughter Dickens promotes is energetic – it encapsulates the popularity, the sociable 
impulses, and the vibrant good health which were associated both with the man and his 
writings as a whole. Brontë’s own writings struggle against much of what Dickens 
stood for, and by extension against much of what her culture valued, and this 
perverseness can be located in the ambivalence with which she depicts, or avoids, 
hearty laughter. Biographical reasons immediately suggest themselves – Brontë’s 
constant poor health and lack of physical energy, and related to this her feelings of 
social awkwardness and inadequacy, no doubt contributed to her sceptical take on joyful 
high spirits as a natural human resource.
95
 But the views expressed in her fiction offer 
clues enough: as the ensuing chapters will explore, Brontë’s novels are strongly 
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insistent on individual willpower, and implicitly privilege frail physicality over more 
fleshy, healthy bodies, which she associates with mental and moral inferiority. Laughter 
which represents the succumbing of the intellect to bodily indulgence is thus cause for 
contempt, while the kind of laughter associated with guzzling consumption and jolly 
company is even less likely to be viewed with complacency. Moreover, despite staging 
a balanced contest between head and heart, the treatment of feeling in Brontë’s novels is 
largely stripped of the sentimentality which plays such a big part in Dickens’s writing.  
 Such an assessment hardly complements recent efforts to critically rescue 
sentimentality, and Dickensian sentimentality in particular, from modern distaste – nor 
is it aligned with readings of the sophisticated, and often radical purposes to which 
Dickens puts his affective energies.
96
 However my intention is neither to dispute the 
value of sentiment indiscriminately, nor to subscribe to simplifications to the effect that, 
for instance, he ‘writes to the hearts, not to the heads, of his readers’,97 but rather to 
show the ways in which Dickens himself pointedly figured laughter in terms of heart 
over head, in such a way as to idealise comfortable domesticity and discourage 
transgressive behaviour. Thus, Brontë’s objection to affect as manifested in sentimental 
cheerfulness is not rooted in the kind of class-based suspicion that led Trollope, for 
instance, to contemptuously label Dickens ‘Mr. Popular Sentiment.’98 Indeed, this strain 
of critical hostility towards Dickens (along with increased disapproval of full-bodied 
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laughter) arose from the 1850s onwards; enthusiasm for him remained largely unshaken 
in Brontë’s lifetime. Though certainly she is prone to intellectual snobbery, the rigidity 
and unease towards open laughter that we will find in Brontë’s novels does not make 
her a sniffy exponent of what Bakhtin calls the ‘official culture’, as challenged by the 
big-hearted, universal and uplifting laughter of Dickens. Aside from her sceptical focus 
on the marginalising and damaging effects of supposedly all-inclusive laughter, we find 
resistance to the ‘feminine’ qualities it insists on, which she links to the suppression of 
women’s intellect and their dissatisfactions. In other words, if Dickens’s healthy, good-
natured laughter generally sits comfortably with mainstream values, Brontë’s favouring 
of darker, anti-social smiles must be recognised as a subversive rather than snobbish 
streak in her writing, and a rejection of cloying, suffocating expectations.  
Thackeray: ‘a humorist in the other category’ 
The weight of Dickens’s influence, the general enthusiasm for sentimental laughter, and 
the pressure to conform that this created, is best illustrated by turning now to Brontë’s 
favourite contemporary writer Thackeray, whose Vanity Fair (1847-8) launched him to 
the centre of the literary scene, where he was routinely compared with Dickens. Never 
matching Dickens’s popularity, Thackeray did gain favour with the critics – however, 
praise (especially in early reviews, from both sides of the Atlantic) was balanced with a 
measure of disapproval, a feeling that too bleak and cynical a picture of human nature 
was painted. This was frequently expressed through unfavourable comparisons with 
Dickens. For instance, Thackeray is ‘inferior’ to Dickens; ‘his geniality is [not] genuine 
... Instead of welling up with perennial jollity, like our most good-humored of humorous 
authors, he is evidently a little blasé, and somewhat disposed to be cynical.’99 Or, as the 
                                                          
99
 [Charles Astor Bristed], ‘Vanity Fair’, American Review (1848), in William Thackeray: the Critical 
Heritage, ed. by Geoffrey Tillotson and Donald Hawes (London and New York: Routledge, 1968) pp. 68- 
76 (p. 70.)  
64 
 
North British Review asked, ‘Why is Mr. Dickens, on the whole, genial, kindly, and 
romantic, and Mr. Thackeray, on the whole, caustic, shrewd, and satirical in his 
fictions?’100 Reviewers would increasingly compare Thackeray’s ‘gentlemanly’ style 
favourably with Dickens’s appeal to the masses (a development closely linked to the 
turn to conservatism in Thackeray’s novels, and to social protest in Dickens’s), but it 
can be seen that, initially at least, Thackeray’s leanings to ‘shrewd’ intelligence over 
spontaneous and expansive emotion (‘welling up with perennial jollity’) were judged 
with suspicion.  
 The essential assessment would prove a long-lasting one. As the Dublin Review 
would recap in 1871, Dickens: 
may have intended sometimes to be savagely satirical, but could not keep from 
caricature, and with exaggeration savageness, even severity, is done away. He was 
infinitely droll and various in his mirthful moods, and the animal spirits which 
overflow through all his earlier writings abounded up to the latest of them ... Mr 
Thackeray was a humorist in the other category. There is a profound intellectual 
satisfaction in our helpless involuntary recognition of the truth of his delineations of 
the smallnesses, the weaknesses, the follies, and the absurdities of ourselves and our 
fellows, – but especially ourselves – it is so sad, with all its good humour; so 
depressing, with all its sparkle and finish; so savagely satirical, with all its 
contemptuous admission that no one is much less of a fool, or a snob, or a swindler, 
pretender, ass, or coquette ... than his neighbour; it has, for all its power and extent, 
such a monotonous refrain, that it does not rest or refresh. 
Thackeray, in conclusion, ‘taxes the mind’ instead of ‘cheering one’s spirits.’101 What is 
bemoaned is the unhealthiness of Thackeray’s ‘intellectual’ savagery: the corollary to 
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his mental powers is a lack of overflowing ‘animal spirits’; the satire taxes the 
intelligence without offering wholesome ‘refreshment.’102 Thus for Robert Bell the 
‘obvious defect’ of Vanity Fair is the excess of ‘sneers and cynicism’ when ‘more light 
and air would have rendered it more agreeable and healthy’ – ‘he cannot call up a tear 
without dashing it off with a sarcasm’, Bell protests.103 This perceived refusal to indulge 
uncritically in the sentimental (or to let his readers indulge in it) is echoed by John 
Forster, who complained that ‘we are seldom permitted to enjoy the appreciation of all 
gentle and kind things ... without some neighbouring quip or sneer.’104 
 Just as the broad genial humour attributed to Dickens is borne out by the joyful 
faces depicted in his fiction, so Thackeray’s reputation can be found embodied in his 
fictional representations of ‘sneering’ laughter. There is no lack of hearty laughter – 
Karen Gindele notes the ‘violence that attaches to laughter in Vanity Fair ... the burst, 
explosion, volley, and roar’, its roots in the physical body – but such laughter is 
consistently undercut or rendered unpleasant, instead of being complacently celebrated. 
As Gindele further observes, ‘one character usually takes pleasure at the expense of 
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another’s humiliation, if not downright pain.’105 Sneers underlie guffaws in accordance 
with the novel’s central image of Becky Sharp as man-eating mermaid: ‘I defy any one 
to say that our Becky, who has certainly some vices, has not been presented to the 
public in a perfectly genteel and inoffensive manner’, says the narrator. ‘Has [the 
author] once forgotten the laws of politeness, and showed the monster’s hideous tail 
above water?’106 The metaphor neatly summarises Thackeray’s satirical style, whereby 
unpleasant truths about human nature are implied but not crudely paraded before the 
reader. Like Ralph Nickleby’s smile, which ‘seemed to skulk under his face, rather than 
play boldly over it’, Thackeray’s cynicism was perceived to lurk menacingly beneath a 
polite surface, like the faint threat of misanthropy. ‘He dissects his victims with a 
smile’, wrote Bell, ‘and performs the cruellest of operations on their self-love with a 
pleasantry which looks very like good nature.’107 Thackeray made his readers 
uncomfortable – as G. H. Lewes put it, he ‘arrests the complacent chuckle, and turns the 
laugh against the laugher.’108  
 This discomforting effect, then, is anticipated in the actual laughter of the 
novel’s characters. Becky, whose ‘sense of ridicule [is] far stronger than her gratitude’ 
can laugh with ‘a horrid sarcastic demoniacal laughter’, but though ‘sharp’ she is also 
charismatic, able to mask feelings of hatred and rage with ‘a comical, good-humoured 
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air.’109 Instead of betraying bitterness in the face of humiliation, she puts a bright face 
on it, leaving the suggestion that anyone may be duped by the appearance of cheerful 
good humour. Furthermore, the large-bodied, loud-laughing Jos Sedley is not 
correspondingly large-hearted, good-natured or charming, but an embarrassment, 
described with contempt as that ‘fat gourmand’, who on drinking up a bowl of punch, 
laughs with a liveliness that is ‘painful.’110 This rather undermines the kind of readerly 
expectations that might be raised by Dickens, for whom the combination of punch and 
plump gentlemen is inevitably a happy combination (the ‘constant succession of glasses 
... produced considerable effect upon Mr. Pickwick; his countenance beamed with the 
most sunny smiles, laughter played around his lips, and good-humoured merriment 
twinkled in his eye’111). There are few genuinely ‘sunny smiles’ in Vanity Fair, and 
‘good-humoured merriment’ rarely goes uncriticised or unchecked. As Lewes would 
feel that ‘the complacent chuckle’ of the reader is ‘arrested’ by Thackeray’s sly, sharp 
cynicism, so Jos is made to ‘burst out into a wild fit of laughter; in which, encountering 
the eye of Miss Sharp, he stopped all of a sudden, as if he had been shot.’112 
 As John Bowen summarises, Thackeray is ‘the major satiric counter-example to 
Dickens’: 
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In contrast to Dickens’s broadly affirmative comic vision, Thackeray’s is marked by 
a characteristically negative irony ... Thackeray’s work, at its strongest in Vanity 
Fair, allies a brilliantly inventive wit to a deeply discomforting and disillusioned 
satiric vision that in its closeness to nihilism often seems deeply at odds with the 
society in which he wrote.
113
 
However, Thackeray’s efforts after Vanity Fair to be more in tune with the society in 
which he wrote, purging his writings of the cynicism that critics objected to – or at least 
obscuring it beneath layers of sentimental sugar-coating – are readily discernible, and 
suggestive of the persuasiveness with which popular (Dickensian) ideals were enforced. 
His response to the critics is most obvious in his 1851 lectures on the ‘English 
Humourists of the Eighteenth Century’ (published in 1853), a set of character studies in 
which Fielding’s vices are justified by his ‘joyful humour’ and ‘gentle heart’, and Steele 
is ‘one of the most generous, good-for-nothing, amiable little creatures’; he is ‘by no 
means the most brilliant of wits nor the deepest of thinkers: but he is our friend: we love 
him ... because he is amiable.’114 In contrast, Swift is painted as a savage misanthrope 
whose writings are unsuitable for soft-hearted ladies, and whose satirical cleverness 
means nothing besides his lack of tenderness – he is ‘an immense genius’ but ‘would we 
have liked to live with him?’115 As Martin points out, ‘repeatedly the same formula 
crops up in the lectures. The writer is credited with wit, but almost immediately 
Thackeray rushes on to what is important, the warmth of his heart.’116 Martin identifies 
these lectures as one of the last but most emphatic manifestations of the Victorian 
weakness for ‘humour’ before ‘wit’ came back into play, and as examples of ‘how 
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enthralled Thackeray could be by popular cliché.’117 Certainly it is significant that, 
amongst his tributes to writers of the previous century, Thackeray makes reference to 
his own times: if Goldsmith is ‘the most beloved of English writers’, it is with a tribute 
to ‘the innocent laughter and the sweet and unsullied page which the author of “David 
Copperfield” gives to my children’ that Thackeray introduces him.118 
 Thackeray’s aspirations to raise ‘innocent laughter’ instead of intelligent smirks 
are reflected in his earlier move from Fraser’s to the team of Punch. While the former 
(despite its loud approval of hearty laughter) retained the wicked spirit of aggressive 
satire typical of early nineteenth-century partisan periodicals, Punch would come to 
epitomise harmless, genial, family-friendly humour.
119
 Thackeray’s mingled regret for 
and distance from past times are explored in Pendennis (serialised 1848-50), which 
dramatises the corruption and redemption of its hero, Arthur Pendennis, through the 
motif of laughter. Reversing Thackeray’s own trajectory, Pen begins as a model of 
amiable health: at sixteen his face is ‘round, rosy [and] good-humoured’, and he has 
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‘such a frank, good-natured kind face, and laughed so merrily at you out of his honest 
blue eyes, that no wonder Mrs Pendennis thought him the pride of the whole 
country.’120 The athletic and vivacious Pen is set in contrast to his feeble tutor Mr 
Smirke, who – being intellectually inclined and unable to ride properly – it is 
‘impossible for any lad endowed with a sense of humour to respect.’ Smirke does not 
actually smirk but he does have ‘a faint laugh’ which well reflects his personal 
inadequacies – boisterously riding past him Pen sends Smirke flying into some stinging-
nettles, and laughs.
121
 Yet Pen’s mirth is meant to be understood not as unkind but as 
essentially innocent and endearing – the natural, spontaneous expression of a young 
lad’s high spirits. 
 His proud mother and foster sister are appalled, however, to find him smoking a 
cigar at the entrance of a pub, ‘in the face of the congregation as it issued from St 
Mary’s’; 
[Helen and Laura] felt that their boy was changed. He was no longer the artless Pen 
of old days, so brave, so artless, so impetuous, and tender. His face looked careworn 
and haggard, his voice had a deeper sound, and tones more sarcastic. Cares seemed 
to be pursuing him; but he only laughed when his mother questioned him, and 
parried her anxious queries with some scornful jest.
122
 
Pen’s moral decline is mirrored in his impaired health, his ‘haggard’ appearance – and 
in his turn from artless merriment to sarcasm and scorn. Moreover, this transition is 
consolidated by his time spent as a journalist, his first article ‘making some bitter fun of 
a book recently published.’ There ‘was not a word in the article which was not polite 
and gentlemanlike’, we are told (echoing the frustrated reviews that Thackeray himself 
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received), yet ‘the unfortunate subject of the criticism was scarified and laughed at 
during the operation’, and the reader’s ‘bilious countenance was puckered up with 
malign pleasure as he read the critique.’ Pen’s fall into masculine intellectual circles is 
bemoaned by his mother, who fears that these ‘literary occupations’ may ‘undermine 
the poor boy’s health’.123 
 Indeed, Pen’s corrupt manners lead him to a near-fatal illness and are 
represented as a particular assault on the gentleness of the women in his life. On his 
sickbed ‘his laughter shot shafts of poison into [Laura’s] heart’, while it ‘struck like a 
dagger into the wounded and tender heart’ of his mother.124 As the hero laughs 
increasingly ‘bitterly’, writing ‘witty and sarcastic’ letters home, he is reprimanded by 
the narrator: ‘It was not an honest laugh, Arthur Pendennis.’125 However, Pen’s descent 
into malignity is slowed by the benevolent influence of his friend Warrington, whom 
‘luckily he had [to] laugh at him and to keep down his impertinence by a constant and 
wholesome ridicule.’ Warrington’s refreshing, ‘wholesome ridicule’ is in contrast to 
Pen’s witty mockeries – he has ‘simplicity, humour, and that freshness of mind [which] 
contrasted so much with Pen’s dandy indifference of manner and faded sneer ... In his 
energy [and] hearty laughter ... what a difference.’126 Moreover, while an essentially 
manly foil to the dandified Pen, Warrington’s gruff geniality is shown to harmonise 
with and appeal to the feminine softness of Helen and Laura. Thus, in tracing Pen’s 
restoration to moral and physical health, Thackeray reminds his readers of the 
superiority of simple, generous laughter to dishonest smirks and sneers – and in doing 
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so places an emphasis on the very qualities that many had found to be lacking in his 
writing.  
‘Deadly brilliancy’: Thackeray and Brontë  
As is well known, Brontë dedicated the 1848 second edition of Jane Eyre to Thackeray, 
praising ‘the satirist of “Vanity Fair”’ for his penetrative, prophet-like commitment to 
truth: 
They say he is like Fielding: they talk of his wit, humour, comic powers. He 
resembles Fielding as an eagle does a vulture: Fielding could stoop on carrion, but 
Thackeray never does. His wit is bright, his humour attractive, but both bear the 
same relation to his serious genius, that the mere lambent sheet-lightning playing 
under the edge of the summer-cloud, does to the electric death-spark hid in its 
womb.
127
 
The unqualified admiration Brontë here expresses is misleading, however, as from the 
first she declared more mixed feelings in her private letters. She was highly critical, as 
well as enthusiastic, about Thackeray’s works, sharing the ambivalence and uneasiness 
of reviewers at the time. As suggested by the above, it was the earnest quality of 
Thackeray’s satire that she valued – the sense that he cared about addressing wrongs (he 
is ‘the first social regenerator of the day’128), and not his bright wit or attractive humour. 
Indeed, she does not seem to have found his humour very attractive at all, frequently 
expressing disappointment at Thackeray’s readiness to stoop from eagle-like nobility to 
vulture-like meanness.   
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 At the time she was composing her tribute to Thackeray (and beginning work on 
Shirley), Brontë was explaining her reservations about the nature of his satire, its 
cynical undertones: 
Mr. Thackeray is a keen, ruthless satirist – I had never perused his writings but with 
blended feelings of admiration and indignation – Critics, it appears to me, do not 
know what an intellectual boa-constrictor he is – they call him ‘humorous’, ‘brilliant’ 
– his is a most scalping humour, a most deadly brilliancy – he does not play with his 
prey – he coils round it and crushes it in his rings ... I should think the faults of such 
a man would be, distrust of anything good in human Nature – galling suspicion of 
bad motives lurking behind good actions – are these his failings? They are at any rate 
the failings of his written sentiments, for he cannot find in his heart to represent 
either Man or woman as at once good and wise. Does he not too much confound 
benevolence with weakness and wisdom with mere craft?
129
 
Chiefly in need of investigating here is why Brontë should have felt so suffocated by 
this ‘intellectual boa-constrictor’, whose caustic irony and distrustful attitude should 
surely have offered a refreshing contrast to the buoyant naivety, and faith in the heart 
before the head, that everywhere else resounded. Why should she have objected so 
strongly to the confounding of benevolence with weakness? 
 The answer, I suggest, again has to do with gender. Brontë became increasingly 
adamant in her indignation, taking issue with his ‘scalping’ sarcasm most particularly as 
it related to female characters. Of Rebecca and Rowena (1849) she complained: ‘it is 
like himself, and all he says and writes; harsh and kindly, wayward and wise, benignant 
and bitter; its pages are overshadowed with cynicism ... As to his abuse of Rowena and 
of women in general [he deserves] to be arrested, to be kept in prison for a month.’ 
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Thackeray is to be chastised for his habit of mockingly rooting out the worst in 
everyone, and especially in women – ‘I have come to the conclusion that whenever he 
writes ... the Great Doubter and Sneerer usually guides the pen’, is the verdict in another 
letter, and later, ‘why should his mocking tongue so perversely deny the better feelings 
of his better moods?’130 However gentlemanly his satire might be on the surface, Brontë 
detected and was perturbed by sly, underhand mocking touches. This conviction is 
firmly repeated in her response to Henry Esmond (1852), a novel in which others 
generally perceived Thackeray to have mellowed: 
But what bitter satire – what relentless dissection of diseased subjects! [...] 
Thackeray likes to discover an ulcer or an aneurism; he has pleasure in putting his 
cruel knife or probe into quivering, living flesh. Thackeray would not like all the 
world to be good; no great satirist would like Society to be perfect. 
And she adds: ‘As usual – he is unjust to women.’131 
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 The language of penetration she employs aptly suggests the sense of unjust 
assault on female vulnerability that guides Brontë’s outrage. Key to Thackeray’s 
offensiveness is the fact that he plies his ‘cruel knife’ in the very midst of his 
sentimental, protective avowals of love and respect for conventional femininity. In a 
casual opposition of malignity with merry innocence, he declares in Vanity Fair that, 
since novels ‘abound in villains of the most sombre sort’, the reader is lucky to have 
Amelia Sedley, ‘so guileless and good-natured a person.’ Amelia’s cheeks are ‘a great 
deal too round and red ... but her face blushed with rosy health, and her lips with the 
freshest of smiles, and she had a pair of eyes which sparkled with the brightest and 
honestest good-humour, except indeed when they filled with tears.’132 Critics were not 
slow to identify the sly contempt that underlies the narrator’s affectionate panegyrics on 
Amelia, whose appeal is defined by her transparent subjection to the body and its affects 
– her susceptibility to smiles and tears.133 Thackeray’s recognition of the acute 
vulnerability of gentle female hearts to the sting of satire and sarcasm – Helen and 
Laura’s sensations of being struck in the heart by poisoned shafts and daggers at the 
sound of Pen’s cruelly cold laughter – is perversely accompanied by a tendency to enact 
that assault in his writing, to mockingly ‘probe into living, quivering flesh.’ 
 Brontë’s ambivalence about Thackeray and these tendencies of his satirical style 
is expressed not only in her letters but in her fiction, and particularly in Shirley, where 
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 Thackeray, Vanity Fair, p. 11.  
133
 Bell, for instance, comments that ‘poor Amelia goes but a short way to purify the foul atmosphere. The 
author has given her a heart, but no understanding. If he has made her patient and good ... he has also 
made her a fool. Her meekness [excites] our pity; but the helpless weakness of her character forces the 
sentiment to the verge of that feeling to which pity is said to be akin.’ [Robert Bell], ‘Vanity Fair’, p. 321. 
Indeed, critics besides Brontë complained of the subtle cynicism with which Thackeray portrayed his 
good female characters. The Athenaeum, for example, felt that Helen is ‘often sadly silly’ while Laura’s 
‘womanly pettiness towards poor little Fanny Bolton is exposed with a gratuitous ungraciousness of 
manner not to be excused,’ Unsigned review (December 1850), in the Critical Heritage, ed. by Tillotson 
and Hawes, pp. 90-3 (p. 91). See also Margaret Oliphant’s objections to Thackeray’s female characters – 
who are either artful and heartless or insipidly sentimental – in ‘Mr Thackeray and his Novels’, 
Blackwood’s, 77 (1855), 86-96.  
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the ‘sneering’ tone that so irked her is embodied by the character of Robert Moore 
(amongst others). The mill-owner Moore is portrayed as an upright, admirable and 
essentially good man who could address social problems if he would (and who does end 
by ‘regenerating’ the community in some respects), but who is let down by a cruel 
streak, a cynical attitude and a tendency to target women. Like Thackeray’s gentlemanly 
satire, Moore’s is represented as discreet and hidden but lurking nonetheless, as in the 
image of him ‘chuckling drily ... his cap brim over his eyes, shading in some measure 
their deep dancing ray of scorn.’134 Though their manners are polite rather than rough or 
boisterous, the good qualities of such men are, just as Brontë felt Thackeray’s writing to 
be, ‘blent through with sarcasm calculated to vex one to the heart.’135 At the same time, 
as I will show in Chapter Four, Shirley also casts a stern eye on habits of laughing 
excess: the trio of curates Malone, Donne and Sweeting are assembled in such a way as 
to morally demolish more bluntly aggressive modes of masculine satire, while tying 
their satirical impulses to images of immoderate, corporeal laughter. Unsavoury male 
attitudes are thus contrasted and criticised in Shirley, Brontë’s most austere novel, via 
their materialization in the faces of her characters.  
 Brontë’s novels are full of undeclared hostility towards the sentiments 
underlying cheerful, hearty laughter. But more explicitly, they evince a seemingly 
contradictory hostility towards laughter of the unfriendly or devious kind, when this 
involves men’s antagonism, disciplining or domination of women. The sardonic 
masculine type that is so prominent throughout her fiction – evolving from Angria’s 
Duke of Zamorna to Graham Bretton of Villette – foregrounds not only Brontë’s 
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 Brontë, Shirley, p. 114. Indeed, personal appearance and satirical tone were, it seems, imaginatively 
entwined for Brontë, whose mixed feelings respecting Thackeray’s literature are reflected in her 
impression of his ‘peculiar face’, which she describes (in a letter to the Revd Patrick Brontë, December 
1849), as ‘generally somewhat satirical and stern in expression, but capable also of a kind look.’ See 
Letters II, p. 301.  
135
 Brontë to George Smith (May 1851), Letters II, p. 615.  
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implied suspicions about what men were ‘really’ like, but also her perception (as voiced 
so pointedly in her response to Thackeray’s novels) of a certain sneering, 
overshadowing tone to be encountered in juxtaposition with protestations of amiable 
good humour and sociable good will. Nonetheless, the subversive laughter that I will be 
identifying in Brontë’s novels is of a curiously similar character. As I explained in the 
introduction to this chapter, laughter for Brontë rarely emerges as an innately seditious 
or gloriously liberating defiance of order and regularity. Instead, it takes often 
uncomfortable shapes: it is stubbornly pessimistic rather than enjoyably feisty; it is 
restrained, instead of constituting a form of (physiological) release, a bringing of things 
into the open. It is socially performed but also anti-social, an individualistic act of 
removal from or contempt for the social unification that laughter is traditionally 
supposed to enable; and it is morbid (in ways that I will elucidate) instead of signalling 
vitality and liberation from unhealthy restraint. Finally, instead of symbolising the 
destabilising force of powerful female energies, it is of a kind that is typically, in 
literature, the preserve of quietly powerful men. In the next chapter I will explore why 
exactly the sneer of lurking malice (or less dramatically, of lurking intelligence) should 
wield such power, and describe the movement in Brontë’s writing from conventional 
attributions of such laughter to shadowy male despots, to its subversive adoption by her 
female characters. This laughter does not burst forth in the mode of victorious self-
expression, but it does pose an awkward challenge to stereotypes about feminine nature. 
As I will demonstrate, Brontë’s detection of tyranny in ostensibly benign laughter is 
absolutely compatible with her detection of more obvious tyranny in threatening 
laughter, since the qualities so pressingly demanded by adherents to the former are 
precisely those qualities that are naturally vulnerable to humiliation, mockery and 
contempt. 
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Chapter Two                                                                                                                             
‘A Freezing Spell’: Subverting Superiority in Jane Eyre and the Early Writings 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the power commanded by despotic, ‘masculine’ laughter in 
Brontë’s fiction, turning from the early Victorian literary scene to the Romantic 
influences on her imagination.
1
 More tangible and more threatening than the dispersed, 
loosely pervasive notion of warm-hearted cheerfulness, the piercing and forceful face of 
mockery is an image that materialises throughout Brontë’s novels. Whereas in the 
previous chapter I linked this mocking face to Thackerayan satire, here I consider it in 
connection with the dark, sinister laughter of Romantic tradition, exploring Brontë’s 
efforts to dig beneath literary clichés for insights into everyday human behaviour and 
power relations. Bridging the Gothic laughter of Bertha Rochester, Jane Eyre’s 
‘madwoman in the attic’,2 with the Gothic laughter of Brontë’s stories set in the fantasy 
territory of Angria, I establish the close connections between this disturbing laughter 
and the less dramatic smiles of Jane Eyre’s main characters, exploring the slippage 
between haunting and taunting effects. And I identify a crucial shift in Brontë’s 
representations of laughter: from the dramatisation of male tyranny over women to the 
                                                          
1
 Brontë’s early writings in particular draw variously on Romantic and Gothic sources (both of which 
feature the archetypal sinister smile), borrowing heavily from Scott, Byron and Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine. As will be seen in Part Two of this chapter, her engagement with this literature is alternately 
enthusiastic and satirical (as, indeed, is much of Byron’s poetry and the contents of Blackwood’s). For 
Brontë’s Romantic inheritance and her youthful identification with ‘the high Romantic conception of the 
man of genius’, see Lucasta Miller, The Brontë Myth (London: Vintage, 2002), pp. 5-6. For her playful 
uses of parody and debunking, ‘anti-Gothic’ humour, see Christine Alexander, ‘“That Kingdom of 
Gloom”: Charlotte Brontë, the Annuals, and the Gothic’, Nineteenth-Century Literature, 47 (1993), 409-
36. (See also Heilman, ‘Charlotte Brontë’s “New Gothic”.’) For laughter’s prominence ‘in Romantic and 
Gothic texts’, including Byron’s poetry, see Ute Berns, ‘The Romantic Crisis of Expression: Laughter in 
Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer and Beyond’, in A History of English Laughter, ed. by Pfister, pp. 83-
98 (pp. 83, 94).    
2
 I take this phrase from Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s classic, The Madwoman in the Attic: The 
Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1979). 
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dramatisation of female self-empowerment. That shift, I suggest, can be clearly 
illustrated in the contrast between her early writings and her first published novel. This 
chapter will thus throw light on the precise psychological effects, and motivations, of 
troubling laughter – moving from that which is unsettlingly spooky, to that which is 
socially unsettling or challenging to established hierarchies and norms. 
 There is more than one face to malevolent, Gothic or ‘Byronic’ laughter. The 
manifold forms that grim laughter may take is illustrated by Byron himself (1788-1824) 
who became representative of bitter, irony-laden laughter, while finding multiple ways 
to represent this laughter in all its darker shades.
3
 In the satiric Don Juan (1819-24), 
these range from the ‘kind of wild and horrid glee,/ Half epileptical, and half hysterical’ 
of the drunk or the deranged, to the laughter of scornful Death, whose ‘lipless mouth 
grins without breath.’ There is further the ‘peculiar smile, which ... boded no good, 
whatever it express’d’, and the melancholy laughter of despair (‘if I laugh at any mortal 
thing,/ ‘Tis that I may not weep’).4 Brontë’s early writings echo all these formulations 
but lean more heavily to the understated: it is ‘peculiar’, not ‘hysterical’ laughter that 
she focuses on. As Juliet John points out, ‘there is more than one model of 
melodramatic villainy ... absolute villainy tends to be either passionate or passionless.’5 
In her study of fin-de-siècle Gothic fiction, Bartlett contrasts ‘the laugh of the 
                                                          
3
 For Byron’s reputation (which was based collectively on his personal celebrity, his poetic persona, and 
the heroes of his poetry) see for instance Maginn’s comments in the last chapter on Byron as the 
‘misanthrope of modern times.’ Juliet John explains that ‘the Byronic hero appears to symbolize the kind 
of Romantic individualism Dickens despised. [His] pale, aristocratic features mask a mysterious inner 
life. His energy is largely internalized ... It is not surprising that this symbol of the involuted, antisocial, 
often aristocratic individual was demonized in melodrama. It is also unsurprising that the few direct 
comments made by Dickens on Byron and his poetry were disapproving or moralistic in tone’ (Dickens’s 
Villains, p. 171). Thus (in the tradition of melodrama) this is the same type vilified in Dickens’s novels: 
repressed, withdrawn, and morally dubious. Although heavily influenced by both the legend and the 
poetry of Byron, Brontë’s enthusiasm was mixed (as was her enthusiasm for Thackeray) by ‘moralistic’ 
scruples – scruples which, I argue, emerge in the uneasiness with which she depicts Byronic laughter.  
4
 Lord Byron, Don Juan, Cantos II (ll. 398-9), IX (l. 88), III (ll. 331-2), and IV (ll. 25-6). Taken from 
Lord Byron: The Major Works, ed. by Jerome J. McGann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).    
5
 John, Dickens’s Villains, p. 9.  
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passionate hysteric’ with laughter as a ‘monstrously calculated expression of triumph.’6 
But the overstated, melodramatic mode – laughter overspilling into madness – is not 
that which principally concerns Brontë. For reasons that will be explored in this chapter, 
her villains and Byronic heroes (and the distinction is by no means clear-cut) are 
assigned mystery-cloaked, self-possessed and sardonic laughter, and it is this, crucially, 
which evolves into the subversive laughter of her heroines. As Brontë makes clear, the 
nefarious smirk which makes a show of concealment is infinitely more powerful (and 
therefore, ultimately, more useful) than the emotional outburst that throws aside all 
pretence of discretion.  
 As established in the last chapter, early Victorian anxieties focused on cool, 
dispassionate laughter, not the emotionally expressive. The case of the hysteric is 
undoubtedly where uncontrolled laughter would be least likely to be regarded in a 
positive light – yet, despite her madness, Bertha’s laughter does not furnish us with an 
example of hysterical excess. In the first part of this chapter I demonstrate that her 
laughter is not the bodily, impulsive or melodramatic utterance that critics have 
assumed to emanate from her, but is instead coded rational and masculine. A 
‘monstrously calculated expression of triumph’ (to borrow Bartlett’s words), it 
strikingly echoes the laughter of powerful men in Brontë’s early writings, suggesting 
masculine self-restraint rather than female subjection to the body. In identifying the 
tones of ‘triumph’ I draw on the Hobbesian understanding of laughter as the expression 
of superiority, but with a twist: I argue that Brontë portrays such laughter as the self-
conscious display and consolidation (rather than simple expression) of superiority, 
highlighting its potential to perform contempt in the interests of self-assertion. Thus, I 
                                                          
6
 Bartlett, p. 106. Similarly Berns (p. 88) differentiates between ‘“true” satanic laughter’, which ‘displays 
an absolute bodily disengagement and revels in god-like superiority and self-possession’, and ‘sardonic 
laughter [which] foregrounds the behaviour of the body to such an extent that it infringes on volition and 
self-possession.’  
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take Bertha as an emblematic case: insofar as she crosses the line between victim and 
villain through an emphasis on intelligence over emotion (as conveyed through 
laughter), she exemplifies a process which recurs throughout Brontë’s novels.  
 Part Two examines further the roots of the despotic laugh in Brontë’s early 
writings (concentrating on the character of Zamorna in the story ‘The Spell’), revising 
Shuttleworth’s Foucauldian reading of power and how it operates in Brontë’s fiction. I 
argue that laughter is a more antagonistic and humiliating enactment of the male gaze, 
symbolically penetrating and expressive of knowing power, while the uncertainty that 
preys on Angria’s emotionally dependent, infantilised female characters – their intense 
dread of ridicule, and their internalisation of the scorn directed at them – perpetuates 
their vulnerability and transparent legibility. However in the third and final part of the 
chapter I return to Jane Eyre to assess the ways in which, beyond Bertha, Brontë 
experiments with these gender roles. I argue that she departs from the Byronic or Gothic 
model by curbing the power of Rochester’s laughter, through a ‘feminising’ process that 
is set off against Jane’s will to power. In stressing Jane’s demand not to be laughed at, 
and her need to be able to mock the men in her life, Brontë images a levelling of power 
whereby Jane secures for herself the self-respect that is out of reach for the earlier 
heroines. However, I also consider the limits of this subversion, showing how Jane’s 
laughter, as well as Rochester’s, is softened over the course of the novel as Brontë seeks 
to conventionalise her heroine in line with the idealisation of ‘natural’ laughter explored 
in Chapter One. The laughter of pleasantry and cheerfulness is thus presented for the 
most part in good faith, but in significant ways is undercut or challenged by Brontë. 
Through modifying traditional images of laughter (both sardonic and sentimental), she 
moves from the clear-cut gender identities and fixed power relations of Angria, to the 
gender bending and shifting balance of power in Jane Eyre. 
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I 
Brontë may not be a novelist readily associated with laughter, but she did produce one 
of the most haunting instances of it in fiction. The moment when Jane, exploring 
Thornfield, first hears the chilling laugh that alerts her to the place’s lurking secret, is a 
well-known one: 
While I paced softly on, the last sound I expected to hear in so still a region, a laugh, 
struck my ear. It was a curious laugh; distinct, formal, mirthless ... It passed off in a 
clamorous peal that seemed to wake an echo in every lonely chamber, though it 
originated but in one, and I could have pointed out the door whence the accents 
issued.
7
   
Where does this laugh come from? Despite the eerie, echoing quality of the noise, the 
question is easily answered; Jane ‘could have pointed out the door whence the accents 
issued.’ And just as she is able to thus precisely locate a source, it is possible to answer 
this question in a different sense: by identifying these ‘accents’ as a peculiarly inflected 
‘echo’ of other fictional laughs, particularly those found in Brontë’s own earlier writing. 
In tracing the origins of Bertha’s laughter, we find surprising and suggestive 
connotations – located within the right context, it takes on a subversive significance and 
carries implications which reverberate beyond Thornfield’s third story corridor, 
reappearing throughout Brontë’s other novels. Accordingly, this chapter begins by 
defamiliarising and re-thinking Bertha’s laugh, making the connections which serve to 
bring out its inherent meanings. Rather than offering a re-evaluation of Bertha herself, I 
will build on existing interpretations via a specific examination of the way in which 
Brontë presents her laughter – my object is not to get closer to the ‘real’ Bertha, but to 
                                                          
7
 Brontë, Jane Eyre, p. 107. Subsequent references to Jane Eyre in this chapter will be given in 
parentheses after quotations.  
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use her as a starting point for reconsidering literary laughter of the sinister or 
melodramatic variety. 
The madwoman in the attic   
The wife that Rochester keeps hidden away is, we learn, a ‘clothed hyena’ with a 
‘purple face’ and ‘bloated features’, the very image of hideous, bestial madness (p. 
293). Brontë’s portrayal confirms negative stereotypes (and much contemporary 
medical opinion) about madness – its links to moral and mental defects, to the female 
condition, and to female sexuality specifically.
8
 Bertha’s descent into insanity is 
presented as the result of characteristically female weakness (inherited from her mother) 
even while it strips her of all femininity. Rochester’s account of the prior characteristics 
that ‘developed the germs of [already hereditary] insanity’ is a damning one: Bertha 
from the beginning had ‘neither modesty ... nor refinement in her mind or manners.’ 
Her conversation was ‘coarse and trite, perverse and imbecile’, she was ‘intemperate 
and unchaste’, and her nature ‘gross, impure, depraved’ (pp. 305-6).  
 Given the nature of this portrait, it might seem logical to attribute her mysterious 
laugh to her condition as a depraved, instinct-guided ‘hyena.’ This, after all, reaffirms 
laughter’s oft-cited symbolic significance as the rebellion of nature over culture, and its 
links with the body. (Recall, for example, Pfister’s summary that laughter and sex ‘are 
both closely linked to our corporeal nature, in particular to the “lower bodily stratum” ... 
The charge of obscenity often brackets them together.’9) And Bertha is emblematic of 
that which is taboo, carnal, ‘impure’ – a destructive force which must not be unleashed 
                                                          
8
 See Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, 1830-1980 (London: 
Virago, 1987; repr. 2011), pp. 66-8, for Bertha’s ‘regression to an inhuman condition’, and the links 
between her madness and her female body, specifically her sexual desires and menstrual cycle. See also 
Shuttleworth, pp. 166-7.     
9
 Pfister, p. vi.  
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upon civilized society, just like the laugh which must be contained within the body. 
According to Karen Chase,  
Bertha presents the danger of feral passions shattering restraint, breaking outward in 
a destructive and unconscious licence. The threat which her emotion poses is that 
containment has become impossible; Bertha will escape her room, and lawless 
passion will overwhelm all outer barriers.
10
 
In contrast to small, neat Jane, who takes pride in her self-control, personal decency and 
moral principles, Bertha is obscene, repulsive and robustly built. What Bartlett 
describes as laughter’s ‘overdetermined suggestions of violent primitivism, extreme 
emotionality, madness [and] sexuality’ would seem entirely applicable here.11  
 Indeed, this is a view of laughter which perfectly captures Victorian fears 
concerning the eruptive threat posed by the female. Shuttleworth, discussing the 
connection between woman and the city in contemporary usage of metaphors, describes 
how both ‘were figured as bodies containing within them dark hidden recesses 
harbouring disease or crime, liable to burst out at any moment in excesses of passion or 
social discontent.’12 It can be seen how Bertha’s laughter might easily be equated with 
her bursts of violence and wild excess; indeed, this is the approach taken by Robin 
Jones, who identifies it as a powerful affirmation of self in the midst of neglect and 
identity erosion. For Jones this is because – along the usual critical lines – her laughter 
‘calls attention to her physicality’; in its anger it is ‘evocative of her body and her 
                                                          
10
 Karen Chase, Eros and Psyche: The Representation of Personality in Charlotte Brontë, Charles 
Dickens, and George Eliot (New York and London: Methuen, 1984), p. 171.  
11
 Bartlett, p. 19. 
12
 Shuttleworth moreover notes Bertha’s conformity to ‘contemporary images of the most violent form of 
maniac’, claiming that her ‘laughter, and propensity to destruction ... form part of the contemporary 
repertoire of images’, pp. 73, 166.    
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materiality as a sexual being.’13 In this reading, along with her acts of violence, Bertha’s 
famous laugh signifies subversiveness (whether to be celebrated or deplored) because of 
the explosively physical threat to law, order, and patriarchal constraint that it 
represents.
14
  
 However, the straightforward equation between laughter and the impulsive 
(female) body is problematised when we pay closer attention to the ‘curious laugh’ in 
question. As Janis McLarren Caldwell confirms, ‘Bertha is often taken to be a fictional 
example of that Victorian diagnostic category, the hysteric’; Caldwell further notes that 
the ‘cause of hysteria was supposedly an excess of passion overcoming weak female 
reason.’15 The pathological laugh of the insane Victorian female in medical literature, or 
of the traditional deranged madwoman in literary representation, is supposed to 
emphasise her lack of control, alienation from reality, and loss of wits; it is a wild, 
shrieking cackle, or a symptom of hysterics.
16
 Brontë, however, presents us neither with 
imbecilic giggling nor the outpouring of despair; Bertha’s laughter is ‘distinct’ and 
‘formal’ rather than incoherent or impulsive – it is drily ‘mirthless’, not (as in 
Caldwell’s description) ‘an excess of passion.’ At all times when it surfaces in the text, 
what we hear is not wild and uncontrolled but the private laughter of morbid 
introspection. It is a low sinister utterance, borrowing more from the convention of the 
composed, haughty smile than it does from manic, deranged laughter.  
                                                          
13
 Jones, ‘The Goblin Ha-ha’, pp. 207, 210.   
14
 As mentioned in my introduction, Hélène Cixous celebrates laughter as an innately female, subversive 
bodily force in ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, an essay which, according to Parvulescu, ‘brought laughter to 
the main stage of feminist theory’ (p. 102).   
15
 Caldwell, ‘Mental Health’, in The Brontës in Context, ed. by Thormählen, pp. 344-51 (p. 347). 
Caldwell also notes the etymological roots of the word ‘hysteria’ in the Greek for ‘womb’ – reflecting its 
supposed origin in the female reproductive system.    
16
 The entry on ‘Hysterics’ in the Brontë family’s religiously consulted Modern Domestic Medicine (by 
Thomas John Graham) characterizes the disease as one of ‘wild and irregular actions ... alternate fits of 
laughter, crying, and screaming, incoherent expressions.’ Graham also affirms that it is more prevalent in 
women, and links it to their sexuality and menstrual cycle (London: Simpkin and Marshall, 1826), p. 347.  
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 This can be more clearly illustrated by a glimpse at the wider body of references 
to laughter in Brontë’s fiction, and the manner in which, prior to Jane Eyre, she had 
tended to describe it. In the fantasy world of Angria – which for several years 
throughout and beyond adolescence had occupied Brontë’s imagination and formed the 
terrain on which her creative efforts were concentrated – laughter is assigned almost 
solely to powerful, aristocratic male characters. In Angria there is no escape from the 
‘low & meaning laugh’, the ‘dark, sinister smile’, the laugh with ‘more of sarcasm than 
mirth in it’ or the ‘low, inward’, ‘low, malignant’, and ‘ironical’ laughs which abound.17 
These emanate principally from the central hero-villain the Duke of Zamorna, and the 
yet more villainous Northangerland, but the examples given are typical of the 
kingdom’s entire dark, brooding, sardonic male population. The genre is clearly that of 
the Gothic, the cliché that of malevolent, devilish laughter. Zamorna, for instance, is ‘a 
fiend’, ‘a true indisputable Lucifer ... Something exceedingly sly, dark, secret & 
imperturbable lurked in the glance of his eye, the curl of his lip, & the whole cast of his 
grand countenance.’18 And when Bertha comes to prey on the terrified Jane, she utters at 
the keyhole ‘a demoniac laugh – low, suppressed, and deep’ – entirely characteristic of 
these villainous types (p. 147).This ‘goblin-laughter’ strikes Jane as an ‘unnatural 
sound’, and she wonders if the instigator is ‘possessed with a devil?’ (p. 148). While 
Bertha’s insanity obviously erodes her femininity, the particular circumstances here 
point to a tangible instance of gender-bending: Bertha does not feature as the 
imprisoned, tormented victim of the Gothic plot but as the predatory, fiendish villain 
who plays with the heroine’s fears and instigates haunting incidents. Thus while in 
many respects Brontë modelled her ‘madwoman’ accurately, based on contemporary 
                                                          
17
 My examples are, respectively, from Charlotte Brontë’s stories ‘The Spell’ (pp. 66-150), p. 133, ‘Mina 
Laury’ (pp. 175-220), p. 194, ‘Caroline Vernon’ (pp. 221-313), p. 224, and ‘The Spell’ again (pp. 74, 75, 
100), all taken from Tales of Glass Town, Angria, and Gondal, ed. by Christine Alexander (Oxford: 
Oxford World’s Classics, 2010). 
18
 ‘The Spell’, p. 133.  
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attitudes to and theories of insanity, in other ways she deviated from this adherence to 
realism. Bertha’s laughter actually points us in a different direction than we might think: 
it points towards powerful, masculine, Romantic stereotypes, evoking the Byronic 
scoffer, the Mephistophelian villain, and the haughty Gothic aristocrat. 
 The haunting quality of Bertha’s ‘demoniac laugh’ reminds us that 
dehumanization (or deviancy) can take different forms; the depravedly inhuman can 
imply the bestial but also the sophisticated supernatural. Brontë gives us two faces, or 
two voices, of madness (both monstrous): one wild and animalistic, the other more 
refined and sinister. Thus Bertha occupies both ‘a wild beast’s den’ and ‘a goblin’s cell’ 
(p. 309). Jane is perplexed by a mysterious being that ‘uttered the voice, now of a 
mocking demon, and anon of a carrion-seeking bird of prey’ (p. 210). And while to 
‘cachinnate’ is to laugh out loud, Bertha’s is a ‘curious cachination’ – thus the 
suggestion of immoderation is tempered by an (Angrian) air of mystery and peculiarity 
(p. 107). In a letter, Brontë explained that Bertha is a case of what ‘may be called moral 
madness’ – a condition popularly perceived at the time in which, as she puts it, ‘all that 
is good or even human seems to disappear from the mind and a fiend-nature replaces 
it.’19 In Rochester’s explanation, ‘the lunatic is both cunning and malignant’ (p. 309). 
Thus as well as degrading her to a savage state, Bertha’s insanity brings out the evil and 
artful in her; this is the Bertha who patiently waits for the opportunity to steal keys and 
a knife from her guard. It is also the Bertha who laughs.  
 There is, then, not correspondence but incongruity between the debased 
‘corpulent’ figure that Jane finally encounters, and the disembodied laugh that initially 
alarms her – the tone of Bertha’s laughter, and the strange mutterings that accompany it, 
are at odds with the other noises she makes: animalistic grunts and shrieks. We never 
                                                          
19
 Brontë to W. S. Williams (January 1848), Letters II (p. 3). ‘Moral madness’ is discussed in more detail 
by Shuttleworth, pp. 14, 49. See also Caldwell, ‘Mental Health’, p. 346.  
88 
 
see her laugh; it remains unconnected to the imprisoned, undignified ‘wild animal’ 
grovelling ‘on all fours’ that eventually appears in the text, and who manages nothing 
more articulate than ‘growling’ and ‘bellowing’ (p. 293). Brontë employs Bertha’s 
laughter to counter the picture of her brutishness, in accordance with the conventional 
assumption that laughter is unique to humans.
20
 Jane explains that she thought 
Rochester’s dog might have been growling outside her door, ‘but Pilot cannot laugh; 
and I am certain I heard a laugh, and a strange one’ (p. 154). In this instance, Bertha’s 
strange laugh – instead of being ‘hyena’-like – serves to confirm her human (or at least 
non-animal) status.  
 It is her state of mind that is at stake, as well as her human status. The common 
emphasis on laughter’s symbolic relationship with the body can obscure its mediating 
role – the fact that it occupies, as Bartlett points out, an ‘indeterminate position between 
the body and the mind.’21 Certainly, the truism that laughter is uniquely human rests on 
the definition of it as an intellectual, not a bodily reaction; laughter can be evoked as a 
signifier of rationality no less than over-excitability. As I have suggested, Bertha’s 
laugh, that ‘low, slow ha! ha!’ (p. 110) tends to align her more with a detached, ironic, 
masculine tradition than with the high pitches of hysterical emotionality. Pursuing this, 
we can see that the ‘fiend-nature’ diagnosed by Brontë, in which intelligence remains 
but moral sentiment is absent (and we might be inclined to doubt that this constitutes 
‘madness’ at all) is at work in the ‘curious cachination’ of Brontë’s monster, whose 
laughter is that of the evil genius, not the idiot – laughter serves as a reminder of 
surviving intellect, rather than proof of its absence. This is further implied by the fact 
that, on first hearing the ‘mocking’ sound Jane stops, and observes that it ‘ceased, only 
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 Aristotle, notably, asserted that ‘no animal but man ever laughs.’ On the Parts of Animals (c. 350 
B.C.E.) ed. and trans. by William Ogle (London: Kegan Paul, French, 1882), p. 84.  
21
 Bartlett, p. 24.   
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for an instant; it began again, louder: for at first, though distinct, it was very low’ (p. 
107). The indication is that Bertha pauses in recognition of Jane’s movements, and 
recommences with emphasis, as a means of attracting attention to her presence. Later, 
Jane notes that a ‘shout of laughter greeted [Rochester’s] entrance; noisy at first, and 
terminating in Grace Poole’s own goblin ha! ha!’ (p. 208). Here the change suggests a 
shift from excitement to a more private, menacing utterance; it implies that ‘Grace’ 
curbs her laughter, brings it under control. This is the reverse of the earlier laugh, where 
she steadily becomes louder, but it reveals a similarly controlling intent. Contrary to 
assumptions we might reasonably make based on other evidence, the ‘goblin’ nature of 
the laughter does not imply incoherent gibberish (since it is ‘formal’ and ‘distinct’), 
while the exclamation ‘ha! ha!’ does not indicate excitability (since it is low, slow, and 
‘suppressed’). Bertha’s laughter is disturbing because it is knowing; it is uncanny 
because it hints at an alert mind that is supposed to be vacant; it is troubling, in short, 
because it questions rather than foregrounds her insanity.
22
  
 In light of this, it is worth looking at Shuttleworth’s account (informed by 
Foucault) of the nineteenth-century shift in the categorisation of and assumptions about 
insanity, which was increasingly viewed in terms of ‘an internal, psychological divide’:  
The border to be policed was not so much between self and other, as between the 
conscious and unconscious self. If all individuals were liable to eruptions of insanity, 
                                                          
22
 A telling comparison is with one of the more obvious inspirations for Bertha: the wronged Ulrika, 
prisoner of the Norman tyrant Front-de-Boeuf, in Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe (1820) – Scott being another 
major Romantic influence on Brontë’s imagination. Ulrika sets fire to Front-de-Boeuf’s castle and makes 
a melodramatic final appearance atop the flaming battlements before coming down with the wreckage. 
Yet, though clearly a precedent for Brontë’s insane arsonist, Ulrika indulges no more than Bertha does in 
loud, deranged laughter; instead she exacts her revenge ‘with frightful composure’ and with ‘a smile of 
grisly mockery’, in ironic contrast to the ‘mad frenzy of despair’ suffered by Front-de-Boeuf. Indeed, 
calmly turning up to taunt/ haunt him from the shadows, her disembodied voice, like Bertha’s coolly 
contemptuous laughter, produces a hysterical loss of control (‘Ha, ha, ha!’) from the dying baron, who is 
tortured by the ‘echoes of his own mad laughter.’ Sir Walter Scott, Ivanhoe, ed. by Ian Duncan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 323-7.   
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the only visible sign that one could cling to that one was not insane would be one’s 
capacity to exert self-control.
23
 
Writing at a time when the ‘test of sanity’, for women in particular, was seen to rest ‘in 
the realm of emotional restraint’, and when the ‘internal self-policing of emotional 
energy’ was ceaselessly advised,24 the clear emphasis placed by Brontë on the 
restrained, deliberate nature of Bertha’s laughter pointedly complicates her cautionary 
portrayal of a lunatic ruled by violent bodily impulses. Her laughter stands in opposition 
to her ‘eruptions of insanity’, marking instead a registration of the ‘conscious self.’ Far 
from being a classic indication of mindless physical compulsion overcoming the 
capacity to exert self-control, Bertha’s low, slow laughter represents willed control of 
the body by the mind, demonstrating a degree of mental integrity and agency.  
 As I stressed before, I do not mean by this to revise our understanding of Bertha 
herself, or even to comment on her mental state; rather, of interest here is Brontë’s 
attribution of conventionally masculine, rational traits to a being ostensibly defined by 
her female body and animal instincts. As subsequent chapters will show, Brontë 
repeatedly uses laughter to challenge gendered oppositions between the intellectual and 
the animal, between restraint and impulse, between self-possession and sexuality. In 
Bertha’s case, this is achieved through troubling the opposition between sane and 
insane.  
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 Shuttleworth, p. 35.  
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 Ibid, p. 50. Shuttleworth explains further that ‘true selfhood’ was not conceived as ‘the naked display 
of the insane, but rather the artful concealment and dissimulation of the social creature ... Indeed, the 
condition of selfhood is dependent on having something to conceal ... Awareness of an audience, and of 
one’s ability to baffle their penetration, constitutes the essential basis of selfhood’ (p. 38; my emphasis). 
Thus, the element of performance in combination with the air of secrecy are strikingly suggestive features 
of Bertha’s laughter.  
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Silent revolt and sudden glory 
What, then, are the wider implications and reverberations of this echo-waking laughter? 
And how should we interpret the odd juxtaposition of  Bertha’s sinister laugh with 
Jane’s rebellious musings? Jane confesses herself ‘discontented’, revealing her 
notorious restless thoughts while pacing the third story corridor: 
[M]illions are in silent revolt against their lot. Nobody knows how many rebellions 
besides political rebellions ferment in the masses of life which people earth. Women 
are supposed to be very calm generally: but women feel just as men feel; they need 
exercise for their faculties, and a field for their efforts ... they suffer from too rigid a 
restraint, too absolute a stagnation ... it is narrow-minded in their more privileged 
fellow-creatures to say that they ought to confine themselves to making puddings and 
knitting stockings ... It is thoughtless to condemn them, or laugh at them, if they seek 
to do more or learn more than custom has pronounced necessary for their sex. 
This is abruptly followed by the comment that ‘when thus alone, I not unfrequently 
heard Grace Poole’s laugh: the same peal, the same low, slow ha! ha! which, when first 
heard, had thrilled me’ (pp. 109-10). Here again we have Bertha aligned with the 
masculine, not on the grounds of her coarseness or physical appearance but by the 
resonance of her laughter with the scornful, hypothetical male laughter reproved by 
Jane. Generally, however – playing on well-established associations – critics have 
preferred to identify the laugh not with the mocking utterance of women’s ‘privileged 
fellow-creatures’ but with the radical threat of rebellion, and the breaking free of ‘rigid 
restraint’ initially contemplated by Jane.25 
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 Shuttleworth, for instance (p. 163) sees the significance here mainly in terms of Jane’s attribution of the 
laugh to the servant Grace Poole. The laugh thereby represents a ‘sexual and social challenge’, while 
Jane’s sense of ‘thrill’ is a response which ‘directly implicates her within this disruptive domain.’ On the 
contrary, I would say ‘thrilled’ is meant in the sense of disturbed and unsettled – as one would be by 
contemptuous or creepy laughter. For Gilbert and Gubar (pp. 348-9), Bertha’s laughter coming at this 
juncture is representative of the irrational within Jane, the ‘bad animal’ that is ‘still lurking somewhere ... 
waiting for a chance to get free.’ According to Jean Wyatt, the ‘preverbal’ Bertha ‘addresses the quirks of 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the act of laughter – like that of bursting 
into tears – is suggestive by its nature of an ‘uprising’, mirroring the concept. When the 
tyrannical Brocklehurst assigns Jane to the humiliating punishment of public exposure, 
she feels that her sensations ‘all rose, stifling my breath and constricting my throat’ until 
she manages to ‘[master] the rising hysteria’ (p. 67). But here we are in the domain of 
physical compulsion and the natural, bodily eruption (of emotion, or violence). For 
Bakhtin, ‘the people’s laughter’ has its powerful levelling effect because laughter 
‘degrades and materializes.’26 But Brontë’s alternative depiction of secretive, controlled 
laughter is not evocative of the corporeal in this way – it evokes not the lower bodily 
stratum but ‘higher’ mental powers. The relationship between laughter and rebellion 
remains pertinent, but the overtly explosive threat makes way for the sense of 
something more quietly (if not silently) dangerous. Consider for instance the storming 
of the mill in Shirley, Brontë’s most conspicuously political novel. For all its ultimate 
violence, the scene is conceived principally as a well-ordered and cool-headed assault, 
not the spontaneous outbreak of an unruly mob. Embittered rather than enraged, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a female unconscious through images of painful incarceration and fiery revenge ... A fairly simple 
example of their collaboration occurs when Jane makes her famous third-story speech against the 
confinement of women [and] Bertha’s mad laughter rings out in confirmation.’ Wyatt, ‘A Patriarch of 
One’s Own: Jane Eyre and Romantic Love’, Tulsa Studies in Women’s Literature, 4 (1985), 199-216 (p. 
207). And for Judith Williams (p. 35), Bertha’s laugh belongs to ‘the realm of irrational forces such as 
passion and imagination.’   
26
 Bakhtin, p. 20. He elaborates: ‘Degradation here means coming down to earth ... To degrade [means] to 
concern oneself with the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the reproductive organs ... it 
has not only a destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating one’ (p. 21). Indeed, the radical 
implications of ‘the people’s’ Carnival – with its suggestion of both comic debasement and comic 
regeneration – are limited by the temporary nature of the liberation from the established order that (both 
historically and symbolically) it offers. According to Ghose, historians are ‘sceptical about the 
implications of festivity.’ While it ‘did on occasion lead to the articulation [of] protest ... the main 
function of festive occasions was to celebrate the community and reaffirm communal solidarity.’ For 
Ghose, ‘one of the most pernicious fallacies to have taken hold of literary studies is the notion that 
laughter represents the authentic expression of the masses, a direct articulation of natural bodily impulses’ 
(pp. 64, 68-9). Certainly – as I will explore further presently – Brontë regularly suggests that laughter’s 
dangerous or rebellious character lies not in its function as an ‘authentic expression’ or ‘natural bodily 
impulse’ (whether of ‘the masses’ or of women) but in its power to coolly subvert or transcend such 
expressions and impulses.  
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‘hundreds’ of rioters make no more noise in their disciplined approach than a ‘muffled 
... measured’ sound, ‘a low conference’, and a ‘slow-filing tread.’27 It is significant that 
when we meet one of the rebels it is the smirking, self-possessed Moses Barraclough, 
who has ‘a kind of leer about his lips’, as though ‘laughing in his sleeve at some person 
or thing.’28 Like Bertha’s acts of rebellion, which smack more of patient, calculated 
destruction than of outright bedlam, seditious behaviour in Shirley is stealthily rather 
than anarchically dangerous. This is reflected in the power which, throughout Brontë’s 
writing, is attached to mysterious, underhand forms of laughter, examples of which far 
outnumber wild outbursts. Just as she dwells on carefully meditated instigations of class 
rebellion rather than fear of the loud, unthinking mob, so her representation of 
subversive laughter tends to take a sharper, quieter, more unnervingly sarcastic shape 
than the Bakhtinian model would lead us to look for. The danger for those in power to 
be wary of is that of an intelligent threat posed from below.  
Throughout the century, the most commonly cited explanation of laughter was 
Hobbes’s claim that, in essence, laughter is the expression of a sense of one’s 
superiority.
29
 The unpleasant notion that we laugh out of triumph or exultation (or in 
Hobbes’s term, ‘glory’) was usually evoked in order to be disputed, but it nonetheless 
held great sway in the nineteenth-century imagination, and its applicability to the 
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 Brontë, Shirley, ed. by Herbert Rosengarten and Margaret Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp. 283, 284.  
28
 Ibid., p. 114.  
29
 Hobbes suggests this both in Leviathan (as quoted in the previous chapter), and in Human Nature 
(1650): ‘the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from some sudden conception 
of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our own formerly ... 
It is no wonder therefore that men take it heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over ... 
For laughing to one’s self putteth all the rest to a jealously and examination of themselves.’ Hobbes, 
Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, ed. by J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford World’s Classics, 
1999), pp. 54-5. As Bartlett points out (pp. 10-11), the idea had other exponents – from Aristotle to 
Laurent Joubert – but was (and is) popularly attributed to Hobbes. Bartlett describes laughter in Rider 
Haggard’s She (1886-7) as ‘a powerful Hobbesian tool of expression for women [lacking] other physical 
and emotional outlets’ (p. 118) – an assessment which, however, again construes laughter as a ‘physical 
and emotional outlet’ rather than a purposeful act.  
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mocking laughter characteristically assigned to villains on both page and stage is easily 
perceived. Merle Tönnies observes that melodrama ‘foregrounded laughter, making it 
the hallmark of a character’s quality ... the villain was readily recognisable for the 
audience by his laugh of (short-lived) triumph over the other characters.’ But, 
‘interestingly, the same interjection “Ha! ha!” could also (although more rarely) signify 
exactly the opposite kind of superiority, the successful stratagem of a positive character 
against a bad one.’30 As seen in Bertha’s curiously contemptuous ‘Ha! ha!’, Brontë, too, 
is drawn to the possibilities for recasting the superior laugh; increasingly in her fiction 
we find it transferred from powerful aristocrats to more downtrodden figures – 
imprisoned lunatics, but also penniless governesses.  
Hobbes’s comments on laughter belong to his theory of the ‘passions’; the idea 
that laughter (spontaneously) arises from ‘some sudden conception of some eminency in 
ourselves’ implies an instinctive, uncontrolled response.31 But what Brontë explores is 
laughter’s ability to provocatively perform, as well as simply express, superiority and 
(self-) knowledge, an insight which she develops in the arena of gender politics, through 
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 In keeping, however, with the contemporary mood as described in Chapter One, in the ‘more frequent 
variant [of laughter in the theatre] the triumphant element was toned down significantly or omitted 
completely ... laughter of this kind was a social affair. It could contain traces of ridicule [but] 
predominantly, it showed good-natured fellow-feeling which united all participants. The spectators were 
drawn into the same emotional group when they joined in with this laughter ... Laughter then became the 
cure for all kinds of misery.’ See Tönnies, p. 100. The contrast is further elucidated by John, who writes 
that ‘melodramatic villains’ were ‘invariably individualistic rather than socially constructive; they expose 
the existence of the private self which melodrama works so hard to downplay; and perhaps most 
importantly, they are often the most intelligent characters in the genre, threatening its general elevation of 
emotion over intellect.’ See John, Dickens’s Villains, p. 11.   
31
 David Heyd provides a helpful analysis of the extent to which Hobbes viewed laughter as a ‘voluntary’ 
act. On the one hand, laughter is not the ‘means for the achievement of a superior position’, but an 
‘expression or an effect of a feeling of supremacy’ (Heyd’s emphasis). On the other hand, it is not 
altogether ‘a blind impulse over which reason has no control’ (‘with the possible exception of hysterical 
laughter’) – it ‘is an emotion whose analysis typically reflects the general Hobbesian conception of man’s 
nature as a social creature: the ceaseless competition for positions of power, the unrelenting struggle for 
self-preservation, and the purely egoistic nature of man, who continuously strives for superiority over 
others.’ See Heyd, pp. 286, 288, 290. 
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the ongoing and meticulously detailed power struggles that her novels dramatise.
32
 To 
trace this development briefly, in Angria (the subject of the following section) women 
tend to figure as the objects of men’s superior laughter, but in The Professor and Jane 
Eyre, we find unsettlingly knowing smiles appropriated by the heroines. The laughter of 
Shirley and Caroline is softened in an attempt to emphasise their femininity, but in 
Villette, Brontë’s interest in the knowledge and power not just implied but carried by the 
superior laugh is brought very much to the fore. The sense of innate superiority that 
buoys up Brontë’s abused or neglected protagonists is crucial to their characteristic 
strength as victims who overcome adversity on their way to triumph, and (although they 
are better known for their explicit complaints to the reader or their passionate bursts of 
outspoken self-defence) it is, I contend, in the frequent projection of their inner thoughts 
through the medium of the smile or laugh that this strength is most compellingly made 
apparent.  
My assessment runs contrary to a certain tradition of reading Brontë’s novels, 
where the focus is on her fierce defence of feelings, desires or the body – that which has 
been denied or repressed. As Caldwell notes, Brontë’s novels have often received 
attention for their expression of ‘violent emotion’ – with critics tending either to 
valorise or criticise what Matthew Arnold described as her ‘hunger, rebellion and 
rage.’33 Terry Eagleton refers to the ‘sexual demand’ that pervades her writing – ‘an 
angry, wounded, implacable desire for full personal acceptance and recognition – which 
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 It is tempting to surmise that Jean Rhys picked up on the politics of laughter in Jane Eyre, since her 
1966 novel Wide Sargasso Sea (London: Penguin, 2000), which undertakes a defence of Bertha 
(‘Antoinette’) by fictionalising her prehistory, similarly abounds in transferrals of power and knowledge 
through laughter. ‘I didn’t like the way you laughed’, complains a troubled Antoinette to Rhys’s 
Rochester, but he is later made uneasy in his turn: ‘she’d laugh for a long time and never tell me why she 
laughed’ (pp. 66, 76).  
33
 Caldwell, Literature and Medicine, pp. 98-9. Arnold’s comment was made in reference to Villette, in a 
letter of April 1853, cited in The Brontës: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Miriam Allott (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001), p. 201.  
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breaks beyond the boundaries of any social or narrative closure.’34 Describing critical 
approaches to Victorian women’s writing more generally, Helena Michie discusses the 
common emphasis on ‘reclaiming the body’, whereby the female body in Victorian 
texts is an ‘insubstantial outline that it is the task of feminism to flesh out.’35 Critical 
interpretations of laughter often entail an analogous project of recovery, and take a 
similar view of rebellion as the outbreak of ‘natural’ urges in defiance of civilization or 
oppression. For Anca Parvulescu, the ‘passional burst of laughter’ is a transgressive act, 
since ‘the ostracizing of the passions’ over the course of history is linked to ‘the 
prohibition on excessive, extravagant, open-mouthed, loud forms of laughter.’36 
Laughter ‘seems to obey reason less than any other passion. A rebel, it sneaks in and 
overpowers reason.’37 But for Brontë, laughter is not about the assertion of sexuality or 
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 Terry Eagleton, ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’ (1988), in Myths of Power: A Marxist Study of the 
Brontës, Anniversary Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. xxix. (Eagleton’s emphasis.) 
Barbara Hardy observes that Brontë’s ‘outbursts’ on the subject of women’s plight (including Jane’s third 
story speech) ‘have the appearance of a spontaneous overflow of feelings too strong to remain within the 
form of fiction ... they are powerful reminders of the novelist’s feelings ... feminist deviations from a 
structural norm.’ See Hardy, Forms of Feeling in Victorian Fiction (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 129-30. 
See also, for instance, Miller’s assessment that Brontë ‘poured her egoism into a new and specifically 
female form of self-expression. In Jane, she let out the pent-up emotions of a woman who feels the world 
against her, and in doing so she indicted the society which had told her to suppress her passions [in] the 
interests of womanly duty.’ Brontë’s novels challenge normative femininity through their ‘passion and 
violence’ and are remarkable for their acknowledgment of ‘erotic feelings’, ‘sexuality’ and ‘desire’ 
(Miller, pp. 13, 18, 52).  
35
 Helena Michie, The Flesh Made Word: Female Figures and Women’s Bodies (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), pp. 127-8. ‘Victorianism remains the main enemy’, Michie states, while 
feminism has set out to ‘construct a female body in the face of patriarchal convention.’ But (as have many 
other critics, following Foucault’s History of Sexuality, 1976-84) Michie does also complicate the picture 
of ‘Victorianism’ as ‘the historical site of repression, silence, and prudery’ (p. 4).  
36
 Parvulescu, p. 7.  
37
 Ibid., pp. 19, 30. Butler (building on Foucault) provides a useful insight into the kind of assumptions 
that sustain such ideas (whether relating to laughter or ‘woman’): ‘One way in which power is both 
perpetuated and concealed is through the establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, 
conceived as repression or domination, and sex, conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for 
release or authentic self-expression’ (Gender Trouble, p. 95). Similarly, I would suggest, laughter is 
conventionally seen in terms of ‘thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression’ – a 
‘natural’ force in opposition to ‘repression or domination.’ In Brontë’s novels, laughter may not always 
be equivalent to male despotism, but neither can it be read as an expression of the ‘authentic female 
voice’ that Miller (p. 15) attributes to Jane.  
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‘violent emotion’ – quite the opposite. In her novels, laughter’s liberating potential lies 
not in its physicality but in its capacity to establish a degree of distance from the body – 
not to overpower reason but to lay claim to it – and thereby to evade or reject defining 
gender traits. Bodily or affective laughter, on the other hand, is figured as tame rather 
than transgressive; it exudes not fiery passions but a warmth that is at once sensual and 
sentimental. The fact that Bertha’s laughter is not ‘excessive, extravagant, open-
mouthed, loud’ – that rather than expressing a kind of mythical, sexual knowledge (as 
commonly attributed to women’s laughter) it sounds a note of emotional detachment 
that is in no sense ‘innately’ female – tells us much about laughter’s significance 
throughout the novels.
38
 While both Brontë and her critics often cast reason as the 
enemy of feeling, her representations of laughter invite us to focus instead on the ways 
in which her characters (both men and women) are empowered through restraint, rather 
than release.
39
  
Bertha’s disembodied, suppressed yet deliberate laugh is a useful example with 
which to have begun, with its suggestion of self-control where we might not expect to 
find it, and of intelligent protest which refuses to be kept out of view (or in her case, 
hearing). If grotesque and sordidly sensual Bertha resembles the brutish, stupid bully of 
the novel’s opening pages, John Reed, with his ‘unwholesome skin; thick lineaments 
[and] heavy limbs’ (p. 9), no less does she recall the small, morbidly thoughtful and 
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 The association of women’s laughter with the sensuality of the mouth is usually evoked to explain why 
it is regarded as dangerous. For instance, Ghose notes that in early modern culture, women’s ‘excessive 
speech and full-throated laughter were a signal revealing assertiveness and, by extension, sexual 
voraciousness. Laughing boisterously was a sign of frivolity and sexual availability’ (p. 27). But in early 
nineteenth-century terms (as argued in the previous chapter) the bodily display of laughter takes on less 
sordid meanings: ‘frivolity and sexual availability’ translate into desirable lightheartedness and healthy 
sexuality.  
39
 The questionable opposition between these terms as they are applied to understandings of subjectivity, 
the emotional life, and Victorian culture more generally is explored by John Kucich, in Repression in 
Victorian Fiction: Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot and Charles Dickens (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), pp. 1-3. I engage with this work in the next chapter.  
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resentful Jane, ‘a noxious thing, cherishing the germs of indignation at [her] treatment’ 
(p. 16). Such an assertion, indeed, only serves to add to the substantial body of criticism 
which doubles or equates Bertha with Jane, and the modern feminist appreciation of 
Bertha as victim rather than monster. But the route taken here is different: identifying 
Bertha first as demonic (masculine) villain allows us to focus in on the liminal link 
between the innocent oppressed and the despotically sadistic, since her hollow, 
mirthless laugh registers the discontent of the former while echoing the articulate 
contempt of the latter.  
 
II 
There was a laughing Devil in his sneer, 
That raised emotions both of rage and fear. 
Byron, The Corsair (1814) 
 
That smile, if oft observed and near, 
Waned in its mirth and wither’d to a sneer; 
That smile might reach his lip, but pass’d not by, 
None e’er could trace its laughter to his eye. 
Byron, Lara (1814)
40
 
 
Amongst Brontë’s early stories, ‘The Spell’ (written in 1834) is one of the most 
complex and experimental. An extravagant Gothic romance, it is a classic example of 
the sophisticated, self-reflexive approach to storytelling that accompanies the early 
stories’ apparently immature immersion in farce, clichés, and supernatural absurdities.41 
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 Byron, The Corsair, Canto I (ll. 223-4), and Lara, Canto I (ll. 299-302). Taken from Lord Byron: 
Selected Poems, ed. by Susan J. Wolfson and Peter J. Manning (London: Penguin, 1996).  
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 Heather Glen describes the ‘self-reflexive playfulness’, the mixing of ‘romance’ with ‘ironic anti-
romanticism’, and ‘the sense that pervades all [Brontë’s] youthful writings, of the literary world as a place 
not of artless self-expressiveness but of artful self-presentation, in which different roles may be tried out, 
99 
 
The narrator Charles Wellesley announces at the outset his intention: to ‘revenge’ 
himself on his brother (Zamorna) by proving him insane. He offers his readers (the 
people of Angria) this ‘proof’ by means of elaborate fabrication; Zamorna’s insanity ‘is 
declared in my present work rather by implication than assertion.’42 What follows is – at 
the level of the story’s ‘real’ framework – whimsical invention on Charles’s part, a story 
designed to expose Zamorna’s ‘double-dealing, hypocritical, close, dark, secret, half-
insane character’ by revealing that he has an identical twin, Valdacella. The existence of 
Valdacella has been hitherto unknown due to a spell cast by a mysterious character 
(implicitly the Devil) at the twins’ birth, forbidding them ever to be seen together at the 
same time in public, on pain of death. The conceit is Charles’s satirical way of 
accounting for Zamorna’s varying moods, changeable affections, and the many lives he 
seems to live. As Shuttleworth shrewdly observes, the ‘critical industry devoted to 
unearthing the presence of psychological “doubles” in Brontë’s novels is here 
unceremoniously pre-empted.’43  
 ‘The Spell’ is a study in character, and – in keeping with its layered structure – a 
story about the study of character, focusing obsessively as it does not only on the 
psychology of Zamorna but on the experience of those, particularly his wife Mary, who 
try to get to the bottom of his secret, to make sense of his behaviour. Most baffling of 
all is his laughter. At one point described as ‘the well-known Ha! Ha! of Zamorna’ (p. 
120), his laugh is ever-ready but it is by no means the familiar, signature laugh that the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
contemplated, explored and satirized.’ See Charlotte Brontë: The Imagination in History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 9-10. As Christine Alexander asserts, ‘the juvenilia demonstrate that even at 
an early age, Charlotte’s grasp of narrative process and its implications was surprisingly sophisticated.’ 
See Alexander’s introduction to Tales of Glass Town, pp. xiii-xliii (p. xxi). (‘The Spell’, technically, was 
written before the kingdom of Angria was created, but for the sake of clarity I will refer to all the early 
writings as ‘Angrian.’)   
42
 ‘The Spell: An Extravaganza. By Lord Charles Albert Florian Wellesley’, in Tales of Glass Town, pp. 
66-150 (p. 67). In this part of the chapter, references to ‘The Spell’ will be given in parentheses after 
quotations.   
43
 Shuttleworth, p. 117.  
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phrase suggests; instead its tone is relentlessly varied, and in need of frequent authorial 
elaboration lest its particular inflection be lost on the reader. Zamorna, after all, 
‘displays all the strange variableness & versatility which characterize possessed 
lunatics’ (p. 67). Laughter acts in the story as the central motif for his unpredictable 
character – the measure and expression of his changeable moods and the multiple sides 
of his personality.  
 Much of the story is concerned with the painful suspense and uncertainty 
suffered by Mary, whose constant tears are set in opposition to Zamorna’s constant 
laughter, and whose sanity is threatened by the end of the story far more than his is 
convincingly thrown in doubt. She not only has to undergo jealousy at the discovery of 
other women (who in ‘reality’ are Zamorna’s mistress and previous wife, but who in the 
story are eventually accounted for by Valdacella); her suffering is also the subject of 
amusement and derision by the two men who so confuse her as she is passed, 
obliviously, from one to the other. Zamorna’s laughter is comfort or torture to Mary 
according to its tone; he ‘tried to cheer me with his wild musical laugh – & never in 
vain, for that laugh, when not fierce or scornful, is a cordial itself to my ears’ (p. 87). 
The Duke’s ‘Ha! Ha!’ is ‘sometimes smothered’ and ‘sometimes bursting forth in its 
full cordial clearness of sound’ (p. 130); ‘cordial clearness’ provides her with 
transparency and comes as a (medicinal) relief to Mary, while laughter with a 
‘smothered’ quality conveys secretiveness and hostility. His smiles, too, differ in their 
expression – sensitive to rebuff as well as to ferocity or scorn, Mary is continuously 
humiliated when confronted (unbeknown to her) with Valdacella: 
It was a curious glance that he gave his lady. The vermillion lip was bit in as if to 
suppress the half comic smile that mantled round it; the eye-brow was raised. The 
light of the eye was arch, scrutinizing, rather satirical yet kind-enough: it forbade 
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fear, yet did not invite any of that overflowing tenderness with which Mary was 
inclined to greet him. She stood silent, blushing & embarrassed (p. 118).  
When (as a result of Mary prying into her husband’s secrets) the Devil’s ‘curse’ comes 
into effect and the real Zamorna begins to die, laughter becomes the key symptom as 
Mary, amidst her growing confusion, finds herself having to discern between healthy 
and unhealthy, as well as between cruel and kind. She is concerned to find him laughing 
‘sweetly, but not heartily’ (p. 125), tapping into the connotations of ‘heartiness’ both 
with flesh and feeling, good health and good nature. ‘I begin to think you have a double 
existence’, she complains, but is relieved to at least find his tenderness (sweetness) 
restored; ‘that [Zamorna] was strong & in full flourish; this [Zamorna] droops at 
present. But to my eyes the pale lips that now smile on me are dearer a thousand, a 
million times than those ruby ones that sneered at me an hour ago’ (p. 124; my 
emphasis). Mary, in other words, is relieved to recognise the authenticity and affection 
in the ‘pale’ smile, despite the ominous absence of colour.  
Crucially, since Zamorna is an important template for Brontë’s later heroes 
(Rochester not least), it is through pitting smiles against sneers, sweetness against scorn, 
and heartiness against hollowness, that Brontë tests and explores the contradictions and 
Byronic dimensions of his shape-shifting character. For Charles, Zamorna’s madness 
consists not in outward excess but inner corruption; ‘there are black veins of utter 
perversion of intellect born with him & running through his whole soul’, he insists (p. 
67), equating and collapsing intellectual and moral perversion with bodily perversion. 
Both black veins and black soul become manifest as the curse grows stronger 
(essentially, as his health weakens and the Devil comes closer to claiming him): he asks 
Mary with ‘an ironical laugh’ if she thinks him ‘a walking skeleton, a sort of living 
symbol of death’, causing her to realise with alarm that ‘there was a morbid feeling 
about him.’ In this deranged state, the Duke is ‘even wildly gay, yet he could not 
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communicate a corresponding spirit to his guests. They saw it was all assumed, hollow-
hearted, & all that sort of cheerfulness is more depressing to a spectator than the most 
determined melancholy’ (p. 100). Perverse and sarcastic, Zamorna’s mirth is akin to the 
Devil’s ‘hollow laugh’ (p. 113) and has a freezing effect on those around him which 
reflects his emotional coolness and loss of (figuratively flowing) spirits. He smiles 
‘coldly’ at Mary as he tells her with ‘ineffable contempt’: ‘I despise you thoroughly’ (p. 
102). Holding her ‘overflowing tenderness’ in check, and failing to ‘communicate a 
corresponding spirit to his guests’, the mentally, morally, and physically ill Zamorna is 
drained of all sociable warmth and geniality, his laughter no longer ‘bursting forth in its 
full cordial clearness of sound.’44  
A man of ‘desperately moody humours’, Zamorna is not permanently morose or 
morbid, himself affirming ‘the soundness of my mental and corporeal condition’ (p. 99). 
Indeed, Valdacella causes further confusion during his twin’s decline by continuing to 
behave with expressive joviality, with ‘the fine glowing clearness which [his 
complexion] ever wears in perfect health’ and without a trace of ‘languor & feebleness’ 
(p. 117). Valdacella ‘looked, talked, laughed & swaggered as usual’ (p. 116). When the 
curse is lifted and the secret finally out in public, the clearing of the air is expressed 
with a symbolical openness of expression, as the pair stand together and enjoy their 
triumph at having tricked everyone: ‘turning to each other, [they] burst into a loud & 
ringing laugh.’ Hobbesian yet hearty, their laughter rises above the confusion ‘like a 
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trumpet swell over the roar of a cataract’ (p. 141). The swiftly alternating masculinities 
represented by Zamorna, the combination he embodies of brusque boisterous energy 
with darkly sinister broodiness, is comically suggested by Charles: ‘Fiercely malignant 
were their mutual glances for some seconds, but all at once something, probably the 
resemblance, appeared to strike them in a ludicrous point of view. They burst into a 
simultaneous laugh [and] strode to opposite parts of the room’ (p. 145). Yet, since no 
‘Valdacella’ exists, Charles’s facetious resolution of the enigma can hardly be said to 
throw reassuring light on the darker shades of Zamorna’s character, ultimately 
representing him as it does as a slippery, multifaceted being.  
What emerges with the most constant emphasis from this story, as from the rest 
of the saga is, most simply, Zamorna’s immensely powerful presence. Whether 
expressed through hearty exultant laughter or through bitter scorn, his ability to belittle 
and disconcert everyone around him is pronounced, and finds its chief expression in the 
meeting of his self-assured laughter with their baffled confusion. Confronted by a group 
of Angrian noblemen, Valdacella is unabashed by their demands that he explain his 
behaviour, first laughing in their faces, then ‘lean[ing] back in the sofa, regarding his 
guests with a smile of the most strange & inscrutable significancy. It was such as one 
might suppose a man might assume when on the eve of accomplishing a grand piece of 
gullery on an extended scale’ (pp. 134-5). Ultimately it is Zamorna’s ‘close, dark, 
secret’ mysteriousness, his withholding of knowledge – the ‘strange & inscrutable 
significancy’ of his laughter – which makes him powerful. Tellingly whenever his 
servant, Eugene Rosier, makes similar gestures they provoke indignant anger: Rosier 
irritates with his ‘slight laugh [and] sly look of his ineffably mischievous eye’ (p. 72), 
his ‘low whistle [and] strange kind of smile’ (p. 109), and ‘a roguishly significant smile 
[which] told that he had solved the riddle’ (p. 119). These covertly confident displays of 
understanding are presumptuous from a servant.  
104 
 
Zamorna asserts his supremacy at every opportunity. When menaced he knows 
how to ‘[throw] into his countenance more scorn than a horse could stomach’,45 meeting 
threats with ‘lofty scorn’ or by ‘lifting his lip with a sour sneer.’ Even the weather is 
challenged by him in this way: he ‘presented to the [wind]’ a ‘desperate grin [that] 
seemed daring the snow flakes to a comparison of whiteness.’46 His laughter is 
frequently accompanied by a gesture of violence. When his brother protests at being 
whipped by him, Zamorna ‘answered this appeal with a laugh intended, I have no doubt, 
to display his white teeth, and a sneer designed to set off his keen wit, and at the same 
instant he gently touched his riding-wand.’47 
The Duke’s ‘low & meaning laugh’ (p. 133) is the most often heard amidst 
abounding instances of ‘peculiar’ masculine laughter in the Angrian tales, which (as 
with Bertha’s ‘curious cachinnation’) is always mysterious, vaguely hostile or 
aggressive, and individualised (in Byron’s phrase, ‘the peculiar smile [which] boded no 
good, whatever it express’d’). The nobleman Hartford mutters ‘with the dark, sinister 
smile peculiar to him’ while Lord Richton assumes ‘a half rueful, half jesting 
expression.’48 The sinister Northangerland has ‘a kind of dry, brief laugh’ and ‘a queer 
sort of smile.’49 In one scene, we are told that ‘the Ambassador, every two minutes, te-
he’d his snivelling laugh, and Hartford curled his lips into a half-sour, half-rakish 
smile.’50 Hartford elsewhere is described as ‘dissevering his lips with a devilish grin’ 
that is ‘kindled partly by wine and partly by the instinct of bloodhound exultation’, 
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while Sir William Percy smiles ‘with an expression meant to be very inexplicable and 
mysterious.’51 Zamorna, indeed, appears frequently jolly and jovial in comparison with 
this shady crowd. 
The sheer range, violence and inventiveness of the vocabulary Brontë employs 
to describe laughter is indicative of her preoccupation with it; alongside tittering and 
chuckling we encounter ‘nichering’,52 ‘keckling’,53 and ‘trying to smile but only 
girning, to use an expressive Angrian word.’54 And its real significance is never far 
below the surface: strikingly, the power carried by laughter is exclusively male – men 
compete and jostle for the advantage amongst each other while women are powerless, 
anxious and unlaughing. In this sense the Angria tales depict the perceived reality which 
Brontë’s later novels attempt to subvert. Mina Laury talks politics and ‘Mr O’Neill 
bowed in deference to her opinion, but smiled at the same time as if he doubted its 
justice.’55 Caroline Vernon lies awake, in love with Zamorna and worrying that ‘he 
would laugh at me & say I was a fool.’56 And Mary, whose constant doubts about her 
husband have ‘weakened her nerves & made them prey to a hundred vague 
apprehensions’ is handled by Zamorna with ‘laughing banter about her over-anxiety’, or 
‘rewarded’ for her silence by being ‘favoured’ with a ‘smile, which as good as said he 
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thought she was looking very handsome.’57 As comes across so strongly in ‘The Spell’, 
her worst fear is ridicule – to be greeted with sneers instead of gratified by smiles.  
The close association of laughter with power is a recurring theme in Brontë’s 
writing, and in these early works we find the beginnings of her use of this theme to 
explore unequal gender relations, and the habitual means by which men assert their 
superiority over women. For Zamorna it is a matter of management: privately enraged 
when Mary follows him against his orders, coming dangerously close to encountering 
his mistress, he affects to laugh ‘heartily’ at her for her pursuit, and manages to placate 
her ‘by dint of lies and laughter,’ with ‘teasing raillery.’ Mary protests that her ‘mind is 
weakened’ by ‘tears and terrors’ and apologises that she is ‘neither so handsome nor so 
cheerful as I once was.’ Successfully silenced and got rid of, the manipulated Mary is 
too broken in spirits to be cheered; she is ‘far too much in earnest to join in his laugh.’58 
The torture of Zamorna’s sarcasm is vividly described by Louisa Vernon, an ex-mistress 
kept in virtual imprisonment, who therefore requires less conciliatory management than 
Mary, and who finds him ‘an impenetrable iron-man.’ She wails: ‘he smiles as if he 
were amused at my anger & that smile of his is so – I don’t know what – vexing, 
maddening – it makes him look so handsome – & yet it tears one’s heart with passion. I 
could draw my nails down his face till I had scraped it bare of flesh.’59 Both attracted to 
and infuriated by his smile – tearing at her heart, it makes her want to rip it from his 
face – Louisa’s desire for violence (and her violent desire) only renders her further 
subject to Zamorna’s contemptuous amusement.   
Louisa’s naive young daughter Caroline is brought up in doubt about her good 
looks and power to please; Zamorna (her guardian) always ‘smiled in silence when she 
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appealed to him,’ and he and Northangerland (her father) privately conspire behind her 
back, constantly smiling at her shows of innocence, ‘laughing quietly’ in an ‘undertone’ 
when she amuses them.
60
 Her powerlessness in the face of Northangerland’s opposition 
to her will, when she had thought she was able to influence him, is made comically but 
starkly apparent when she resorts to cold-shouldering him: ‘She seemed quite 
unconscious of any absurdity in her indignation, though it produced much the same 
effect as if a squirrel had thought proper to treat a Newfoundland dog with lofty hauteur. 
Northangerland smiled when her back was turned.’61 In the two men’s competition for 
control over this plaything, it is Zamorna who wins when he successfully seduces her. 
She is entranced by his mysterious airs, and rendered giddy with self-conscious 
nervousness when he silently scrutinizes her: ‘the young lady laughed again, fitfully & 
almost hysterically – as if there was some internal struggle between tears & laughter.’ 
Characteristically self-possessed in the face of this hysterical confusion, Zamorna 
(‘Satan’s eldest son’) takes advantage despite her ‘piteous upward look’; he ‘smiled at 
the mute prayer.’62 Whisked off to a secluded country retreat, it is only to be assumed 
that Caroline will in time grow resentful of that satanic smile, echoing the frustrated cry 
of her discarded mother: ‘there is something so scornful about your lips. I do hate you! I 
abhor you!’63 Zamorna’s scornful lips provoke the mad rage and fitful hysterics – the 
mingled tears and laughter – that Bertha’s laughter notably does not resemble.64  
By this point it must be apparent that there is a significant gap in Shuttleworth’s 
otherwise comprehensive analysis of ‘penetrating power’ in Brontë’s writing (and her 
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early writings specifically). ‘All dominant men, whether heroic or villainous, are given 
penetrating, piercing eyes’, she notes.65 ‘Women, Brontë suggests, can have no such 
answering power of the gaze which can wield such public humiliation.’66 But 
Shuttleworth leaves unaddressed the particular force carried by male laughter, with its 
surely more palpable ability to ‘humiliate’, and its extra connotations of aggression and 
superiority. As difficult to ignore as it is ostensibly covert, the Hobbesian laughter that 
Brontë so persistently attributes to Angria’s bullies is clearly an extension, a more 
antagonistic version of the penetrating gaze. The preying, uncertain sense that one is 
being mocked is (recalling Foucault’s analysis of the Panopticon) akin to the insecurity 
accompanying the suspicion that one is ‘seen through’, stripped, defenceless (Mary 
standing ‘silent, blushing & embarrassed’). Angria is a world in which men are the 
harbourers of knowledge (placing women in a corresponding state of doubt and 
dependence), and the primary expression of this order is the superior, enigmatic smile or 
laugh. It is clear that additional power accrues to men through this particular means of 
flaunting their self-assurance.
67
 When Mary records watching (and feeling aroused by) 
Zamorna’s disrespectful ‘ransacking’ invasion of another woman’s desk and portfolio, 
crucial to the scene is not just his public scrutiny of her private papers but his scornful 
dismissal of them: reading her letters, he ‘laughed at some & sneered at others, tossed 
the seals & wax & wafers about.’ Since the desk also contains literary ‘manuscripts’, we 
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cannot doubt that anxieties about female creative efforts, exposed to a confidently 
judgmental male readership, are here being raised (pp. 85-6).  
It is unspoken ridicule’s bewildering ability not only to express derogatory 
knowledge of and power over the female, but also to baffle female understanding and 
rebuff interpretation, which Brontë explores so closely, and yet which is absent from 
Shuttleworth’s evaluation. A pointed display of mystery – meaning acknowledged even 
while obscured – the secretive laugh is a more tantalisingly unanswerable gesture than 
the gaze, an openly challenging provocation which refuses to reveal or to share. 
Employing Deborah Lutz’s observation that the Gothic ‘involves shining a fitful light 
on the shadows while holding on to their depths’ – that its ‘dual power’ is ‘to both 
uncover and darken’ – Zamorna’s smile can be understood as a characteristically Gothic 
image for reasons beyond its familiarity as a stereotype.
68
 ‘The Spell’ is not really about 
Zamorna’s ‘madness’ but about his mystique. And his ‘mystique’ is no vague, feminine 
quality but a powerful tool. The mocking demeanour by which he disguises his own 
secrets, baffles understanding and evades scrutiny is simultaneously the means by 
which he registers his understanding of and penetrating contempt for others. It is while 
‘smiling’ that, Mary records, ‘he held me at arm’s length &, still smiling, looked 
through my eyes into my very heart’ (p. 88). ‘I cannot help smiling at the whole female 
character’, he sweepingly tells her; ‘so finely epitomized in you’ (p. 103). Through 
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mockery (the ‘handsome’ smile that ‘tears [Louisa’s] heart with passion’) he 
demonstrates confidence in his sexual power over women. When the newly revealed 
‘Valdacella’ assures the crowd he is no stranger to them (‘I know you all, body, mind & 
estate’), it is with ‘that bold & mischievous smile’ which had earlier ‘distressed’ Mary 
that he persuades a former flame of Zamorna’s that they are better acquainted than she 
realises.   
In comparison, women’s rare laughter is a symptom of nervousness, a loss of 
control, or a flimsy bluff for emotion. Caroline laughs ‘almost hysterically’ in response 
to her sexual confusion and her ‘internal struggle between tears & laughter’, while Mina 
Laury gives ‘a somewhat forced laugh’ to unconvincingly hide her feelings (p. 128). 
Smiling for Mary is a means of ‘evading [Northangerland’s] sarcasm’;69 another time 
she attempts ‘my father’s sneer, for my heart was choking in my throat ... I laughed 
scornfully, for my blood was up’ (p. 91). In this case the sadistic male laugh is faintly 
echoed by the daughter, losing its effect by being stripped of its veil of mystery. Mary 
betrays the emotion and physical compulsion behind the sneer, which is explained from 
her perspective: haughtily affecting superiority in front of her husband’s mistress, she 
gives us pitiful insight into the vulnerability – the wounded heart and boiling blood – 
that is the motive for her hostile laughter.  
In the novels to come, we find a more alert, considered representation of 
laughter’s role in social interaction and its roots in mental calculation. We also find 
Brontë’s female characters less passive in the face of satirical attacks. Mary’s meek 
recourse to sighs and sobs in response to Zamorna’s tiresomely reiterated mockery is 
largely left behind, as Brontë’s interest in her heroines’ skill at staving off, and even 
initiating, intimidation through their own insinuating smiles takes centre-stage. But, as 
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Brontë goes about adapting the devices and images of her Gothic fantasy world to her 
works of contemporary realism, the demonically shape-shifting Zamorna never goes 
away. He continues to emerge, smugly amused, in later, more realistic representations 
of charismatically threatening men – all the more troubling for being less crudely 
depicted. Though it is in Villette’s Graham Bretton that we find the clearest modern 
reincarnation of Zamorna and the contradictions (coldness and warmth, cruelty and 
heartiness) that he embodies, it is to Jane Eyre – and Brontë’s most famous ‘Byronic’ 
hero – that this chapter will now return.  
 
III 
Though too well bred to quiz men to their faces, 
Her laughing blue eyes with a glance could seize 
The ridicules of people in all places –  
That honey of your fashionable bees –  
And store it up for mischievous enjoyment. 
Byron, Don Juan  
 
... many a withering thought lies hid, not lost, 
In smiles that least befit who wear them most. 
Byron, The Corsair
70
 
 
Blanche Ingram, the society beauty who physically resembles Bertha Rochester (as she 
was before becoming a hideous ‘hyena’) is given comparable moral traits too; she 
represents the bad manners and unpleasant qualities that Brontë perceived to thrive 
amongst the supposedly ‘well bred’ upper classes. Blanche reveals her arrogance with 
frequent displays of scorn. She ‘laughed continually; her laugh was satirical, and so was 
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the habitual expression of her arched and haughty lip’ (p. 172). She looks down at the 
child Adèle ‘with a mocking air’ (p. 173) and responds to the topic of ‘good-natured’ 
governesses by ‘curling her lip sarcastically’ (p. 178). Another foil to plain, polite Jane, 
Blanche is one source in the novel of confidently superior female laughter, absent in the 
male-dominated Angria.  
 At the same time, though not an aggressive laugher, Jane firmly retains a sense 
of innate superiority amidst her sneering ‘betters’, assured of her inner worth. Often this 
is evidenced simply by her composure – her calm imperviousness to the scorn of those 
she thinks beneath her – as displayed in the company of her Reed cousins: 
Young ladies have a remarkable way of letting you know that they think you a 
‘quiz,’ without actually saying the words. A certain superciliousness of look, 
coolness of manner, nonchalance of tone, express fully their sentiments on the point, 
without committing them by any positive rudeness in word or deed. | A sneer, 
however, whether covert or open, had now no longer that power over me it once 
possessed: as I sat between my cousins, I was surprised to find how easy I felt under 
the total neglect of the one and the semi-sarcastic attentions of the other (p. 229). 
Jane here attests to the power of the wordless sneer to embarrass by making itself 
obvious despite remaining supposedly ‘covert.’ But Georgiana Reed’s ‘semi-sarcastic 
attentions’ are wasted on the self-possessed Jane, having (at least so she asserts) no 
power over her. More to the point, Jane herself is more prone to sarcasm than she 
admits. Though it is Blanche who belongs to the kind of fashionable milieu portrayed in 
Byron’s Don Juan (above), Jane is quick to ‘seize’ on the ridiculous and ‘store it up for 
mischievous enjoyment’ – her resilience has as much to do with her irreverent sharpness 
as with her quiet dignity.   
 Indeed, Jane is more subversive of feminine conduct codes than Blanche, who 
reserves her ‘satirical’ laugh for other women (in particular children, the slow-witted, 
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and social inferiors) while lavishing flattery on the powerful Rochester. As Robin Jones 
summarises, ‘in their cultural roles as nurturers, [women] are the repositories of 
aggression, not the instigators. Laughter in women is unexpected because [the] marginal 
aren’t expected to laugh at the dominating force, nor is humorous aggression 
appreciated in women.’71 Though unfeminine in her aggressive arrogance, Blanche at 
least does not challenge social or gender hierarchies, indeed she often supports them; as 
Jones further observes, ‘she and other women in the novel laugh, not when it moves 
them, as much as when it is appropriate. They respond to the social codes of the 
situation.’72 As well as highlighting Blanche’s fundamental subservience to male power, 
in contrasting the notion of being ‘moved’ with that of responding to ‘social codes’, 
Jones here suggestively touches on the pitting of authenticity against artificiality that, as 
I argued in Chapter One, shaped nineteenth-century strictures on laughter. Brontë’s 
conflicted, irresolute handling of this theme is reflected in the ambivalent 
characterisation of Jane, whose laughter serves in the novel to emphasise, alternately, 
two sides of her character which exist in tension. Her often sly rebelliousness and ‘semi-
sarcastic’ challenges to social rules – her determined resistance to Rochester as a 
‘dominating force’ – sit in problematic combination with Brontë’s painstaking efforts to 
depict her as morally attractive, open, and a stark contrast to the sneering Blanche. 
 While the problem of un/natural expression is explored fully in the next chapter, 
it will be useful here to draw on Moshe Barasch’s division of ‘human expression and 
gesture’ into ‘movements we believe to be part of “Nature”, and movements based on a 
(more or less) deliberate use of available cultural conventions’:  
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Gestures of the first kind are performed spontaneously, involuntarily, and perhaps 
even without our being aware of the fact that we are performing them ... 
Conventional gestures are in the first place conceived as a means to communication. 
The readability of the natural gesture is a side- or after-effect; it has little to do with 
the aim of the gesture. The conventional gesture is – at least in its origins – 
performed in order to convey a message.
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It is this distinction between the spontaneous and the ‘(more or less) deliberate’ – the 
instinctive and the performed – that preoccupies Brontë, with laughter as the image she 
repeatedly returns to. Blanche’s assertions of superiority and her flirtations with 
Rochester are in line with social codes, ‘performed in order to convey a message.’ In 
showing off, Jane notes critically, she is ‘self-conscious – remarkably self-conscious 
indeed’ (p. 172). 
The point is constantly reiterated. Blanche is ‘very showy, but she was not 
genuine: she had a fine person, many brilliant attainments; but her mind was poor, her 
heart barren by nature: nothing bloomed spontaneously on that soil; no unforced natural 
fruit delighted by its freshness’ (p. 185). The familiar imagery of ill-nature is present: 
Blanche is superficially brilliant but not (healthily) spontaneous, fresh, blooming; her 
sourness of disposition is reflected in the quality of her ‘fruit’ – her ‘forced’, false 
gestures (images through which Jane snidely de-sexualises her rival). Watching her with 
Rochester, she ponders: 
Surely she cannot truly like him; or not like him with true affection! If she did, she 
need not coin her smiles so lavishly; flash her glances so unremittingly; manufacture 
airs so elaborate, graces so multitudinous ... I have seen in his face a far different 
expression from that which hardens it now while she is so vivaciously accosting him; 
but then it came of itself: it was not elicited by meretricious arts and calculated 
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manoeuvres; and one had but to [address] him when needful without grimace – and it 
increased, and grew kinder and more genial, and warmed one like a fostering 
sunbeam (p. 187). 
As in the imagery applied to the alternating sincerity and sarcasm (or wholeness and 
hollowness) of Zamorna’s smiles, genuine geniality here has an organic quality, 
evoking warmth and light; it generously spreads, flows, and produces a natural response 
in surrounding faces. In contrast, Blanche’s shallow grimaces, coined smiles, 
manufactured airs and calculated manoeuvres are contrived ‘means to communication’ 
which have a freezing effect, ‘hardening’ Rochester’s face. 
 In her own way Jane too is artful, even flirtatious. As a narrator she constantly 
lays bare for the reader her strategies, her consciousness of her power over Rochester, or 
her means of manipulating him. Troubled on one occasion by her ‘earnest, religious 
energy’, he begs her to ‘look wicked, Jane; as you know well how to look; coin one of 
your wild, shy, provoking smiles ... teaze me, vex me ... I would rather be incensed than 
saddened’ (p. 282). Subtle the coincidence may be, still apparently it is not only 
Blanche who knows well how to ‘coin’ her smiles; Jane simply manages hers rather 
better. As critics ever since Elizabeth Rigby have suggested, she is not quite as genuine 
as she would have us believe.
74
 Eagleton, for instance, recognises that Jane’s efforts to 
‘demonstrate her quietly self-sufficient independence of Rochester’ involve ‘a good deal 
of dexterous calculation – calculation which, if pressed too far, would seriously 
undermine Jane’s credibility as a character.’ He observes, moreover, that Rochester’s 
request in the original manuscript – ‘coin one of your wild, shy, provoking smiles’ – is 
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misprinted in the first edition as ‘wild, sly, provoking smiles’, and suggests that this ‘is 
not, perhaps, wholly insignificant.’75 
 However, language which betrays Jane’s sly side, her awareness of social codes 
or her self-conscious management of her own behaviour, contends with more 
purposefully emphatic passages in which Brontë seeks not only to differentiate her from 
scheming, artful Blanche but to give her something of the characteristics of a 
conventionally appealing, feminine heroine. Rochester assesses her from the beginning 
as ‘grave’ and ‘quiet’, but goes on to ask: 
Do you never laugh, Miss Eyre? Don’t trouble yourself to answer – I see, you laugh 
rarely; but you can laugh very merrily: believe me, you are not naturally austere, any 
more than I am naturally vicious. The Lowood constraint still clings to you 
somewhat; controlling your features, muffling your voice, and restricting your limbs; 
and you fear in the presence of a man ... to smile too gaily, speak too freely, or move 
too quickly: but in time, I think you will learn to be natural with me ... and then your 
looks and movements will have more vivacity and variety than they dare offer now 
(p. 138).  
The pattern of Jane Eyre as Bildungsroman is often described in terms of progression 
from unrestrained passion to strict self-control; Jane learns to curb her impulses and 
manage her behaviour (and her ‘features’). But, as explored in the previous chapter, the 
importance of ‘naturalness’, the desirability of open impulsiveness, could be insisted on 
no less than restraint and discretion; studied behaviour is desirable only when the 
mental effort required is kept invisible. In light of this, a more accurate assessment of 
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the term ‘management’ is offered by Michael Kearns, who proposes that Jane’s 
‘development consists of learning to analyze her impulses and learning when and how 
to repress them, when to give them free rein ... What Jane must learn is to increase her 
mental health by management of her impulses.’76 Though the importance of giving ‘free 
rein’ to emotion might seem to be at odds with Victorian codes of conduct, it is an 
important part of Jane’s character development: the ‘Lowood constraint’ is something 
she must shake off as she ‘learns’ to behave more gaily and merrily. 
Thus, while the child Jane is castigated for the outburst that lands her in the Red 
Room, what is really considered disturbing is how eerily quiet and grave, ‘sullen and 
sneaking’ (p. 15) she had been beforehand. What Jane lacks (and ironically must 
‘endeavour to acquire’) is not only mastery of her emotions but also ‘a more sociable 
and child-like disposition, a more attractive and sprightly manner, – something lighter, 
franker, more natural as it were’ (p. 7). Jane may hold herself proudly different from the 
Reeds, but her older self does understand their repulsion; she criticises their faults while 
being retrospectively able to appreciate what an ‘uncongenial alien’ she must have 
seemed to them, as an inaccessibly reserved and serious child. The naughtiness of a 
‘sanguine’ and ‘romping’ child, she understands, would have been easier to tolerate in 
the midst of such a robustly insensitive family (p. 16). Hence, just as Rochester hopes, 
Jane’s maturation does in some ways involve ‘warming’ and ‘lightening’ up, becoming 
more desirably good-humoured. Her cheerfulness is important to him in being 
connected to her physical health and appearance: at Gateshead she had felt her ‘physical 
inferiority’ to her ‘contented, happy’ cousins (p. 7), but at Thornfield her increasing 
happiness – the result of her sexual awakening – renders her (unlike the ‘barren’, ill-
natured Blanche) plumper, fresher, more buoyant and ‘blooming.’ Rochester may not 
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appreciate being ‘vivaciously accosted’ by the shallow, unwomanly Blanche, but it is 
natural vivacity which marks the improvement in Jane’s health and temperament.  
Recalling again that she had impressed him initially as quiet, sober and self-
contained, Rochester then records his impressions when spying on her the next day: 
I think those day-visions were not dark: there was a pleasurable illumination in your 
eye occasionally, a soft excitement in your aspect, which told of no bitter, bilious, 
hypochondriac brooding: your look revealed rather the sweet musings of youth, 
when its spirit follows on willing wings the flight of Hope ... how curiously you 
smiled to and at yourself, Janet! There was much sense in your smile: it was very 
shrewd, and seemed to make to make light of your own abstraction (p. 313). 
While Jane is shrewdly sensible and intelligent, she is crucially different from Villette’s 
Lucy Snowe, and from William Crimsworth in The Professor before her: she is not 
overly embittered or morbid. She suffers from no ‘hypochondriac brooding’, and she is 
not too self-absorbed, being able to make light of her own serious thoughts, while the 
language of illumination, softness, and sweetness goes to reaffirm her essential 
healthiness of spirit. This is stressed by Rochester yet again:  
Your habitual expression in those days, Jane, was a thoughtful look: not despondent, 
for you were not sickly; but not buoyant, for you had little hope, and no actual 
pleasure ... There was something glad in your glance, and genial in your manner, 
when you conversed: I saw you had a social heart; it was the silent school-room – it 
was the tedium of your life that made you mournful (p. 314).  
The point is hard to miss; Jane is not naturally grave or eccentric, but waiting for 
Rochester to unlock her ‘social heart’ (and, by implication, her woman’s heart).77  
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More tellingly still, when he is disguised as the gypsy, Rochester moves from 
the reading of Jane’s palm to deliver the following verdict on her mouth:  
it delights at times in laughter: it is disposed to impart all that the brain conceives; 
though I dare say it would be silent on much the heart experiences. Mobile and 
flexible, it was never intended to be compressed in the eternal silence of solitude: it is 
a mouth which should speak much and smile often. 
He upbraids himself for not making her happy; ‘I wish to foster, not to blight ... my 
harvest must be in smiles’ (p. 201). But the words and smiles that Rochester here 
desires are not the ‘wicked’ smirks and sharp-tongued sarcasms that the modern reader 
enjoys (that which ‘the brain conceives’). When he demands to be ‘pleased’ by learning 
more about her, the ‘[not] very complacent or submissive smile’ with which she 
responds does not betray what her ‘heart experiences.’ What he is after at this point is 
not to be vexed and incensed, but rather the heartfelt, earnest smiles that will prove her 
genuine pleasure in him, and expose (or illuminate) for him her inner depths: he wishes 
to ‘draw [her] out’ (p. 132). On seeing Rochester when she returns from her visit to 
Gateshead, Jane fails ‘to control the working muscles of my face – which I feel rebel 
insolently against my will, and struggle to express what I had resolved to conceal. But I 
have a veil – it is down: I may make shift yet to behave with decent composure’ (p. 
244). Her smile in this instance represents the transcendence of emotion over studied 
behaviour, of feeling over composure – only a (literal) veil can protect her inner self 
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from his penetration. In the same way as a blush, which, as Mary Ann O’Farrell 
analyses, ‘in seeming involuntarily and reliably to betray a deep self ... assists at the 
conversion of legibility into a sense of identity’, Jane’s involuntary smile opens her 
subconscious up for translation, not simply surfacing but creating an ‘authentic’ 
emotional core.
78
 Rochester’s wish ‘to foster, not to blight’, for a ‘harvest’ in smiles, 
echoes Jane’s description of his countenance growing ‘kinder and more genial, and 
[warming] one like a fostering sunbeam’ (p. 187). As we will see, the language of 
fostering and nurturing runs through Brontë’s descriptions of romance, typically with 
men seeking to ‘draw out’ the previously shaded, unsexed woman – restoring her to 
physical health and emotional warmth, and successfully producing smiles of feminine 
feeling. 
 So, given Rochester’s roots in the figure of the worldly Byronic hero, how can 
the supposedly softened, mellowed and amiable Jane have any kind of edge over him? 
The answer lies not only in Jane’s more memorable, sharply unsentimental moments 
(her ‘vivacity’ is double-edged) but also in the care Brontë takes to strip Rochester of 
the sarcastic tendencies that make Zamorna an intimidating figure. If Rochester’s dark 
past, moody scowls and bitter speeches are indications of his Byronic origins and 
borrowings, he less often indulges in Byronic sneers; this particular aspect of his 
behaviour belongs to that side of his Romantic character which must be tamed, or made 
palatable to Jane.
79
 ‘You are dreaming, sir – or you are sneering’, she suspects when he 
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tells her she is a beauty; ‘For God’s sake, don’t be ironical!’(p. 259) She is deeply 
irritated on the rare occasions when we do glimpse a Zamorna-like display of power 
gloating over dependence – as when she produces her small supply of money and ‘He 
took the purse, poured the hoard into his palm and chuckled over it as if its scantiness 
pleased him’ (p. 224). Or when ‘he smiled; and I thought his smile was such as a sultan 
might, in a blissful and fond moment, bestow on a slave his gold and gems had 
enriched’ (p. 269). Jane shares the anxieties of Mary: her fears surface in a nightmare 
which features Rochester looking on ‘with his arms folded – smiling sardonically, as it 
seemed’ (p. 243). But she is intolerant of this attitude; just as his physical strength must 
ultimately be impaired to facilitate their equality, so his wit must be curbed.  
 Instead, what Jane seeks to bring out is the ‘kinder and more genial’ side of the 
embittered Rochester, much as he aims to develop the ‘social heart’ of his thoughtful 
and reserved governess. Drawing again on the contrast of artifice and authenticity, 
surface and depth, she comments: 
I could imagine that most observers would call them [the other gentlemen] attractive, 
handsome, imposing; while they would pronounce Mr Rochester at once harsh-
featured and melancholy looking. I saw them smile, laugh – it was nothing: the light 
of the candles had as much soul in it as their smile; the tinkle of the bell as much 
significance as their laugh. I saw Mr Rochester smile: – his stern features softened; 
his eyes grew both brilliant and gentle, its ray both searching and sweet (p. 175).  
While watching, Jane realises: ‘I feel akin to him – I understand the language of his 
countenance and movements’ (p. 175). The harmony between them is simultaneously 
spiritual and sexual – evoking the common equation of soul and body as identified in 
the previous chapter. Though he is ‘harsh-featured’, his smiles have gentleness, depth, 
meaning – smiles for Jane and Rochester are the true windows to the soul, the quietly 
profound ‘language’ through which they communicate, and express their inner selves: 
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Mr Rochester had sometimes read my unspoken thoughts with an acumen to me 
incomprehensible: in the present instance he took no notice of my abrupt vocal 
response; but he smiled at me with a certain smile he had of his own, and which he 
used but on rare occasions. He seemed to think it too good for common purposes; it 
was the real sunshine of feeling – he shed it over me now (pp. 245-6). 
Thus, the language of feeling and fostering rests on a notion of mutual exchange: it is 
not only Rochester who considers himself to be tending a plant, watching a fruit fill out 
– Jane is quite as intent on cultivating his good humour (when she is not trying to 
aggravate him, that is). And Rochester is susceptible to influence in a way that Zamorna 
is not: Mary waits with bated breath to see if she will be rewarded with smiles or 
humiliated with sneers, Jane simply rejects the latter: ‘For God’s sake don’t be ironical!’  
 Indeed, the emphasis on Rochester’s innately benign nature, and the process by 
which he is tamed and softened, is crucial to his redemption. Jane’s use of the phrase 
‘for God’s sake’ is not flippant. Brontë draws on a Byronic theme: the lost innocence of 
the hardened cynic. For instance, of the ‘Giaour’, whose ‘ghastly mirth’ ‘mocks at 
Misery’, and whose ‘bitter smile [transfers] to others fear and guile’, the poet insists: 
Time hath not yet the features fix’d, 
But brighter traits with evil mix’d;  
And there are hues not always faded, 
Which speak a mind not all degraded 
Even by the crimes through which it waded:  
The common crowd but see the gloom 
Of wayward deeds, and fitting doom;  
The close observer can espy 
A noble soul, and lineage high.
80
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Jane’s achievement is not only to (somewhat unconvincingly) restore Rochester’s piety 
by the end of the novel, but to relieve his gloom and take the sting out of his sarcasm – 
to emphasise his ‘brighter traits’, and thereby overcome his degradation. When thwarted 
in his bigamous scheme, Jane sees ‘a grim smile contort Mr Rochester’s lip’ in the 
church; the sight of Bertha produces ‘a smile both acrid and desolate’ (pp. 291, 293). 
But these dark, blasphemous smiles are a contrast to the final image of the punished, but 
spiritually cleansed Rochester, whose ‘noble soul’ is finally brought to the surface: 
‘Blind as he was, smiles played over his face, joy dawned on his forehead: his 
lineaments softened and warmed’ (p. 437).  
 According to Kathleen Tillotson, ‘Mr Rochester looms up at first like Zamorna; 
but unlike him, he can be mocked [and has] a conscience dormant, not dead.’81 The 
assessment is an insightful one, casually linking Rochester’s moral potential with his 
openness to (Jane’s) mockery. Indeed it is his benign qualities which render him 
vulnerable to affectionate ridicule; the ‘softening’ of his ‘stern features’ works to 
feminise him, evoking the openness and readability associated with innocence and 
naivety. If Zamorna ‘finds an amusement in playing with [Mary’s] fears – piquing or 
soothing them as caprice directs,’82 it is Jane who, in a significant echo, knows ‘the 
pleasure of vexing and soothing [Rochester] by turns’ (pp. 157-8). The de-Byronizing 
process has much to do with de-mystification: his secret must be outed, then ominous 
grimaces can be replaced with the emergence of ‘the real sunshine of feeling’, ‘joy 
[dawning] on his forehead.’   
 Given this conditioning of his character, it is a short step to perceiving that, 
anodyne as the smiling exchanges between Jane and Rochester generally are (being 
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imbued with a healthy glow), Brontë does not lose sight of the power balance at stake in 
the representation of laughter. The language of power remains ever-present, albeit in 
mild terms. ‘You master me’ Rochester complains; ‘I am influenced – conquered; and 
the influence is sweeter than I can express; and the conquest I undergo has a witchery 
beyond any triumph I can win. Why do you smile, Jane? What does that inexplicable, 
that uncanny turn of countenance mean?’ (pp. 260-1; Brontë’s emphasis). Jane tells him 
he should excuse the uncomplimentary thought that produced her frustratingly 
‘inexplicable’ smile, since ‘it was involuntary’, but her ability to tantalise him in this 
way is recurrently underlined. ‘Speak!’ he insists when she asks a favour, ‘but if you 
look up and smile with that countenance, I shall swear concession before I know to 
what, and that will make a fool of me’ (p. 261). These are turns of phrase which imply 
for the most part innocently affectionate attempts at ‘witchery’ and ‘conquest’, but at 
times Jane’s evocation of laughter to illustrate her control over a situation appears rather 
more self-aware and darkly coloured. ‘Mr Rochester affirmed I was wearing him to skin 
and bone, and threatened awful vengeance for my present conduct at some period fast 
coming,’ she tells us. But, confident of her ability to ‘keep him in check’, she asserts: ‘I 
laughed in my sleeve at his menaces’ (p. 274). Her strategy is generally defensive: when 
she refuses to say what is worrying her, on the grounds that ‘I dare say you will only 
laugh at me for my pains’, he replies ‘I’ll laugh at you heartily when to-morrow is past; 
till then I dare not: my prize is not certain’ (p. 278). In this way they battle over who is 
in a position to laugh at whom – who is to secure the prize, and who is to be made the 
‘fool.’ Taken together these exchanges indicate Brontë’s consistent attention to the 
connection between laughter and power, and are characteristic of the tense, tactical – 
and really far from straightforwardly open – relationship between the lovers.  
However it is with the introduction of St John Rivers – and the contrast he 
supplies to Rochester – that laughter’s importance for Jane becomes markedly apparent. 
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St John has ‘a peculiar smile, more solemn than cheerful’ (p. 351). When Rosamond 
Oliver tells him about how much fun she has been having, Jane watches his response 
with interest: 
It seemed to me that Mr. St. John’s under lip protruded, and his upper lip curled a 
moment. His mouth certainly looked a good deal compressed, and the lower part of 
his face unusually stern and square, as the laughing girl gave him this information. 
He lifted his gaze, too, from the daisies [which he is crushing underfoot], and turned 
it on her. An unsmiling, a searching, a meaning gaze it was. She answered it with a 
second laugh, and laughter well became her youth, her roses, her dimples, her bright 
eyes (p. 364). 
Jane is both fascinated and unnerved by the ‘mute and grave’, ‘stern and distant’ St 
John. If Rosamond, with her dimples and bright eyes, is a picture of merry, feminine 
innocence, St John’s ‘unsmiling’, ‘searching’, ‘meaning’ gaze is representative of the 
crushing, masculine ‘penetrating gaze’ analysed by Shuttleworth. With his youth and 
good looks, his professionalism and his name, St John strikingly anticipates Graham 
Bretton (or ‘Dr John’) of Villette, whose searching, scrutinizing gaze reflects his 
investigative role and medical authority. But the difference between them is no less 
striking. Dr John is jolly and continually laughing, where St John’s rare smiles are 
‘peculiar’, ‘solemn’, ‘bitter or sad’ (p. 355). It is spiritual authority that the latter 
represents, and he takes nothing lightly.  
 The discomforting effect of this sternness is vividly described by Jane: 
By degrees, he acquired a certain influence over me that took away my liberty of 
mind: his praise and notice were more restraining than his indifference. I could no 
longer talk or laugh freely when he was by; because a tiresomely importunate instinct 
reminded me that vivacity (at least in me) was distasteful to him. I was so fully aware 
that only serious moods and occupations were acceptable, that in his presence every 
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effort to sustain or follow any other became vain: I fell under a freezing spell (pp. 
397-8).  
Jane is thus silenced and sobered in the company of cold, hard, humourless St John, with 
his ‘marble’ features, in a way which reinforces his powerful, steely grip on her 
emotions. The ‘freezing’ effect of his seriousness is linked to his lack of sexual interest 
in her – laughter and sexuality (with their shared relationship to vitality, fluidity, 
emotion and the body) must alike be repressed. Where Rochester’s spiritual yet sunny 
smiles have their melting, thawing effect, Jane considers the less pleasant sensation that 
would result from marriage to the coldly unresponsive St John, being ‘forced to keep the 
fire of my nature continually low, to compel it to burn inwardly and never utter a cry, 
though the imprisoned flame consumed vital after vital’ (p. 408). Jane evokes the 
entwined dangers of emotional and physiological obstruction – neither sexual release 
nor relief through laughter would be possible.  
  Their incompatibility is highlighted when Jane throws aside her submissiveness 
to defend the claims of her ‘heart’ (and her ‘vitals’):  
I will not swear, reader, that there was not something of repressed sarcasm both in 
the tone in which I [spoke], and in the feeling that accompanied it ... He was silent 
[and] I presently risked an upward glance at his countenance. His eye, bent on me, 
expressed at once stern surprise and keen inquiry. ‘Is she sarcastic, and sarcastic to 
me!’ it seemed to say. ‘What does this signify?’ (pp. 406-7; Brontë’s emphasis) 
What it signifies is her unwillingness to continue repressing her instincts, and her 
resentment of his power over her. But, importantly, it is her sarcastic streak as well as 
her passionate impulses that have been let loose – that which ‘the brain conceives’ as 
well as that which ‘the heart experiences.’ His ‘stern surprise’ reveals his intolerance not 
merely of general levity but of being personally mocked; ‘Do not let us forget that this is 
a solemn matter’, he reproves her, ‘one of which we may neither think nor talk lightly 
127 
 
without sin’ (p. 407). ‘For God’s sake don’t be ironical!’ he might as well say. But it is 
in this scene that Jane loses something of her awe of him; the ‘veil fell from his hardness 
and despotism.’ His stern imperviousness to her attempts at good-humoured familiarity 
has made him seem not quite mortal, and therefore beyond ridicule. The comparison 
with Rochester is obvious when she contemplates ‘his features, beautiful in their 
harmony, but strangely formidable in their still severity: at his brow, commanding but 
not open; at his eyes, bright, and deep, and searching, but never soft; at his tall, imposing 
figure’ (p. 407). It is more than ‘openness’ and ‘softness’ that St John is missing; his 
good looks are also a bar to Jane feeling at ease with him. This is something she admits 
on her very first meeting with Rochester, when she tells us she had ‘a theoretical 
reverence’ for beauty, but that if Rochester had been a ‘handsome, heroic-looking young 
gentleman’ she would have been too shy to approach him (p. 113).   
 Rochester’s ugliness and oddities give him a vulnerability that has a levelling 
effect between them. He recalls that at first Jane was restrained by habit, ‘and a good 
deal afraid of making herself disadvantageously conspicuous by some solecism or 
blunder’, but that soon ‘you seemed to get used to me’ (pp. 313-4). Getting used to him 
had involved familiarising herself with his weaknesses – feeling confident enough to 
‘laugh in her sleeve at his menaces,’ without ‘reverence’ and without worrying that it 
might be she who is vulnerable to humiliation, made ‘disadvantageously conspicuous.’ 
Her inability, in contrast, to laugh whether openly or in her sleeve at St John – his 
demand to be taken seriously – erodes her sense of self-confidence. She realises that his 
severity and frigidity forbid intimacy – so she could never be his wife – but that 
otherwise she would be happy to ‘toil under eastern suns ... admire and emulate his 
courage, and devotion, and vigour; accommodate quietly to his masterhood; smile 
undisturbed at his ineradicable ambition’ (p. 407). That odd clause underlines Jane’s 
needs: she is content to suffer, to admire and to emulate, but she must also retain her 
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passive-aggressive sense of superior understanding – at a distance she would still be able 
to discreetly express her acknowledgement of the ludicrous in St John’s formidable 
earnestness. He disconcerts her not only because he is too oppressively serious, it is 
implied, but also because she can in no way cast him as an object of raillery – and his 
resistance to this role leaves her no means of compromising his ‘masterhood.’   
 In finally revealing her true character (which encompasses both her ‘natural’ 
desires as a woman, and her unwomanly bent for satire), Jane alienates and offends her 
cousin: ‘most bitterly he smiled – most decidedly he withdrew his hand from mine’ (p. 
413). Paradoxically, it is both her passionate earnestness (on the subject of herself and 
her earthly rights), and her refusal to be consistently (and submissively) earnest, which 
disillusion him. Her feelings on returning to Rochester, who is not only still alive and 
conveniently widowed, but endearingly damaged into the bargain, present a manifest 
contrast and confirm what it is exactly that Jane requires to be comfortable: 
I soon had the room in more cheerful order ... My spirits were excited, and with 
pleasure and ease I talked to him during supper ... There was no harassing restraint, 
no repressing of glee and vivacity with him; for with him I was at perfect ease, 
because I knew I suited him: all I said or did seemed either to console or revive him. 
Delightful consciousness! It brought to life and light my whole nature: in his 
presence I thoroughly lived; and he lived in mine. Blind as he was, smiles played 
over his face, joy dawned on his forehead: his lineaments softened and warmed (p. 
437).  
But there is more to Jane’s satisfaction than the release from ‘restraint’, the renewed 
permissibility of ‘glee and vivacity’, and the promise of sexual fulfilment. Rochester is 
soon accusing her of ‘wickedness’, of being a ‘mocking changeling.’ When he jealously 
demands to know if she has been with other men, she refuses to answer: ‘I laughed and 
made my escape, still laughing as I ran up stairs. “A good idea!” I thought, with glee. “I 
see I have the means of fretting him out of his melancholy for some time to come”’ (p. 
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438). Her motives are still redemptive – to enhance Rochester’s ‘brighter traits’, to ‘fret 
him out of his melancholy.’ But her cheerfulness is tinged with the consciousness of 
power: she is the one to do the ‘fretting’, and thereby to control him – to laughingly 
‘make her escape’ while leaving him anxious and (quite literally) in the dark. Through 
the example of St John Rivers,  Jane Eyre teaches that there ought to be a healthy 
balance between grim earnestness and sociable merriment, between overt severity and 
thoughtless frivolity. But it also implies that a balance of power between the sexes is 
necessary, and that the role played by laughter is absolutely crucial to the establishment 
or destruction of this balance. Being in a position to poke fun without leaving herself 
vulnerable to sarcasm – being able to comfortably ‘smile undisturbed’ – is key to Jane’s 
sense of that self-assurance and security which Brontë denied the weeping women of her 
early stories.  
* 
This chapter has explored the significance of the expressive face in both consolidating 
and questioning gender norms, showing how Brontë alternately embraces and distorts 
conventional representations – of the superior sneer, and of ‘natural’ feminine 
merriment. At many points in Jane Eyre, Brontë echoes popular suspicion about 
calculated or underhand laughter, idealising spontaneous emotional expression; she 
naturalises her heroine’s laughter in an attempt to distance it from the aggressive, self-
aware performances of Blanche, and from the grim, mirthless tone of Bertha’s disruptive 
cackle. But beneath these efforts lurks a canny awareness of laughter’s subversive or 
strategic potential, derived from her recognition (evident throughout the Angria stories) 
of laughter’s role in male manipulation of women. Thus, not only is Jane able to ‘keep 
[Rochester] in check’, but his laughter, too, is softened – his Byronic swagger muted in 
this crucial respect – and it is therefore not Rochester but Bertha, strikingly, who is the 
main source of masculine, mocking laughter in the novel.  
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 Judith Lowder Newton suggests that, in novels by female authors, 
the very covertness of power, the nature and degree of its disguise, the very omission 
of overt reference are of the greatest interest, for subversion, indirection, and disguise 
are natural tactics of the resisting weak, are social strategies for managing the most 
intense and the most compelling rebellions.
83
 
But as seen in Zamorna’s smiles, the appearance of covertness and disguise may also be 
a stereotypically male (and specifically gentlemanly) resource, the trick being that these 
smiles are not discreet or subtle at all, but pointed and visible. The ‘intense and 
compelling rebellions’ depicted by Brontë depend not on a characteristically female 
mode of resistance, but on the continual questioning and blurring of the boundaries 
between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine.’ Laughter can be used to cement these boundaries, 
but can also dissolve them. While in many respects Jane Eyre is, in John Bowen’s 
words, a novel ‘fascinated by the physicality of sensation’, with Jane ‘constantly 
[emphasising] the desires and needs of the embodied self’,84 Jane at other times seeks to 
escape the embodied (gendered) self, through laughter that is self-assertive in its very 
refusal to exhibit instincts or desires. Brontë’s ‘best mature fiction is remarkable for the 
subjective intensity of its female first-person narrators,’ declares Lucasta Miller, ‘but in 
her juvenilia she tended to adopt the pose of a cynical and detached male narrator.’85 In 
the chapters that follow, I will question the idea of an authentic but repressed female 
voice, showing how the adoption of ‘cynical and detached’ laughter is indeed a ‘pose’ 
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for Brontë’s heroines, but one that allows escape from the constraints of ‘natural’ 
female identity.
86
  
 As the next chapter will show, gender boundaries are particularly fluid in The 
Professor, a novel which draws attention to the ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’ of the male 
protagonist in securing his masculine identity. Just as Bertha’s villainous laughter 
emerges from her disempowered condition, so in The Professor we watch the 
development of the protagonist from feelings of inferiority, to (at least in his own self-
presentation) the role of smug tyrant. While Shuttleworth and others have recognised 
William Crimsworth’s progress from uncertain beginnings to masculine confidence, for 
Shuttleworth it is Crimsworth’s ‘interpretive powers’ – rather than, as I will argue, his 
powers as an actor – that ‘underwrite his ascent from his initial highly ambivalent 
gender and class position to that of confirmed masculinity and social power.’87 In 
tracing the process whereby the sensitive Crimsworth learns to imitate the mocking 
contempt that is directed at himself, expressing and thereby creating a Hobbesian 
armour of superiority, Brontë alerts us to the element of performance (rather than innate 
superiority) that drives masculine behaviour. 
 There may seem to be a contradiction here. As explored in the last chapter, 
idealised pictures of laughter in the first half of the century generally evoked masculine 
behaviour of a very different kind: laughter was supposed to promote sympathy, not 
superiority; it represented moral feeling, not mocking contempt. However, the 
alternative picture painted by Brontë reflects the fact that ideals of middle-class 
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masculinity were in a state of transition, with the rise of (in Jane Wood’s words) ‘bodily 
vigour and mental toughness’ as ‘the hallmarks of manliness.’88 Hearty laughter, we 
have seen, was held to promote robust physicality, but also ‘overflowing’ emotional 
sentiments – bodily vigour, but not mental toughness. With increased emphasis over the 
Victorian period on the conservation of energies and the strength of mind over body, the 
association of laughing excess with manly health disappeared; the idea of abandonment 
to bodily impulse, and indulgence in feeling, came to connote simply weakness.
89
 In 
North and South (1854-5), Elizabeth Gaskell captures the turn to sternness (concomitant 
with the rise of industrial society) in her portrait of the factory owner, Thornton: 
Now, in Mr. Thornton’s face the straight brows fell low over the clear, deep-set 
earnest eyes, which, without being unpleasantly sharp, seemed intent enough to 
penetrate into the very heart and core of what he was looking at. The lines in the face 
were few but firm, as if they were carved in marble, and lay principally about the 
lips, which were slightly compressed over a set of teeth so faultless and beautiful as 
to give the effect of sudden sunlight when the rare bright smile, coming in an instant 
and shining out of the eyes, changed the whole look from the severe and resolved 
expression of a man ready to do and dare everything, to the keen honest enjoyment 
of the moment, which is seldom shown so fearlessly and instantaneously except by 
children. Margaret liked this smile.
90
 
Gaskell, like Brontë, conveys uneasiness respecting this ‘severe and resolved 
expression.’ Just as Jane and Lucy are relieved when ‘sudden sunlight’ breaks out on 
the faces of Rochester and Paul Emanuel, so the ‘rare bright smile’ here figures as a 
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necessary point of reassurance: the lifting of the mask provides insight into Thornton’s 
capacity for spontaneous feeling, so that it is now Margaret who is enabled to ‘penetrate 
into the very heart.’ The transition from firmness and sharpness to child-like impulse 
acts to momentarily dissolve the distinctions between masculine hardness and feminine 
softness that were becoming increasingly rigidified around mid-century. But, crucially, 
Brontë’s anxieties centre not only on such ‘marble’ images of grim austerity – her St 
Johns and Brocklehursts – but on the more complex threat represented by the sneer; her 
recognition of the laughing face as an exercise in cool self-government, or a mask for 
patriarchal power. And while she draws on Byronic imagery to convey this hint of 
intimidation in the midst of laughter, her preoccupation with the sneer – especially in 
The Professor, whose hero was intended to be representative of ‘real living men’91 – in 
fact suggests a pressing concern with contemporary social realities.  
  Thus, despite the positive accounts of bodily laughter presented in Chapter One 
– which glorified masculinities ranging from the raucous and roaring to the kindly but 
still carefree – such depictions sat alongside the contradictory, emergent emphasis on 
the importance of self-control as the sign of successful manliness. Herbert Sussman 
describes the efforts of male writers to establish ‘a psychic armor to contain the 
inchoate, fluid energy within’, presenting ‘a particularly fragile and unstable model of 
the male psyche always at the edge of eruption, of dissolution, of madness.’ These 
feelings of inner chaos were displaced onto women, so that ‘male is to female as order 
is to chaos, external hardness to internal fluidity, boundedness to dissolution, 
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containment to eruption.’92 Such patterns of thought help to explain why excessive 
laughter became negatively associated with women and morbid symptoms (the 
‘eruption’ and ‘dissolution’ of hysterics) instead of with jovial manliness – and why 
laughter as the expression of ‘the inchoate, fluid energy within’ was increasingly 
frowned on and viewed with alarm in the latter half of the century. Physiognomical 
ideas offer further clues to the hearty laugh’s fall from favour. According to E. S. Dallas 
(writing in 1861), ‘the extent to which a mouth is open is merely a measure of the 
passiveness of character.’ Explaining his characterisation of great orators in terms of 
closed rather than open mouths, Dallas declares that the ‘idiot [has] his mouth wide 
open ... while, at the other extreme, the man who is intensely active has his lips 
compressed until sometimes they appear bloodless.’93 The image suggests St John’s 
compressed, unsmiling lips, but also the restrained and dispassionate (‘bloodless’) sneer 
of Zamorna. Between these extremes we find that the ‘half-open mouth indicates the 
receptive character of the listener’, meaning ‘impressibility.’94 Applied to laughter, 
these guidelines are revealing in their implicit equation of the open mouth with 
inferiority, the shut mouth with authority. Recalling Lavater’s notion that ‘woman 
laughs; man smiles’, they pit subjection to the body against the achievement of 
‘boundedness’ and ‘containment’, aligning openness with the ‘receptive’ and ‘passive’ 
nature of women.  
 Certainly, the assumption of ‘external hardness’ is what the initially ‘fragile and 
unstable’ Crimsworth aims at in his bid for masculine (self-) mastery. A keen 
physiognomist (but more precisely, I will argue, a keen pathognomist), he is intently 
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attuned to the gendered play of power, as present in facial expression, and specifically 
in smiles and laughter. The Professor anticipates the switching of gender characteristics 
that runs through Jane Eyre, and we see the origins of Jane’s character in Frances Henri 
(who is similarly divided between normative femininity and deviant unsentimentality). 
But in describing the exercise of sneering despotism from a male perspective, The 
Professor also provides radical insight into the artificiality of gender identity, exposing 
the insecurities that goad its hero into the role of masculine tyrant – through superior 
laughter that is neither loud nor open-mouthed. 
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Chapter Three                                                                                                              
Mastery, Mockery and ‘Phases of Physiognomy’ in The Professor 
 
Introduction 
At a critical moment in The Professor, when his bullying, overbearing brother Edward 
reaches for a whip, William Crimsworth – narrator and hero – is keen to assure us that 
he is not to be menaced in this way: ‘I permitted myself to laugh with a degree of scorn 
I took no pains to temper or hide. His fury boiled up, [and he swore] half a dozen 
vulgar, impious oaths, without, however, venturing to lift the whip.’1 It is an assertion 
which might lead us to imagine we are dealing with another Duke of Zamorna – 
combating his enemies with fierce scorn and laughing in the face of danger, Crimsworth 
appears to cut a cool and forbidding figure, able to inspire rage and fear merely by 
showing his teeth.  
 Such, however, is far from the case. Beneath Crimsworth’s self-promoting 
version of events lies another story: he is not so much the ‘hero’ as the fool of his own 
tale, an awkward and highly ridiculous figure who forms the butt of a joke at every turn 
in the plot. He is mocked or scorned continually – by his relatives, employers, students, 
and even by his wife. This reality is partly recognised by critics. Heather Glen has 
pointed to the heavy irony at play and identifies Crimsworth as a satirical take on ‘what 
was beginning to be a familiar contemporary masculine type ... the self-made man.’2 
The critical appreciation of Crimsworth has shifted from mere bewilderment at his 
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unattractive personality to recognition that his narrative is to some extent intended to be 
misleading and coloured by his defensive, abrasive character. Making sense of the 
novel, which in Glen’s words ‘has generally been adjudged an unpleasant and oddly 
disquieting book’, has been a case of explaining Crimsworth and his dire lack of 
charisma.
3
 Thus for Annette Tromly, the novel is about the ‘motives and processes of 
self-presentation; the book is informed by its exploration of the issue. By means of a 
thoroughly obtrusive and essentially unreliable narrative voice, Brontë explores the 
reasons and the ways that an autobiographer presents himself to the world.’4 Brontë 
invites us, that is, to look between the lines of Crimsworth’s narrative – to recognise her 
underlying critique of the man telling the story.  
 Nonetheless, though not usually read now as a mouthpiece for the author, 
Crimsworth is still largely accepted to be the unnervingly cool and self-controlled 
character of his own self-presentation – a figure of domineering masculinity. As 
Shuttleworth observes, the novel ‘is centrally concerned, as its working title “The 
Master” suggests, with questions of mastery and self-control’5 – but critics have 
underestimated the extent to which the cool airs of this ‘Master’ are ironically treated. 
Eagleton claims that ‘it is the very unshakeability of Crimsworth’s composure, its 
sustained, uncrackable contrivance, which persuades us of the fundamental anxiety 
lurking unconfessed behind it.’6 But – while this chapter will look closer at his 
unconfessed anxieties – I take as my starting point the assumption that Crimsworth’s 
haughty composure is neither ‘unshakeable’ nor ‘uncrackable’, but instead decidedly 
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flimsy. Crimsworth is represented not only critically, but also comically – he is (as 
Eagleton writes) a ‘thoroughly unlikable character’ whose aim is to ‘make himself 
invulnerable to others’, but he is also a laughable character, whose vulnerability is far 
more in evidence than his success at hiding it.
7
 Recognising the comic dimension of 
Crimsworth’s characterisation is important, enabling clearer appreciation of the 
weaknesses that lead to his determined efforts at dignified self-control. And crucially, 
this is a drama that is played out on the face: in observing the reactions that Crimsworth 
draws from those around him, we also see how he changes his behaviour in response to 
their amusement. This chapter thus considers what Tromly calls ‘the motives and 
processes of self-presentation’ as enacted through facial expression – specifically smiles 
and laughter – rather than through narrative voice. Identifying the face as the primary 
site of Crimsworth’s self-presentation and struggle for mastery, I argue that Crimsworth 
as despot is a ‘self-made man’ in the sense that his tyrannous masculinity is performed 
(though not, Brontë implies, always as successfully as he claims). For Eagleton, ‘in 
reading his narrative we have the exasperated sense that he is telling us only what he 
wants us to know.’ He is ‘a manifestly untrustworthy narrator.’8 But, I contend, apart 
from the fact that a good deal of what he doesn’t want us to know seeps into his 
narrative, Crimsworth’s means of dealing with it consists in showing other characters 
only what he wants them to see. Not only is he deceptive as a narrator, but (and despite 
his attempts to deceive us), no less apparent are his efforts at deception in the face-offs 
that he recounts.  
 Crimsworth’s anxiety about being laughed at, and resulting mindfulness of 
laughter’s power, become strongly apparent on reading the novel attuned to its 
pathognomic dynamics. Although Brontë’s fiction has received extensive critical 
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attention for its engagement with physiognomy and phrenology (the ‘sciences’ of 
reading the external appearance and the skull, respectively) these approaches have 
tended to focus attention on the power acquired through masterful interpretation of 
another’s bodily appearances. On the other hand, I argue, pathognomy (the study of the 
expressions; physiognomy in motion) draws attention to the power inherent in being 
able not only to read appearances, but also to ‘write’ them. Inviting fresh consideration 
of the ways in which the ‘inner’ self is expressed or performed through the body, a 
pathognomic focus adds a new dimension to current understandings of psychology and 
the workings of self-empowerment in Brontë’s fiction. It is particularly productive for a 
re-reading of The Professor, in which Brontë’s use of phrenological and physiognomic 
terms are prominent and have led to the protagonist being viewed as essentially 
repressed and self-contained, a closed book. In standard accounts – most notably 
Shuttleworth’s – mastery of the self and others is gained through an (implicitly one-
way) act of interpretation whereby the physiognomist (or phrenologist) accurately 
penetrates into others’ secrets or ‘inner depths’, himself remaining invulnerable to such 
scrutiny. In Shuttleworth’s words: ‘Knowledge, for Crimsworth, is power. He sites his 
struggles for pre-eminence on the battleground of psychological legibility. Social 
control resides with the figure who possesses the power to read the inner state of the 
other, whilst maintaining the illegibility of the self.’9 Crimsworth (especially through 
his notoriously invasive phrenological case studies of his female pupils) in many ways 
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provides the model example. Sensing that Edward is ‘trying to read [his] character’, he 
claims to feel ‘as secure against his scrutiny as if I had on a casque with the visor down’ 
(p. 53). The suggestion is of impenetrability; he may hold the key to others’ inner 
selves, but no-one can successfully decode him. 
 However, this is not the whole story. What the model as outlined by 
Shuttleworth does not take into account is the disruptive role played by expression in 
such social exchanges. This chapter thus challenges the assumption that Crimsworth’s 
efforts at mastery (of himself and others) centre on making himself illegible, 
impenetrable, a blank sheet – ruled by restraint and negation. While he does often pride 
himself on hiding, restraining, or denying emotions, he is otherwise persistent in his 
endeavours to render his thoughts transparent, in short to make himself legible to others 
(including the reader). That is, his quest for power involves more than accruing 
knowledge, storing up details of others’ faces while remaining himself unknowable. On 
the contrary, he aspires to make himself known insofar as he can actively direct the 
impression he creates, present himself in an impressive or intimidating guise and 
impose that on others, thereby inviting rather than simply thwarting interpretation. It is 
not a ‘blank’ mask that he assumes, but an animated one. In exploring this I build on my 
analysis in Chapter Two of the ‘superior’ laugh as self-assertive and provocative 
performance; in ‘permitting’ himself to laugh ‘with a degree of scorn I took no pains to 
temper or to hide’ Crimsworth engages in an act of showing-off that has to do not with 
self-protection (as in the image of the ‘casque with the visor down’) but with self-
projection.  
 In Part One I provide an overview of pathognomy in the nineteenth century, 
outlining the distinctions between pathognomy and physiognomy (to which it is closely 
related), and illustrating how attention to fleeting rather than fixed appearances – the 
mobile face rather than the static features – allows us to recognise a more dynamic, fluid 
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conception of power in play than is produced by standard physiognomic readings. I 
argue that in changing the lens through which Brontë’s novels (and especially The 
Professor) are usually viewed – in turning to the expressive subject, as opposed to the 
passive subject of traditional physiognomic inquiry – we can more readily discern the 
self-conscious manoeuvres by which identity (in this case, Crimsworth’s masculine 
identity) is performed and transformed. In Part Two I put this into practice, attending to 
the ways in which Crimsworth affects a scornful demeanour in reaction to the 
amusement and contempt that he is typically faced with. I begin, however, by throwing 
into question the unflappable composure and self-command that he boasts of, showing 
that he is modelled primarily on comic types derived from Brontë’s early writings and 
that the novel does not encourage us to take his despotic tendencies too seriously. After 
thus identifying him as a laughable figure, whose absurdities are frequently highlighted, 
I pinpoint the root of his insecurities in the laughter that he provokes – in his sensitivity 
to the mocking faces that surround him – and finally I follow the process by which he 
turns this laughter around.  
 In Part Three, I turn to the characterisation of Frances Henri, and consider the 
extent to which a levelling of power between the sexes is permitted by so dubious a 
hero. Certainly, Frances is a clear precursor to Jane, in that subjection to her ‘master’ is 
complicated by her disrespectful mockery of his oddities. But, as in Jane Eyre, there are 
limits both to Frances’s defiance of masculine authority, and to Brontë’s defiance of 
representational norms in portraying her. As Crimsworth masters the art of the sneer 
over the course of the novel, Frances mellows and conforms. Whereas Crimsworth 
learns to control emotion through shows of knowing superiority (the intellect 
overcoming animal instinct), Frances’s womanly impulses rise to the surface. The 
increased sentimental emphasis on her femininity serves to draw attention away from 
her mental capacities and self-possession, and towards her sexuality and moral qualities 
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(a development expressed through smiles which soften and warm in proportion to 
Crimsworth’s self-development as masculine tyrant). Brontë’s first novel is thus marked 
by conflict and hesitations, ultimately returning to the combination of male aggression 
and female powerlessness – masculine minds and feminine bodies – that defines gender 
relations in the Angria saga. But it also shows significant signs of deviation from those 
stereotypes, and a more thorough examination of the expressive processes by which 
they are enacted and sustained.  
 
I 
The physiognomy of laughter would be the best of elementary books for the 
knowledge of man. If the laugh be good, so is the person.  
J. C. Lavater (1775-8) 
Charlotte Brontë cannot help herself; she has a morbid tendency to anatomize every 
passion, every impulse, every expression. Hence what may perhaps be regarded as a 
defect of all Currer Bell’s novels, she must find a motive for every little act, for the 
twirling of a thumb, and for every tol-de-rol that a man heedlessly sings: she has no 
idea of purposeless behaviour, uncontrollable impulses without meaning.  
E. S. Dallas (1857)
10
 
 
Physiognomy – the ancient practice of reading inner character from outward appearance 
– enjoyed widespread popularity in the nineteenth century, and its influence on the 
novel (as well as on wider culture and social life) has long been recognised.
11
 The craze 
was initiated by the works of Lavater (1741-1801), the Swiss pastor who taught that 
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one Italian, and no less than twenty English versions ... The regular production of the work did not much 
slacken until about 1870.’ See Graham, ‘Lavater’s Physiognomy in England’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 22 (1961) 561-72 (p. 562). For physiognomy’s influence on the novel, see Tytler, Physiognomy in 
the European Novel: Faces and Fortunes.   
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outward signs were the natural manifestation of inner qualities, and that students of 
physiognomy could learn to read these signs with skill.
12
 The pervasiveness in Brontë’s 
writing of physiognomic terms and assumptions, alongside those of phrenology, has 
been much remarked on by critics.
13
 However, pathognomy – which concerns itself 
with moods and emotions through the interpretation of temporary expressions – is a 
much less familiar term, partly because it is often conflated with physiognomy. For 
instance, in her study of expression in nineteenth-century science and art, Lucy Hartley 
briefly opines that ‘distinctions between pathognomy and physiognomy’ do not ‘hold up 
to scrutiny’, since both involve ‘the examination of external appearances [as] an index 
to internal states.’14 During the nineteenth century, the distinctions were often explained 
only to be dismissed; for instance in the Monthly Magazine (1840), we are informed that 
physiognomy ‘teaches the knowledge of character at rest’, pathognomy ‘of character in 
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 Skill and acquired knowledge were not, however, so important as they were for phrenology. As Tytler 
notes (pp. 64-5), Lavater stressed that ‘we are all born physiognomists’ and ‘we make physiognomical 
judgments all the time’, but that these judgments could be improved with practice and study.   
13
 As Shuttleworth insists, there are important differences between phrenology and physiognomy 
(although it is the latter with which I am chiefly concerned): ‘Although the two systems ... clearly 
overlapped in popular usage, they sprang from very different roots, and were associated with quite 
distinct world views. While physiognomy, as defined by Lavater and other eighteenth-century theorists, 
was an extension of theology; phrenology, in its English incarnation, was based on a materialist system of 
the mind and was linked to a specific political and social platform’ (pp. 58-9). Michael Davis explores 
how Brontë ‘exploits but also interrogates psychological concepts as adequate terms in which to describe 
the self, and draws attention to the ideological meanings and relations of power bound up with them. 
Physiognomy ... is closely identified with issues of social control. It offers a method of policing 
subjectivity according to social norms of behaviour which are heavily gender-inflected.’ See Davis, 
‘Psychology and the Idea of Character’, in The Nineteenth-Century Novel, ed. by Kucich and Taylor, pp. 
492-508 (p. 496). See also Ian Jack, ‘Physiognomy, Phrenology and Characterisation in the Novels of 
Charlotte Brontë’, Brontë Society Transactions, 13 (1970), 337-91. 
14
 Lucy Hartley, Physiognomy and the Meaning of Expression in Nineteenth-Century Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 36. Definitions of pathognomy are also offered by 
Parvulescu (p. 47), and by Julie F. Codell, ‘Expression over Beauty: Facial Expression, Body Language, 
and Circumstantiality in the Paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood’, Victorian Studies, 29 (1986), 
255-90 (p. 274). Simon Bayly has undertaken an imaginative recovery of the word pertaining to theatre 
and philosophy, in A Pathognomy of Performance. His book ‘takes up the pathognomical cause’, 
declaring that ‘the pathognomist [takes] pleasure in the fact that his quarry is as likely to evade seizure as 
to yield itself up for capture and consumption.’ The pathognomist is alert to ‘the deceptions, ploys, ruses, 
tracks and traces of what she seeks’ (p. 2).   
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motion’ – but ultimately they are ‘but two branches of one science.’15 But pathognomy 
does have a distinct history of its own, and a relationship with physiognomy which, 
though close, is not altogether complementary. In this part of the chapter I will explore 
that history and relationship, in order to suggest the potential usefulness to literary 
criticism of focusing separately on the neglected ‘branch.’16   
 As Mary Cowling points out, interest in pathognomy both preceded the arrival 
of ‘physiognomy proper’ and overtook it in the latter half of the century (notably with 
Darwin and his study of expression, from which time the practice became more 
scientific in focus, and lost the connection to physiognomy – the term ‘pathognomy’ 
becoming thereafter increasingly obscure).
17
 As Cowling explains, it was in fact ‘the 
tendency to confuse facial anatomy with the fleeting signs of human emotion, which are 
muscular, and which strictly speaking, belong within the limits of pathognomy or 
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 ‘Physiognomy’, Monthly Magazine, 4 (1840), 88-96 (p. 89). A similar summary and conclusion is 
offered in ‘On the Science of Physiognomy’, Blackwood’s, 6 (1820) 650-5 (p. 650).  
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 This has been undertaken in part by Jenny Bourne Taylor, who places the emphasis on motion in her 
summary that ‘physiognomy saw the face and body as an expressive mask on which the inner drama of 
identity was stamped.’ See Taylor, In the Secret Theatre of Home: Wilkie Collins, Sensation Narrative, 
and Nineteenth-Century Psychology (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 50; see also pp. 81-2 
for a discussion of ‘physiognomy’ which crosses over into the domain of pathognomy without making the 
distinction. Taylor gives a further helpful overview of physiognomic and phrenological trends in ‘Body 
and Mind’, in The Cambridge Companion to English Literature, 1830-1914, ed. by Joanne Shattock 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 184-204. Although again not identifying 
pathognomy by name, she observes that ‘physiognomy offered a flexible set of visual codes that 
connected facial expression to emotional response. Although popular manuals ... tended to stress the 
significance of static facial features, the emphasis on expression had been taken up and transformed 
[notably by Bell, who influenced Darwin]’, pp. 188-90. Taylor discusses the importance of expression in 
fictional texts, describing ‘physical mutability’ in the novels of Mary Elizabeth Braddon and Wilkie 
Collins – however (as this chapter will make clear), my analysis differs from Taylor’s in that the 
mutability she describes is compulsive and physiological: the ‘body acts out the tensions [of] inner 
psychic struggle. Both the face and the body thus become the means of expressing complex inner 
tensions, as physiognomy becomes integrated into a wider bodily economy’ (pp. 190-1).  
17
 Indeed, Darwin was keen to disassociate his ideas from the pseudoscientific practice of physiognomy. 
See Cowling, The Artist as Anthropologist: the Representation of Type and Character in Victorian Art 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 17-8, 31. Tytler (p. 47) provides a summary of pre-
Lavaterian physiognomy, including the eighteenth-century researches of James Parsons (1705-70), who 
investigated the ‘Actions of the Muscles of the Face and their particular Obedience to the Influence of the 
Mind.’ Other notable pathognomists included Charles le Brun (1619-90) and Lord Kames (1696-1782) – 
for details see Cowling, p. 17. 
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expression’ which was ‘one of the main forces behind the development of [Lavater’s] 
physiognomy.’18 Lavater set out to define his work in contrast to pathognomy, stressing 
that physiognomy ‘is the knowledge of the signs of the powers and inclinations of men’, 
whereas ‘pathognomy is the knowledge of the signs of the passions.’ Physiognomy 
addresses ‘the form of the solid and the appearance of the moveable parts while at rest’; 
pathognomy ‘the moveable parts in motion.’19 While Lavater did not wholly restrict 
himself to the permanent features, finding plenty to say about expressions (including 
laughter) nonetheless he considered the distinction to be an important one, and was 
wary – for reasons we will see – of reliance on ‘the moveable parts in motion’ as 
physiognomic signs.
20
  
 The advantages of a change in focus have been recognised (in passing) by Paul 
White, who remarks that: 
Charlotte Brontë has often been placed firmly within the Lavaterian tradition, and it 
is clear that physiognomy remains important for the description and development of 
her characters; but it is a physiognomy that is highly suspect when restricted to the 
permanent features of the face, one that unfolds instead through the body’s 
movements and inner workings.
21
 
This is an astute observation, but White’s reference to ‘the body’s movements and inner 
workings’ reflects his interest in the physiological, rather than physiognomic, 
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 Lavater, p. 31.  
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 As Sharrona Pearl points out, it was the ‘purists’ who ‘insisted that physiognomy referred only to the 
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 Paul White, ‘The Face of Physiology’, 19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, 7 
(2008), <www.19.bbk.ac.uk> [last accessed 22 April 2015] (para. 7 of 24).     
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dimensions of expression. Omitting the term pathognomy in favour of ‘the face of 
physiology’, he proposes a shift away from ‘the Lavaterian tradition’ in the direction of 
the anatomical approach taken by Bell (1824) and Darwin (1872). As I suggested in the 
introduction to this thesis, pathognomy as understood in this way is largely the study of 
muscular movements – that which goes on beneath the literal surface of the face. This is 
not to say that it was physical instead of psychological, but rather that it sidelined the 
question of intentionality on the part of the subject, seeking to explain the correlation of 
mind and body through accounts of how the inner ‘passions’ produced outward effect, 
via the physical mechanics of the body. As an artist, Bell was interested in how to 
portray that ‘mental excitement, which draws the frame into action ... uncontrollable 
movements of the body, not determined by the will, but spontaneously arising with the 
state of feeling.’ He traced how ‘states of feeling’ might ‘produce’ a smile by their 
impact on the muscles, or bring about ‘the condition of a man convulsed with laughter 
... incapable of a voluntary act.’22 As a scientist, Darwin was not interested in laughter 
that is ‘employed in a forced manner to conceal or mask some other state of mind’, but 
in natural expression that can be reliably analysed in connection with its correspondent 
emotion – the involuntary laughter that ‘expresses mere happiness or joy.’23 As 
suggested in Chapter One, it is just such ‘uncontrollable movements’ that are considered 
by Spencer and Bain, too, in their physiological accounts of laughter’s function.  
 As we have seen, Brontë’s novels do contain instances where (in Bell’s words) 
‘the actions and expressions of the body betray the emotions of the heart.’24 Jane finds 
herself failing ‘to control the working muscles of my face – which I feel rebel insolently 
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 Bell, pp. 134-5.  
23
 Darwin, p. 212.  
24
 Bell, p. 181.  
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against my will, and struggle to express what I had resolved to conceal.’25 In Villette, ‘a 
smile of pleasure transforms Paul Emanuel’s countenance ‘from a mask to a face’; it is 
an ‘illuminated sign of milder [and] warmer feeling.’26 In her analysis of the role of the 
blush ‘as an act of self-expression’, outside conscious control, with the capacity ‘to 
reflect a readable self’, Mary Ann O’Farrell demonstrates the convenience of the 
transparent face as a novelistic device.
27
 But more prevalent than such spontaneous 
revelations of feeling in Brontë’s fiction are ‘mask’-like manifestations (or in Darwin’s 
words, laughter ‘employed in a forced manner’): ‘that strange smile which passes from 
ear to ear, and is marked only by a sharp thin curve, which fails to spread over the 
countenance, and neither dimples the cheek nor lights the eye.’28 As E. S. Dallas 
complained (in the epigraph above), Brontë ‘anatomizes’ every passion, every impulse, 
every expression – but not in the same physical sense as Darwin and Bell; ‘she must 
find a motive for every little act ... she has no idea of purposeless behaviour, 
uncontrollable impulses without meaning.’ That is, the language of expression for 
Brontë involves a degree of calculation and social awareness; emotion (‘uncontrollable 
impulse’) rarely goes unmediated by a conscious thought process. How, then, is it to be 
translated in the context of pathognomy? 
 The answer lies in the uncomfortable challenges that a pathognomic perspective 
brings to the practice of physiognomy more broadly conceived – the questions that it 
may lead to concerning the role of volition on the part of the subject. Lavater believed 
laughter to be useful to the physiognomist, claiming that ‘the physiognomy of laughter 
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 Brontë, Jane Eyre, p. 244.  
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 Brontë, Villette, p. 321.  
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 O’Farrell, p. 5.  
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 Brontë, Villette, p. 328. (Cf. Dickens’s description, quoted in Chapter One, of Uriah Heep having ‘not 
such a thing as a smile about him [so that] he could only widen his mouth and make two hard creases 
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would be the best of elementary books for the knowledge of man’, but – as suggested by 
his attempts to differentiate his ideas about physiognomy from those of pathognomy – 
the matter of expression more generally touches a weak point in his philosophy, 
complicating his claims to enable the sure decoding of an essential, and essentially 
passive subject. Carsten Zelle suggests that Lavater’s ‘scientific’ attempts to focus on 
the skeleton and ‘firm’ parts of the body (a practice that would be taken to its logical 
conclusion with the emergence of phrenology) was a means of avoiding the 
untrustworthy and ‘variable’ signs that were the province of the pathognomist, who is 
‘always at risk of being misled by his subject’s simulation.’29 Juliet McMaster describes 
the fashion for simulation that emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century – the 
manuals that were produced on ‘how to fake it’ – inspired by the observations of 
pathognomists, and accounting for Lavater’s determined ‘preference for physiognomy’, 
strictly defined.
30
 And as Josh Epstein explains, ‘facial expression was eventually 
abandoned by the disciples of Lavater for its susceptibility to affect as opposed to 
essential character traits.’31  
 In short, pathognomy raises inconvenient questions. The strict physiognomist 
preferred a static appearance to study since it could be easily correlated with an innate 
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 Carsten Zelle, ‘Soul Semiology’, in The Faces of Physiognomy, ed. by Ellis Shookman (Columbia: 
Camden House, 1993), pp. 40-63 (p. 45).  
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 Juliet McMaster, Reading the Body in the Eighteenth-Century Novel (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
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essence. But pathognomy – while still looking to read the inner character as present in 
outer signs – threatens to take power from the interpreter, and hand it to the subject 
under interpretation. The issue is one of unpredictability; replacing a static face with a 
mobile one, the pathognomist not only risks being misled, but destabilises the 
Lavaterian assumption that character is innate and essential, waiting to be decoded. 
Instead – faced with shifting expressions and changeable inner states – it is the 
possibilities for self-determination on the part of the subject that come to the fore. And 
it is precisely these possibilities that rise to the surface when reading faces in Brontë’s 
fiction. Although pathognomy is not a term that she uses, nonetheless her novels are 
filled with images of ‘the character in motion’, as well as ‘the character at rest.’ ‘Why 
do you smile, Jane?’ asks Rochester. ‘What does that inexplicable, that uncanny turn of 
countenance mean?’32 Such ‘turns of countenance’, or in The Professor, ‘phases of 
physiognomy’ (p. 180), make frequent – though fleeting – appearances, along with the 
challenge of reading their meaning. It is an interpretative quest which brings to light 
Brontë’s perception of character as mutable and performed, and hence, her awareness of 
the constructed, unstable nature of (gendered) identity.
33
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 Jane Eyre, p. 261.  
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 In Butler’s words, ‘there is no gender identity behind the expression of gender ... identity is 
performatively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results’ (Gender Trouble, p. 
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will argue, from those that they project or perform.   
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 In exploring these ideas I am indebted to Epstein, who focuses on George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch (1871-2) in an article which is worth quoting from extensively. Epstein 
discusses not expression but ‘neutrality’, claiming that Eliot ‘unseats physiognomy as a 
system of knowledge in order to replace it with an irrevocably contingent state of being, 
where representational strategies are recognised so they can be used.’ The ability of the 
subject to situate him or herself tactically ‘[damages] physiognomy as a credible system 
of meaning’, and in this way Eliot ‘[explodes] the Lavaterian system’ – physiognomy 
‘proves itself incapable to deal with the contingencies of tactical self-representation.’34 
It is this concept of ‘representational strategies’ and ‘tactical self-representation’ that I 
engage with in this chapter, showing its applicability to Crimsworth. However, while 
Epstein insists that Middlemarch ‘recasts illegibility as a volitional mode of self-
presentation’, I contend that the points he makes about the deliberately neutral, 
frustratingly illegible face are pertinent to – and can be fruitfully expanded through – 
consideration of the deliberately expressive face (as drawn attention to by the novelist), 
where performance on the part of the subject being read is similarly undermining to the 
premises of physiognomy. Epstein’s article is particularly suggestive in considering the 
‘neutral’ face from a feminist perspective, suggesting the power of the tactically blank 
face to ‘[threaten] the male by virtue of its indecipherability.’35 This notion of 
expression as strategy is key to my assessment of the subversive capacity of smiles and 
laughter in Brontë’s novels more widely – but it is precisely decipherability, the 
subject’s role in making herself (threateningly) legible, rather than illegible, which I 
place at the centre of my argument.  
 The process of ‘surfacing the personality, of making it completely legible’ is 
touched on from a different angle by Dames, who argues that essential interiority – 
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represented for Dames by memory – is ‘obscured and demoted’ by the practice of 
phrenology, a ‘model of visuality’ which privileges ‘surfaces’ at the expense of 
‘depths’, rather than simply building a bridge between them. Dames suggests we read 
Brontë’s work as ‘less a critique of repression than an instance of a psychological model 
that prefers the progressive, the active, the forward-looking’ to habits of dwelling on the 
past.’36 I develop this insight by turning from the visibility of the skull to the 
performativity of the face, arguing that it is chiefly in rewriting himself through active 
expression that Crimsworth attempts to move forward – to overcome (or ‘repress’) his 
humiliations. In doing so I also reconsider John Kucich’s analysis of the meanings of 
‘repression’ in Brontë’s fiction. As Kucich says, repression ‘is usually understood to be 
only a defensive practice – at best, a means by which the heroines screen themselves 
from male vision.’ Yet it is also ‘a powerful aggressive weapon’ which secures stable 
self-identity, as well as ‘tactical benefits.’ But, demonstrating ‘the extent to which 
[Brontë’s protagonists] convert repression into power ... self-negating impulses into 
self-containing ones’, Kucich still accepts the notion of the ‘screen’, of self-
containment.
37
 Thus, Crimsworth ‘[employs] important strategies of reserve’: 
The self-suppression apparently enforced by his class position is transformed in this 
novel from humiliation or defensiveness into devastating personal power ... From the 
very beginning of The Professor, William Crimsworth is adept at using his enforced 
reserve as an instrument of mastery ... Brontë’s characters demonstrate acute feelings 
of vulnerability about the details of their inward lives. [But] William’s silence is an 
aggressive, flagrant performance of his independence, of his imperviousness to 
Edward’s attacks. Inwardly, William resolves to adopt silent steadfastness as a 
defiance of his brother’s influence.38 
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Synthesising Kucich’s account of the power gained through repression with Epstein’s 
more specific focus on facial expression, in the analysis of The Professor that follows I 
expand on their ideas about aggressive and strategic performance while thoroughly 
overturning the terms in which they see this happening: neutrality, suppression, reserve, 
silent steadfastness. Moreover I begin by pushing further Kucich’s understanding that it 
is ‘humiliation’ that informs Crimsworth’s ‘acute feelings of vulnerability’, by 
demonstrating that it is, specifically, mockery that eats away at Crimsworth’s self-
respect – and mockery that, consequently, he endeavours to project back outwards onto 
the world.  
II 
The first step, in toppling the persona that Crimsworth builds up for himself, is to 
recognise the points of continuity between Brontë’s juvenilia and her first novel. 
Supposedly a dry and sober tale, The Professor nonetheless shows evidence throughout 
of the strong spirit of irony and absurdity that colours the Angrian stories. If those 
stories reveal, as Christine Alexander claims, ‘a sense of humour often denied to the 
Brontës by those familiar only with their later works’, in some respects The Professor 
retains a similar comic extravagance.
39
 The difficulty is that the protagonist, who takes 
himself very seriously, has tended to persuade readers to take him seriously too. Yet as 
Heather Glen points out, the narrating personae of the early writings are not ‘figures of 
unquestioned masculine power ... They are themselves objects of representation; they 
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are often mockingly characterized, and their weaknesses and inadequacies exposed.’ 
And The Professor ‘seems from the first to have been conceived as a fiction of this 
kind.’40 But while Glen, despite this, considers Crimsworth as primarily representative 
of the grimly serious self-made man type, my initial focus will be on the ways in which 
he is trivialised, his ‘weaknesses and inadequacies’ exposed by way of comedy, as well 
as critique. This is an important distinction because Crimsworth’s foibles and follies are 
apparent not only in a few satirical touches of the author, for our benefit; his absurdity is 
a theme acknowledged, signposted in the text – the mocking laughter of the novel’s 
other characters is constantly creeping into his (and therefore our) line of vision. 
 Crimsworth’s silliness is threefold: he is a romantic in denial, prone to the kind 
of high-flown sentiments and enthusiasm that he assures us are alien to his nature; he 
can be unwontedly stiff, pompous and prudish; and his narrative voice often echoes the 
camp, affected tones of Angria’s high society dandies. His foolish vanity and 
priggishness are brought to the fore when, in one incident, his employer’s elderly 
mother invites him to tea, and he convinces himself that (being French) she intends to 
make love to him. Responding with exaggerated ‘fearful dismay’ (‘Gracious heavens!’) 
he contemplates running away; instead he is obliged to sit down, where (observing ‘a 
bottle of something’ on the table), ‘the cold sweat started on my brow – already I 
glanced back over my shoulder at the closed door.’ He finds himself ‘seated fairly 
between’ two old ladies – one ‘as fat and as rubicund as [the other] was meagre and 
yellow’, with a ‘jolly face’ and ‘a twinkle and leer in her left eye.’ He is shocked by the 
‘stiff tumbler of punch’ they pour out, and when they laugh at his attempts at gallantry, 
he ‘whipped out a white pocket-handkerchief and wafted it, with a French grace, past 
my nose, bowing at the same time’ (pp. 101-4). The scene derives its humour from the 
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 Making another suggestive comparison, Glen adds that ‘the voice of the novel’s narrator is as distinct 
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image of the discomforted Crimsworth being sandwiched between these caricatured 
‘droll old creatures’, and from the contrast between his awkwardness and their harmless 
merriment. On top of this is there is his horror of being seduced by an old woman (her 
‘lace cap with flourishing red roses’ seems at first to ‘confirm [his] worst 
apprehensions’), and their amusement at his formal flattery. ‘You are a dangerous 
person, I fear,’ laughs the unsentimental Madame Reuter, ‘if you can forge compliments 
at that rate’ (p. 104). The scene plays alternately on his English uprightness (confronted 
with the ‘jolly’ decadence of outrageous foreigners) and his dandified airs, the ‘French 
grace’ with which he ‘whips out a pocket-handkerchief.’ The handkerchief gesture in 
particular is redolent of numerous comic instances in Angria, where it serves to show up 
foppishness or wounded vanity.
41
 
 Despite priding himself on his plain spoken, down-to-earth manners (usually 
manifested in simple rudeness), Crimsworth retains traces of the languishing, dandified 
type that figures prominently in Brontë’s early stories – as we find, for instance, in the 
voice of Charles Townshend:  
My dear reader, when you are inclined to grow enthusiastic ... just recall my image, 
leaning over the gallery with my hat on, alternately squeezing and sucking on a 
remarkably fine Madeira orange, and meantime cocking my eye at the honourable 
gent ... with an expression sufficiently indicative of the absorbing interest I take in 
his speechifications.
42
 
Lacking Townshend’s elegance and relaxed confidence, Crimsworth nonetheless echoes 
something of his pompous wordiness and studied casualness of tone, as in the claim: ‘I 
like unexaggerated intercourse; it is not my way to overpower with amorous epithets’ 
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(p. 249).
43
 He has a habit of undercutting high sentiments with drily ironic reflections, 
and even has the eye for trivia typical of fashionable Angrian fops – desperately 
searching for the woman he loves, Crimsworth finds time for such scathing asides as: 
‘(Gracious goodness! why don’t they dress better? My eye is yet filled with visions of 
the high-flounced, slovenly and tumbled dresses ... the ill-cut coats and strangely-
fashioned pantaloons)’ (p. 191). He is satirised as a man making his way up in the 
world, but also for the traits he inherits from his aristocratic mother (and from Angria’s 
silver-fork figures); it is for this that he is mocked by the straight-talking Hunsden, and 
despised by his tradesman brother Edward. His delicate notions are constantly coming 
up against hard truths – as when, before encountering the schoolgirls that live next-door, 
he is obliged to confess that his ‘sentimental reflections were occasionally a trifle 
disarranged by the not quite silvery [sounds] which, rising from the unseen paradise 
below, penetrated clamorously into my solitude’ (pp. 96-7).  
 The scene in which Edward brandishes a whip at his brother (who is employed 
as his counting-house drudge) is as much an exercise in comic contrast as it is a serious 
struggle for power. It is, moreover, recognisably descended from similar incidents in the 
Angria stories involving the antagonistic brothers Edward and William Percy. In The 
Professor, Edward’s violent ranting is foiled by William’s nonchalant observation that 
‘he was going on in the same breath, when an abrupt pause announced that rage had for 
the moment got the better of articulation.’ Abused as a ‘Hypocrite and Twaddler! 
Smooth-faced, snivelling Grease-horn!’ he tells us in a parenthetical aside that ‘this last 
term is – I believe – purely [local] and alludes to the horn of black, rancid whale-oil, 
usually to be seen suspended to cart-wheels’ (p. 73). Similarly, in ‘The Duke of 
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 Cf. Townshend, in ‘Henry Hastings’ (p. 207): ‘I make a point of never speaking in raptures, especially 
in a stage-coach.’   
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Zamorna’, we find William Percy’s tradesman older brother lashing out at him with a 
whip shouting ‘Fire and Fury! Butter and brimstone!’ while the sarcastic narrator 
escapes, ‘waving a white handkerchief as a parting token of fraternal affection.’44 The 
Professor’s comic affinity with Angria is most evident in such scenes of boisterous, 
farcical energy: Crimsworth wrestling an intoxicated Pelet to bed (pp. 208-9), deftly 
hopping out of Edward’s range, or tumbling about having ‘a tug for it’ with Hunsden (p. 
267). The use of slang is also in this spirit; it is hard to imagine characters of the later 
novels describing themselves as ‘a shy noodle’ (p. 57) or accused of being a ‘Twaddler.’ 
Edward’s tirade, indeed, is typical of colourful Angrian ‘speechifications’ in this line 
(for instance: ‘G – d d – n! Blast such folly! Cursed conceited humbug! Infernal 
petticoat perverseness! Fetid foppery!’45) ‘The adult antagonists of The Professor bawl 
puerile abuse like characters from Branwell’s and Charlotte’s juvenilia’, as Stevie 
Davies observes.
46
 
 But beneath his refined airs and efforts to rise above such puerile abuse, 
Crimsworth’s lack of dignity is discernible – especially in the earlier parts of the novel. 
He smugly asserts that if Edward ‘could have once placed me in a ridiculous or 
mortifying position, he would have forgiven me much, but I was guarded by three 
faculties: Caution, Tact, Observation’ (p. 63). Yet the whip-dodging drama forms one of 
several instances of Crimsworth being placed in ridiculous or mortifying positions, 
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 Brontë, ‘The Duke of Zamorna’, p. 177. Alternatively, in The Green Dwarf (p. 5), theatrical brutality 
against a weedier, irritating younger brother is comically presented through the Wellesleys: Arthur (later 
the Duke of Zamorna) greets the narrator Charles (later Townshend): ‘What a little chalky spoon ... The 
whipping I bestowed on him as stuck to his small body right well’, at which Charles indignantly 
exclaims, ‘Fratricide! [...] How dare you speak thus lightly to your half-murdered brother! How dare you 
demand whether the tortures you have inflicted continue yet to writhe his agonised frame!’   
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 ‘Henry Hastings’, p. 254.  
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 Stevie Davies, ‘Three distinct and unconnected tales’, in the Cambridge Companion to the Brontës, ed. 
by Glen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 72-98 (p. 77).   
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utterly belying his claims to unflappable composure.
47
 Awkward, easily alarmed, and 
wary of female sexuality, we can by no means trust Crimsworth when he tells us ‘I 
bowed with instantaneously recovered sang-froid – for I am not easily embarrassed’ (p. 
107). He is laughed at by his female pupils, who observe that they have made him blush 
(pp. 113-115), and he admits to feeling ‘the blood stir about my heart and rise warm to 
my cheek’ when Pelet mockingly identifies his ‘weak point’ as ‘the sentimental’ (p. 
122). When Crimsworth assures Pelet that he may have been abashed in front of the 
girls at first, ‘but I rallied and got through with all due sang-froid’, Pelet’s response is to 
brutally undercut his pretensions: ‘I don’t believe you’ (p. 124).  
 His resolutely masculine abruptness and aggressiveness, as well as his 
sensitivity, are satirically portrayed. His self-important description of how he asserts 
himself in the classroom, inviting us to visualise his overly dramatic movements, 
certainly smacks of absurdity: ‘I entered, flinging the door wide and striding in fast, as it 
was my wont to do now, for I had found that in entering with aplomb, and mounting the 
estrade with emphasis, consisted the grand secret of ensuring immediate silence’ (p. 
147). Indeed, many of his more sinister traits should be read alongside his laughable 
traits, and seen in the context of his readily embarrassed nature.
48
 His assumption of 
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 In this respect, he is comparable to the ‘indignant youth’ Edward Sydney in ‘The Foundling’, who as a 
prim, proper and overly earnest Englishman in Angria finds himself constantly the butt of jokes amidst 
the sarcastic, disrespectful residents. Sydney’s enthusiasm and moral ideas are soundly satirised in the 
story – he is represented as naive rather than heroic. See for instance page 17, where a servant is 
instructed to pick up the outraged Sydney, and ‘carried him off with the same ease as he would have done 
a child’, to ‘a burst of laughter from all the spectators’, or page 35, where his chivalrous but farcically 
unsuccessful attempts to rescue a lady from her horse cause Arthur Wellesley hearty amusement. Brontë, 
The Foundling: A Tale of Our Own Times by Captain Tree (London: Hesperus, 2004).  
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 For instance, his spying habits appear less disturbing when seen as a continuation of the comical 
representation of Townshend’s and William Percy’s antics. ‘I quickened my pace to get a nearer view’, or 
‘My eye is quick, my fingers are light’ are the boasts of these shameless voyeurs, who delight to be ‘left 
alone in a lady’s boudoir.’ See ‘Stancliffe’s Hotel’ (pp. 95, 97), and ‘The Duke of Zamorna’ (p. 133). 
Disappointed that his bedroom window is blocked by a ‘most tantalizing board’, Crimsworth’s 
opportunistic lechery is in a similarly flippant vein: ‘I thought it would have been so pleasant ... so 
amusing to have watched the demoiselles at their play ... myself the while, sheltered from view by a 
modest muslin curtain’ (pp. 54-5). In the manner of Townshend and Percy’s thwarted adventures, he is 
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callousness towards Frances is redolent of William Percy’s rudeness to the ‘plain, 
pinched’ Elizabeth Hastings (‘pretending not to see her, I carelessly followed the rest 
and took my place, with all the ease and coolness of my natural habits’).49 But for all his 
aggressive unfriendliness, so smugly relayed to the reader, Crimsworth does not really 
possess the ‘ease and coolness’ of the haughty Percy. In referring (as Kearns does) to 
his ‘unendearing self-control’, his ‘phlegmatic and controlled’ feelings, critics take him 
at his own word.
50
 W. A. Craik suggests that ‘Crimsworth’s scorn and distaste for his 
young Belgian pupils are hardly natural in the competent and cool young man he is 
supposed to be; but are very right in Villette as the reaction of a nervous and not very 
competent young woman.’51 But it is precisely coolness and competence that 
Crimsworth lacks – his disproportionate feelings of scorn and distaste arise (like 
Lucy’s) from nervousness, from the fear of being undermined.  
 The spying, suspicious atmosphere, and Crimsworth’s habitual recourse to 
physiognomy or phrenology in his judgments of people, are salient features of The 
Professor. As Glen states, the ‘imagery of looking and being looked at runs throughout 
the novel, chillingly replacing any more intimate conception of human interaction.’52 
Yet this sinister picture is encapsulated with a playful touch in Townshend’s account, in 
‘Henry Hastings’: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
annoyed that ‘that old duenna of a Directress’ has spoilt his fun, not letting him ‘get a peep’ at the 
schoolgirls. In effect, the penetrative power of the male gaze is limited here by the ludicrousness of the 
male in question.  
49
 ‘Henry Hastings, p. 240. Percy is satirised for his pompousness and selfishness – later noticing the 
neglected governess in tears, he decides not to speak to her: ‘there was something that suited my turn of 
mind [in the picture she presented]. I would not break the charm by trying to remove the sorrow’ (p. 241). 
Male obnoxious of this kind is normal behaviour in Angria.  
50
 Kearns, p. 142.  
51
 W. A. Craik, The Brontë Novels (New York: Routledge, 1968; repr. 2011), p. 53.  
52
 Glen, Introduction to The Professor, p. 18.  
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As she sat shrinking behind me she had taken the opportunity of my seeming 
abstraction to scrutinize my physiognomy most closely. Consequently, when I made 
the unexpected movement of turning my head, I saw her veil thrown back and her 
eyes fixed full on me with a gaze of keen, sharp observation. I protest I felt almost 
flattered by the discovery. However, I soon recovered my wonted self-possession 
sufficiently to take revenge by an answering stare of, I flatter myself, at least equal 
intensity.
53
 
Crimsworth’s conceited narrative voice is recognisable in the above, and it is this 
obsessive attitude towards the reading of faces (as well as the use of the face to enact 
expressive ‘revenge’) that I will explore next. But what in The Professor has struck 
readers as disconcerting is for the flippant Townshend a kind of game, in which his own 
competitive motives are readily offered up to the reader. With the loss of Townshend’s 
calm assurance and casual honesty comes increased authorial attention to those 
insecurities of the narrator that lurk beneath the surface, and to the role of his own 
ludicrousness in fuelling his anxieties.  
 According to Glen, in The Professor Brontë ‘casts a cold eye on [a] familiar 
contemporary masculine type’; Crimsworth’s ‘is not presented as a peculiar or eccentric 
stance, but as endemic to the world through which he moves. Observation and 
objectification of the other are central to the dynamics of the society of the novel.’54 
Without disputing this on the whole, I must insist that Crimsworth is both peculiar and 
eccentric. Not so much a ‘type’ as a contradictory jumble of types, he inherits from the 
lively comic characters and scenes of Angria, as well as offering an imitation of the 
strict self-made man. While it would be stretching it to say that he is affectionately 
portrayed, to say that he is conceived entirely with ‘a cold eye’ is perhaps to take him 
(and his own cold gaze) as seriously as he takes himself. Moreover, the ridiculous 
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elements of his character are significant because of the deeper insights that they give 
rise to. Demonstrating the ways in which Crimsworth is characterised as non-serious is 
the first step to perceiving him as laughable, and recognising this is key to grasping his 
acute sensitivity to laughter, and his manner of dealing with it – which consists in 
‘answering’ not just with stares, but with sneers of equal intensity.  
‘A series of covert sneers’ 
Crimsworth is ill at ease in company and disconcerted by cheerful scenes: he is 
alienated by the laughter shared between his brother and sister-in-law at dinner (p. 45), 
while at a party he is made to feel like a ‘block, or a piece of furniture’ amidst the 
‘smiling faces’ (p. 57). And while often excluded or sidelined by smiles and laughter, he 
is more frequently (and more crushingly) their object; his story, on examination, is one 
of continual humiliation from all sides, and the ways in which he responds to or denies 
it. Initially his career is triggered by the contempt of his uncle: he would not have 
chosen to go into trade, ‘but such was the scorn expressed in Lord Tynedale’s 
countenance ... such the contemptuous sarcasm of his tone’ that it decides him: ‘My 
father was but a name to me, yet that name I did not like to hear mentioned with a sneer 
to my very face’ (p. 40). While his aristocratic uncle holds him in disdain for his 
plebeian heritage, his tradesman brother despises him for his Eton upbringing and the 
manners that come with it – when he lets out a ‘deep, involuntary sigh’ (of 
disappointment, so he tells us) on gazing at Mrs Crimsworth, ‘she took it as a homage to 
her beauty, and Edward ... threw on me a glance – half ridicule, half ire’ (p. 46). He is 
the victim of misunderstanding again when he romantically believes himself to be in 
love with Zoraïde Reuter, and she with him, then is disillusioned by overhearing her 
‘little laugh of exulting coquetry’ as she and her real lover – Pelet – mock him beneath 
the open window (p. 139). The closest he has to a friend, Hunsden, seems to find him no 
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less contemptible, and even Frances’s awe of him is significantly tempered with 
rebellious sarcasm.  
In all these cases, Crimsworth’s awareness of being mocked is filtered or 
mediated through the defensive stance of his narrative – thus he reports Pelet telling 
Reuter that he (Crimsworth) blushes whenever her name is mentioned (‘which was a lie, 
by the by – I had never gone so far as that, after all’) (p. 139). The persistence with 
which such instances are brought to our attention has much to do with the persistent 
quality of the mockery, as Crimsworth perceives it. While Tynedale sneers ‘to his very 
face’ or Hunsden ‘only replied by looking in my face and laughing’ (p. 79), more often 
what is evoked is an impression of falsely discreet or undercover mockery which 
operates by a kind of stealth. Even on first arriving at the school, when Crimsworth is 
‘willing to take Pelet for what he seemed – to believe him benevolent and friendly’ (p. 
100), he feels uncomfortable, distrustful of his ‘quiet, sarcastic smile’, suspecting that 
he is ‘sometimes a little sarcastic and sometimes a little too insinuating’ (p. 99). ‘I broke 
from M. Pelet’, Crimsworth tells us, ‘and as I strode down the passage he followed me 
with one of his laughs – a very French, rakish, mocking sound’ (p. 111). The image 
perfectly encapsulates the sense that dogs Crimsworth’s brash, striding narrative, of 
having his assertiveness undercut behind his back, or through the open window – of 
being ‘quietly’ but persistently undermined.  
 It is a perception which does indeed ‘follow’ him everywhere, infringing on his 
consciousness and impacting on his confidence. Despite his concern when Frances goes 
missing, he initially refuses to run ‘the risk of exciting silly smiles and gossiping 
whispers’ by making enquiries (p. 179). And when he asks Rosalie the portresse for 
Frances’s address, she ‘looked up from her work with a knowing smile, precisely the 
sort of smile I had been so desirous to avoid exciting’ (p. 180). The idea of a sustained 
attack, both blatant and unsettlingly covert, is explored through the manoeuvres of the 
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schoolgirls, whose continual object is apparently to disrupt his lessons and undermine 
his authority. Their first reaction to him (‘I’m about to split my sides with laughter’, 
‘How he blushed when he spoke!’, ‘He’s a real greenhorn’55) is perfectly audible, yet 
given an air of discretion by being delivered in French, and under cover of the desks – 
‘behind the lifted lids which momentarily screened the heads bent down to search for 
exercise-books, I heard tittering and whispers’ (pp. 113-4). It is chiefly ‘tittering’ and 
‘silly smiles’ that are used to threaten Crimsworth in the classroom – the spread of 
laughter constitutes a ‘mutiny’ (p. 116). The sexual threat (as traditionally symbolised 
by women’s laughter) is what most discomposes him, as seen in his perception of their 
boldly promiscuous smiles: ‘If I looked at these girls with little scruple, they looked at 
me with still less ... Hortense regarded me boldly, and giggled at the same time.’ As for 
Caroline, ‘parting her lips, as full as those of a hot-blooded Maroon, she showed her 
well-set teeth sparkling between them, and treated me at the same time to a smile’ (p. 
115). ‘An air of bold, impudent flirtation, or a loose, silly leer’ claims Crimsworth, ‘was 
sure to answer the most ordinary glance from a masculine eye’ (p. 127).  
The ambiguous nature of the taunting that Crimsworth feels himself to be 
exposed to is apparent in the following passage: 
Aurelia’s conduct in class, at least when I am present, is something extraordinary, 
considered as an index of girlish innocence. The moment I enter the room, she 
nudges her next neighbour and indulges in a half-suppressed laugh. As I take my seat 
on the estrade, she fixes her eye on me; she seems resolved to attract, and, if 
possible, monopolize my notice: to this end she launches at me all sorts of looks, 
languishing, provoking, leering, laughing. As I am found quite proof against this sort 
of artillery – for we scorn what, unasked, is lavishly offered – she has recourse to the 
expedient of making noises ... If, in walking up the schoolroom, I pass near her, she 
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puts out her foot that it may touch mine; if I do not happen to observe the manoeuvre 
... she affects to fall into convulsions of suppressed laughter (p. 128). 
Notable here is his perception of ‘artillery’, ‘launching’, ‘expedients’ and ‘manoeuvres’ 
– the deliberateness with which the leering Aurelia attempts to seduce him, ‘affecting’ 
to fall into convulsions of well-aimed laughter. And despite her ‘lavish’ and ‘provoking’ 
brazenness, the whole is contained by the familiar drama of covertness, of ‘suppressed’ 
or ‘half-suppressed’ laughter. Back in England, Edward’s taunting had involved the 
same mixture of subtlety and persistent affront: learning that Crimsworth is religious, he 
‘turned the information into a weapon of attack against the equability of my temper. He 
commenced a series of covert sneers’ – sneers which are his ‘ammunition.’ Crimsworth 
in turn learns to come ‘prepared, [managing] to receive the mill-owner’s blasphemous 
sarcasms, when next levelled at me, on a buckler of impenetrable indifference’ (p. 56).  
 His mingled susceptibility to and disgust for the sensual allure of the girls is 
sharply appreciated by the ‘rakish’, morally degenerate Frenchman Pelet, with his ‘quiet 
sarcastic smile’ and lewd insinuations. His mockery of the ‘frigid’ Crimsworth threatens 
his pretensions to dignity and to sexual aloofness with suitably invasive language: ‘Any 
woman sinking her shaft deep enough will at last reach a fathomless spring of 
sensibility in thy breast, Crimsworth’, he taunts, generating the desired response: ‘I felt 
the blood stir about my heart and rise warm to my cheek’ (p. 122).56 Pelet’s teasing has 
the same effect as the ‘knowing smile’ that Crimsworth is ‘so desirous to avoid’, or 
indeed of the metaphorical ‘shaft’ with which he is threatened; his probing 
identification of Crimsworth’s ‘weak point’ has a perceptibly physical impact, 
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producing a blush (the ‘spring of sensibility’) which he cannot mask or suppress. It 
evokes the imposing presence of the ‘leering’, provocative girls, who show him their 
teeth in a move which is animalistic and aggressive, yet at the same time mysterious and 
seductive.  
 The favourite pastime, indeed, of both Pelet and Reuter consists in testing, 
probing and tricking Crimsworth, seeking to draw his ‘real’ self to the surface by 
exciting involuntary facial expression. Pelet goes into rhapsodies about the girls, much 
to Crimsworth’s suspicion: ‘I might have laughed at the director’s enthusiasm had I 
believed it real, but there was something in his tone which indicated got-up raptures. I 
felt he was only affecting fervour in order to put me off my guard, to induce me to come 
out in return, so I scarcely even smiled.’ His employer’s attempts to embarrass him are 
apparent on his shift in approach when Crimsworth conveys his disapproval: ‘He 
laughed a forced laugh, affirmed that he had only been joking, and demanded to know 
whether I could possibly have thought him in earnest’ (p. 125). Reuter, having lost her 
flirtatious hold over the schoolteacher, achieves a triumph when her flattery brings 
about a lapse in his prickly resolve: she ‘caught the prohibited smile, though I passed 
my hand over my mouth to conceal it’ (p. 183). Laughter and smiles in these cases work 
to secure or to surrender control of a situation depending on whether they reveal the 
inner state (expression as studied by Bell and Darwin) or feature as an exercise in self-
mastery (evoking the capacity of the pathognomic subject to simulate or mislead). Thus 
Crimsworth’s inability to cover up his warmer feelings tells against him, whereas Pelet 
employs his ‘forced laugh’ in order to regain control. Pelet’s ‘jesting allusions’ (p. 207) 
to Reuter are particularly sneaky given the fact, later revealed, that he is secretly 
engaged to her. Asked how he likes Reuter’s features, Crimsworth guardedly replies: ‘a 
little harsh, especially her mouth’ at which Pelet ‘chuckled inwardly’ and presses the 
point: ‘There is character about her mouth – firmness – but she has a very pleasant 
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smile; don’t you think so?’ ‘Rather crafty’ is Crimsworth’s significant answer. While 
both Pelet and Reuter seek to catch Crimsworth out, his lurking distrust of their seeming 
pleasantness is expressed in his recognition of the connection between her ‘rather 
crafty’ smile and Pelet’s ‘inward chuckling.’ Given, indeed, the romantic connection 
between them, and the specific relevance of the mouth as a site of intimacy, we are 
alerted both to devious conspiracy and to sexual intrigue – Crimsworth is beset by 
enemies.  
Foremost amongst these enemies is his friend Hunsden, who laughs at his 
‘petulant and snappish’ manners (p. 79) and delights in making sport of him. On one of 
their first meetings Crimsworth begins to understand that Hunsden, though sensitive 
himself, can be ‘selfishly relentless towards the sensitiveness of others’ – that he is 
‘overbearing,’ with ‘a tone of despotism’: 
I saw written in his eye and mien a resolution to arrogate to himself a freedom so 
unlimited, that it might often trench on the just liberty of his neighbours. I rapidly ran 
over these thoughts, and then I laughed a low and involuntary laugh ... It was as I 
thought: Hunsden had expected me to take with calm his incorrect and offensive 
surmises, his bitter and haughty taunts; and himself was chafed by a laugh scarce 
louder than a whisper (p. 69). 
Though Crimsworth claims that his revenge is ‘involuntary’, its effect and his 
accompanying satisfaction is significant, marking the realisation of the laughingstock 
that he can be a bully in his turn – that ‘haughty taunts’ may be not simply disregarded 
(as through an impervious countenance), but punished (through an expressive one). 
More revealing still is Hunsden’s angry response: 
I told you that you were an aristocrat, and who but an aristocrat would laugh such a 
laugh as that, and look such a look? A laugh frigidly jeering; a look lazily mutinous; 
gentlemanlike irony, patrician resentment ... Now, if you’d only an estate and a 
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mansion, and a park, and a title, how you could play the exclusive, maintain the 
rights of your class, train your tenantry in habits of respect to the peerage, oppose at 
every step the advancing power of the people (p. 69).  
Crimsworth’s ‘aristocratic’ nature does not here translate as the delicacy and refinement 
that Hunsden elsewhere mocks him for, but as haughtiness and obstinacy. His cynical, 
aggressive laugh with its low, threatening tone transforms him into an empowered, 
tyrannical figure, one who ‘plays the exclusive’ instead of being himself excluded and 
downtrodden.  
The transformation attested to by Hunsden is important, explaining 
Crimsworth’s puzzling nastiness – the pleasure he takes elsewhere in that ‘laugh 
frigidly jeering.’ Describing Reuter’s efforts to gain a foothold over him (and this 
before he has any reason for hostility towards her), he tells us: ‘I found it at once 
pleasant and easy to evade all these efforts; it was sweet, when she thought me nearly 
won, to turn round and to smile in her very eyes, half scornfully, and then to witness her 
scarcely veiled, though mute mortification’ (p. 134). It is easy to see that the root of this 
sadistic tendency is in his own constant experiences of mortification; his aggressive 
sense of a competitive edge in all his exchanges makes it ‘sweet’ for him to ‘win’ – to 
catch the expression that she fails to veil – and to do so with controlled, ‘half scornful’ 
coolness. After learning of her engagement to Pelet, his scorn is redoubled – but still, he 
implies, enjoyable and performed for effect. Reuter greets him ‘with a charming smile – 
it fell on my heart like light on stone’: ‘I shot into her eyes, from my own, a look, where 
there was no respect, no love, no tenderness, no gallantry; where the strictest analysis 
could detect nothing but scorn, hardihood, irony. I made her bear it, and feel it’ (p. 142). 
This, then, is the unduly stern, hard Crimsworth who has repelled readers. Whereas 
before thoughts of the schoolmistress had ‘made the blood stir about his heart and rise 
warm to his cheek’, here he boasts that his heart is ‘stone’, the different internal 
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sensation allowing him to carry out a cooler external show. But the facade of emotional 
indifference is amply apparent in the intensity of his desire for revenge (‘I made her 
bear it, and feel it’). ‘Scorn, hardihood, irony’ are his weapons of revenge, as they are 
the same ‘weapon of attack’ that he feels is used against him – the campaign of sneers 
that he is repeatedly made to bear, and feel.  
His ‘buckler of impenetrable indifference’, then, begins to seem less a passive 
and more a reactive device. His assumption of scornful (rather than blank) indifference 
is habitual. Even on hearing of Frances’s mistreatment by Reuter, he displays knowing 
amusement rather than permitting himself indignation or sympathy: ‘I laughed 
inwardly; all this was so like the directress’ (p. 198). Smiling makes Crimsworth feel 
self-assured, on top of situations, and more importantly helps him convey this to the 
minds of others. When Reuter witnesses him exercising violence towards her pupils, he 
tells us that ‘her look of affright I answered with one of composure, and finally with a 
smile, which perhaps flattered and certainly soothed her’ (p. 130). He likewise ‘smiles 
inwardly’ at the knowledge that she has fallen in love with him, admitting that his 
‘amour-propre was excited not disagreeably’ (p. 210; Brontë’s emphasis). Still, ‘I could 
scarcely pity her’ – ‘her presence and manner had [a] singular effect on me; they sealed 
up all that was good, elicited all that was noxious in my nature ... they always hardened 
my heart.’ He feels himself a ‘tyrant’ (pp. 210-11). Whereas Jane Eyre is mortified to be 
seen as ‘artful [and] noxious’, Crimsworth relishes playing the part.57 Yet if we needed 
a reminder that this tyrannical, hard-hearted Crimsworth remains the awkward and 
bespectacled character of the novel’s comic interludes, it comes from old Madame 
Reuter: when her daughter sighs that his ‘haughty smile’ makes him as handsome as 
Apollo, ‘the jolly old dame’ laughs outright at the idea (p. 211). 
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 Crimsworth’s ‘noxious’ sentiments find expression in laughter, apparently 
powerful enough to make Hunsden react with a kind of horror, and to make Reuter 
grovel in fascinated awe of him. It dramatises for him a turn-around of affairs. Hunsden 
senses in him a tyrant, but also interestingly describes the ‘look lazily mutinous’ that 
accompanies his aristocratic smile. As it happens, it is not in actual class warfare but in 
maintaining order (and racial supremacy) over his classroom of brutish ‘swine’ that 
Crimsworth will find the opportunity to ‘oppose at every step the advancing power of 
the people’ (p. 69) – people who, in the girls’ case, are themselves inclined both to 
laziness and to ‘mutiny’ of a sniggering kind. Implicit throughout is the sense that the 
urge to oppress (or bully, or intimidate) arises from the fear of being oppressed in turn. 
Crimsworth may lay claim to intellectual superiority over his students, but beneath airs 
of sophistication and loftiness lies the same crude instinct to domination. His laugh 
‘scarce louder than a whisper’ speaks to Hunsden of bloodthirsty despotism, just as the 
girls’ sly, knowing smiles are inseparable from what Crimsworth perceives as their 
dangerous, animal natures. Intellectual and animal energies – airs of refinement and of 
revolt – are thus intertwined. While passions and impulses certainly play their part in 
the novel, they are complicated – as I will consider further in the next section – by 
Brontë’s insistence on their controlled, manipulated (and manipulating) expression.  
Crimsworth’s friendship with Hunsden is characterised by the competitive will 
to dominate, to unbalance, or to express knowing superiority over the other. Having 
smugly presented Frances to his friend, and after a physical battle of strengths (a play-
fight in the street) Crimsworth taunts an aggravated Hunsden, who, ‘speaking low and 
deep ... desired me to hold my peace, threatening to do something dreadful if I 
stimulated his wrath further by boasting. I laughed till my sides ached’ (p. 267). 
Crimsworth here internalises a projected state, laughing until it produces a physical 
sensation (aching sides) as though to consolidate his satisfaction, confirm and make 
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substantial his triumph over Hunsden. He is comforted by thoughts of Frances, which 
take ‘the sting out of Hunsden’s sarcasm’, so he demonstrates his composure 
accordingly: 
Just then I turned my face a little to the light; the approach of twilight [had] for the 
last ten minutes, prevented him from studying my countenance; as I moved, 
however, he caught an expression which he thus interpreted – ‘Confound it! How 
doggedly self-approving the lad looks! I thought he was fit to die with shame, and 
there he sits grinning smiles, as good as to say, “Let the world wag as it will, I’ve got 
the philosopher’s stone in my waistcoat pocket, and the elixir of life in my 
cupboard”.’ (pp. 231-2)    
Positions are again reversed, and Hunsden again clarifies Crimsworth’s ability, through 
‘grinning smiles’, to convey his ‘self-approving’ inner state to others, confounding and 
averting their sarcasm in the process.  
 Indeed, Hunsden’s key function in the novel is arguably to lay bare 
Crimsworth’s motivations, to make explicit the trains of thought which are presented to 
us obscurely. Like Pelet he takes on a patronising role towards him, seeing through his 
defences and mocking the weaknesses that Crimsworth would keep out of his narrative. 
He too can produce a blush of embarrassment – at which ‘Hunsden triumphed: his eyes 
– his laugh announced victory.’ Asked ‘what the deuce are you laughing at’ the 
sarcastic reply is revealing: ‘At your exemplary composure’ (p. 229). But he has the 
honesty that Pelet and Reuter conspicuously lack. This honesty is brutal, allowing 
Brontë to comment with some directness on the psyche of her crotchety protagonist. 
Hunsden tells Crimsworth outright that when he mentions his name back in England, 
‘the women sneer covertly’ (p. 230). He recalls him ‘looking frigidly shy at the 
commencement of a party, confusingly vigilant about the middle, and insultingly weary 
towards the end’, thus encapsulating his characteristic progression from lonely naivety 
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through unwarranted aggressiveness to a self-isolating affectedness. ‘If you are 
generally unpopular,’ he explains, ‘it is because you deserve to be so’ (p. 230). And he 
crushes Crimsworth’s retort: ‘No, you are not content; you see beauty always turning its 
back on you; you are mortified and then you sneer.’ He is ‘tantalized’ by ‘ripe grapes’ 
but ‘they are out of reach ... you’ll go away calling them sour’ (p. 230). Through this 
cruelly accurate assessment, we are offered insight into Crimsworth’s character; the 
introduction of Hunsden’s perspective allows us to see in its psychological simplicity 
his strategy towards life, his response to being ‘sneered at covertly’ where he wishes to 
impress: ‘you are mortified and then you sneer.’  
Turns of countenance 
The atmosphere of ‘looking and being looked at’, the accompanying caution, and the 
obsessive, careful scrutiny of faces – all these features of the novel are familiar critical 
territory. Yet, if we take note of Crimsworth’s specific alertness with regard to being 
laughed at, his anxious avoidance of mockery (‘that smile I had been so desirous to 
avoid exciting’; p. 180), then the reading of faces in the novel takes on a new 
significance. For what really guides social interaction in the novel is not just the general 
practice of physiognomy, but a series of distinctly pathognomic readings. When 
Crimsworth turns his face to the light so that Hunsden can ‘study his countenance’, it is 
specifically so he can ‘catch an expression’ there (pp. 231-2). Once we recognise this, 
we can observe a different psychological pattern, a different dynamic, than that which 
has usually been emphasised: Brontë appears less interested in repression (Crimsworth 
keeping it all in) than in expression, and the ways in which it is translated. In turning the 
focus to his expressive side, we find the novel’s protagonist playing (or at least 
attempting to play) an active, presiding role over his own image and even his own 
moods, using the face to simultaneously communicate and establish his ‘inner’ self at 
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given moments, rather than (more passively) keeping a permanent lock on a single, 
private identity.  
 The notion of an essential, unified identity which can be hidden, but gathered 
from facial signs, is one that Crimsworth himself is reliant on in his efforts to know his 
enemies. At times, the expression of laughter features as something that obscures or 
baffles the standard physiognomic reading, rendering facial signs unreliable. Thus he is 
glad to catch a ‘moment’ when a ‘momentary eclipse’ comes over Hunsden’s face, 
‘extinguishing his smile, and replacing, by an abstracted and alienated look, the 
customarily shrewd, bantering glance of his eye. I employed the interval of silence in a 
rapid scrutiny of his physiognomy’ (p. 66). As Lavater complained, ‘how often does it 
happen that the seat of character is so hidden, so enveloped, so masked, that it can only 
be caught in certain, and, perhaps, uncommon positions of the countenance, which will 
again be changed, and the signs all disappear, before they have made any durable 
impression!’58 Crimsworth therefore seizes an opportunity to make sense of his friend’s 
character while his mocking, ‘shrewd, bantering’ demeanour has been superseded by 
what is presumably his ‘real’ appearance. Hunsden is off guard without his ‘customary’ 
smile; its eclipse gives Crimsworth an advantage, allowing accurate scrutiny. Similarly, 
on ‘meeting Pelet’s false glance and insinuating smile’, he is relieved that he ‘had last 
night opened my window and read by the light of a full moon the true meaning of that 
guileful countenance.’ He continues: ‘I felt half his master, because the reality of his 
nature was now known to me; smile and flatter as he would, I saw his soul lurk behind 
his smile’ (p. 142). Crimsworth’s ‘mastery’ over Pelet is achieved through knowledge 
of ‘the reality of his nature’, a reality or ‘soul’ which ‘lurks behind his smile.’ The smile 
is the front, the cover; it obscures ‘true meaning’. Likewise, Reuter’s smiles constitute a 
misleading appearance, as apparent when Crimsworth catches her off guard: ‘At the 
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moment I turned her countenance looked hard, dark, and inquisitive ... I had scarce 
caught this phase of physiognomy ere it vanished; a bland smile played on her features; 
my harsh apology was received with good-humoured facility’ (p. 180). The ‘phase’ of 
physiognomy is again implicitly the true one – Crimsworth witnesses the ‘hard’ and 
‘dark’, sinister personality ‘lurking’ beneath Reuter’s assumed airs of pleasant 
affability, just as in Pelet he had all along suspected ‘the existence of flint or steel under 
an external covering of velvet’ (p. 99).  
 At other times, however, it is suggested that it is the smiling face which 
represents the essence of the character in question. And in fact, Pelet is all along 
characterised by his insinuating sneers; Crimsworth distrusts him long before he is 
undeceived about his relationship to Reuter. It is not through open, beaming grins that 
Pelet presents a ‘guileful countenance’; the very guilefulness of the countenance is 
perfectly expressed through the shadiness of his smiles. What Crimsworth reads ‘by the 
light of a full moon’ is written just as clearly in the shadowy, menacing aspect of his 
habitual countenance.
59
 Again we encounter that paradox identified in the previous 
chapter, whereby the covert and the blatant are inseparable – and deliberately so. An 
illusion of it but no real efforts at guardedness or deception are made by Pelet; rather, 
his intention is to intimidate – and it is in precisely the same way that Crimsworth goes 
about seeking not to hide and restrain, but to impress.  
 It is this drive to make an impression – and the purposefulness of expression 
through which it is achieved – which not only renders the act of decipherment to some 
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extent redundant (since meanings are being volunteered instead of hidden) but troubles 
the very notion of an ‘essence of character’ which it is physiognomy’s task to root out. 
Lavater affirmed that ‘if the laugh be good, so is the person’, and (in an example 
particularly pertinent to Pelet) surmised that ‘Judas must have been distinguished by an 
insinuating countenance and an ever-ready smile.’60 But not much credit accrues to the 
physiognomist who can interpret such a pointedly ‘insinuating countenance’, where 
there is nothing, really, to see through; success rather lies with he whose ‘ever-ready 
smile’ conveys (rather than betrays) a suggestion (rather than a revelation) of private, 
mysterious depths. The notion of tactical self-representation discussed in the first part of 
this chapter becomes considerably more complex when the subject at once aims to 
render his meaning transparent, and to throw over it a cloak of dark obscurity. Legibility 
of a kind is offered, but certainly not an ‘open’ countenance.  
According to Zelle, physiognomy was intended as ‘a science of the truly 
authentic self’, transcending ‘masks, simulation, and dissimulation’; the physiognomist 
was supposed to ‘tear away masks in order to gaze upon a person’s true face.’61 In short, 
it was a science in which the existence of an absolute divide between mask and face was 
desperately grasped at. The same controlling tendency is displayed in the classroom by 
Crimsworth, whose efforts to secure his mastery over his pupils (the literal endeavour 
being paralleled by the narrative one) take authoritatively ‘scientific’ form, as he shows 
off his expertise in physiognomy and – more memorably – phrenology. In one such 
instance we learn that one of the Belgian girls is ‘an unnatural-looking being – so 
young, fresh, blooming, yet so Gorgon-like. Suspicion, sullen ill-temper were on her 
forehead, vicious propensities in her eye, envy and panther-like deceit about her mouth.’ 
Moreover, ‘she had but two varieties of expression; the prevalent one a forbidding, 
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dissatisfied scowl, varied sometimes by a most pernicious and perfidious smile’ (p. 
129). With this attempt to fix the features, to contain and reduce the meanings of the 
face, Crimsworth echoes the kind of sweeping generalisations provided by Lavater’s 
maxims on laughter. Limited to just ‘two varieties of expression’, the attractive yet 
terrifying (or terrifyingly attractive) Adèle is made manageable: Crimsworth is able to 
set her perfidious smile and ‘Gorgon’ stare in defiance through this comprehensive 
summary of her character. Adèle is rendered a passive, rather than expressive subject. 
Crimsworth constantly seeks to convince us of his racial, moral and intellectual 
superiority, in contrast to the brutish stupidity of his pupils. As Jenny Bourne Taylor 
comments, he is ‘establishing his psychological mastery, while exposing [his] anxieties 
and aggression.’62 But, as is the case with Bertha in Jane Eyre (and as will be 
considered further in the next chapter) the bestial, crude and sensual nature of the 
schoolgirls is combined with deviousness and a capacity for shrewd cunning. ‘Brazen’ 
and ‘vulgar’ they may be, but they are as skilled as Reuter when it comes to the art of 
subtle intimidation, probing Crimsworth for his weaknesses, mocking his confusion 
behind their desk lids, and threatening to match his own tact(ics). According to 
nineteenth-century phrenological philosophy, Crimsworth’s task as a self-controlled 
man is to control and subjugate the lower animal propensities to the higher intellectual 
faculties.
63
 But The Professor effectively blurs the line between these, drawing attention 
to the Hobbesian laugh of superiority as a form of sophisticated brutality, animal 
propensities dressed up by intellectual faculties – the smile of ugly triumph given a 
certain well-bred shape and precision. By implying that savage instincts are made 
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socially effective when refined by intellect, or composure, what Brontë dramatises is not 
the suppression so much as the expressive channelling of the passions.  
The Professor is centrally concerned with how the language of the body makes 
legible the inner mental and emotional life, and to see this in terms of the skilful 
channelling of instinct or passions makes that language seem all the more pointed and 
highly charged. Crimsworth ‘answers’ Reuter’s look with a smile, ‘shoots into her eyes’ 
a look, takes pleasure in ‘[turning round] to smile in her very eyes ... then to witness her 
scarcely veiled, though mute mortification.’ These conversations involve the interplay 
between thoughts, moods and expressions, not between static personalities. 
Furthermore, they require us to look again at the language of affect by focusing in on 
the bridge between heart and mind, face and mask, subconscious and self-conscious, in 
ways that trouble attempts to fix character though straightforward interpretation of 
appearances – or feelings – over which the subject has no control. If Crimsworth’s 
involuntary bodily or emotional expressions (‘I felt the blood stir about my heart and 
rise warm to my cheek’) act to unveil and betray him, then he compensates via acts of 
calculation (‘I permitted myself to laugh’) which enact his ‘seeing through’ or ‘drawing 
out’ others in revenge. In this sense, the bridge that Brontë’s protagonist crosses is also 
between ‘mute mortification’ and mocking mastery.  
 The nature of the provocation that Crimsworth offers his brother – the rage he 
produces in permitting himself to laugh (channelling the passions) – is something we 
can appreciate more fully on reading an often cited passage (which actually concerns 
Edward’s lackey and spy, Steighton) in light of the above observations:  
I thought he was trying to read my inner character, but I felt as secure against his 
scrutiny as if I had on a casque with the visor down – or rather I showed him my 
countenance with the confidence that one would show an unlearned man a letter 
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written in Greek; he might see lines, and trace characters, but he could make nothing 
of them (p. 53).  
The first analogy suggests a self-protective strategy: our narrator achieves security by 
means of an impassive, guarded countenance, wearing armour ‘with the visor down.’ 
The amendment that follows, however, suggests something rather different. Playing on 
the actual realities of the situation (Edward and Steighton are unlearned; Crimsworth’s 
classical education gives him intellectual superiority), Crimsworth compares his face to 
a letter which is not blank, but inscribed with meaning. Indeed, the very shift in 
metaphor implies a questioning of the ‘inner character’ at first alluded to, which is 
replaced by something more versatile. The coarse, frustrated Edward is ultimately 
thwarted in his efforts to impose mastery over his brother, as his associate, able to ‘see 
lines, and trace characters’ is unable to translate the provocative signs with which he is 
presented.  
III 
With the late arrival to the plot of Frances Henri, we are presented with another 
curiously two-faced heroine. At the time of the novel’s publication, some critics 
perceived Frances as a redeeming feature, a pleasant antidote to the Professor himself. 
Elizabeth Gaskell, who thought The Professor ‘disfigured [by] coarseness’ nonetheless 
advised George Smith that its publication (after editing) would not further damage 
Brontë’s reputation, as it contained amongst other things ‘the most charming woman she 
ever drew, and a glimpse of that woman as a mother – very lovely.’64 W.C. Roscoe 
described Frances as ‘a refined and softened Jane Eyre ... decidedly the most attractive 
female character that ever came from the pen of the author’ and went on to lament her 
                                                          
64
 Gaskell to Emily Shaen (September 1856), in the Letters of Mrs Gaskell, ed. by J. A. V. Chapple and 
Arthur Pollard (Manchester University Press, 1966), pp. 408-12 (p. 410), Gaskell’s emphasis. See also 
her letter to George Smith (August 1856), p. 403.     
177 
 
fate in the clutches of the ‘bashaw-like’ Crimsworth with his ‘affected indifference and 
simulated harshness.’65 Yet while giving ‘a charm to the book’, she was still 
recognisable to Roscoe and others as a precursor to Jane and Lucy, as ‘the plain, 
piquant, strong-minded, fascinating little girl.’66 
 Ambitious yet timid, Frances’s combination of strong-mindedness and sweet 
docility is precisely what fascinates Crimsworth. In characteristically controlling terms, 
while leaning (or looming) over his new pupil, he instructs himself: ‘chide her, or 
quietly approve; you know the effect of either system; you know her smile when 
pleased, you know the play of her looks when roused; you have the secret of awakening 
what expression you will, and you can choose amongst that pleasant variety’ (p. 224). 
But the extent of his actual power over her expressions and moods is uncertain. The 
pleasure Frances takes in a submissive meekness and mildness to her ‘master’ is 
frequently disrupted by sharply articulated expressions of defiance – in the form of 
smiles – which pose a distinct challenge to Crimsworth’s ‘systems’ of management.  
 Frances employs her smiles – at least initially – to register plainly her discontent 
or to assert her self-worth, even as she behaves submissively. Thus Crimsworth is first 
intrigued on watching her being lectured by Mademoiselle Reuter: 
Without reply, Mdlle Henri turned away; dissatisfaction was plainly evinced in her 
face, and a smile, slight and brief, but bitter, distrustful, and, I thought, scornful, 
curled her lip as she took her place in the class; it was a secret, involuntary smile, 
which lasted but a second (p. 154).  
Later, he observes that she momentarily objects to a command from Reuter, ‘then 
smiling, with that same bitter, derisive smile I had seen on her lips before, she hastily 
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rose and made her exit’ (p. 173). What is striking about these shows of feeling is how 
markedly at odds they are with conventional rhetoric about desirable female conduct, 
countenance and characteristics. The humble lace mender has the haughty ‘curled lip’ of 
Blanche Ingram. Quiet and obedient she may be, but her smiles are everything that was 
held to be suspect in commonplaces about laughter: bitter, derisive, scornful, secret, 
brief.
67
 Although Crimsworth accounts for them as ‘involuntary’, these shady smiles 
nonetheless make her private thoughts, her dissatisfaction and her sense of innate 
superiority clearly legible in a way which (in line with the usual paradox) suggests at 
the same time concealment and cynicism. Transparency of a sort there is, but not the 
requisite ‘openness.’ 
 Such signs of rebellious inner feeling are not restricted to those she dislikes, as 
Crimsworth discovers: 
On looking up, I saw the sun had dissevered its screening cloud, her countenance 
was transfigured, a smile shone in her eyes – a smile almost triumphant; it seemed to 
say ‘[you] need not so carefully moderate your language. Do you think I am myself a 
stranger to myself? What you tell me in terms so qualified, I have known fully from a 
child.’ [But] in a moment the glow of her complexion, the radiance of her aspect, had 
subsided ... So quick was the revulsion of feeling, I had not time to check her 
triumph with a reproof; ere I could contract my brows to a frown she had become 
serious and almost mournful-looking (p. 165).  
The incident is similar to that in which Reuter lets down her guard (‘I had scarce caught 
this phase of physiognomy ere it vanished; a bland smile played on her features’; p. 
180), except that in this case the momentary expression appears to have a more 
deliberately communicative purpose. It ‘seemed to say’ to Crimsworth that she is ‘not a 
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stranger to herself’ and even that she knows already how talented she is, without his 
condescending praise of her work – a self-knowledge which undermines his importance 
in the role of mentor. Moreover, while Reuter allows a hard, mean look to supersede her 
assumed appearance of affability, with Frances it is a smile that breaks through a 
‘serious’ and ‘mournful-looking’ countenance. Yet Frances’s smile does not, at this 
stage, present a sweet and sunny contrast to Reuter’s sinister hardness of expression. 
Despite the imagery of a brightly transfigured countenance and glowing complexion, 
the ‘real’ Frances that the smile gives us access to is not all warmth and gratitude but 
rather a ‘triumphant’ figure whose smugness needs to be ‘checked’ with a ‘reproof.’ 
Crimsworth’s controlling response, however – which is to ‘contract [his] brows to a 
frown’ – is too slow to take effect; Frances is able to evade him in this pathognomic 
game.   
 Indeed, if it is through the amusement of the novel’s other characters that 
Crimsworth’s faults and quirks are drawn to our attention and his stern authority 
undermined, then Frances is no exception. She appears unabashed on receiving a 
lecture:  
To this wise speech I received no answer; and when I looked up, my pupil was 
smiling to herself a much-meaning, though not very gay smile; it seemed to say, ‘He 
talks of he knows not what’: it said this so plainly, that I determined to request 
information on the point concerning which my ignorance seemed to be thus tacitly 
affirmed. [He does so.] An odd question, and bluntly put; it excited a second smile 
(p. 168). 
The substitution of smiles for verbal language (‘I received no answer’) is strongly 
apparent here – and apposite, given the language barrier. Again, the ‘much-meaning’ 
expression ‘seems to say’ (and say ‘plainly’) something specific, made excusable by its 
supposed privacy: she smiles ‘to herself’. In its subtlety it deflates the wordy pomposity 
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of Crimsworth’s ‘wise speech’ (which has been to insult her), while quietly flagging up 
Crimsworth’s ‘oddness’ and ‘bluntness’ of manner in the midst of his assumption of 
superiority.
68
 She smiles both ‘at me’ and ‘on me’, he later admits (p. 277; Brontë’s 
emphasis), raising the question of what precisely the difference might be – at any rate, 
she doesn’t smile ‘with’ him. 
 Thus, Brontë highlights the expressive power of the underhand smile, from a 
disadvantaged woman with a struggling grasp on the English language, to further 
belittle her self-styled draconian protagonist. But this is only one function of Frances’s 
subversive expressiveness – her smiles also emphasise her likeness to him; their affinity. 
On top of the neatness and intelligence that he finds such a refreshing novelty in his 
classroom, what these sneers signal to Crimsworth is a certain anti-social tendency, a 
peculiarity which marks her out not just as different from the rest, but as self-
consciously, proudly different, and above the ordinary. They are indications in short of 
her suitability for him, proof that she partly shares his sourness or ‘noxiousness’, his 
superior aloofness from others. In contrast to the physical and spiritual bond between 
Jane and Rochester, the attraction here is of a primarily intellectual rather than 
emotional or impulsive character – a meeting of minds, rather than hearts. It is the same 
ironic recognition of kinship that occurs early in Crimsworth’s acquaintance with 
Hunsden, when they share a rare moment of harmony: ‘I could not repress a half-smile 
as I said this; a similar demi-manifestation of feeling appeared at the same moment on 
Hunsden’s lips’ (p. 82). These half- or demi-demonstrations underline the meeting of 
like minds, in an oddly sociable yet obstructed ex/repression of emotion – two cynical, 
undemonstrative characters venturing out of  shadowy reserve, meeting each other half 
way.  
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 But while it serves initially to mark her out with distinctness, Frances’s strong-
mindedness as we first encounter it is not allowed to stand. Her controversial smiles 
appear on what is initially (like Jane’s) a ‘grave, joyless face’ (p. 155), and it soon 
appears that in their sharpness and intelligence they are the unfortunate side-effect of 
poor health and spirits – it is this which explains their edgy, unfeminine quality. 
Crimsworth quickly decides that Frances is not Belgian: ‘her complexion, her 
countenance, her lineaments, her figure, were all distinct from theirs, and, evidently, the 
type of another race – of a race less gifted with fullness of flesh and plenitude of blood; 
less jocund, material, unthinking’ (p. 151). This is, at first, a positive comparison; 
Crimsworth is drawn to the physical deficiencies which present so manifest a contrast 
with the ‘material’ figures of the despised, ‘unthinking’ schoolgirls. Their ‘giftedness’ 
in flesh and blood is, he makes clear, the natural accompaniment to their lewdness, their 
stupidity, and their ‘jocund’ insensitivity. Frances’s racial superiority (she is half Swiss, 
half English) is written on her body – or rather, it is emphasised by the fact that we do 
not at first see her body (unlike the full-bodied and fully described Belgians), since it is 
her mind that takes precedent. Crimsworth’s first mention of her is accompanied by a 
refusal to describe her appearance, and when he does he focuses on her face, and 
specifically her forehead – the site of phrenological clues to her character, and 
specifically evidence of her intellectual capacities. Her very thinness and physical 
insignificance (as with the child Jane next to her robust cousins) is a pointer to her 
superior mental qualities. 
 But this characterisation, and the connection it gives her with Crimsworth, is no 
sooner established than it is problematised. Frances’s bodily weakness sets her apart 
from the boisterous, jolly crowd but it also disadvantages her as a teacher, and makes 
her unhappy, as Crimsworth observes: 
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Human beings – human children especially – seldom deny themselves the pleasure of 
exercising a power which they are conscious of possessing, even though that power 
consist only in a capacity to make others wretched; a pupil whose sensations are 
duller than those of his instructor, while his nerves are tougher and his bodily 
strength perhaps greater, has an immense advantage over that instructor, and he will 
generally use it relentlessly, because the very young, very healthy very thoughtless 
know neither how to sympathize nor how to spare. Frances, I fear, suffered much; a 
continual weight seemed to oppress her spirits ... whether in her own abode, 
wherever that might be, she wore the same preoccupied, unsmiling, sorrowfully 
resolved air that always shaded her features under the roof of Mdlle Reuter, I could 
not tell (p. 160).  
Thus, her ‘much-meaning, though not very gay’ smiles signal her originality at the 
expense of her happiness. The generally ‘unsmiling’ air which ‘shades her features’ is a 
symptom of ill-health, which must be put to rights. Superior to her healthy and 
‘thoughtless’ pupils, Frances nonetheless implicitly thinks too much, cutting a 
‘wretched’ and morbid figure with her ‘oppressed spirits’, and is consequently 
disempowered amongst them.  
 What ensues is a more explicit and detailed version of the progression from 
weedy rebelliousness to well-adjusted roundness that Brontë would impose on Jane 
Eyre. Inspired by Crimsworth, Frances speedily changes ‘for the better’: 
When I first saw her, her countenance was sunless, her complexion colourless; she 
looked like one who had no source of enjoyment, no store of bliss ... now the cloud 
had passed from her mien, leaving space for the dawn of hope and interest, and those 
feelings rose like a clear morning, animating what had been depressed, tinting what 
had had been pale. Her eyes, whose colour I had not at first known, so dim were they 
with repressed tears, so shadowed with ceaseless dejection, [were now] lit by a ray of 
the sunshine that cheered her heart ... That look of wan emaciation which anxiety or 
low spirits often communicates to a thoughtful, thin face, rather long than round, 
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having vanished from hers; a clearness of skin almost bloom, and a plumpness 
almost embonpoint, softened the decided lines of her features. Her figure shared in 
this beneficial change; it became rounder (p. 175). 
Controlling as ever, Crimsworth of course is behind this development, which is 
presented in the same horticultural terms as in Jane Eyre: ‘I watched this change much 
as a gardener watches the growth of a precious plant, and I contributed to it too, even as 
the said gardener contributes to the development of his favourite.’ He boasts expertise 
on how to ‘foster’ his pupil, ‘cherish her starved feelings’, and, crucially, ‘induce the 
outward manifestation of that inward vigour which sunless drought and blighting blast 
had hitherto forbidden to expand’ (p. 176). Luckily, overwork does not make Frances 
‘pale or feeble’; ‘perhaps the stimulus it communicated to her mind counterbalanced the 
inaction it imposed on her body’, Crimsworth suggests (p. 175). Of course, it is her 
‘feelings’, as much as her intellect, which had been ‘starved’, and it is implicitly 
emotional excitement, and sexual awakening, which restores Frances to bodily health. 
In Shuttleworth’s evaluation: ‘following interaction with her “master”, her “old maid’s” 
state of withered self-control and obstructed flow is transformed into one of vital animal 
health.’69 Finding a man to distract her from unhealthy brooding and a ‘joyless’ life, she 
comes to partake of the ‘vital animal health’ of the sensual schoolgirls. 
 This does not make her loud, coarse or boisterous – animal health instead 
translates into moral health (following the usual alignment of physical, emotional and 
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 Shuttleworth, p. 140. The assumptions behind these contrasting images of healthy and unhealthy 
femininity would later be applied to the author herself. Gaskell's Life of Charlotte Brontë came out in 
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strategy is to get readers to judge Charlotte as a woman not an author’ (pp. 32, 75).  
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moral traits in definitions of ‘natural’ femininity) – but it does otherwise go to 
normalise her, where before she had seemed eccentric.
70
 Through sunny imagery 
Frances is rendered warmer, sweeter, clearer (more open) and thus is essentially 
feminised: the softening of the ‘decided lines of her features’ implies a corresponding 
softening of her decidedness of character – she loses something of her sharpness. The 
new intent focus on her body, her ‘figure’, draws attention away from her individuality 
and on to her identity as a (fulfilled) female; edginess is sacrificed to plumpness. At the 
core of this process is the strongly emphasised connection between filling out and 
cheering up. ‘Animated’ by newly flowing spirits, Frances is buoyed up by the ‘fullness 
of flesh’ but more suggestively by the ‘plenitude of blood’ running through the other 
girls’ veins. Later Crimsworth remarks that after he has sternly lectured her, ‘her spirits 
would maintain their flow, often for some hours, and, as I remarked before, her health 
therefrom took a sustenance and vigour’ (p. 204). In ‘[inducing] the outward 
manifestation of [inward] vigour’, he plays on the interconnectedness of health and 
(flowing) spirits; the ‘ray of sunshine that cheered her heart’ brings colour and 
animation to her countenance and complexion, it lights up her previously dim, tearful 
eyes and shaded features. This is a literal inside-out transformation that gives Frances a 
crucial transparency which before she had lacked. It is now the tell-tale (female) body, 
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 Brontë’s association of intelligence with eccentricity – and her mixed feelings respecting these 
characteristics, her awareness that they are not desirably feminine – are suggested in a letter of January 
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and bitterness.  
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rather than any deliberate, assertive facial expressions, which serves to communicate 
Frances’s inner self to the world.  
 As Frances gradually blends in with the school’s ‘normal’, healthy women, her 
merriment and naturalness form a contrast to, for instance, the assiduous student and 
future nun, Sylvie, whose ‘weak health stunted her growth and chilled her spirits’ (p. 
131). More alarmingly there is Léonie Ledru, who represents the moral failings 
commonly associated with a quietly cynical, intellectual character: she is a ‘diminutive, 
sharp-featured, and parchment-skinned creature of quick wits, frail conscience, and 
indurated feelings; a lawyer-like thing.’ In the classroom she responds to success with 
‘a pert smirk, and a hard glance of triumph’ (p. 150). Léonie’s ‘parchment’ skin is 
evocative both of poor health and its cause: intellectual habits. ‘Diminutive’ and ‘sharp-
featured’ (a description which conveys both lack of flesh and the sharpness of her 
‘quick wits’), her physical failings reflect her emotional and moral deficiencies, while 
the added slur, ‘lawyer-like’, underlines her ‘frail conscience’ but also, by placing her in 
a masculine profession, her unfeminine nature. Yet, unpleasant as she is, her ‘pert 
smirk’ and ‘hard glance of triumph’ are disconcertingly close to Frances’s similar brief 
smile of ‘triumph’ on being praised for schoolwork.   
 The feminine traits that Frances comes to take on are the same that Crimsworth 
had desperately tried to discern in Mademoiselle Reuter, when he was originally 
attracted to her. Talking to her at dusk (that softener of physiognomies) Crimsworth is 
able to ‘fancy her forehead as open as it really was elevated, her mouth touched with 
turns of sweetness as well as defined in lines of sense’ (p. 109). ‘She laughed a little, 
quite good-naturedly’, Crimsworth decides (p. 110), and he is pleased to have ‘kindled a 
little merry smile on her countenance’ at which ‘I thought her almost charming’ (pp. 
134-5). ‘Now, Zoraïde Reuter’, he summarises, ‘has tact, “caractère,” judgment, 
discretion; has she heart? What a good, simple little smile played [earlier] about her 
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lips’ (p. 137). Of course the schoolmistress, like her pupils, eventually fails the test of 
‘heart’; physically plump and healthy, while ‘the colour on her cheek [is] like the bloom 
on a good apple’, Crimsworth was wrong in imagining the apple ‘as sound at the core as 
it is red on the rind’ (p. 108).71 Thus, initially impressed by Frances’s ‘bitter, derisive’ 
smiles, it is soon ‘bloom’, ‘sweetness’, ‘simplicity’ and ‘merriment’ that he most 
appreciates in her, in his search for authenticity. And the change is duly reflected: 
looking for the ‘exulting smile’ he had ‘elicited’ before, he notes instead that she 
blushes. ‘If she did smile, it was very softly and shyly; and instead of looking up to me 
with a conquering glance, her eyes rested on my hand’ (p. 174).  
 Frances’s normalisation is confirmed in the observation that ‘when the young 
and healthy saw that she could smile brightly, converse gaily, move with vivacity and 
alertness, they acknowledged in her a sisterhood of youth and health, and tolerated her 
as of their kind accordingly’ (p. 176). But what exactly is the significance of her arrival 
in this healthy sisterhood? A bitter rebelliousness and ‘conquering glance’ may have 
given way to a ‘soft’, ‘shy’ subservience in some respects; we are now told that ‘she 
looked down, smiling softly and passively’ (p. 280). But Brontë is also concerned to 
show how, in a society with little patience for the low-spirited or intellectually inclined, 
she is empowered by this change – at least in relation to her students: 
She now took her place amongst her pupils with an air of spirit and firmness which 
assured them at once that she meant to be obeyed ... They felt they had lost their 
power over her ... she would no longer have taken [disobedience] to heart; she 
possessed a source of comfort they could not drain, a pillar of support they could not 
overthrow: formerly, when insulted, she wept; now, she smiled (p. 176).  
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What we have actually seen is that formerly, when insulted, she smiled – but there has 
been a shift in the meaning of her smiles. Before, they were the outlet for a streak of 
bitter discontent which makes her intriguing to readers and a match (in both senses) for 
Crimsworth, but did not substantially benefit her. Though ‘much-meaning’ they were 
‘not very gay’ and perhaps not very potent either. On the other hand, the less interesting 
smiles of genuine contentment are the reflection of an internal ‘source of comfort’, a 
‘pillar of support’ whose metaphorical substantiality mirrors her increased physical 
strength. It is the capacity to ‘smile brightly’ – rather than sarcastically, as for 
Crimsworth – which ultimately fortifies Frances against the bullying contempt of 
others: they have ‘lost their power over her.’  
 Describing Crimsworth and Frances’s happiness together, towards the end of the 
novel, Brontë endeavours to strike a careful balance in her portrayal of Frances. The 
face she turns towards Crimsworth is ‘sweetened with gaiety, and pointed with 
defiance’ (p. 204). She criticises him with a ‘sourire à la fois fin et timide’ (p. 248).72 
And in their scenes together: 
She would show me what she had of vivacity, of mirth, of originality in her well-
dowered nature. She would show, too, some stores of raillery, of ‘malice,’ 
[roguishness] and would vex, tease, pique me sometimes about what she called my 
‘bizarreries anglaises,’ [English peculiarities] my ‘caprices insulaires,’ [insular 
whims] with a wild and witty wickedness that made a perfect demon of her while it 
lasted (p. 276; Glen’s translations).  
But the ‘elfish freak’, he continues, would always be brief (p. 276). Sometimes he 
would attempt to ‘arrest bodily the sprite that teased me. Vain idea! no sooner had I 
grasped hand or arm than the elf had gone; the provocative smile quenched [and 
replaced by] a ray of gentle homage ... I had seized a mere vexing fairy, and found a 
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submissive and supplicating little mortal woman in my arms’ (pp. 276-7). In other 
words, Frances remains a quirky character, well able to appreciate and mock the quirks 
of her ‘master.’ He is even so gallant as to claim that her teasing makes him ‘in a 
fashion (though happily she did not know it), her subject, if not her slave’ (p. 204). But 
while she may have achieved a degree of authority over her pupils, this is hardly the 
case with Crimsworth. Her wry and sour smiles are now ‘sweetened with gaiety’ as well 
as ‘pointed with defiance’; the defiance she offers is vexing but not incompatible with 
the feminine charm that Gaskell was so approving of, and if Crimsworth is provoked by 
her occasional ‘wild and witty wickedness’, he is compensated by her conventional 
womanly submissiveness. Her designation as ‘sprite’, ‘elf’ and ‘fairy’, as in Jane Eyre, 
trivialises and makes light of her rebellion – she is charmingly evasive of his strict 
management, piquantly and flirtatiously disrespectful, but ultimately embraces and 
takes pleasure in his authority.  
 The real ‘perfect demon’ that emerges is the taunting Hunsden, who writes 
informing Crimsworth that he is coming to visit. ‘Oh, confound him!’ is Crimsworth’s 
response. ‘Let him come, and let him laugh ... Were he the devil himself, instead of 
being merely very like him, I’d not condescend to get out of his way, or to forge a smile 
or a cheerful word wherewith to avert his sarcasm’ (p. 220). As it is sarcastic rather than 
‘cheerful’ smiles which he generally forges to avert sarcasm, Crimsworth’s defiance 
indicates that their tense relationship is to be renewed, with all the usual alertness to 
facial expression. But Hunsden’s main function at the end of the novel is as a sinister, 
demonic foil to the new-found placidity of Crimsworth and Frances. At first finding his 
old friend without money or prospects ‘he laughed, as mockingly, as heartlessly as 
Mephistopheles’ (p. 233). And, importantly, it is in his meeting with Frances that 
Brontë examines the necessary consequences of her loss of a close, secretive and 
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‘shaded’ character. Frances’s patriotic ‘enthusiasm’ brings out Hunsden’s satirical 
streak, ‘thawed [his polite] reserve as fire thaws a congealed viper’: 
I use this not very flattering comparison because he vividly reminded me of a snake 
waking from torpor, as he erected his tall form, reared his head ... and putting back 
his hair from his broad Saxon forehead, showed unshaded the gleam of almost 
savage satire which his interlocutor’s tone of eagerness and look of ardour had 
[caused] (p. 259). 
Being largely concerned with the hero’s self-protection against ridicule, The Professor 
does not (as the early writings do and as Shirley does with particular rigour) dwell much 
on the particular vulnerability of women in the (literal) face of male mockery. But with 
Frances’s transition from cynicism to naivety we see just this in action, as with her new 
pleasant openness she exposes herself both to Hunsden’s satire and to a ‘low laugh’ 
which her husband supposedly ‘could not suppress’ (p. 262). Previously quiet and 
downtrodden, Frances is now confident, communicative and vocal – but in this 
situation, it is by no means clear that her assertiveness puts her in a strong position. She 
is unable to ‘avert his sarcasm’ with words.  
 While it might seem that Hunsden, too, enacts a kind of self-exposure, drawing 
back his hair and revealing his face ‘unshaded’, it is significant that what he confronts 
Frances with is his large forehead – a gesture which reminds us of his impressive 
intellect. The mind is the seat of ‘savage satire’, and the snake-like Hunsden – faced 
with Frances’s charming outburst about fellow feeling and community spirit – is the 
representative of anti-social and morally questionable feeling. (He recalls, furthermore, 
Brontë’s use of serpentine imagery to describe Thackeray’s satirical savagery.) With his 
Mephistophelian manners, Hunsden comes to stand in as an eccentric contrast to 
wholesome domestic contentment. Again he ‘laughed – his laugh of unmitigated scorn’ 
(p. 261); ‘he sneered diabolically’ (p. 262), and Frances rebukes him with animated 
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moralising. He is impressed when she ‘clears conventional limits’ by talking about hell 
with an ‘uncompromising sort of accent’, but Crimsworth quickly assures us that she is 
not proud to be controversial: ‘the display of eccentric vigour never gave her pleasure, 
and it only sounded in her voice or flashed in her countenance when extraordinary 
circumstances – and those generally painful – forced it out of the depths where it burned 
latent’ (p. 262). In essence, the ‘painful circumstances’ of solitude, poor health, and 
social and financial insecurity are what made her interesting; the bitterness or 
noxiousness formerly attached to Frances as well as to Crimsworth was a sign of 
frustrated mental superiority but also dangerously close, in moral terms, to those latent 
‘burning depths’ (the allusion being clearly to the hell which Frances is unintentionally 
drawn to dwell on, by its sneering representative, Hunsden).   
 What happens in The Professor, as it will in Jane Eyre, is that to some degree a 
tone of moral responsibility takes over; there is an anxious shift in the direction of safe 
conformity. Crimsworth’s ‘success’ story is about more than money and status – it 
charts also his dubious integration into normality; the social security he craves has as 
much to do with his personal ease in society as it does his financial ease. Before his 
fortunes change he is chagrined that Hunsden expects to find him ‘on the summit of 
prosperity, about to be married, to step into a warm nest, to lie comfortably down by the 
side of a snug, well-fed little mate’ (p. 219). How ironic, he thinks, that ‘instead of a 
pair of plump turtle-doves, billing and cooing in a bower of roses, he [will find] a single 
lean cormorant, standing mateless and shelterless on poverty’s bleak cliff’ (pp. 219-20). 
Hunsden will find the same awkward, vulnerable and unendearing character who stood 
alone and unsmiling at his brother’s party, refusing to be sociable, and harbouring sour 
grapes. The turtle-dove picture evokes prosperity (the nest) and resultant health 
(plumpness); it is further suggestive of sexual fulfillment and the animal body – and 
finally it is a sentimental picture, of birds ‘billing and cooing in a bower of roses.’ It is 
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eventually realised (at least up to a point): from scornful and sharp Frances becomes 
tame and ‘happy as a bird with its mate’ (p. 276), Crimsworth loses his ‘lone cormorant’ 
status, and both leave the teaching profession to embrace the warmth, softness and 
joyful contentment of the nest. Crimsworth remains abrupt, eccentric and unpleasant, 
but nonetheless finds himself a family man in the Edenic abode of ‘Daisy Lane’, in the 
healthy English countryside. The wholesome environment is poisoned, nonetheless, by 
that sarcastic viper, Hunsden – a reminder of those ‘burning depths’ which still remain 
latent.
73
  
 Another reminder is their morbid son Victor, a Byronic phenomenon with a 
‘large forehead’ (p. 288) whose temper ‘emits, now and then, ominous sparks ... it 
appears in the grinding of his teeth, in the glittering of his eye’; there is a ‘cloud on his 
bony brow’, and ‘a fit of mute fury [would likely] sicken his body and madden his soul’ 
(p. 289). ‘I never saw a child smile less than he does’ remarks Crimsworth, ‘nor one 
who knits such a formidable brow’ (p. 286). Interestingly, this sinister child is named 
after Victor Vandenhuten, an unremarkable Belgian of the placid and well-fed type that 
the judgmental Crimsworth has spent much of the novel deriding. The humility that he 
admits to on meeting Vandenhuten is anomalous: ‘As I exchanged a smile with him, I 
thought the benevolence of his truthful face was better than the intelligence of my own. 
Characters of my order experience a balm-like solace in the contact of such souls as 
animated [his] honest breast’ (p. 237). Vandenhuten gives him ‘a smile of benignant 
content’ and, he records, ‘I went away with its sunshine in my heart’ (p. 238). The 
uncharacteristic episode is significant in the light it sheds (the phrase being apt) on 
Crimsworth’s character, and on the novel’s attempted turn to cheerful conventionality 
                                                          
73
 The disturbing ending has been much commented on by critics. Glen, for instance, describes the world 
of The Professor as one of ‘ominous instability’, noting that ‘in the closing pages of the novel there are a 
series of disquieting images of violence and unease’ (The Imagination in History, p. 47). See also 
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over bitter individuality. It appears to express a kind of genuine longing, rather than 
disguised contempt, on Crimsworth’s part – an almost poignant acknowledgment of his 
own lack of ‘benignant content’, and perhaps even an admission of intellectual pride, or 
racial snobbery. Certainly it is an instance of a physiognomic reading which privileges 
the ‘honest breast’ over the intellectual forehead, and an exchange which allows warmth 
from an unlikely source to influence the narrator’s somewhat withered good nature. 
Nonetheless, the hearty Belgian’s qualities are not realised in his namesake, who is 
depicted under an ominous cloud. ‘He never looks so like his mother as when he 
smiles’, muses Crimsworth – ‘pity the sunshine breaks out so rarely!’ (p. 289)  
* 
Writing before critics had begun to appreciate the coherence of the novel – the ways in 
which Crimsworth’s story is filtered and distorted through his manner of telling it – 
Carol Christ suggests that The Professor ‘is not a successful book’ because Brontë 
‘creates a hero in William Crimsworth who embodies the values of self-discipline and 
self-denial’: 
Because Crimsworth is so self-consciously controlled and because Brontë never 
takes us beyond the surface of that control, the narrator is both uninteresting and 
unsympathetic. Brontë’s insistence on imaginative control inhibits her own 
imagination, making her unable to portray the psychology of control in her character 
with any depth or complexity.
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Needless to say, such judgments overlook the imaginative effort involved in portraying 
a character through the elisions and propaganda of his own narrative. Moreover it is the 
‘self-consciousness’ of Crimsworth’s self-disciplining that allows Brontë to explore the 
‘psychology of control’ – and with great depth and complexity. The access we are given 
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to his motivations and to his physical (as well as narrative) manners of self-presentation 
enable us to see Crimsworth embodying the self-control that he represents; ‘taking us 
beyond the surface of his control’ is precisely what the novel does achieve – through 
what Dallas described as the author’s ‘anatomizing’ approach to human behaviour (see 
the epigraph to Part One). Cohen has insightfully proposed that the novel supplied 
Brontë with ‘the opportunity to imagine being a man, and in particular to speculate 
about how it feels to inhabit a male body. In pursuing a fantasy of male embodiment 
[she] dramatizes the strangeness of the idea of being inside any body at all.’75 Certainly, 
as I have argued in this chapter, The Professor’s psychological complexity lies in its 
recognition of the ways in which character is built through its projected appearances on 
the surface of the body – and in imagining how these appearances may be manipulated 
from the ‘inside.’ The experiment of inhabiting a male body/ mind thus lays the 
groundwork for the future novels, in which female identity is similarly forged – or 
rather resisted – through expressive performance and mental effort.  
 While Christ’s dismissal of Crimsworth as ‘uninteresting’ is easily disputed, her 
charge that he is ‘unsympathetic’ is true enough – especially when he is compared to 
Frances, who, as the clear precursor to Brontë’s later heroines, has engaged readers’ 
sympathies more readily.
76
 But it should be stressed that Crimsworth’s limitations as a 
relatable protagonist lie not in the fact that he is male, but rather in the non-seriousness 
with which – as I argued at the beginning of Part Two – he is portrayed. The feelings of 
isolation that he experiences are not wholly matters for empathy, being largely 
deserved, absurdly represented, and fairly satirised. At the same time however, 
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 Judith Williams, for instance, describes her as ‘a character capable of engaging our sympathies as 
William never can’ (p. 13), though this judgment rests on Williams’s acceptance of Crimsworth’s self-
presentation – Frances’s ‘struggle with poverty, bereavement, and disappointment in love’ is ‘more 
moving’ than Crimsworth’s ‘calm progress’ (p. 13) and ‘total control’ (p. 10).  
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Crimsworth’s anxiety (for those very reasons) about being a misfit – his consciously 
employed survival strategies, his ever-ready sneer – prepare the ground for Brontë’s 
increasingly serious representation of laughter’s pervasive influence on social life. It is 
Crimsworth’s eccentricity and sensitivity to ridicule that make him an outcast figure of 
a distinctly Brontëan kind and in which he anticipates Brontë’s more understandably 
defensive female protagonists, particularly Lucy Snowe. For all his unsympathetic and 
even comically presented traits, Crimsworth (as well as Frances) is a precursor of sorts 
for the vulnerable heroines of the later novels, The Professor forming a link between the 
flippancy of the juvenilia and the earnestness of those novels. He may be foolish but he 
is also hyper-sensitive, conscious of being at odds with the world around him for 
distinctly personal reasons, and in this self-consciousness he paves the way for the 
representation of Lucy, and her more painful experiences of marginalisation and 
indignity – as well as her more successful attempts to combat them. 
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Chapter Four                                                                                                                        
‘Not ill-natured, but ... too significant to be generally thought amiable’:                  
Morbid Laughter in Shirley and Villette 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters Two and Three I have traced Brontë’s mingled resistance to and acceptance 
of ‘positive’ constructions of laughter as natural and wholesome. I have discussed the 
ways in which Brontë’s intelligent heroines sit outside of ‘healthy’ representational 
norms, as well as outside of the social mainstream more generally, despite Brontë’s 
reluctance to fully endorse the dark, eccentric or unsentimental tones of their laughter. I 
now argue that it is in Villette, her final novel, that Brontë converts this abnormality into 
subversive power – into a full-fledged challenge to prevailing gender ideology. The last 
of Brontë’s women to experience laughter as oppressive or despotic, Lucy Snowe is 
also the most successful, in her sharply self-expressive smiles, at exercising this 
despotism in return.  
 I consider Shirley and Villette in sequence because of the dramatic shift in ideas 
that takes place in the course of the former novel: a turn to disillusionment which is 
carried over, with more positive effect, into Villette. Through Caroline Helstone and 
Shirley Keeldar, Brontë posits laughter both as the source of women’s misery, and the 
key to their empowerment, with a logic that the novel struggles to sustain. Caroline and 
Shirley are conventionally and healthily attractive, physically and morally; Caroline’s 
mild gentleness and Shirley’s colourful, vibrant sociability in different ways conform to 
the ideal femininity which is manifest in their good looks. Contemptible male types are 
meanwhile introduced in order to offset the heroines’ natural superiority, the novel 
initially working to place women – as the champions and embodiment of healthy 
amiability – in positions of communal solidarity and power over feeble and ridiculous 
men. These men, characterised by their morally off-colour laughter, are made the 
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objects of women’s emphatically good-natured and well-mannered mirth in an effort to 
elevate ‘feminine’ values, while adhering to contemporary sentimental ideas about those 
values. It is thus a novel in which the gendered categories of mockery and mirth remain 
rigidly divided. Brontë seeks to combat male mockery through the power of female 
mirth, setting up a battle of the sexes in which men laugh nastily and women (at least 
initially) laugh nicely.  
 However, this attempt at a righting of the power imbalance is thwarted, I will 
argue, by the novel’s underlying cynicism respecting the power of laughter to positively 
transform the community. Following the process in Shirley by which healthy feminine 
triumph is ultimately met with, and eroded by, brutal discipline and disease, Villette 
replaces merry, attractive heroines with a sour and plain one; it turns from sociable, 
optimistic feeling to anti-social withdrawal – but it also converts anxiety and 
inconsistency into useful knowledge. If Shirley ends with the bleak acceptance that 
genially wholesome women are the prey of powerful men – that open laughter is in the 
grip of the predatory sneer – Villette in turn asks rather more productively what might 
be done with that awareness. The novel may not be any more cheerful for this, but in 
discarding the soft smiles and bright buoyancy of Caroline and Shirley respectively, 
Lucy is less weighted down and less exposed by that ‘openness’ required of the 
conventional heroine. In both novels, Brontë uses the language of laughter to address 
the discord between self and society, and between men and women. But whereas Shirley 
rails against a sick society, Villette’s more subtle critique is achieved through following 
a ‘sick’ protagonist through scenes that are (falsely) vibrant with apparent health. 
Brontë thereby collapses the binary of negative mockery and positive mirth by 
demonstrating their interconnectedness – and from this emerges her most clear-sighted 
vision of laughter’s dominion over social life.  
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I 
It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting ... 
Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is 
made better. The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning; but the heart of fools 
is in the house of mirth... For as the crackling of thorns under a pot, so is the 
laughter of the fool: this also is vanity.  
Ecclesiastes, 7:2-6 
 
More explicitly and more pressingly than in Brontë’s previous novels, Shirley poses a 
series of questions about laughter’s moral and social value: when is it appropriate and 
when inappropriate to laugh? Is laughter beneficial or destructive to communities? Is it 
irreligious? Is it always at someone else’s expense? A curiously conflicted novel, Shirley 
is filled equally with mourning and with feasting, with sorrow and with laughter – it 
veers between hearty good humour and grim warnings akin to that propounded in 
Ecclesiastes. Although the novel is packed with ostensibly comic characters and scenes, 
the overall impression it leaves is however a sombre one, and the questions it poses have 
by the end been answered with decided pessimism.  
 But if Shirley ultimately settles on a gloomy note, it is not consistently severe on 
the theme of laughter. Particularly in the first two volumes, the narrator’s frequent 
condemnations of mean-minded laughter (which includes but is not restricted to the 
laughter of ‘fools’) are bolstered by efforts to justify or celebrate that which is sociable 
and good-natured. Of the eponymous heroine, we are told that ‘when animated, [her] 
wistfulness became blent with a genial gaiety, seasoning the laugh, the smile, the glance, 
with an unique flavour of sentiment, so that mirth from her never resembled “the 
crackling of thorns under a pot”.’1 The novel’s moral position on laughter is a qualified, 
and distinctly gendered one. Specifically, female mirth – of which Shirley is the 
                                                          
1
 Brontë, Shirley, p. 219. Although it is not explicitly evoked by Brontë, Shirley’s laughter appears to 
follow the alternative biblical maxim that ‘a merry heart doeth good like a medicine’ (Proverbs, 17:22). 
Subsequent references to Shirley will be given in parentheses after quotations.  
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representative – is held up by the narrator as a source of social healing and a signifier of 
spiritual depth, in opposition to the various shallow and unpleasant masculine varieties 
that Brontë describes. The novel’s defence of ‘genial gaiety’ is bound up with the 
endeavour to represent morally healthy, admirable heroines, insofar as it is the tone of 
their laughter which sets them apart from the novel’s ill-mannered men, and is used to 
illustrate their superior qualities.  
 The foremost examples of these unpleasant types are the curates Malone, Donne 
and Sweeting, who as religious specimens present a stark contrast to the unsmiling 
severity of St John Rivers. From the opening scene through to the novel’s conclusion 
this trio is regularly introduced to furnish illustrations of impolite laughter. Particularly 
abhorrent is Malone, who, drinking excessively, ‘waxed by degrees hilarious after his 
fashion ... said rude things in a hectoring tone, and laughed clamorously at his own 
brilliancy’ (p. 8). This clamorous laughter is both boorish and malicious: ‘Each of his 
companions became in turn his butt. Malone had a stock of jokes at their service, which 
he was accustomed to serve out regularly on convivial occasions like the present’ (pp. 8-
9). Brontë emphasises the inappropriateness of the curates’ greed (in the midst of a 
community which is starving) in conjunction with the unseemliness of their high spirits; 
their ‘mocking laughter’ (p. 10) is persistently linked to their habits of gluttony and 
intemperance. Thus Malone ‘waxed very exultant over the supper: he laughed aloud at 
trifles; made bad jokes and applauded them himself; and, in short, grew unmeaningly 
noisy’ (p. 24). Laughing at his own jokes, and at trivialities, Malone displays the vanity 
and shallowness of the biblical fool – this is, implicitly, the ‘crackling of thorns’ that 
Shirley’s laughter does not resemble, and it reverberates throughout the novel. 
 Its reverberations are amplified by the sheer volume of this ‘unmeaningly noisy’ 
laughter. For gentle, sensitive Caroline Helstone, the offensive tones of the curates’ 
cachinnations figure as an invasion of her personal space, as ‘through the closed doors 
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Caroline heard their boyish laughter, and the vacant cackle of their voices’ (p. 93). As 
the Rector’s niece she is obliged to entertain these unwelcome visitors, whose vacant 
cackling and ‘silly ridicule’ of the local people (p. 99) are not merely an annoyance but, 
by force of volume, a form of assault, her exposure to the constant sound of inane 
laughter bringing on physical distress. Caroline falls victim to ‘a sort of brain-lethargy’ 
caused by ‘the unmeaning hum round her: the inharmonious, tasteless rattle of the piano 
keys, the squeaking and gasping notes of the flute, the laughter and mirth of her uncle 
and Hannah and Mary, she could not tell whence originating, for she heard nothing 
comic or gleeful in their discourse’ (p. 103). Spreading from the curates to the entire 
company, the sound of laughter takes on a nightmarish meaninglessness comparable to 
the ‘inharmonious ... squeaking and gasping’ of the music, with Caroline left feeling 
both isolated and trapped in the midst of merriment. However, what separates this scene 
from comparable incidents in Villette is the sense that Caroline’s distress is justified by 
the vileness of the company. As flutes and pianos are conventionally accessories to 
social harmony – but only when played well – so the implication is that the laughter here 
is of a false, perverted kind, and that in better company Caroline would be perfectly 
cheerful. In other words, she is alienated not because of any innate anti-social quality or 
morbid temperament, but because of the circumstances of the case, the lack of anything 
genuinely ‘comic and gleeful’ to enjoy. The narrator is clear (at this stage in the novel) 
about the distinctions to be drawn between felicitous and foolish mirth, and the 
importance of drawing such distinctions is a constant refrain.  
 Thus, despite frequently adopting a flippant tone, the narrator is earnest and 
didactic on the subject of ill-judged laughter, as for instance in defence of the old maid 
Miss Ainley, whose sincere piety forms a contrast with the bad example set by the 
curates:  
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She was religious [and] referred to religion often in sanctioned phrase – in phrase 
which those who possess a perception of the ridiculous, without owning the power 
[of] truly judging character, would certainly have esteemed a proper subject for 
satire: a matter for mimicry and laughter. They would have been hugely mistaken for 
their pains. Sincerity is never ludicrous; it is always respectable ... Let those who 
cannot nicely, and with certainty, discern the difference between the tones of 
hypocrisy and those of sincerity, never presume to laugh at all, lest they should have 
the miserable misfortune to laugh in the wrong place, and commit impiety when they 
think they are achieving wit (p. 156).  
Coming down heavily on the crime of laughing ‘in the wrong place’, the narrator is no 
less critical of the absolutism of dour Mrs. Yorke, who thinks hard things ‘of any 
unhappy wight – especially of the female sex – who dared in her presence to show the 
light of a gay heart on a sunny countenance.’ In Mrs. Yorke’s estimation, ‘to be mirthful 
was to be profane; to be cheerful was to be frivolous: she drew no distinctions’ (p. 126). 
The narrator calls for compromise, challenging on one hand the ‘crackling thorns’ and 
on the other the grim outlook of Mrs. Yorke – it is thus precisely those distinctions 
between mirthful and profane, and between cheerful and frivolous, that the novel seeks 
to establish.  
Proper subjects for satire 
It is Shirley who (arriving towards the close of the first volume) provides the required 
role model, bringing a spirit of amiable sociability to the community. When we first 
meet her, ‘mischief, spirit, and glee sparkled all over her face’ and she has a ‘joyous 
laugh’ (p. 174). She is deemed a beneficial example for physically weak and low-
spirited Caroline, who (for reasons we have seen) ‘could not be cheerful in company’ 
(p. 164). The point is made by Shirley herself, who triumphantly observes: ‘Caroline is 
laughing, Mrs. Pryor: I made her laugh; I have done her good’ (p. 206; Brontë’s 
emphasis). But it is stressed that Shirley has moral standards with her merriment. She 
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‘never laughed at her former governess [Mrs Pryor]: even the little formalities and 
harmless peculiarities of that lady were respectable in her eyes.’ Had it been otherwise, 
the narrator points out, ‘she would have proved herself a weak character at once; for it is 
only the weak who make a butt of quiet worth’ (p. 175). Shirley thus proves herself 
above that kind of raillery which typically targets old maids; she is able to accurately 
judge who constitutes ‘a proper subject for satire.’ The youthful appearance of her suitor 
Sir Philip ‘had at first elicited some laughing, though not ill-natured, remarks from the 
merry Shirley.’ However, ‘she soon checked her sarcasm on this point ... A spare and 
rare shaft she still reserved for his unfortunate poetic propensity [but] she would tolerate 
no irony save her own’ (p. 398). If Shirley’s high spirits are made acceptable by her 
considerateness for others, her capacity for ‘mischief’ is rendered open, pleasant, and 
‘joyous’; her sunny disposition ‘robbed her very raillery of its sting’ (p. 251) – through 
the usual careful phrasing, female laughter is purified and disarmed.  
 But, sweetened as it is, what Shirley exerts in the narrative is no less than a 
compelling satirical power. Whereas Caroline had been victimized before, in company 
with the no-nonsense Shirley she is not only restored to health but acquires 
cheerfulness, confidence, and protection. Shirley wields social power, and her point of 
view is authorised and carried by laughter. Thus, ‘[such] books as Miss Keeldar had 
read with the most pleasure, were Miss Helstone’s delight also. They held many 
aversions too in common, and could have the comfort of laughing together works of 
false sentimentality and pompous pretension’ (pp. 188-9). With the heroines set up in 
this way as the right judges of ‘proper subjects for satire’, the behaviour of the curates 
becomes matter for fun rather than frowning distaste. Malone’s clumsy courting sends 
Shirley to the window ‘to laugh her silent but irrepressible laugh unseen: it turned 
Caroline’s head aside, that her long curls might screen the smile mantling on her 
features.’ Though they are impeccably ladylike in their discretion, Malone is put in his 
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place – his own ‘hollow laughter’ is shown up in all its feeble inadequacy by Shirley’s 
‘mirth-lit face’, when he falls down the stairs. Observing Malone slipping ‘in his stately 
descent’ Shirley condescendingly ‘took pity – she ceased to laugh; and Caroline was too 
true a lady to smile even at any one under mortification.’ Nevertheless Malone glares at 
them ‘as if he would have liked to clutch one and gripe her to death’, and the reader is 
presumably meant to enjoy the joke (pp. 233-5).  
 Shirley’s laughter effects an infantilization of the novel’s weak male characters, 
consolidated by the facetious satire with which they are treated by the narrator. This is 
evident for instance in Shirley’s adoption of Sweeting, who, unlike Donne and Malone, 
receives a flower ‘like a smart, sensible little man’, and is beckoned apart to help 
Shirley prepare a picnic ‘as a reward for his good manners’ (p. 238). At the picnic a 
comparison is drawn between the wholesome merriment of the good-natured, feminine 
(or feminised) part of the company, and the anti-social conduct of Malone and Donne, 
who ‘contributed but little to [the party’s] vivacity, the chief part they played in it being 
what concerned the knife, fork, and wineglass.’ As well as being busy eating and 
drinking, the curates are ‘too much occupied with their own jokes to notice what passed 
at the other end of the table’ (pp. 238-40). It is scenes like this which serve most 
emphatically to make those distinctions which Mrs. Yorke refuses to draw; Shirley’s 
bright vivaciousness enables her to be the figurehead for acceptable light-heartedness 
and sociability, which is portrayed in opposition to the mock-conviviality represented 
by the curates. From being dreaded visitors, whose presence is oppressive to Caroline, 
they become belittled and marginalised, dismissively satirised and easily shunted to the 
end of the table.  
 Shirley’s strength of character also makes easy work of her uncle Sympson, a 
mean-minded bore who arrives in the neighbourhood intending to exert control over his 
niece, and who expresses his sense of self-importance with a ‘chuckling laugh’ (p. 457). 
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Shirley is provocatively witty and contemptuous in her defiance of this would-be tyrant, 
causing him to rage furiously but impotently (‘[this] is not a laughing matter!’) in 
another scene in which female humour triumphs over inadequate masculinity (p. 462). 
Shirley’s satirical power extends, to an extent, over more dignified men too; she is 
cheerfully patronising in her attitude towards Helstone, for instance, who is a fierce and 
oppressive uncle to Caroline. ‘Captain Keeldar’ (the masculine nickname serving to 
emphasise her position of condescending joviality) is ‘charmed’ to have been able to 
please him with food, noting approvingly that he ‘did justice to it, though in a 
gentlemanly way – not in the mode Mr. Donne would have done, had he been present’ 
(p. 231). Men in the novel are ranked in dignity in accordance with their appetite – only 
pious, mild-tempered Mr. Hall, who is ‘no bon-vivant’ but a ‘naturally abstemious 
man’, and whose good nature is signalled by his ‘benignant’ smile, escapes Shirley’s 
(and thus the novel’s) satirical teasing (pp. 229, 231). 
* 
As we will see, both the innocence of Shirley’s sense of humour and the position of 
power it puts her in are, ultimately, undermined. Acting as a wholesome put-down to 
the follies of men like Malone and Donne, her laughter is less effectual against the 
novel’s more intelligent, socially influential male characters. But her initial 
characterisation does enable Brontë to flirt with a reversal of power relations, and in a 
spirit which verges at times on the vicarious. Ladylike and discreet as Shirley and 
Caroline might be, the objects of their mirth are not always protected from the ‘sting’ of 
raillery: 
[Malone] saw the laugh – it was unmistakeable – he was made a joke of – his 
gallantry, his chivalry were the subject of a jest for a petticoat – for two petticoats – 
Miss Helstone too was smiling. Moreover, he felt he was seen through, and [he] grew 
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black as a thunder-cloud. When Shirley looked up, a fell eye was fastened on her: 
Malone, at least, had energy enough to hate: she saw it at a glance (p. 252).  
What this passage dramatises is Shirley’s power to humiliate, and Malone’s 
vulnerability to the humiliation imposed on him. Like Crimsworth, and like Martin 
Yorke, who though himself partial to ‘a refreshing laugh of scorn’ (p. 477) is also ‘as 
sensitive to ridicule as any girl’ (p. 493), the supposedly coarse and insensitive Malone 
deeply resents the emasculating feeling that he is ‘seen through.’ Women’s laughter is 
not consistently harmless or hidden from sight: in this and other instances it is 
something that its victims are necessarily exposed to, and which enacts punishment 
rather than promoting social harmony and good will.   
 As a rich and independent heiress, Shirley provides an illustration of male power 
redesignated to morally responsible hands; Brontë’s typically plain, poor and obscure 
heroines make way for one with beauty, wealth and influence. And this is not all she 
possesses; Shirley’s position of power is expressed in the physical health which, in turn, 
lends her an energy unique to Brontë’s heroines, and the ‘healthy’ good spirits in which 
they are generally impoverished. Favourable circumstances produce the capacity to 
laugh, and that laughter consolidates the power it reflects. But Shirley is a novel of 
harsh truths and probing realism, and the ethical quality of this laughter does not go 
wholly untarnished. Shirley represents a fantasy of female invulnerability, as well as a 
moral lesson in female compassion, and there are tensions produced by this dual 
function which the novel’s simplistic distinctions between good nature and bad manners 
fail to resolve. The ideal of a moral, essentially female alternative to the laughter 
associated with male characters is shakily balanced with the privileging of the female 
satirical perspective – Shirley’s smug superiority over the curates, who provide her with 
‘amusement’, even ‘sport’ (p. 251) seems at times hardly compatible with the work of 
justifying laughter’s social and moral value. But more damagingly, the attempt to 
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champion healthy, feminine mirth while turning a grave, earnest face to irreverent male 
laughter is increasingly thwarted by the insidious, and decidedly unhealthy effects of 
masculine laughter which, instead of being foolish and crude, is impeccably polite. 
Significant smiles 
If for all their obnoxiousness, the curates constitute a kind of false threat – a means by 
which the heroines are shown to advantage – a more challenging face is shown by the 
novel’s ‘heroes’ and respectable men. Particularly in the case of mill-owner Robert 
Moore, the familiar objection is raised to a different kind of anti-social tendency, to 
laughter that is quieter, cooler, and compatible with the gentleman. This tendency is 
characterised principally in terms of sinister reserve (boisterous joviality, for all its very 
different power to oppress, is restricted to the loud and stupid curates), and is expressed 
in smiles which jeopardise the feminine good humour that the novel celebrates. 
 Helstone fixes nervous Mrs. Pryor ‘with his sarcastic, keen eye’ (p. 168); Mr. 
Yorke smiles, amused, at Shirley’s earnest criticisms of him (pp. 309-10); Moore 
‘[smiles] in deep secrecy at [Shirley’s] naïveté and simplicity’ (p. 446), or ‘[chuckles] 
drily ... his cap brim over his eyes, shading in some measure their deep dancing ray of 
scorn’ (p. 114). Once again, scorn and sarcasm are ostensibly secretive or shaded, yet 
effectively target female weaknesses, or ‘openness.’ Moore’s show of concealment is 
very different to Caroline considerately turning her head aside, ‘that her long hair might 
screen the smile mantling on her features’; his cap brim serves an altogether more 
hostile purpose than her long, feminine curls. Helstone likes to see women ‘as silly, as 
light-headed, as vain, as open to ridicule as possible’ (p. 99). His contemptuous laughter 
at Caroline’s ‘namby-pamby’ desire for a change in her life gives literal manifestation 
to the general, sneering male attitude to women’s concerns which the narrator protests 
at, when s/he urges the ‘fathers of England’ not to dismiss increased opportunities for 
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women ‘with an idle jest’ (pp. 163, 330). Individual mocking faces are in this way used 
to illustrate the widespread, habitual putting down of women. And the sinister 
impression persists when a laugh or smile is accompanied by less-than-reassuring 
disclaimers that it is benign, as when ‘the hardest of laughs, though [by] no means 
insulting, was the response of the Rector’ (p. 112). Or when Moore smiles ‘in his way, 
with that expression which gave a remarkable cast of sweetness to his mouth, while his 
brow remained grave’, or ‘smiled pleasantly, but his lips continued sealed’ (pp. 244, 
262). Laughter hides sealed, silent depths: Helstone is merry in company but ‘stern and 
silent at home, [where] he locks his liveliness in his book-case ... the knitted brow and 
brief word for the fireside; the smile, the jest, the witty sally, for society’ (p. 181). Such 
laughter is disciplinary in its effects, and characterised by underlying coldness and 
seriousness. It is employed too by the masculine, tyrannical Mrs. Yorke, who, despite 
her disapproval of sunny feminine countenances, has ‘her own peculiar short laugh’, 
drily directed at girlish enthusiasm, and is in the habit of ‘hurling’ sarcasms at Caroline 
(pp. 338, 339). 
 In contrast to the curates, Moore and Helstone are powerful patriarchs, 
emotionally inflexible but admirable for their intelligence and self-command – ‘no 
animal vice was lord of them: they looked and were superior beings’ (p. 113). The novel 
criticises their hardness but endorses their moral uprightness and leadership skills; the 
scorn of these ‘superior beings’ is preferable to the ‘boyish laughter’ of the curates 
(boyishness implying not endearing charm but immaturity and dissolute habits). 
Nonetheless, the crushing effects of this scorn are represented as a source of deep 
unease. In a novel preoccupied with the challenge of interpreting and combating 
laughter, with power dynamics centred on reading and responding to the face, laughter 
of this kind is far more successful at demonstrating superiority. The curates’ laughter is 
loud but not so lingering in its effects; they are transparently Hobbesian in their 
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exchanges – manageable through being so easy to read and to judge. The contrast 
between intellectual and animal natures is apparent when we are told that ‘Helstone 
smiled sardonically; Malone laughed a horse-laugh’ (p. 16), or when Moore’s ‘queer, 
quiet smile’ is juxtaposed with the violent ‘Ha! ha!’ of Malone (p. 20). Aggression, it is 
again suggested, may be more unsettling in combination with restraint and 
understatement: oppressors of the working classes as well as of women, Moore and 
Helstone share ‘a cynical smile flashed into each other’s stern eyes’ as they contemplate 
crushing a rebellion (p. 113). The novel’s earnest criticism of masculine laughter is 
shared and seemingly influenced by Anne Brontë’s Tenant of Wildfell Hall (1848), a 
novel in which – as Juliet McMaster has explored – laughter connotes tyranny but at the 
same time excess and a contemptible lack of self-government.
2
 However, in Shirley’s 
representation of laughing masculinity, drunken immaturity is neatly separated from the 
tyrannical power that is wielded by the morally upright gentleman. 
 In Shirley we find a sustained exploration of the social effects of this understated 
mockery – its capacity to produce discomfort, to diminish more pleasant laughter or 
stop it in its tracks: Moore teases the ‘discomfited’ Shirley, who ‘laughed at her own 
over-eager generosity’; ‘Moore laughed too – very quietly, though.’ ‘You ought to be 
thankful’, Shirley complains, ‘and not mock me’ (p. 303). The quiet persistence of 
                                                          
2
 See Juliet McMaster, ‘“Imbecile Laughter” and “Desperate Earnest” in The Tenant of Wildfell Hall’, 
Modern Language Quarterly, 43 (1982), 352-68. McMaster raises a number of interesting ideas in this 
article, in which she demonstrates that ‘the imagery of laughter, smiles, and tears forms a consistent 
pattern in the novel by which Anne Brontë articulates her moral theme and develops her characters and 
their relations with one another’ (p. 358). She argues that Anne Brontë ‘explores the huge discrepancy 
between the moral standards for women and men’ through a comparison of ‘Regency and Victorian 
mores’, in which raucous laughter is representative of ‘the masculine ethos of the Regency’, in contrast to 
the women’s moral, ‘Victorian’ solemnity. This results in an ‘alignment of fun and laughter with the men, 
moral earnestness and tears with the women’ – the men ‘have a monopoly on gaiety, as the women on 
seriousness.’ But McMaster finds no distinction between ‘imbecile – mindless, inappropriate, 
irresponsible’ laughter, and more dignified, menacing mockery (pp. 354, 357, 361). Shirley is also set in 
the Regency period and is similarly based on a division between men and women – however it aligns 
morality (and women) with ‘gaiety’, not seriousness, while its moral critique is split between loud-
laughing raucousness and smooth-smiling ridicule.  
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Moore’s laughter has the same function as his disconcerting gaze, as recognised by 
Shirley: ‘you can’t fix your eyes on him but his presently flash on you. He is never off 
his guard: he won’t give you an advantage ... Oh! I know that sort of character ... it is 
one that piques me singularly’ (p. 232). In short, Shirley’s satirical authority is thwarted 
by Moore: 
I rather like to entertain a circle of gentlemen ... it is amusing to observe how they 
enjoy a judiciously concocted repast. [They] seem to retain something of the naïveté 
of children about food, and one likes to please them ... I watch Moore sometimes, to 
try and discover how he can be pleased; but he has not that child’s simplicity about 
him. Did you ever find out his accessible point, Caroline? (p. 231)  
Shirley is unable to find out an accessible (weak) point, and thereby to gain ‘an 
advantage’, because of his exemplary self-government. Whatever advantage she may 
gain over the novel’s less guarded male characters, Moore’s lack of ‘amusing’ child-like 
naivety makes him a ‘superior being.’   
 Caroline, who herself has a kind of ‘child’s simplicity’, is no match for this kind 
of laughter. Though she voices disapproval at Moore’s lack of sympathy for the 
unemployed, her devotion to him is largely reminiscent of that shown by gentle Mary 
Percy to Zamorna. The narrator at times joins Caroline in stressing Moore’s essentially 
good and admirable character (presumably since it is so often brought into question) – it 
is claimed for instance that he is ‘not habitually given to sarcasm, especially on 
anything humbler or weaker than himself’ (p. 151). A similar blindness is shown by the 
grave, earnest child Rose Yorke, who gives voice to the pervading suspicion with which 
laughter is viewed in the novel by declaring that Moore ‘looks too sorrowful to be false 
... If he were always laughing, I should think he forgets promises soon, but Mr. Moore 
never laughs’ (p. 132). This pronouncement, echoing the assumption that ‘by the 
sadness of the countenance the heart is made better’, fails to take into account the 
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warning signs provided by the ‘deeply secretive’ smiles playing around his lips; Moore 
may not laugh much, but his falseness to Caroline is foreshadowed in his countenance 
all the same. Moore’s untrustworthiness is likewise signalled by his mockery of the 
unfortunate Miss Mann, a ‘cankered old maid’, and Caroline’s response on one such 
occasion is shrewd: ‘Ah! Robert, you do not like old maids. I, too, should come under 
the lash of your sarcasm, if I were an old maid’ (p. 152). She is troubled too by Miss 
Ainley’s rough treatment, and ‘how gentlemen always sneer at her!’ (p. 151) When 
abandoned by Moore, Caroline is left vulnerable to just such a fate – prompting her 
determination to befriend these old women, and take them seriously. The need for a 
more earnest model of female solidarity than that offered by Shirley is thus suggested. 
Indeed, for all Shirley’s refusals to make fun of Mrs Prior, the promise of communal 
feeling through laughter is overshadowed not only by men but by the ‘lash of sarcasm’ 
that Mrs. Yorke, for instance, applies to other women. Scepticism emerges regarding 
the possibility of sisterly laughter, with good spirits beginning to seem a less sure 
remedy for women’s grievances.3  
                                                          
3
 Brontë expresses similar ambivalence in a letter of August 1846 to her friend Ellen Nussey, concerning 
a mutual acquaintance of theirs. The letter is worth quoting at length here, for the comparison it offers 
between the author’s personal observations and her fiction: ‘Greatly was I amused by your accounts of 
Joe Taylor’s flirtations – and yet something saddened also – I think Nature intended him for something 
better than to fritter away his time in making a set of poor, unoccupied spinsters unhappy – The girls 
unfortunately are forced to care for him and such as him because while their minds are mostly 
unemployed, their sensations are all unworn and consequently fresh and keen – and he on the contrary has 
had his fill of pleasure and can with impunity make a mere pastime of other people’s torments. This is an 
unfair state of things, the match is not equal. I only wish I had the power to infuse into the souls of the 
persecuted a little of the quiet strength of pride – of the supporting consciousness of superiority (for they 
are superior to him because purer) of the fortifying resolve of firmness ... Perhaps luckily their feelings 
are not so acute as one would think and the gentleman’s shafts consequently don’t wound so deeply as he 
might desire – I hope it is so’ (Letters I, pp. 494-5). These comments highlight Brontë’s perception of a 
power imbalance (‘the match is not equal’) between confident men and ‘persecuted’, ‘tormented’ women 
(particularly ‘spinsters’). The ‘supporting consciousness of superiority’ that she advocates here and at 
many points in Shirley (a superiority based on ‘purity’ and ‘quiet strength’) is implicitly of a serious 
nature – she hopes that these women might be too dignified to feel ‘the gentleman’s shafts’ – but 
elsewhere in her novels (especially in Villette), consciousness of superiority as a talisman against ridicule 
manifests itself in answering mocking smiles. 
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 This sincerity of tone, and the oppressive atmosphere created by cruel laughter, 
becomes more prominent as the novel progresses. Moore is made to seem demonic, 
hidden behind a gravestone, ‘his dark eyes shining, and his lips parted with inward 
laughter’ (pp. 216-7). At the end of the novel, the supposedly reformed Robert is still to 
be found ‘laughing in his sleeve and sneering with every feature of his pale, foreign 
face’ (p. 532) – hardly an image to affirm his newly declared moral earnestness. Indeed 
those contradictory physiognomic displays, his ‘half smiles’, are an apt reflection of his 
half English, half Belgian identity, foreignness accounting for the shady side of his 
character that accompanies his admirable English uprightness. Nonetheless his 
temperament cannot fully be accounted for in this way, since disturbing male behaviour 
is endemic to the society Brontë depicts. Caroline is beset even by the young misogynist 
Martin Yorke; ‘I made her sob, shudder, almost faint: I’ll see her smile before I’ve done 
with her’ he resolves (p. 482), in an eerie echo of Shirley’s announcement: ‘I made her 
laugh ... I have done her good.’ Martin’s manipulation of Caroline arises from a 
fascination with her feminine charms and a will to control her bodily and emotionally. 
‘You may laugh’, he tells her – ‘I have no objection to see you laugh: your teeth – I hate 
ugly teeth; but yours are as pretty as a pearl necklace’ (p. 495; Brontë’s emphasis). In 
opening her mouth to laugh, Caroline’s merriment becomes subject to male voyeurism 
and triumph, her inner feelings rendered transparent to the gratified Martin. 
 Whereas Caroline slips back into a state of innocent vulnerability, the effect of 
such controlling attitudes on Shirley is more interesting: she takes on the taint of male 
behaviour. Even in the earlier stages of the novel, when the emphasis is more on her 
healthy good nature, a few jarring instances stand out where that good nature is 
problematised – where she is made to seem cynical and knowing, in the jostle for 
power. For all her celebrated openness, she displays at times an acute awareness of the 
power of the enigmatic smile. If Helstone ‘[smiles] a little grimly’, suspicious that 
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‘something in petticoats was somehow trying underhand to acquire too much influence’, 
Shirley ‘comprehends’ the expression and responds by ‘smiling queerly to herself’, an 
expressive act consolidated by her strategic self-positioning: 
Shirley stood behind the Rectors, leaning over their shoulders ... listening to all they 
said, and still at intervals smiling her queer smile – a smile not ill-natured, but 
significant: too significant to be generally thought amiable. Men rarely like such of 
their fellows as read their inward nature too clearly and truly. It is good for women, 
especially, to be endowed with a soft blindness: to have mild, dim eyes, that never 
penetrate below the surface of things (pp. 229-30). 
It is certainly ‘significant’ that Shirley imitates the ‘queer, quiet smile’ of Moore. It is 
significant that, despite all apparent efforts to endorse a conventionally attractive, 
perfectly good-humoured heroine, Brontë should undermine all this with the insistence 
on an expression which (though of course ‘not ill-natured’) is yet distinctly not amiable. 
As Malone had recognised that he was ‘seen through’, Shirley here reads the ‘inward 
nature’ of her guests, and shows it. The smile is an expression of knowledge, and 
knowledge as power; it is ‘comprehending’, penetrating, and unfeminine. 
 The unamiable display is unmistakeably a response to the repressive effects, as 
illustrated throughout the novel, of masculine sarcasm on facial expressiveness. In 
Shirley’s case, affective demonstration is curbed and exchanged for cool intelligence. 
When Moore examines ‘with rather significant scrutiny her still flushed face,’ a 
‘pleasant enough smile played on her lips, but she hid it’ (p. 302). The ‘pleasant enough 
smile’ is increasingly compromised or hidden; under the scrutinising male gaze the 
merry laugh becomes muted, concealed. And when it does appear, it takes on 
increasingly the characteristics of ‘masculine’ laughter – her protective, feminine 
disposition is necessarily called into question when we are told she is capable of ‘a 
jesting, gibing laugh’ in Caroline’s direction, and is ‘ever ready to satirize [enthusiasm]’ 
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(pp. 288,291). Interestingly, the trajectory followed by Shirley is exactly the reverse of 
that assigned to Frances and Jane, who begin as edgy, sharp characters but who improve 
in health and amiability.  
 Louis Moore, who does not appear until the end of the second volume, is the 
principal cause of this change in Shirley’s character. The power struggle between them 
begins when Louis succeeds in stealing the affections of Shirley’s dog. The first time 
this happens he ‘smiled one little smile to himself’, and the second time ‘the significant 
smile again rippled across [his] quiet face’ (p. 380). ‘Full of odd, quiet, out-of-the-way-
humour’ as he is described, Louis typically smiles ‘into his book’ (pp. 384, 385), a 
gesture indicative of secrecy and intellect. Like his brother, Louis does not ‘laugh much, 
but [utters] in the quietest tone the wittiest things’ (p. 389).The effect on Shirley is that 
she is transformed from ‘a wild, laughing thing’ into a more cynical, guarded character 
(p. 385). Denying her feelings for this ‘odd, quiet’ tyrant, she ‘laughed: she laughed 
again; each time with a slightly sarcastic sound’ (p. 382). Under pressure, she hides a 
smile which ‘she would not permit to expand’ (p. 410). And she ‘scornfully ridicule[s]’ 
the idea that she is out of sorts, while Louis smiles to see her ‘in such a mood’ (pp. 416, 
420). Shirley is tamed and subdued, but without falling into the state of glowing, 
complacent contentment that is Frances’s response to her subjection by Crimsworth – 
Brontë implies, this time, that vitality and cheerfulness may be eroded rather than 
awakened by a man’s influence. By the finale, the previously jolly heroine is 
characteristically to be found partaking in embittered ‘gibes and jests’ (p. 506), or with a 
haughtily scornful ‘curled lip’ (p. 516). These expressions are, evidently, her most 
potent means of resistance to the controlling, predatory Louis, as she gradually 
succumbs to him – ‘her little spark of temper dissolved in sarcasm, and eddied over her 
countenance in the ripples of a mocking smile’ (p. 517). The phrase (echoing the smile 
that ‘ripples’ across Louis’s face) aptly reflects the larger pattern of the narrative: 
213 
 
Shirley’s rebellious and emotional spirit (as well as her independence) is curbed, and 
her character sours.
4
  
 Both heroines are saved from the threat of death by the conclusion of the novel: 
Caroline is raised from her sickbed, and Shirley’s bite from a rabid dog proves 
harmless. Louis, too, recovers from illness and Robert from injury. Yet these 
restorations to health – insofar as they are symbolic of a larger salvation of the 
community – are no more convincing than any other aspect of the ‘happy ending’, 
which critics agree is laced with cynicism.
5
 The note of disillusionment is a bitter one – 
in the first two volumes feminine mirth had been invested with the potency to restore 
the community to moral and spiritual health, yet the redeeming contagiousness of the 
heroine’s laughter proves less effective than the negative contagion that overrides it. 
The novel’s turn to cynicism is a turn to morbidity, Shirley’s corruption (for all her 
renewed bodily health) evinced by the unhealthy quality of her laughter. Caroline, saved 
from spinsterhood (and the ill health that this entails) retains her femininity and healthy 
colour – restored by maternal care – only to be claimed by Robert, who at the last 
glimpse is ominously sneering with every feature of his pale face.  
 Faces in Shirley thus register a movement from expression to repression, from 
optimism to pessimism, and from health to morbidity, while the gendered operations of 
power that bring this about are closely recorded. Shirley’s souring, her internalization of 
male sarcasm, is not a positive indication of her refusal to be patronised but a defeatist 
                                                          
4
 As Kucich sees it, Shirley ‘seems to turn to repression very gradually, after having been characterized 
early in the novel as a creature of spontaneous passions’ (Repression in Victorian Fiction, p. 75). It is 
through her laughter, I suggest, that this development can be seen most clearly.  
5
 Christopher Lane, for instance, describes the double wedding as parodic, and claims that Shirley 
‘[anticipates] Villette’s complex antisocial impulses.’ I agree with Lane that Shirley essentially ‘distrusts 
[claims] about social harmony’ and ‘undermines [myths] about communities.’ See Lane, Hatred and 
Civility: the Antisocial Life in Victorian England (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 90, 
96. In the view of Robert Bernard Martin, ‘Nowhere does the novel seem more sober, more disillusioned 
than in the conventional “happy” ending.’ Martin, Charlotte Brontë’s Novels: The Accents of Persuasion 
(New York: Norton, 1968), p. 135.  
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development, akin to her loss of liberty in marriage – the rhetorical energy spent on 
elevating healthy, feminine good humour leads only to the conservative ‘taming’ of the 
heroine by her ‘master.’ In Shirley’s two narratives, of redemptive female power and of 
destructive male power, it is the latter that triumphs. Nonetheless, Shirley’s change of 
mood represents an exchange of naive earnestness for cool self-government which will 
be turned to more positive account in Villette. Stripped of her benign amiability, Shirley 
loses the claim to moral superiority that had to an extent empowered her: in suppressing 
her heroine’s high spirits and buoyant health, Brontë ends by denying the subversive 
potential of these qualities for women, showing instead how easily they can be trampled 
and exploited. But Shirley’s change in temperament anticipates Lucy Snowe, for whom 
the cultivation of ‘masculine’ sarcasm proves a more tangible source of power and 
protection. A self-confessed stranger to mirth, Lucy is nobody’s fool.  
* 
Before moving on to Villette, however, it should be acknowledged that Shirley is in 
certain respects a humorous novel, which in places recalls (as The Professor does) the 
boisterous, farcical energy of the early writings, and which – also imitating the early 
writings – adopts the strident satirical voice of Blackwood’s and Fraser’s magazines. It 
features stock-comic scenes and caricatures, with clergymen being chased by dogs and 
Hortense Moore fussing over slovenly servants. ‘Much of Shirley seems lacking in the 
sobriety which its subject-matter might appear to demand’, comments Glen.6 Bowen 
observes that ‘the narrator embodies a kind of teasing, humorous aggression that 
reminds us why Charlotte Brontë so admired the satirical smack of Thackeray.’7 What 
                                                          
6
 Glen, ‘Shirley and Villette’, in The Cambridge Companion to the Brontës, pp. 122-47 (p. 124). As Glen 
further observes, the tone of Shirley is ‘closer to the flippancies of Blackwood’s and the early Fraser’s 
than it is to the moral seriousness of the condition-of-England novelists’ (The Imagination in History, p. 
145).   
7
 Bowen, ‘The Brontës and the Transformations of Romanticism’, p. 215.   
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are we to make of these humorous elements, this ‘satirical smack’? And more 
perplexingly, why are they attempted in a novel which otherwise so strenuously seeks to 
criticise standards of taste in matters of humour – and in particular to tackle male 
irreverence and flippancy?
8
 Since (as I argued in Chapter One) the narrator’s complaints 
about levity and scornful cynicism closely echo the author’s frustrated complaints about 
Thackeray’s narrative voice – those traits of his that she did not admire – why are these 
moral scruples embedded in a novel which itself seems to imitate a ‘masculine’ satirical 
style? A reader may well experience the same doubt as Yorke, who gazes at Shirley 
‘much puzzled. He could not divine what her look signified; whether she spoke in 
earnest or jest: there was purpose and feeling, banter and scoff playing, mingled, on her 
mobile lineaments’ (p. 312). There is a parallel between Shirley’s ambiguous (indeed, 
androgynous) mobile lineaments and Brontë’s intentions in Shirley; is she in (feminine) 
earnest or in (masculine) jest? It is difficult to ascertain what ‘face’ the narrator is 
showing us at any one time.  
 But it is Brontë’s stance of disapproval towards laughter that prevails – for all its 
flourishes of comedy, Shirley leans heavily towards the sombre and the disapproving. As 
I have shown, the novel consciously raises and engages with questions of (in)appropriate 
ridicule, voicing moral concerns about why, how, and at who characters laugh – and 
given the uneasy conclusions that it reaches, it would seem perhaps appropriate that 
Shirley does not raise many wholehearted laughs. Recurring constantly throughout, 
laughter yet for the most part offers no more light relief than does Brontë’s handling of 
hunger, political unrest, disappointed love or the omnipresence of death. Satiric ridicule 
prevails over spirited comedy; Shirley’s joyful mirth gives way to knowing smiles, and 
                                                          
8
 The novel’s hypocrisy in this sense is highlighted by such reviews as that in the Atlas, which complains: 
‘All this is very coarse – very irreverential. And there is ... an unseemly mode of allusion to solemn 
topics, a jesting with scriptural names, and a light usage of scriptural expressions, which will grate 
painfully upon the feelings of a considerable number of [readers].’ Unsigned review, 3 November 1849 
(pp. 696-7).  
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earnest moral outbursts (in defence of sunny countenances) are subsumed by sardonic 
narrative cynicism. 
 The Yorke household is emblematic. As we approach it, the narrator prepares us 
for jolly, heart-warming, Dickensian domestic scenes: the curtains do ‘not entirely 
muffle the sound of voices and laughter’ (p. 125). However on entry to this ‘house of 
mirth’ what we actually find is Mrs. Yorke, who wears the ‘cloud and burden people 
ever carry who deem it their duty to be gloomy’ (p. 126), and Mark Yorke, for whom 
‘Life will never have much joy ... by the time he is five-and-twenty, he will wonder why 
people ever laugh, and think all fools who seem merry’ (p. 129). Still, laughter there is – 
Mrs. Yorke likes ‘to crack a dry jest’, and the family are much enlivened in mocking 
their visitor’s misfortunes (pp. 131-4). For Martin and Matthew Yorke, ‘a dry laugh, an 
insulting sneer, a contemptuous taunt’ are the precursors to fighting (p. 482), while as 
for the ‘irresistibly comic’ Jessie, the narrator abruptly switches from her joking banter 
to a vision of her lying ‘cold, coffined, solitary’ (pp. 342-3). The destructiveness of 
men’s laughter, and the death of women’s laughter, are the respective themes here. 
Despite intermittently gesturing towards a brighter view (chiefly through the ‘genial 
gaiety’ of its heroine), Shirley more often conveys suspicion of laughter, which falls 
into the camps of intemperate folly or sneering aggression. Brontë thus presents ill-
natured laughter as the symptom of social sickness, while throwing cold water on 
contemporary wisdom that it is by the cheerfulness of the countenance that the heart is 
made better. 
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II 
Villette was hailed by the critics as a decided improvement on Shirley, yet critical 
enthusiasm was tempered by distaste for what was perceived as a ‘morbid’ taint. The 
charge was most famously brought by Harriet Martineau, who complained that ‘an 
atmosphere of pain hangs about the whole’ – that even ‘the gaiety has pain in it.’ 
Martineau looked forward to future novels, to the improvement that would be seen 
‘when the cheerfulness of health comes in with its bracing influence.’9 The reviewer for 
the Spectator described ‘the morbid feeling so predominant in the writer’, while the 
Examiner felt the author ‘to lapse occasionally into a tone of irony a little harder than is 
just and now and then to give vent to a little morbid wail.’10 The reviews equated the 
painfulness or unhealthy tone of the writing with its voicing of grievances, its 
indulgence in the ‘morbid wails’ of discontent.  
 ‘That’s a plaguey book that Villette,’ commented Thackeray. ‘How clever it is – 
and how I don’t like the heroine.’11 Thackeray identifies the source of ‘plaguey’ 
uneasiness, the ‘crabbed and crusty’ protagonist Lucy Snowe, whose awkwardness and 
reserve are conveyed through her infamously evasive, unreliable narrative voice.
12
 
Brontë returned in Villette both to introspective first-person narration and to a small, 
poor, plain and obscure heroine, one who, as Martineau opined, ‘may be thought a 
                                                          
9
 [Harriet Martineau], unsigned review in the Daily News, 3 February 1853 (p. 2). Martineau’s criticisms 
(also expressed in a private letter to Brontë) brought an awkward end to their friendship: Brontë explained 
to George Smith (in a letter of March 1853) that ‘the differences of feeling between Miss M. and myself 
are very strong and marked; very wide and irreconcilable ... In short she has hurt me a good deal.’ See 
Letters, III, pp. 141-5 (p. 142).   
10
 Unsigned reviews in the Spectator, 12 February 1853 (pp. 155-6), and Examiner, 5 February 1853 (pp. 
84-5).  
11
 Thackeray, letter to Mrs Procter (April 1853), in The Letters and Private Papers of William Makepeace 
Thackeray, ed. by Gordon N. Ray, 4 vols (London: Oxford University Press, 1945-6), III (1946), pp. 250-
2 (p. 252).   
12
 Brontë, Villette, p. 233. Subsequent references to Villette will be given in parentheses after quotations.  
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younger, feebler sister of Jane. There is just enough resemblance for that – but she has 
not Jane’s charm of mental and moral health, and consequent repose.’13 Certainly, the 
hypochondriac Lucy is far removed from both the feminine sweetness of Caroline and 
the sociable vitality of Shirley. Brontë, who originally assigned her the surname ‘Frost’, 
intended her to be for the most part a ‘morbid and weak’ character, lacking warmth, and 
‘healthy feeling’14 – she is a misfit, ill at ease with social norms. And Lucy’s alienation 
and morbid turn of mind are accentuated by her presence in the midst of people who are 
variously light-hearted, boisterous, or cheerfully complacent. As she is told when she 
takes part in the school play, she threatens to ‘spoil all, destroy the mirth of the piece, 
the enjoyment of the company’ (p. 139).  
 In his review of the novel, G. H. Lewes declared that Brontë ‘has not the 
humour, so strong and genial, of Mrs. Gaskell. There are, occasionally, touches 
approaching to the comic in Villette, but they spring mostly from fierce sarcasm, not 
from genial laughter.’15 The common slippage between humour and laughter is 
particularly significant in this case since it is Lucy’s preference for ‘fierce sarcasm’ over 
‘genial laughter’ on the thematic, as well as the narrative level, that colours the mood of 
the novel. As an example, Lewes notes that ‘Ginevra Fanshaw [sic] is “shown up” in all 
her affectations and careless coquetry, but there is something contemptuous in the 
laugh, nothing sympathetic.’16 Unable to distinguish between the mood of the author 
and of the narrator, between the temperament of Brontë and that of her characters, 
Lewes borrows the very images in which the novel itself abounds to describe his 
perception of an approach that is (satirically) contemptuous rather than (humorously) 
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 Martineau, review in the Daily News, p. 2.  
14
 Brontë to W. S. Williams (November 1852), Letters  III, p. 80. 
15
 Lewes, unsigned review in the Leader, 12 February 1853 (pp. 163-4). 
16
 Ibid. Martineau, too, responded to the novel’s comic side with misgivings: humour, she acknowledged, 
‘is felt throughout, though there is not a touch of lightheartedness from end to end.’  
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sympathetic. For Lucy’s morbid nature is illustrated not only in the plainness of her face 
but in the sneers that appear on that face; it can be located in her lack of amiability, her 
‘tone of irony’, and most clearly in the embittered quality of her laughter. 
 The turn to morbidity is a turn inwards, involving a shift in focus from outward 
appearances to inner experience, from the social effects of laughter (as recorded in 
Shirley) to its self-conscious motives. Lucy cannot be described as ‘open’ in any sense, 
and as readers we are made to translate and read between the lines of what she tells us, 
in the same way that she conducts her physiognomic and phrenological ‘translations’ of 
the faces she encounters. But like Crimsworth, though she represses information, Lucy 
is strikingly expressive, and while keeping her ‘essential’ self guarded and mysterious, 
she gives us detailed accounts of how she consciously manipulates her manners and 
expressions – the habits through which she (per)forms her identity. Her response to the 
medical advice that, essentially, she should cheer up and make herself agreeable, is to 
exclaim: ‘No mockery in this world ever sounds to me so hollow as that of being told to 
cultivate happiness. What does such advice mean? Happiness is not a potato, to be 
planted in mould, and tilled with manure’ (p. 250; Brontë’s emphasis).17 The metaphor 
is significant, given the horticultural language applied to the transformations undergone 
by Jane and Frances on the route to health and happiness, and Lucy’s protest signals 
that she will not take this route, will not be moulded into a conventionally feminine 
shape. But, though Lucy scorns the idea that one can ‘cultivate’ the required emotional 
qualities, the phrase is otherwise an apt one for the way that she develops her sense of 
self. Villette, like The Professor, centres on pathognomic exchanges, recording the 
processes of communication between self and society; Lucy’s struggle to empower 
herself as a marginalised, miserable figure amongst happy, healthy groups is played out 
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 Brontë plays with a variant on this idea in a letter of July 1851, to George Smith: ‘Tell your Mother I 
shall try to cultivate good spirits as assiduously as she cultivates her geraniums.’ Letters II, pp. 662-5 (p. 
664).  
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on the mobile face. As Shirley learns to imitate the ‘masculine’ smirk, so Lucy controls 
her expressions in response to circumstances, preserving integrity and avoiding self-
exposure through carefully calculated smiles.  
 If Shirley is ultimately pessimistic in the insights it gives into the link between 
laughter and power, this is because it fails to overcome the impasse created by Brontë’s 
conflicting subversive and conservative impulses. Power is for the most part 
straightforwardly gendered (with men as tyrants, women as victims) and the moralising 
narrator stops short of endorsing female behaviour which transgresses conventional 
stereotyping. Defiant (masculine) laughter on women’s lips – the smile that is ‘too 
significant to be generally thought amiable’ – is portrayed with uneasiness, rather than 
being construed as liberating. Villette, however, leaves behind many of the conformist 
inhibitions of Shirley; it does not betray the same anxiety to be in line with ideals of 
health and sociability. Those features of Shirley’s and Caroline’s characters that 
translate into ‘healthy’ laughter are not insisted on for Lucy, who (without being 
immoral) lacks moral health. What is gestured towards or hinted at, yet usually retreated 
from, throughout Brontë’s previous writing – the sense that this lack may carry 
subversive potency – is finally embraced in Villette. Less attractive, less obviously 
likeable than the other heroines, Lucy panders less to sentimental expectations and her 
defiance of social (and literary) norms finds expression in her face; Brontë unleashes the 
power of the sardonic sneer without apology, with a firmer conviction than is evident in 
her other works.   
 Despite this firmer conviction, Villette is also in many respects a more nuanced 
novel than Shirley – less constrained by gender stereotypes, more flexible in its 
conception of power relations, and evasive of didactic certainties. The greater 
psychological complexity of Villette is apparent in the organization of the previous 
novel into types. For instance, the pairing of Shirley and Caroline had allowed Brontë to 
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represent women alternately in the role of victim or role model, and through the 
splitting of men from boys, male characters could be easily either demonised or 
belittled. Graham Bretton, however, combines a sarcastic air with a boyish 
boisterousness – both of which Lucy feels to be threatening. He embodies 
simultaneously the thoughtless joviality which in Shirley amounts only to inanity or 
self-abandonment, and a cool, scrutinising cynicism. Likewise, Paul Emanuel combines 
the ‘feminine’ qualities of openness and earnestness with a sardonic Byronic streak, a 
capacity for smirking cruelty and spite. Lucy herself combines the vulnerability of the 
sensitive woman with the sharpness of a worldly-wise one, bringing together fear of 
mockery with the ability to combat it: she carries all the tormenting weight of low 
spirits while boasting too an edgy self-assurance, which ensures that power flows 
continually in more than one direction. 
 For all these nuances, and for all Lucy’s capacity for self-defence, Villette does 
not lose any of the usual emphasis on the tyranny of laughter. Trivial as it may seem to 
readers who associate the Brontëan heroine with passionate, defiant independence, what 
Lucy most wishes to avoid is being laughed at – her dread of mockery is extreme, 
shaping her behaviour and her relationships with others. In drawing attention to this 
anxiety of Lucy’s, and her means of responding to it, the novel plays on the same drama 
of cause-and-effect as The Professor, except that Lucy’s trials are portrayed with more 
poignancy than those of Crimsworth (whose self-diagnosed hypochondria, and 
misanthropic tendencies, she shares). Lucy laughs aggressively to disguise her 
insecurities – her displays of smug superiority are transparently compensatory. Villette 
exposes the ways in which ‘good feeling’ (both men’s and women’s) can mask 
hollowness, hostility or coldness, and in this it is a sceptical, anti-social novel which 
challenges sentimental clichés and pits the ‘scornful, sneering’ heroine against the world 
(p. 309). But there is also an emotional complexity, an affective quality granted to 
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laughter, linked to the recognition of its function as self-protection, and its source in 
loneliness as well as triumph. In Lucy’s own explanation, ‘I smiled; but I also hushed a 
groan’ (p. 317). To make sense of this, I will first explore Lucy’s complex 
characterisation, and then turn to the different forms of tyranny represented by the 
novel’s main male characters, Graham and Paul. In showing how mockery lurks 
beneath the surface of good-natured merriment in the one case, while innocent mirth 
underlies mocking airs in the other, I argue that Brontë breaks down the terms of 
opposition that she had set forth in Shirley, offering instead a more discerning view of 
the ways in which laughter – in all its forms – sustains patriarchal power.  
‘Laying on the lash of sarcasm’: Lucy Snowe 
One reviewer of Villette speculated that Currer Bell ‘has been the better for a little 
happiness and success’, since ‘the author has gained both in amiability and propriety 
since she first presented herself to the world – soured, coarse, and grumbling; an alien, 
it might seem, from society, and amenable to none of its laws.’18 The opinion, however, 
is an anomalous one, since most critics equated author with narrator, and ‘amiability’ 
(as Brontë had determined) is not one of Lucy’s defining characteristics. The 
sympathetic portrayal of her unhappiness and victimization is complicated by 
indications that, rather than being consistently faced with a hostile environment, her 
own hostile exertions – her ‘soured’ and ‘grumbling’ nature – contribute to her 
alienation. This is made clear early, in her response to the ‘Watson group’ on board the 
boat to Labassecour (Belgium) (pp. 52-3). From a distance Lucy observes this laughing 
group of fellow passengers, and is amazed to note that the most beautiful girl of the 
party is married to ‘the oldest, plainest, greasiest, broadest’ of the men, yet ‘she was gay 
even to giddiness.’ Her laughter, Lucy reflects, ‘must be the mere frenzy of despair.’ 
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 [Anne Mozley], Review of Lady Bird and Villette, in the Christian Remembrancer, 25 (1853), 401-33 
(p. 423).  
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Her amazement is further compounded when the same girl approaches her (‘an utter 
stranger’) to offer her a chair, ‘smiling a smile of which the levity puzzled and startled 
me, though it showed a perfect set of perfect teeth.’ Her stiff, untrusting attitude is 
apparent in her reaction: ‘I declined it, of course with all the courtesy I could put into 
my manner’, at which the girl ‘danced off heedless and lightsome.’ Lucy concedes that 
she ‘must have been good-natured’, but ‘what had made her marry that individual, who 
was at least as much like an oil-barrel as a man?’ The lack of grounds for disdain here, 
and Lucy’s apparently unwarranted coldness, suggest Crimsworth’s judgemental 
tendencies and unfriendly behaviour – as well as his embarrassment at ‘levity’ and 
‘giddiness.’  
 This is the first of multiple scenes in which Lucy’s loneliness is accentuated by 
her positioning on the outside of sociable gaiety and laughter, ‘heedless and lightsome’ 
folk – the kind of staple, heart-warming scene that is so central to Dickens’s novels. She 
betrays a pitiful unfamiliarity with, and mistrust of displays of friendliness or 
merriment, which here she can only understand by translating as ‘the mere frenzy of 
despair.’ This is not to say that she is always unjustified in her coldness – only that the 
critique of society that she offers us is not entirely an unbiased one. Puzzled by the jolly 
Watson party, who remain in the background ‘laughing and making a great deal of 
noise’, Lucy is considerably more at ease in her meeting with the rude Ginevra 
Fanshawe, in an exchange which will set the tone for all their future dialogues, and for 
the novel as a whole. As Ginevra rattles selfishly on, Lucy marks her mixed disapproval 
and amusement by smiles which, although supposedly covert, consistently fail to go 
unnoticed by Ginevra (a self-absorbed and generally unobservant character) who twice 
demands to know why she is being laughed at. The reason – Ginevra’s bad manners – is 
apparent enough to the reader, but so too is the motivation for Lucy’s overtly displayed 
mockery, which is neither subtle nor purely indicative of amusement. Her claim to be 
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‘only laughing at my own thoughts’ is a typical, and a typically untrue claim, since 
Lucy is clearly also offended and threatened by Ginevra, who has already shown her 
contempt in similar style, having ‘slightly curled her short, pretty lip’ on first noticing 
Lucy (p. 53). Imposed upon by this intimidating bluntness, Lucy smiles to denote a 
supposedly private feeling of superiority which in turn baffles and disconcerts her 
antagonist. Compared to the good-natured laughter of the noisy group in the 
background, which Lucy regards with suspicion, the smiles shared between these 
unlikely friends are characterised by a spirit of competitive provocation.  
 Repeated constructions of ‘inward’ laughter (as in Lucy’s representation of 
herself ‘laughing at my own thoughts’) almost always in Villette signify precisely the 
opposite – laughter is never secret or private, but instead introduced for purposes of 
display and demonstration (even if only for the reader’s benefit). Regina Barreca’s 
essay on Villette and Jane Eyre posits humour as the essential survival tool of both 
protagonists – an assessment which does not entirely account for the complexity with 
which its usefulness as a ‘tool’ is laid bare by the text, and which underestimates the 
emphasis on outward effect (on others) over inner comfort (to the self). Jane and Lucy 
‘use their wit in a combination of self-defense and mutiny’, Barreca rightly recognises, 
‘as a way of negotiating with a world they often dislike and always distrust.’19 But, 
focusing on Lucy’s ‘wry observations, satiric perspectives and humorous insights’ 
Barreca asserts that she meanwhile remains ‘unlaughing’, when in fact it is precisely her 
expressions of amusement, rather than her amusing narrative asides, which she uses to 
her advantage in negotiating with the world. Barreca takes at face value Lucy’s claims 
to discreetly hide her laughter, assuming that she is ‘responding to the maxim that the 
laughter of women is naturally suspect.’20 But where Caroline Helstone hides her 
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 Barreca, p. 61.  
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 Ibid., pp. 68, 69.  
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laughter in earnest – turning aside ‘that her long curls might screen the smile mantling 
on her features’ – Lucy makes only the pretence of doing so, an act which goes no way 
to prevent her scorn reaching its target. The difference is significant, and apparent in 
clues throughout the text. Through Lucy, Brontë uncovers not just the seditious 
implications of a woman’s smile, but the self-conscious intent with which it could be 
utilised. 
 In Villette (Brussels) Lucy finds her way to Madame Beck’s establishment, a 
school full of ‘healthy, lively girls’ who are ‘a little noisy and rough, but types of health 
and glee’ (p. 75). Of course this evaluation masks disapproval – Lucy fosters self-
righteousness and a defined sense of her own identity as a proud outsider amongst these 
girls. Like Crimsworth, she pits her Protestantism against their Catholicism, her sound 
morals against their unprincipled ideas, her intelligence against their stupidity, her good 
manners against their ‘noisy and rough’ behaviour, her sickly diminutiveness against 
their robust health. Finally their ‘glee’ differentiates them from Lucy, who proudly 
acknowledges that ‘gay instincts my nature had few’, holding herself aloof accordingly 
(p. 109). The continental setting allows Brontë to thematize Lucy’s social isolation in 
terms of mind against body, and to explain it on the grounds of cultural and religious 
difference: Lucy’s unsociable stance may be excused given her mental superiority to 
these foreigners. But the critique being made here is not solely aimed at ‘popish’ ideals, 
since (as proposed in Chapter One), the alignment of moral and spiritual worth with 
bodily health, cheerful appearances and high spirits is no less characteristic of an 
oppressive ideology rather closer to home. Impatience with conventional values is thus 
displaced, or focused onto a condemnation of Catholicism. In complaining that the 
‘CHURCH strove to bring up her children robust in body, feeble in soul, fat, ruddy, 
hale, joyous, ignorant, unthinking, unquestioning’ (p. 127; Brontë’s emphasis), Lucy 
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gives vent more widely to her anti-social, and (to use George Meredith’s word) 
misogelast feelings.
21
 
 However, the ‘unthinking’ quality of this joyous laughter is soon brought into 
question. Seemingly organized by the polarisations set out above, Villette refuses to 
simplify character (or national) traits, instead blurring distinctions that at first seem 
clear-cut. As we have seen, foreignness may be associated with materiality and animal 
excess, or with deviousness and intrigue – it may be linked to the lively ‘health and 
glee’ of the schoolgirls, or to the shady smirks of Pelet or the Moore brothers. Villette 
works to further collapse this distinction in exposing the cunning and artifice that goes 
hand in hand with the girls’ seemingly natural high spirits. Lucy’s first trial in the 
classroom is to quell this gleefulness, which is revealed in its true light, as sadistic and 
conspiratorial (the same as that which Crimsworth confronts in The Professor): 
Mesdemoiselles Blanche, Virginie, and Angélique opened the campaign by a series 
of tittering and whispering; these soon swelled into murmurs and short laughs, which 
the remoter benches caught up and echoed more loudly. This growing revolt of sixty 
against one, soon became oppressive enough (p. 79). 
Again, the ugly truth about these ironically named beauties is revealed to the reader. 
And again this is a ‘campaign’ – not the natural overspilling of liveliness and good 
humour, but a calculated mutiny. As with Bertha’s laughter, which becomes clamorous 
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 Although the portrait of Lucy is not autobiographical, Brontë did of course draw on her similar 
experiences and sentiments as a social alien at a Belgian school. To Emily Brontë (in May 1843) she 
wrote from Brussels: ‘I really don’t pretend to care a fig for [anybody] in the establishment’. She 
observed that Mme Heger (who ran the school) ‘cannot comprehend why I do not make intimate friends 
of [the other teachers]’ while M. Heger, she speculates, ‘disapproves very much of my unamiable want of 
sociability. He has already given me a brief lecture on universal bienveillance [benevolence], and, 
perceiving that I don’t improve in consequence, [has] taken to considering me a person to be let alone’ 
(Letters I, p. 320). But, interestingly, she portrays her isolation (as she would portray Lucy’s) in terms of 
choice and personal disposition, as well as distaste for the available company – in a letter to Branwell 
Brontë (May 1843), she wrote: ‘I perceive [that] I grow exceedingly misanthropic and sour – you will say 
this is no news, and that you never knew me possessed of the contrary qualities, philanthropy & 
sugariness’ (Letters I, p. 316).  
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but originates from an identifiable source (‘I could have pointed out the door whence 
the accents issued’), rebellion and disorder do not spontaneously erupt, but are 
deliberately initiated. 
 Under threat, Lucy considers how she would return the attack, if she could only 
do it in English – she would silence them ‘with some sarcasm, flavoured with 
contemptuous bitterness, for the ringleaders, and relieved with easy banter for the 
weaker, less knavish followers’ (p. 80). Sarcasm is her weapon of choice in this battle, 
and it is controlling and channelling (rather than simply subduing) the girls’ mutinous 
laughter that will prove the crucial skill for Lucy. She measures her first success by the 
fact that the class were quiet, but ‘then a smile – not a laugh – passed from desk to desk’ 
(p. 81). She has not only quelled the chaos but also turned the tide, diverting the girls’ 
vindictive amusement from herself to one of their number. A particular kind of 
discipline is required here – high spirits must be craftily managed, not merely kept 
down. As Lucy gains confidence she learns how to ‘lay on the lash of sarcasm’ (p. 83) 
as she had felt powerless to do before, but also, importantly, to withhold the 
‘contemptuous bitterness’ that she had imagined herself using. Where an average 
English girl, she tells us, would quietly settle down to a task, ‘a Labassecourienne 
would laugh in your face, and throw it back to you.’ The correct way to respond, she 
learns, is to take the work back and make it easier, but also to employ mockery. There is 
a trick to this: 
They would feel the sting, perhaps wince a little under a bit, but they bore no malice 
against this sort of attack, provided the sneer was not sour but hearty, and that it was 
well held up to them, in a clear light and bold type (p. 83; Brontë’s emphasis). 
Lucy’s distinction plays into the Victorian doctrine that laughing at others is only 
acceptable when it is good humoured and open, while underhand laughter with a ‘sting’ 
is unpleasant. But, mastering the art of joking in order to assert authority, Lucy’s 
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observations are of a different, wholly unsentimental nature. Sour ridicule is ill-advised, 
but a hearty sneer (though something of an oxymoron) will serve well. The oxymoron is 
appropriate, given the blend of cheerful conventionality and shrewd superiority that is 
exercised here – by Lucy, and by the sociable yet cynical, merry yet malicious pupils 
from whom she has learnt it. In this way, Brontë dissolves the apparently stark contrasts 
between characters and their values; Lucy is more at home in Villette than she will 
admit. 
 Her smiles – more so than speaking up for herself – are Lucy’s standard 
response to insults, and her pointed way of asserting superior self-knowledge in the face 
of being misunderstood, or her general superiority in the face of intimidation. Often 
remaining silent, she is rarely entirely passive, indirect phrasing often highlighting the 
irony that underlies her accounts of ‘inward’ or secretive smiles. Insulted by Ginevra, 
she informs us that ‘I delegated the trouble of commenting [to] my countenance; or 
rather, my under-lip voluntarily anticipated my tongue: of course, reverence and 
solemnity were not the feelings expressed in the look I gave her’ (p. 308). This 
roundabout way of narrating that she mocked Ginevra, and that she did so expressively 
rather than in thought, is a typical indication of Lucy’s desire to impress upon us, or on 
other characters, her unperturbed calm. With similar delicacy she describes how, having 
been humiliated by M. Paul, she gets her revenge while he reads out a translation of 
Shakespeare: 
Of course, the translation being French, was very inefficient; nor did I make any 
particular effort to conceal the contempt which some of its forlorn lapses were 
calculated to excite. Not that it behoved me to say anything; but one can occasionally 
look the opinion it is forbidden to embody in words ... I had not uttered a sound, and 
could not justly be deemed amenable to reprimand or penalty for having permitted a 
slightly freer action than usual to the muscles about my eyes and mouth (p. 330; 
Brontë’s emphasis).  
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Through such mischievous insinuations, Lucy makes a pretence of passivity: she 
‘permits’ rather than performs her contempt, laying the blame on ‘the muscles about my 
eyes and mouth.’ But the denial of responsibility is unconvincing, given the 
circumstances and the irony in her tone. More than a hint of the deceptiveness that is 
habitual to her as a narrator is at work in claims like these. Presuming that Lucy dictates 
the actions of her facial muscles, and not the other way round, complicates Barreca’s 
assessment that she has an admirable sense of humour – which, indeed, rather misses 
the point. Her smiles are better understood as performative manoeuvres – the evidence 
of active engagement in the process of self-definition – rather than of inner reliance on 
complacent self-knowledge, or resigned amusement at the ironies of the world.  
 Comparing the differing conceptions of her character that are held by her various 
acquaintances – all, she claims, inaccurate – Lucy declines to contradict any of them 
outright but must still signal her triumphant impenetrability somehow: ‘I smiled at them 
all.’ Count de Bassompierre knows nothing about her real self – ‘indeed his 
misconceptions of my character often made me smile’ (p. 285). Ginevra ‘[bursts] into a 
laugh’ of frustration at Lucy’s mysteriousness; ‘Who are you, Miss Snowe?’ she 
demands, ‘in a tone of such undisguised and unsophisticated curiosity, as made me 
laugh in my turn’ (p. 308; Brontë’s emphasis). The pair alternate in their intimidation of 
each other, through laughter intended on Ginevra’s part to break through Lucy’s 
impenetrable ‘disguise’, on Lucy’s to preserve that shield while ridiculing Ginevra’s 
‘unsophisticated’ self-exposure. As Karen Lawrence assesses,  
[One] of the striking aspects of Lucy Snowe as protagonist is the degree to which she 
is primarily viewer rather than a viewed object ... Lucy’s plainness allows her to 
reverse the gaze, to observe the ‘mystery’ of the male rather than provide the 
feminine mystique ... instead of being a mark to be deciphered, Lucy [resists] the 
male as viewer who would interpret her. Although [she] represses her feelings 
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unhealthily, particularly at the beginning of the story, her emotional reticence does 
not eliminate the real power that develops by means of her ‘invisibility.’22 
While Lucy does not entirely evade scrutiny (and her ability to mystify Ginevra is 
indicative of the novel’s subversion of gender relationships, as well as gender norms), it 
is true that she is generally misinterpreted through oversight rather than through the 
applied gaze. But again, in identifying this power of Lucy’s, Lawrence attributes it to an 
appearance of blankness: it is her plainness that allows her to take the role of viewer 
rather than viewed object. This misses the more aggressive moves by which Lucy 
(visibly) reverses the laugh of male power, securing protection for herself through an 
‘emotional reticence’ that is paradoxically expressive, making a show of the ‘mystique’ 
that renders her so difficult to interpret.  
 The answer to Ginevra’s question (who are you, Miss Snowe?) is as elusive for 
the reader as it is for the other characters. Lucy’s ‘scornful, sneering’ laughter might 
seem to be a symptom of the ‘external coldness’ assigned to her by Brontë,23 but 
Lawrence’s claim that she ‘represses her feelings unhealthily’ requires some 
qualification. Although (as M. Paul recognises) there is abundant fiery passion beneath 
this cold surface, nonetheless Lucy defies literary expectations in her stubborn 
resistance to the melting narrative so often imposed on female characters, and her ‘true’ 
self is at no point straightforwardly unearthed.
24
 As an adolescent, Lucy wishes that the 
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 Karen Lawrence, ‘The Cypher: Disclosure and Reticence in Villette’, in Critical Essays, ed. by Gates, 
pp. 306-19 (pp. 307-8).  
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 Brontë to W. S. Williams (November 1852), Letters III, p. 80. In the words of the Literary Gazette: ‘To 
few will she appear, on first acquaintance, loveable. There is a hardness and cold self-possession upon the 
surface of her character, somewhat repelling; and it is only when you see, by degrees, into its depths, 
when she flashes upon you revelations of emotion and suffering ... and when you feel what a glow of 
tenderness and loving-kindness is burning under the unattractive and frigid exterior, that you admit her 
into your heart.’ Unsigned review, 5 February 1853 (pp. 123-5).  
24
 This is partly because, as Shuttleworth explains (p. 39), selfhood in nineteenth-century psychological 
thought ‘was situated neither in inner impulse, nor in outer social behaviour, but in the self-conscious 
awareness of the disjunction between the two ... The Victorian conception of selfhood [is] of a private 
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child Polly ‘would utter some hysterical cry, so that I might get relief and be at ease’ (p. 
14) – a desire which seems to suggest that Lucy craves emotional release, for which 
Polly’s outbreak would be a substitute. But Lucy’s wish must be read in the context of 
her previous comment, that ‘on all occasions of vehement, unrestrained expansion, a 
sense of disdain or ridicule comes to the weary spectator’s relief.’ In other words, the 
‘relief’ she seeks is from weariness, at Polly’s passionate earnestness – she looks 
forward to the ‘hysterical cry’ as an opportunity for ridicule, for the indulgence in a 
superior sneer that it would allow. (And again, this would be a display of superiority, 
not the retreat into ‘invisibility’ that Lawrence describes.) Lucy manages desire through 
a tight control over affective impulses – which are sometimes repressed or restrained, 
but sometimes simply absent; her unsentimental coolness is no mere facade, no flimsy 
cover for her latent warmth, but an essential element of her characterisation.
25
  
 When she does lose emotional control, it is brought on by the oppressive 
conditions of life under Madame Beck’s watchful regime. Lucy is keen as a narrator to 
undermine the power that her employer has over her, by impressing on us constantly her 
                                                                                                                                                                          
state of being which is constituted only within the social act of exchange ... The erotic interplay which 
occurs throughout Brontë’s fiction [is] not just a defensive game designed to protect the boundaries of a 
pre-existent self, but is rather actually constitutive of selfhood.’ Nonetheless, many critics continue to 
read Lucy in terms of the opposition between public appearances and private self drawn on by the 
Literary Gazette (above). According to Miller, for example, Villette shows that Brontë ‘believed that 
being a woman in her society often involved putting on a social mask to guard the deeper self’; it is a 
novel ‘about identity and the unconscious in which, as the recurrent images of burial suggest, much of the 
action takes place beneath the surface’ (pp. 27, 48). While this is certainly true in some respects, I would 
suggest that the novel’s imagery is more notable for the ways it seeks to confuse the distinction between 
surfaces and depths, masks and faces.  
25
 Lucy can thus be understood in light of the broader point made by Auerbach (p. 196): ‘It is a critical 
cliché that Charlotte Brontë is concerned with the conflict between reason and passion or imagination, but 
her use of these abstractions is defined by her peculiar imagery: the “cooler region” of reason or reality 
that follows the “burning clime” of impulse and imagination ... The struggle between the worlds 
represented by fire and ice underlies [Jane Eyre and Villette], and their vitality comes from the energy of 
the battle, not from the fulfillment of resolution. Like many Victorians, Charlotte Brontë was a 
Manichean – a continual clash of opposed forces gives birth to her world – and the world of ice is an 
active force in her novels, not a mere negation of energy.’ In these terms it can be seen that Lucy’s icy 
smiles are not the mere negation or suppression of her natural impulses, passion and energy; they have an 
‘active force’ of their own.  
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feelings of superiority, in the face of the older woman’s exercise of control. ‘I caught 
myself smiling as I lay awake and thoughtful on my couch – smiling at madame’, Lucy 
tells us, and ‘I had occasion to smile – nay, to laugh, at madame again, within the space 
of four and twenty hours’ (pp. 115-6). Knowing her as well as she does, Lucy smiles ‘in 
half-pity, half-scorn’ at those who vainly appeal to her warmer feelings (p. 74). But 
Lucy’s smug self-assurance is belied by her breakdown after discovering Beck 
searching through her private possessions. The usual hardy response, laughter, is soon 
undercut by the emotional tumult that follows: 
How I laughed ... I knew what her thoughts were. The spectacle of a suspicious 
nature so far misled by its own inventions, tickled me much. Yet as the laugh died, a 
kind of wrath smote me, and then bitterness followed ... I had never felt so strange 
and contradictory an inward tumult as I felt for an hour that evening: soreness and 
laughter, and fire, and grief, shared my heart between them ... Complicated, 
disquieting thoughts broke up the whole repose of my nature. However, that turmoil 
subsided: next day I was again Lucy Snowe (p. 119).  
Lucy’s initial response to her outrage is to laugh in such a way as to show herself above 
her adversary, whose nature she understands well (‘I knew what her thoughts were’). 
But with the rush of genuine, suppressed anguish that then overwhelms her, Brontë 
depicts a transition from artificial display to naked, uncontrolled emotion – her claim to 
being much ‘tickled’ is belied as a new kind of laughter, hysterical, takes its place. 
Indeed this, far more than Bertha’s controlled cackle, fits descriptions of ‘hysterical 
affections’ such as George Combe’s (laughing and crying ‘alternately and involuntarily, 
apparently on account of some varying affection of the whole mental system’).26 It is 
the only point in the novel at which Lucy loses control of her laughter, and her 
assurance that ‘next day I was again Lucy Snowe’ tells us much about her sense of self. 
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 George Combe, A System of Phrenology (Boston: Marsh, Capen & Lyon, 1834), p. 319.  
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She conceives of her real identity as that which she forges in her relations with others – 
the (sneering) face she presents publicly, rather than any hidden but authentic emotional 
core. Still, the rare descent into ‘involuntary’ behaviour, foreshadowing her later mental 
collapse, recalls Lucy’s assumption about the girl on the boat coming over, that (being 
married to an ‘oil-barrel’) her laughter must be ‘the mere frenzy of despair’ – a 
diagnosis which, in this case, would seem more accurate.  
 Lucy does attempt a medical account of her despair, describing ‘a feeling that 
would make its way, rush out, or kill me – like ... the current which passes through the 
heart, and which, if aneurism or any other morbid cause obstructs its natural channels, 
impetuously seeks abnormal outlet’ (p. 185). The explanation of trapped emotion is 
interesting for its resonance with contemporary insistence, both popular and scientific, 
on the importance of laughter as healthy and necessary release – Alexander Bain’s 
theory, for instance, that ‘the outburst of laughter is nature’s provision for relieving an 
incompatibility of mental and bodily states, that would otherwise be painful in the 
extreme.’27 Such rhetoric was applied of course to other forms of unhealthy repression, 
but Lucy’s mental fragility, her need for an outlet, and indeed her unhappiness, are 
related to the lack of healthy cheerfulness that would conventionally find bodily 
expression in laughter. The implication, however, is not that she would make herself 
better by lightening up (as Graham advises when she describes her state of mind to 
him), Brontë’s point instead being that, while she is not allowed to express her feelings 
of desire or dissatisfaction, she is not able to generate (or ‘cultivate’) the feelings of 
cheerfulness that are required of her instead. Such commonplaces as, for instance, that 
laughter ‘is a substitute devised by nature for the screams and shouts of [childhood], by 
which the lungs are strengthened and the health preserved’ therefore take on a cruel 
irony in the case of Lucy, for whom mental and bodily health are hopelessly 
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 Bain, ‘Wit and Humour’, p. 34.  
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intertwined.
28
 Her experience of oppression as physical sensation is apparent in her 
comment on her painful past: ‘To this hour, when I have the nightmare, it repeats the 
rush and saltiness of briny waves in my throat, and their icy pressure on my lungs’ (p. 
35). The misery that, as Brontë insisted, explains Lucy’s frigidity,29 the embittered 
feeling or ‘saltiness’ that sticks in her throat, is tellingly figured as an incapacitating 
weight, an ‘icy pressure’ on the lungs – those accessories to the heart, and vehicles of 
hearty laughter. 
‘Bright Animal Spirits’: Graham Bretton 
To say that Lucy’s misery is represented sympathetically, her ‘icy’ state of mind 
attributed to her circumstances, is not to say (as is the case with Frances) that Brontë 
pathologises her anti-social leanings as the unfortunate side-effects of an unhappy life. 
Or rather, if Lucy is pathologised, her abnormality is celebrated more than it is 
lamented. Her unsentimental edge, that morbid taint on her character, is never really 
represented as in need of fixing, since it defines her – and paradoxically enough is her 
source of strength. Lucy shuns the companionship of the attractive girl on the boat, 
whose smile shows ‘a perfect set of perfect teeth’, out of instinctive recognition that she 
is not akin to these smiling, sunshiny people. Lucy is a marginal figure for reasons 
beside her gender and her poverty; in her distaste and mistrust for laughter, she gives 
voice to an outsider’s perspective, bordering on the misanthropic, which is rarely 
allowed to go uncorrected in the Victorian novel.
30
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 ‘Philosophy of Laughter’, Chambers’, p. 322.   
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 As Brontë wrote to Williams in November 1852, ‘anybody living her life would necessarily become 
morbid’ (Letters III, p. 80).   
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 Anne Brontë’s Helen Huntingdon, for instance, must learn to laugh as a sign of her recuperation into 
society. As McMaster describes, she gradually ‘ameliorates’ her ‘sharpness’ out of love for Gilbert 
Markham, until the ‘smile comes more naturally’ – ‘Laughter at last! And it is both a sign of conscious 
love and a manifestation of reawakening gladness in a life in which laughter had become horrible ... The 
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 Lucy’s mingled feelings of longing and contempt – her envious yet critical and 
aloof attitude towards the ‘insiders’ – is best illustrated by her relationship with Graham 
Bretton. ‘There are human tempers’, she concedes, ‘bland, glowing, and genial, within 
whose influence it is as good for the poor in spirit to live, as it is for the feeble in frame 
to bask in the glow of noon. Of the number of these choice natures were certainly both 
Dr. Bretton’s and his mother’s.’ For Lucy they ‘communicate happiness ... Every day 
while I stayed with them, some little plan was proposed which resulted in beneficial 
enjoyment.’ So far, so straightforward; she benefits from the Brettons’ wholesome 
geniality. Everything Graham does is accomplished ‘with the bountiful cheerfulness of 
high and unbroken energies’, and he lets ‘his pleasure beam in his eye and play about 
his mouth.’ But, just as these attractive traits spell trouble in the case of the schoolgirls, 
Lucy is not always so uncritical of his ‘bright animal spirits’, or willing to see pure 
innocence in the ‘bountiful cheerfulness’ of his countenance (pp. 196, 198). In Graham, 
Brontë succeeds in crystallizing the double menace of laughter, recreating in a realist 
context that same mixed joviality and sardonicism of the Duke of Zamorna – that 
combination of animal and intellectual energies which in ‘The Spell’ is represented 
through the concept of a dual personality. A medical man with boyish charm, Graham’s 
‘animal’ spirits complement rather than clash with his intellectual penetration.31  
                                                                                                                                                                          
bitter resistance to smiles and laughter that her first marriage had induced has been dispelled.’ McMaster, 
‘Imbecile Laughter’, pp. 365-6.  
31
 The complex historical connotations of the phrase ‘animal spirits’ are explored by George Rousseau, 
who explains that the animal spirits ‘pertained to both flesh and soul’ and ‘carried three cognitive 
meanings’: ‘(1) sources of sensations; (2) seats of temperament, i.e., especially courage and masculinity; 
(3) sources of human inclinations, i.e., especially vivacity and gayety of disposition.’ See Rousseau, 
Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, Culture and Sensibility (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 
pp. 18, 20 (Rousseau’s emphasis). It will be seen, then, that the phrase is well suited to Graham, who (as 
well as exemplifying masculine vigour and gaiety of disposition) is characterised both by his materialism 
and by his noble qualities (flesh and soul), and whom Lucy consequently regards with a mixture of 
derision and hero worship.   
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 Like Mary Percy in her anxious scrutiny of Zamorna’s laughing countenance, 
Lucy is obsessed by the challenge of interpreting Graham’s moods and thoughts. 
Almost never without a smile on his face, these enigmatic smiles must be gauged by 
Lucy, who offers the following analysis: 
As to his smile, one could not in a hurry make up one’s mind as to the descriptive 
epithet it merited; there was something in it that pleased, but something too that 
brought surging up into the mind all one’s foibles and weak points: all that could lay 
one open to a laugh; yet Fifine [Madame Beck’s daughter] liked this doubtful smile, 
and thought the owner genial (p. 96).  
Alternately attracted and annoyed by him, Lucy is plagued by suspicions respecting the 
uncertain balance of kindness and cruelty in his ‘doubtful smile.’ The child Fifine, ‘an 
honest, gleeful little soul’ with a ‘healthy frame ... blue eye and ruddy cheek’ (p. 94) is 
physically and temperamentally akin to the doctor and therefore perfectly comfortable 
in his presence. But to Lucy his charisma, good looks and physical presence (on top of 
his social standing and professional authority) make him an intimidating figure. Like 
Jane in her awkwardness around St John (nodded to in Bretton’s alias ‘Dr John’), and 
her acknowledgement that if Rochester ‘had been a handsome man’ she could not have 
felt at her ease with him, Lucy is as suspicious of the handsome doctor as she would be 
of any ‘perfect set of perfect teeth.’ His smile causes her to feel keenly her vulnerability, 
and her worst fear: that she should be ‘laid open to a laugh.’ Speaking ‘gravely’ but 
‘chuckling, however, to myself’, Lucy’s usual recourse to supposedly secretive yet 
blatant laughter, so effective amongst the thick-skinned Labassecouriennes, overshoots 
the mark with the more sensitive Englishman. Dr John has ‘a fine set of nerves, and he 
at once felt by instinct, what no more coarsely constituted mind would have detected; 
namely, that I was a little amused by him.’ She observes that ‘the colour rose to his 
cheek; with half a smile he turned and took his hat – he was going. My heart smote me’ 
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(p. 125). Lucy’s self-assurance here is checked, since she is in her turn disturbed and 
stung by the ‘half a smile’ that her chuckling mockery provokes. 
 On her first night in Villette, Lucy is helped by an English gentleman who turns 
out to be Graham – and, even then, she had been able to acknowledge his kindness only 
with a reserved suspicion that he may be laughing at her in the dark. ‘I don’t know 
whether he smiled’, she comments, but he spoke ‘in a gentlemanly tone; that it is to say, 
a tone not hard nor terrifying’ (p. 62). Her wariness of a ‘hardness’ about him is 
inseparable, contradictory as it might seem, from her wariness of any signs of mischief 
or levity. Typically, Graham has ‘a mischievous half-smile about his lips’ (p. 102) or he 
listens ‘good-naturedly, but with laughing indifference’ (p. 104). She is relieved on one 
occasion to find that ‘his mouth was not cynical’ (p. 191). Mrs Bretton, too, has an 
indefinable hardness submerged beneath her godmotherly kindliness. When Lucy 
eventually tells us that she had recognised Dr John as the Graham of her childhood, she 
explains it was on account of his smile (p. 175), and likewise when she wakes up in the 
Brettons’ house, she recognises his mother ‘smiling with that smile I so well knew – a 
pleasant smile, though not soft’ (p. 172). In Auerbach’s useful description of Brontë’s 
mode of characterisation, ‘Lucy does not reflect the stable essence of character; she 
presents “the view of character” as it fluctuates from moment to moment, refracted by 
the split in Lucy herself ... All the characters who exclude Lucy are split up in this way: 
lacking a fixed essence, they become unknowable.’32 This is certainly true of Graham, 
whose fluctuating appearances reflect the ‘split’ in his character which draws such 
mixed feelings from Lucy. In contrast to the ‘knowable’ Paul, whose ‘fixed essence’ is 
reassuringly revealed through his authentic smiles, Graham is all perplexing surfaces 
and hinted, but not readily discernible depths.  
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 As Lucy’s unrequited interest in Graham grows stronger, his smiles become 
increasingly a source of pain to her. Desperately clinging to her secrets and in fear for 
her sanity, she initially refuses to tell the doctor about the ghostly ‘nun’ she has seen 
because ‘You would laugh ... You are laughing now.’ When he insists, she retreats 
further: ‘I felt raillery in his words; it made me grave and quiet’; 
Graham in mirthful mood must not be humoured too far. Just now there was a new 
sort of smile playing about his lips – very sweet, but it grieved me somehow – a new 
sort of light sparkling in his eyes: not hostile, but not reassuring (p. 248). 
The qualified strain is characteristic of Lucy’s attempts to describe his laughter. And her 
vulnerability to emotional exposure (her desire for Graham) is intertwined with her 
dread of being ‘laid open to a laugh.’ She will only confide in him after again seeking 
the assurance, ‘You will not laugh?’ at which Graham evokes the conventional notion 
of well-intentioned mockery: ‘Perhaps I may, to do you good; but not in scorn.’ Even 
his laughter – as he deems – has the capacity to effect good results in a patient, but Lucy 
will only give in having satisfied herself that ‘he now looked like a friend: that 
indescribable smile and sparkle were gone; those formidable arched curves of lip, 
nostril, eyebrow, were depressed; repose marked his attitude – attention sobered his 
aspect’ (p. 249). The attractive, ‘sparkling’ quality of Graham’s kindness ‘in mirthful 
mood’, his unbounded energy and sense of fun, is ‘formidable’, powerfully oppressive 
to Lucy’s melancholy state of mind. His charisma threatens to draw her out, to expose 
her all at once to his erotic power, his clinical gaze, and his ridicule; she is therefore 
relieved to find him returned to sober earnestness.  
 As with the schoolgirls, whose jolly good health puts an innocent face on their 
underlying deviousness, Lucy recognises that Graham’s upbeat lightheartedness and 
good humour mask insult, or at least indifference to her, and that she is chiefly sensitive 
to this on account of her own contrasting low spirits. ‘He had assumed a bantering air: a 
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light, half-caressing, half-ironic, shone aslant in his eye’ she notes another time – but 
‘mine was a soon-depressed, an easily-deranged temperament – it fell if a cloud crossed 
the sun.’ Lucy is obliged to ‘keep down the unreasonable pain which thrilled my heart, 
on thus being made to feel that while Graham could devote to others the most grave and 
earnest, the manliest interest, he had no more than light raillery for Lucy’ (p. 315). She 
is simultaneously seduced and chilled by the ‘half-caressing, half-ironic’ quality of his 
raillery; if it is beneficial for the ‘feeble in frame’, the ‘poor in spirit’, to ‘bask in the 
glow’ of such genial tempers as Graham’s, it is altogether more damaging when ‘a 
cloud [crosses] the sun.’ While she is intolerant of such changes in temperature, Graham 
himself is insensitive to pain, strengthened by his buoyant spirits. When he has trials to 
undergo, Lucy observes that ‘no temper, save his own, would have expressed by a smile 
the sort of agitation which now fevered him’ – throughout trouble ‘his smile never 
faded’, while ‘pain only made Dr. John laugh, as anxiety had made him smile’ (pp. 432-
5). Resilient himself, Graham is unable to wholly empathise with those who are unable 
to brightly smile through pain (the remedy advocated in Dickens’s novels); it is in this 
way that Brontë accounts for how such characters may be hardened rather than softened 
by the very pleasantness of their tempers.  
 The correlation between cheerfulness and toughness is illustrated in the fact that 
Graham is everywhere known for his smiling, good-humoured airs, except by the one 
person more lively and laughing than him: Ginevra, who finds him absurdly serious and 
dull. She had hoped that she and her admirer should ‘flutter about like two butterflies, 
and be happy’, but instead finds him ‘grave as a judge, and deep-feeling and thoughtful’ 
(p. 92). It is significant that to everyone else, with whom Graham is jolly, he is a self-
assured, respected, even intimidating figure (especially for Lucy, who wishes that he 
would be earnest with her instead), whereas his deadly seriousness with Ginevra makes 
him a pathetic object of scorn and ridicule, and places him in her power. The link 
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between his hardiness (or hardness) and his merriment is made explicit when Lucy 
surmises that the ‘strong and cheerful’ Graham is ‘one of those on whose birth benign 
planets have certainly smiled. Adversity might set against him her most sullen front: he 
was the man to beat her down with smiles’ (p. 177). Thus, smiled on benignly (unlike 
the less fortunate, and much sneered-at Lucy) he also survives by smiles. That these are 
often of a less than benign nature is hinted at in the choice of phrase, ‘beat her down’, 
while the abstract Adversity being both female and ‘sullen’ seems to suggest Lucy 
herself, who certainly often feels beaten down – and very often by smiles.  
 Ginevra, indeed, is the hardiest character in the novel – and (once again) she is 
robust, vibrant, likeable, but at the same time deviously cruel. She receives Lucy’s 
insults by laughing ‘as if I had paid her a compliment’ (p. 87), while the drier Lucy is 
with her, ‘the more merrily she laughed’ (p. 477). Her laughter is both how she wounds, 
and how she demonstrates imperviousness to insult, and the frank openness with which 
she does both is what shatters Graham’s illusions of her as ladylike, innocent and 
tractable. Thoroughly disconcerted to find her making fun of his mother in public (pp. 
215-21), he stiffly doubts ‘whether Ginevra will have [gained respect] by making a butt 
of her neighbours’, and assures Lucy he would not mind her laughing at him, ‘but my 
mother? I never saw her ridiculed before. Do you know, the curling lip, and 
sarcastically levelled glass thus directed, gave me a most curious sensation?’ Lucy’s 
empty reassurance relies on the false differentiation between malice and high spirits: ‘if 
Ginevra were in a giddy mood, as she [is] tonight, she would make no scruple of 
laughing at that mild, pensive Queen, or that melancholy King. She is not actuated by 
malevolence, but sheer, heedless folly. To a feather-brained school-girl nothing is 
sacred.’ But as Lucy well knows, no one in Villette is actuated merely by ‘sheer, 
heedless folly’, which is always inseparable from malevolence. She has consistently 
mocked Graham’s notions of Ginevra’s unthinking innocence, laughing at his claim that 
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she is too ‘simple-minded’ to know the value of his gifts (‘I had heard her adjudge to 
every jewel its price’) (p. 193). Ginevra may laugh openly and without subtlety, but – 
knowing her scheming character as she does – Lucy’s apologetic construction of her as 
a feather-brained schoolgirl echoes the naivety of Graham himself.  
 Disillusioned by the incident, Graham establishes the rules with a pompous 
didacticism suggestive of Shirley’s narrator: ‘The merry may laugh with mama, but the 
weak only will laugh at her. She shall not be ridiculed, with my consent at least.’ 
Realising, however, that he is rising to the bait, he recovers the advantage by affecting 
merriment: ‘I am glad she laughed at my mother ... That sneer did me all the good in the 
world. Thank you, Miss Fanshawe!’ Mrs Bretton, too, is far too cheery to be insulted 
just because Ginevra ‘satirically levels her eye-glass’ at her, exclaiming ‘she is a pretty, 
silly girl: but are you apprehensive that her titter will discomfit the old lady?’ (pp. 218-
9; Brontë’s emphasis) For the remainder of the evening, strong (and rather forced) 
emphasis is placed on the good-natured merriment and frequent causes for laughter 
enjoyed by the Brettons’ party, regardless of Ginevra’s superior sneers. The line 
between folly and felicity is drawn again – only this time with more than a hint of irony. 
Lucy’s perception of Graham’s superiority is coloured once again by violent imagery, 
when she notes that Graham’s ‘cheerfulness seemed natural and unforced ... I read in 
[his demeanour] no common mastery of the passions, and a fund of deep and healthy 
strength which, without any exhausting effort, bore down Disappointment and extracted 
her fang’ (p. 223; my emphasis). Throughout the novel, the positive connotations 
attached to ‘naturalness’ and ‘healthiness’ are seamlessly blended in this way with 
suggestions of self-serving performance and calculated ‘mastery of the passions.’ In a 
more subtle critique of male power than that offered in Shirley, Brontë suggests that it 
may operate not apart from, but under cover of benign appearances and good cheer.  
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 As Lucy gains emotional distance, she is increasingly wise to the sinister aspect 
of Graham’s smiles. Watching his response to the passionate singing of ‘Vashti’, she is 
chilled to observe that ‘such a strange smile went wandering round his lips, a smile so 
critical, so almost callous!’ (p. 260) The fleeting evidence of critical callousness 
towards an openly passionate woman is a key moment of truth, putting Lucy on her 
guard. But what is most notable about Graham is how Brontë invests his character with 
such disturbing power, without making it seem disproportionate to his cheerful 
mundanity. He has all the mysteriousness of a sadistic Angrian aristocrat, yet he has no 
secrets or latent evil to be revealed, remaining instead an ordinary, kindly enough 
middle-class man. At sixteen, he is ‘animated ... with sanguine health in his cheek ... 
penetrating eyes [and] a gay smile’, and yet, Lucy muses, his portrait raises doubt about 
his capacity for faith – ‘for whatever sentiment met him in form too facile, his lips 
menaced, beautifully but surely, caprice and light esteem’ (p. 170). Two sides of 
Graham are present in the portrait: the pleasantness promised in the ‘sanguine health’ 
and the ‘gay smile’, and the suspicions menaced by his seductive beauty, the 
‘penetrating eyes’ and sinister lips. Yet these are the same lips that form the ‘gay smile’; 
the two faces form one physiognomic whole. On our first introduction to Graham, his 
smile is described as ‘frequent, and destitute neither of fascination nor of subtlety, (in 
no bad sense)’, and indeed Lucy means it in no really bad sense – the ominous biblical 
connotations of guile and deceit lead to nothing; Graham’s snake-like charisma does not 
conceal satanic depths. Refusing to cast any actual aspersions on Graham’s religious or 
moral respectability, Brontë nonetheless challenges the popular equation of wholesome 
health with transparent honesty, through a portrait of the unsettling power that may 
coexist with commonplace masculine benignity.  
* 
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As romance develops between Graham and Polly (now Paulina, Countess de 
Bassompierre), Lucy observes with interest his self-restraint and calm amusement: 
Not one of those pretty impulses and natural breaks escaped him. He did not miss 
one characteristic movement, one hesitation [or] one lisp. [At times] she still lisped; 
but coloured whenever such lapse occurred, and in a painstaking conscientious 
manner, quite as amusing as the slight error, repeated the word more distinctly. 
Whenever she did this, Dr. Bretton smiled. [Gradually] the restraint on each side 
slackened ... already to Paulina’s lip and cheek returned the wreathing, dimpling 
smile; she lisped once, and forgot to correct herself. [Graham] did not grow gayer – 
no raillery, no levity sparkled across his aspect – but his position seemed to become 
one of more pleasure to himself (p. 288). 
Paulina lays herself open to a laugh often enough – from Graham, from her father, and 
from Lucy, all of whom take a ‘pleasure’ in her lisping, child-like naivety. Lucy is able 
to tolerate this rival because she likes her, but also because, as when she was a child, she 
can ridicule her – she does not entirely respect her. Paulina laughs ‘unconsciously’, or 
betrays her feelings with ‘an unconscious but tender smile’ (p. 290) which makes her 
transparent, manageable. She is ladylike where Ginevra is rudely direct, but endearingly 
‘unconscious’ where Ginevra behaves with intent; she is ‘tender’ rather than sharp. 
Thus her laugh, ‘clearer than the ring of silver and crystal’, conforms to idealised 
descriptions of the feminine laugh in its mingled clarity, purity and unobtrusiveness. Its 
‘clearness’ nods to the transparency of the open laugh, clearing her of artifice, but at the 
same time the evocation of silver and crystal suggests aesthetic surface rather than 
unseemly bodily depth – delicacy rather than heartiness (p. 279). While tending Paulina, 
Lucy’s distrust and jealousy are kept at bay by a sense of her innocence, over which she 
can feel superior. She observes that ‘her lip wore a curl – I doubt not inherent and 
unconscious, but which, if I had seen it first with the accompaniments of health and 
state, would have struck me as unwarranted, and proving in the little lady a quite 
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mistaken view of life and her own consequence’ (p. 264). She thus goes some way to 
acknowledging her usual hastiness of judgment – it is only the Countess’s vulnerable 
condition (her impaired physical health), and Lucy’s position in charge of her, that 
redeem her from charges of haughty showing off. Brontë maintains an unusual balance 
in the case of Paulina, whose icy aesthetic perfection does not undermine her emotional 
softness: ‘the smile of feeling, rather than of conscious power, slept soft in her eyes’ (p. 
370). 
 In some respects Paulina represents what Lucy herself might have been. Lucy 
speculates that if Paulina had suffered pain, hardship and fear instead of a comfortable 
life (in other words, if she had lived Lucy’s life) it would have ruined her nerves, and 
her features – she would have ‘lost in health and cheerfulness’ (p. 376). Her assessment 
of the delicate Countess is revealing: ‘Graham had a wealth of mirth by nature; Paulina 
possessed no such inherent flow of animal spirits – unstimulated, she inclined to be 
thoughtful and pensive – but now she seemed merry as a lark; in her lover’s genial 
presence, she glowed like some soft glad light’ (p. 423). Recalling Lucy’s words in 
relation to herself – that to ‘bask’ in the genial influence of the Brettons is a cure for 
poor health and melancholy – this suggests that Lucy too might have been healthily 
glowing, ‘merry as a lark’, with Graham’s love. But at the same time it is recognised 
that this would not, in fact, have been all gain for Lucy, who is not assigned the 
innocent, lark-like contentment of Frances (‘happy as a bird with its mate’) or Jane. It is 
Paulina who – like those earlier heroines – is given an endearingly elf-like charm (‘and 
the vexed, triumphant, pretty, naughty being laughed’; p. 304). Her rebellious 
‘triumphs’ are spirited but piquant and flirtatious, where Lucy’s demonstrations of 
defiance are emptied of mitigating sweetness.  
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‘From a mask to a face’: Paul Emanuel 
As Paul replaces Graham as the object of Lucy’s romantic interests, she is keen to 
impress on us simultaneously two contradictory things: the power and status of this 
intimidating figure, and the mocking levity with which she, Lucy, feels confident 
enough to treat him. She does the former by stressing that no one would dare ‘laugh in 
his face’ (p. 143), or telling us that – at an arrangement of Paul’s – ‘highly absurd as it 
was, not a soul in the room dared to laugh’, as ‘luckless for the giggler would be the 
giggle’ (p. 329). But Lucy does dare to laugh – she delights in it, apparently finding rich 
stores of entertainment in Paul’s eccentricities and ugliness, and (more to the point) a 
means therein to antagonise and torment him. Early mentions of him are accompanied 
by assertions of the following kind: ‘M. Paul amused me; I smiled to myself as I 
watched him ... so perfectly in earnest ... so naive’ (p. 212). ‘He made me smile’, she 
informs us again – ‘Who could help smiling at his wistfulness, his simplicity, his 
earnestness?’ (p. 320). Emphasising his short stature and child-like qualities, Lucy 
repeatedly refers to Paul in belittling terms, more often than not with the epithet ‘little.’  
 Paul, however, is not sweet-tempered but fiery and draconian. Feeling self-
conscious in a pink dress, Lucy is relieved when Graham takes no further notice beyond 
‘a kind smile and satisfied nod, which calmed at once my sense of shame and fear of 
ridicule’ (p. 208). But when Paul sees her, ‘sardonic comment [on the dress] gleamed in 
his eye’, while his ‘mocking but not ill-humoured gaze’ is ‘turned to a swarthy frown’ 
when Lucy slights him (pp. 221-2). The reasons for Lucy’s transferral of affections are 
apparent here – Graham’s kind but commonplace response is less provocative than 
Paul’s mocking gaze, which does at least express interest in the dress and its wearer, 
and which furthermore is easily crushed. Lucy finds herself newly empowered in her 
relations with this alternately challenging and manageable character, whose earnestness 
and naivety – and consequent sensitivity to insult from Lucy – are as much an attraction 
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as his fierce masculine vigour. Where the late arrival of Shirley’s lover had brought 
about her subjection to him, Lucy finds on the contrary that she can lay Paul open to 
plenty of laughter, and pursues her advantage accordingly, taking ‘a certain pleasure in 
keeping cool, and working him up’ (p. 201).  
 The assault is on both sides: Paul relishes Lucy’s intellectual failings, taking 
‘quiet opportunities of chuckling in [her] ear his malign glee’ (p. 234), and Lucy wishes 
she had been better educated, so that with ‘one cold, cruel, overwhelming triumph’ she 
could have ‘for ever crushed the mocking spirit’ out of him (p. 354). But Paul in his turn 
is stung on finding her playing with a handkerchief he has given her, perceiving her to 
be ‘mocking him and his things’ (p. 241). Indeed, the handkerchief comes to play a 
symbolic part in the contest between them. Lucy records her impressions when Paul 
arrives at an event to give a speech: 
This head I knew ... the amplitude and paleness of brow, the blueness and fire of 
glance, were details so domesticated in the memory, and so knit with many a 
whimsical association, as almost by this their sudden apparition, to tickle fancy to a 
laugh. Indeed, I confess, for my part, I did laugh till I was warm; but then I bent my 
head, and made my handkerchief and a lowered veil the sole confidants of my mirth 
(p. 310).  
Her manoeuvre here might recall the delicacy of Caroline and Shirley, endeavouring to 
hide their laughter from Malone. But the handkerchief and lowered veil are introduced 
as false gestures of discretion (and are by no means ‘the sole confidants of her mirth’, 
since she shares her amusement with the reader); like Paul’s speech, this is a public 
performance. The handkerchief device is soon exposed as a superficial display due to a 
parallel performance from Graham, after Paul has attempted to embarrass Lucy with a 
jealous whisper. ‘The worst of the matter was’, Lucy records, ‘that Dr. Bretton ... caught 
every word of this apostrophe; he put his handkerchief to his face and laughed till he 
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shook.’ Looking over at Paul, Graham observes to Lucy that ‘in his soul he is frantic at 
this moment because he sees me laughing. Oh! I must tease him ... And Graham, 
yielding to his bent for mischief, laughed, jested, and whispered on till I could bear no 
more.’ Graham stops when he realises that there is a space free near Paulina, who 
(‘ever-vigilant, even while laughing’) he has meanwhile been watching – at which he 
‘crossed the room, and made the advantage his own’ (p. 318). The incident throws 
significant light on Lucy’s similar display of rudeness, moments before. The 
handkerchief, in Villette, is introduced not for purposes of concealment but for purposes 
of emphasis. Lucy laughs ‘till she is warm’ less because she is naturally tickled at a 
humorous spectacle than because of her own ‘bent for mischief’, which she yields to 
quite intentionally, just as Graham decides ‘Oh! I must tease him.’ Laughter in Villette 
is always – whether from the self-assured Graham or the less confident Lucy – an act 
not of relaxation or abandonment to the moment, but of calculation and strategy, 
entirely consistent with ‘vigilance.’ 
 But Paul represents something new in Lucy’s life – more than a continuation of 
the battle of wits she plays with everyone else, and further opportunities for sarcasm. 
This is first impressed on us through the description of Paul’s smile when he and Lucy 
are reconciled: 
You should have seen him smile, reader; and you should have marked the difference 
between his countenance now, and that he wore half an hour ago. I cannot affirm that 
I ever witnessed the smile of pleasure, or content, or kindness round M. Paul’s lips, 
or in his eyes before. The ironic, the sarcastic, the disdainful, the passionately 
exultant, I had hundreds of times seen him express by what he called a smile, but any 
illuminated sign of milder or warmer feeling struck me as wholly new in his visage. 
It changed it as from a mask to a face: the deep lines left his features; the very 
complexion seemed clearer and fresher; that swart, sallow, southern darkness which 
spoke his Spanish blood, became displaced by a lighter hue. I know not that I have 
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ever seen in any other human face an equal metamorphosis from a similar cause (p. 
321). 
This smile (‘the smile of feeling, rather than of conscious power’) marks a turning-point 
for Lucy in her transition from Graham to Paul. She had previously been used only to 
artificial gesture, from him as from others – Paul ‘grimacing a half-smile, or what he 
intended for a smile, though it was but a grim and hurried manifestation’ (p. 204). This 
new expression of feeling moves her not only for what it tells her about Paul’s character 
– that he is capable of more than ‘the ironic, the sarcastic, the disdainful, the 
passionately exultant’ – but also because these ‘milder and warmer’ feelings are 
bestowed on her, such a smile being fresh and novel to the emotionally starved Lucy.  
 Being Lucy, she interprets it in such a way as to make Paul better suited to her 
ideologically; the smile essentially improves him, rather than simply gratifying her. 
Thus the ‘metamorphosis’ is powerful even to the point of going some way to change 
his nationality, making him more English, and thereby making his very blood more 
healthy and more acceptable. The concept is that of a blood-deep smile, not a shallow, 
surface manifestation. Entirely natural (revealing a face where a mask had been), this is 
an ‘illumination’ or revelation which renders transparent his whole being; no ‘doubtful’ 
secrets lurk beneath it, as with Graham’s more ambivalent ‘half-smiles’. It comes from 
Paul’s inner depths, whereas for all his flaunted deep ‘healthy fund’ of spirits, Graham’s 
smiles are characterised by their showy ‘sparkle’, or even Paulina’s laughter as the 
tinkle of silver and crystal. And it is in complete contrast to such strategic smiles as that 
of the ‘cold, snaky’ Zélie St. Pierre, who is eager to secure Paul’s attention when he 
enters the room: 
As usual, Zélie rose with alacrity, smiling to the whole extent of her mouth, and the 
full display of her upper and under rows of teeth – that strange smile which passes 
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from ear to ear, and is marked only by a sharp thin curve, which fails to spread over 
the countenance, and neither dimples the cheek nor lights the eye (p. 328). 
The true natural smile, Brontë suggests, is in tune with the body, ‘spreading’ organically 
with easy fluidity – Zélie’s is artificial, mask-like, representing the effect on the face of 
an exertion of the will, and (as we have seen) it is a far more common phenomenon in 
Villette.   
 Again in refreshing contrast to the hard-minded Graham, who watches the 
passionate Vashti with a ‘critical’, ‘callous’ smile, Paul is romantic and subject to his 
emotions. When his smiles are genuine he labours not to produce but to suppress them, 
speaking on another occasion ‘in a growl of which the music was wholly confined to his 
chest and throat, for he kept his teeth clenched, and seemed registering to himself an 
inward vow, that nothing earthly should wring from him a smile’ (p. 325). Such 
attempts at self-mastery are futile with Lucy, who notes another time that he ‘covered 
with his hand the upper part of his face, but did not conceal his mouth, where I saw 
hovering an expression I liked’ (p. 405). Lucy is again gratified when, fearing she has 
displeased him, she looks up and finds that ‘his face, instead of being irate, lowering, 
and furrowed, was overflowing with the smile, coloured with the bloom I had seen 
brightening it that evening [described above].’ Paul is at the mercy of this ‘overflowing’ 
expression, which comes spontaneously, from within – similar subjection to his 
emotions is implied when he is disturbed, and ‘his luminous smile went out’ (p. 481).  
 But the affective softening undergone by Lucy herself due to this new 
relationship is by no means so apparent as the change in Frances or Jane – she remains 
her ‘crabbed and crusty’ self, rather than experiencing any transformation in emotional 
and bodily health comparable to Paul’s smiling metamorphosis. She is not noticeably 
normalised, or socialized; womanly impulses do not rise to the surface to crack up her 
customary mask. Paul, likewise, remains prone to vindictive, sniping moods, which 
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come to present an enjoyably stimulating challenge to Lucy. In illustration of this, the 
action on Paul’s birthday is played out in the following sequence: first Zélie smiles 
triumphantly, ‘well pleased’ when she realises that Lucy has no flowers for Paul, who 
will expect them (p. 337). Paul enters glowing and radiant – ‘in a mood which made 
him as good as a new sunbeam’, Lucy notes; the ‘light, playing amongst our plants and 
laughing on our walls, caught an added lustre from M. Paul’s all-benignant salute’ (pp. 
337-8). This quickly changes to violent fury when he discovers that Lucy has no flowers 
for him – at which the ‘comic side of Monsieur’s behaviour’ tempts Lucy into the 
perverse resolve to stay mute instead of producing the present that she does, in fact, 
have ready to give him. ‘M. Paul was so tragic, and took my defection so seriously, he 
deserved to be vexed’ she declares (p. 340), echoing Ginevra’s earlier vexing flippancy 
at the expense of a tragically serious Graham. Aggrieved, Paul commences his revenge 
by launching into a vicious tirade against England and English women, at which ‘Zélie, 
and the whole class, became one grin of vindictive delight; for it is curious to discover 
how these clowns of Labassecour secretly hate England’ (‘secret’ sentiments are of 
course perfectly articulated in the usual fashion). Roused in her turn, Lucy speaks up in 
protest, which hands the advantage over to Paul, who expresses his triumph 
accordingly: ‘the professor put up his handkerchief, and fiendishly smiled into his folds. 
Little monster of malice!’ (p. 341). 
 Again, the handkerchief is introduced for purposes of emphasis, not 
concealment. But the war waged above is a notably playful one, and Lucy’s 
exclamation (‘little monster of malice!’) conveys affection rather than doubt and 
mistrust. With Paul, ‘malicious’ and ‘fiendish’ smiles have become endearing – the 
threat posed by masculine laughter has been finally rendered almost tame. Lucy is well-
matched with this monster. Herself an artful master of the fiendish smile (‘I thought 
Lucifer smiled’ laments Paul when she mocks his religious beliefs; p. 397), she may be 
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eager for affection but she is nonetheless keen to see Paul assert his strengths and skills 
amidst the cut-throat atmosphere of Villette. Once assured of his ‘milder’ and ‘warmer’ 
feelings for her, she is willing to acknowledge her delight in his sharper side; the sneers 
which Jane Eyre had dismissed or forbidden with appalled dismay, Lucy encourages. 
When he ‘sneers’ at her, Lucy tells us, ‘his injustice stirred in me ambitious wishes – it 
imparted a strong stimulus – it gave me wings to aspiration.’ Previously, that 
‘uncomprehended sneer of his made my heart ache, but by-and-by it only warmed the 
blood in my veins, and sent added action to my pulses’ (pp. 351, 352). Recording the 
antagonism between Paul and the bluestocking teacher, one Madame Panache (a contest 
she likens to that between Napoleon and de Staël), Lucy is vexed that Paul cannot 
disguise his anger and employ mockery: ‘Instead of laughing in his sleeve at his fair 
foe, with all her sore amour propre and loud self-assertion, M. Paul detested her with 
intense seriousness; he honoured her with his earnest fury’ (p. 349). Lucy’s frustration 
arises from her knowledge of the power that can be wielded by putting a triumphant 
(mocking) face on a battle not yet won – beating down an adversary with smiles. 
Treasuring for herself Paul’s ‘earnestness’, his inability to disguise emotion, here she 
wishes he would assume the ‘mask’ that would empower him – laughing in one’s 
sleeve, it is implied, is as (in)effective as laughing into a handkerchief.   
 The relationship between Lucy and Paul, then, in many ways consolidates both a 
defiant anti-sentimentality, and a reconciliation with the heart – a levelling between men 
and women, made possible by a balance of healthy feeling with eccentric malignancy. 
But it would not be true to say that in her final novel Brontë entirely resolves her 
misgivings concerning the gender politics present in laughter. By the end of Villette, 
when Lucy is thoroughly attached to Paul and in danger of losing him, it is made clear 
that a transferral of power has taken place – she is less self-controlled, and 
correspondingly less inclined to sneer at him. This is reflected in her perception of his 
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behaviour at the midnight fête, during her opium trance. She notes that upon his arrival, 
the ‘Walravens-party, augmented in numbers, now became very gay ... they drank 
healths and sentiments; they laughed, they jested’ (p. 466). Paul ‘underwent some 
raillery, half good-humoured, half, I thought, malicious’ – but, undaunted by his 
subjection to such raillery, Paul appears utterly in control, his dominance in the group 
made conspicuous by his joviality. ‘M. Emanuel was indeed very joyous that night’, 
Lucy jealously remarks; he ‘was the true life of the party; a little despotic perhaps, 
determined to be chief in mirth ... yet from moment to moment proving indisputably his 
right of leadership. His was the wittiest word, the pleasantest anecdote, the frankest 
laugh’ (p. 466).  
 Paul’s ‘despotic’ mirth is an act of determination; he asserts his ‘right of 
leadership’ by force of laughter. Perceiving intimacy between Paul and his young ward, 
the girl’s lover is made jealous and grumbles – ‘whereat M. Emanuel actually laughed 
in his face, and with the ruthless triumph of the assured conqueror, he drew his ward 
nearer to him’ (p. 466). What is notable about this scene is how thoroughly the 
distinctions between positive and negative laughter have been broken down and 
rendered meaningless. Whether pleasant and frank, or ruthless and exultant, Paul’s 
laughter rings loudly and oppressively in Lucy’s ears, and it is thereby 
indistinguishable, ultimately, from Graham’s laughter – Brontë has hit on the sound of 
patriarchal power. Its aggressiveness is underscored, yet undifferentiated from the jolly 
festivity of the atmosphere. In this respect, Micael Clarke makes a telling remark in 
commenting that the fête is supposed to represent ‘community, not anarchy, a festival, 
not a feast of misrule. But Lucy experiences this fête in a disoriented opium-dream state 
that evokes the Carnival.’33 As I suggested in Chapter One, ‘carnivalesque’ laughter 
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 Micael M. Clarke, ‘Charlotte Brontë’s Villette, Mid-Victorian Anti-Catholicism, and the Turn to 
Secularism’, ELH, 78 (2011), 967-89 (p. 984).  
253 
 
(insofar as this implies boisterous mirth and bodily affirmation) became almost 
synonymous with tame, sentimental laughter in the era of Dickens. Lucy’s experience 
of the laughter here as threatening rather than cheering is a reflection less of her 
‘disoriented’ state than of the general work done by the novel to remove any sense of 
innocence from ‘community’ merriment. There is symmetry here too: Lucy again finds 
herself on the outside of a happy, laughing party, a ‘mere looker-on’ at the Walravens 
party, as she had been to the Watsons on the boat coming over. Laughter excludes, even 
when it does not cause more direct pain.  
 When misunderstandings are cleared up and Paul presents Lucy with a school of 
her own, the reversal in their positions of power remains apparent. His benevolent 
patronage, and her relative position of grateful subordination, is expressed by the 
‘laughing down-look’ he is able to bestow on her (p. 486). Laughing down, he no longer 
appears so diminutive. At the mention of his ward Lucy is stirred to jealousy, at which 
‘he smiled, betraying delight’, so that it is now Lucy who is ‘warm, jealous, and 
haughty’, and her passionate little professor who is smugly entertained (p. 491). 
Warmth and health are stirred up in Lucy after all – which might be considered 
something of a double-edged outcome. Having rather less control over the ‘conqueror’ 
Paul is the price she pays for her happiness – a happiness whose genuineness is 
signalled by its resonance in her heart, as well as her face: ‘I lifted my happy eyes: they 
were happy now, or they would have been no interpreters of my heart’ (p. 483; Brontë’s 
emphasis). Though Paul instructs Lucy before leaving to ‘mind your health and 
happiness for my sake’ (p. 487), his implied death at sea creates open-endedness. His 
drowning might return her to a life of miserable oppression (‘the rush and saltiness of 
briny waves in my throat, and their icy pressure on my lungs’), but after all it is her 
embittered streak, and her frosty guardedness, that give Lucy her unique appeal amongst 
Victorian heroines. By subverting the happy ending, Brontë liberates Lucy from social, 
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and sociable constraints – allowing us to imagine her still living by her sharp wits, and 
wry smiles.  
* 
Discussing Lucy’s retiring habits in terms of her distaste for the prominently visible, 
fleshy materiality of the models of femininity displayed elsewhere in the novel, Jill 
Matus points out that she nonetheless ‘does not want to play the man, as her insistence 
on retaining female garb in the school dramatic production reveals.’ Lucy ‘articulates 
here the difficulty of envisaging a representation of female desire and sexuality that is 
not tantamount to looseness and “giant propensities” [the phrase applied to Bertha’s 
sexual appetite in Jane Eyre].’ Noting that ‘the representation of Vashti’s passionate 
self-expression suggests that the assumption of power by a woman is overwhelming, 
uncontainable’, Matus points to the dilemma ‘for the woman who does not want to 
exhibit herself as a spectacle for male consumption.’34 Through her laughter, Lucy in 
some respects ‘plays the man’, but it is a role reversal which successfully answers to the 
problem identified by Matus – the difficulty of assuming (or performing) power without 
exhibiting herself as spectacle – since she does not laugh with wild abandonment, but 
with practised self-restraint. In deflecting attention from herself while scrutinising and 
judging others, Lucy’s dispassionate laughter is an act of self-expression which 
simultaneously sustains her self-protective invisibility.
35
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 Matus, pp. 147-8. 
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 This strategy might be described, using Litvak’s phrase, as ‘exchanging theatrical self-display for 
theatrical self-concealment.’ Analysing Brontë’s letters, Litvak claims that her ‘wish for a sheltering 
shadow betokens not an anti-theatrical posture, but indeed an intensely theatrical penchant for disguise 
and dissimulation’, p. 87. Lynn M. Voskuil offers a further insight into the kind of power wielded by such 
a ‘posture’, noting that ‘though she depicts herself as passive, Lucy’s position as spectator gives her an 
authority that seems sometimes masculine.’ See Voskuil, ‘Acting Naturally: Brontë, Lewes, and the 
Problem of Gender Performance’, ELH, 62 (1995), 409-42 (p. 425).   
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 Lucy’s smiles are unfeminine not simply because they lack amiable sweetness. 
She resists gender definition insofar as she retains, for the most part, her ability to 
mystify and manipulate through laughter, without being compromised by the unwitting 
establishment of an innate, legible female identity. As discussed more fully in Chapter 
Three, the power dynamics in Brontë’s novels rest on the contrast between the capacity 
to direct or channel emotions and energies through purposeful bodily display, and the 
experience of having an ‘inner’ emotional self betrayed and brought to the surface.36 
This opposition is repeatedly disrupted in Villette, which cannot be seen to reverse 
gender roles in any straightforward way, since Lucy directs her sarcasm at both men and 
women, and is threatened as much by Ginevra and Madame Beck as by Graham and 
Paul. The androgynous quality of the schoolgirls is reproduced in each and every 
character, to the extent that at some points Brontë seems to have succeeded in breaking 
down the restrictive gender boundaries, and accompanying behavioural patterns, that 
loom so large in her previous novels (Shirley in particular). But, ultimately, in blurring 
the distinction between appearances and authenticity, Villette achieves not so much a 
dismantling of patriarchal power as a clearer conception of its omnipresence. If there is 
no meaningful difference between Lucy’s frigid exterior and her natural self, so 
Graham’s coolness and warmth – his mockery and mirth – are unsettlingly 
interchangeable. Likewise, the opposition between ‘mask’ and ‘face’ is by the end 
thrown into question, as Lucy struggles to distinguish between Paul’s merry and 
menacing moods. If Paul is ‘honest, and not false – artless, and not cunning’ (p. 494), he 
                                                          
36
 According to Gillian Beer, Brontë ‘shows the way in which the inhibited inner world will demand 
vehement presence. She knows the dangers of being a spectator too long and sees that for her heroine 
[Lucy] to survive she must act, not only interpret.’ See Beer, ‘“Coming Wonders”: Uses of the Theatre in 
the Victorian Novel’, in English Drama: Forms and Development, ed. by Marie Axton and Raymond 
Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 164-85 (p. 185). But – as implied in 
Litvak’s and Voskuil’s readings (above) – the distinction between acting and interpreting is not always a 
valid one. Lucy’s laughter is an act in its very refusal of an ‘inhibited inner world’; it works to penetrate 
into others’ secrets through its own performance of secrecy and spectatorship.   
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nonetheless emerges elsewhere as a hissing ‘boa-constrictor’ (p. 318).37 Smiles and 
laughter in Villette provide insight not (borrowing Auerbach’s terms again) into ‘the 
stable essence of character’ but into ‘the view of character as it fluctuates from moment 
to moment.’ In some ways Lucy thrives in this environment of ‘doubtful smiles’, but it 
also fuels her feelings of vulnerability and mistrust – her wariness of being ‘laid open to 
a laugh.’  
 Matus points to a further problem, moreover, in the way in which ‘the 
ambiguous and troubling closure of the novel’ frees the heroine from subjection to the 
male gaze through killing her emotional life: 
Lucy loves Monsieur Paul and is seen, recognised and rewarded by him, however 
problematic his despotic demeanour may be for modern readers. Lucy survives his 
loss, has economic independence, and is no man’s slave. But Brontë does not allow 
her to keep in sight that which reflects her desiring, sexual self, and she becomes 
understandably associated with frost and cold.
38
 
The laughter I have identified as ‘morbid’ is a source of power for Lucy: expressive but 
restrained, it combats ‘despotic demeanours’ and throws off slavery (to the gaze, but 
also to the mockery which is the consequence of being exposed to that gaze). But it is 
necessarily connected to ‘frost and cold’ in ways which shut down affective impulses 
and experiences. As I have argued, Villette does in some ways achieve the reconciliation 
of heart and head, and of men and women, that Shirley portrays in terms of stark 
opposition and painful, unresolved conflict. But Brontë’s refusal to confirm a happy life 
for Lucy with Paul is another indication that gender relations for the author remain 
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 Cf. Brontë’s description of Thackeray as an ‘intellectual boa-constrictor ... he does not play with his 
prey – he coils round it and crushes it in his rings’ (see Chapter One, p. 73).   
38
 Matus, p. 148.  
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essentially problematic and unbalanced. Sexual fulfillment, for Lucy, is sacrificed to 
self-respect.  
 At the same time, if Brontë does not end on either an altogether happy or a 
conclusively defiant note, and if Lucy’s laughter is at times discomforting, bordering on 
the ill-nature so tabooed elsewhere in Victorian fiction, we should recognise that this 
morbidity for Brontë is inseparable from intellect and integrity. It makes its statement 
through being antipathetic to social and cultural expectations, and to the pressing 
demand for healthiness. I have traced the development of a mode of laughter which (as I 
stressed in Chapter One) is subversive, though not in any overwhelming or uplifting 
way. Resistant to optimism as well as to oppression, the laughter of Brontë’s heroines 
will not be assimilated into the broader traditions of social harmony or wholehearted 
rebellion. Lucy, indeed, might be partly understood in the terms used by Auerbach to 
describe an earlier nineteenth-century heroine, Jane Austen’s Fanny Price – who ‘[lures] 
us out of fellowship to adopt the perspective of the monstrous and the marginal’: 
Fanny captures our imaginations [by] welcoming the reader into her solitary 
animosity against the intricacies of the normal. [...] As omniscient watcher and anti-
comic spirit [Fanny] possesses a subtler power than we find in brighter and livelier 
heroines of fiction ... Fanny moves beyond the sphere of traditional heroinism to 
associate herself with a host of dashing British villains ... a spectral presence at the 
communal feast.
39
  
Auerbach’s perception of Fanny ‘adopting the role of traditional literary villains’ recalls 
Bertha Rochester’s adoption of villainous laughter, which, as I argued in Chapter Two, 
establishes her ‘spectral presence’ but also reverses her victim status and challenges 
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 Auerbach, pp. 24, 27. She further describes Fanny as ‘joyless’, ‘a killjoy’, and an ‘anticomic watcher’, 
defined by her ‘resistance to the comic’ and to ‘those impulses of comedy which bring us together’ (p. 
25).  
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female stereotypes.
40
 Drily humorous rather than solemn, and ‘controlling’ through her 
expressive smiles as well as her quiet gaze, Lucy is not altogether an ‘anticomic 
watcher.’ Nonetheless, in her withdrawal from community feeling and from the 
‘brighter and livelier’ atmosphere that Brontë equates with ‘the normal’, Lucy possesses 
a power that is simultaneously more subtle and more aggressive than that exerted by 
Caroline and Shirley. No wonder she so disconcerted the novel’s original critics. 
                                                          
40
 Ibid., p. 27. In this sense, Lucy also fits Juliet John’s description of Romantic, melodramatic or 
Dickensian villainy as being in opposition to community feeling (see Chapter Two, note 3) – but as 
Auerbach playfully suggests, this might be seen in a positive light after all, making a character wickedly 
appealing rather than in need of rescuing.  
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Conclusion 
Five years after her death, Thackeray would reflect on Brontë’s place in the public 
imagination: ‘Of the multitude that has read her books, who has not known and 
deplored the tragedy of her family, her own most sad and untimely fate?’ Tellingly, he 
remembers:  
the burning love of truth, the bravery, the simplicity, the indignation at wrong, the 
eager sympathy, the pious love and reverence [of] the woman ... the trembling little 
hand ... the heart, newly awakened to love and happiness, and throbbing with 
maternal hope ... that intrepid outspeaker and champion of truth, that eager, 
impetuous redresser of wrong ... the trembling little frame, the little hand, the great 
honest eyes. An impetuous honesty seemed [to] characterize the woman ... an austere 
little Joan of Arc marching in upon us, and rebuking our easy lives, our easy morals 
... a very pure, and lofty, and high-minded person.
1
 
Exalting and ennobling Brontë, Thackeray also emphasises her fragility and humanity 
in line with the general tendency, initiated by Gaskell, to foreground biography at the 
expense of the literary works, creating a myth of ‘the Brontë sisters’ according to which 
they are great geniuses, but women before intellectuals. All large eyes, little frame and 
throbbing heart, this image of embodied womanhood is inseparable from the impression 
of passionate sincerity that Thackeray calls up; she is an ‘outspeaker’, but defined by 
‘simplicity’ and ‘sympathy’, while it is her newly awakened happiness in married life 
that makes her endearing, vulnerable, and ultimately tragic. Thackeray captures traits 
that are typically still attached to Brontë today: melancholy, impetuous feeling, truth-
telling earnestness.
2
 This thesis has sought to explain why such a ‘pure, and lofty, and 
                                                          
1
 Thackeray, ‘The Last Sketch’, Cornhill Magazine, 1 (1860), 485-7 (pp. 486-7).  
2
 As Miller records, the Brontë family has been relentlessly romanticised and ‘primarily remembered for 
its tragedies’ (p. 2; see also pp. 29, 63), while another popular image – quite contrary to the idea of wild 
passions or sincere suffering, but equally anti-comic – is that of Charlotte Brontë as the epitome of ‘the 
current negative stereotype of the Victorian age: prim, priggish, and a prude’ (p. 135).   
260 
 
high-minded person’ should have had so much to say about something so frivolous as 
laughter.  
 Thackeray distances himself from the woman writer through affectionate 
memories of when she ‘took [him] to task’ for his flippancy, stressing that she 
(impulsively) ‘jumped too rapidly to conclusions’, and using the tribute (though with 
gentlemanly graciousness, of course) to assure readers that she had been wrong about 
him: ‘I have smiled at one or two passages in the Biography [Gaskell’s Life] in which 
my own disposition or behaviour forms the subject of talk.’3 The rhetorical imposition 
of a kindly but corrective smile in the direction of the ‘eager’, misguided woman is a 
reassertion of the literal smiles that Brontë recalled being the object of when she first 
entered literary society.
4
 It evokes the politely satirical strain that (as seen in Chapter 
One) Brontë perceived to run through Thackeray’s novels, and to be especially present 
amidst his sentimental fervour for the female character. And it is just the sort of smile 
that Brontë’s own novels repeatedly either protest at, or reassign to distinctly 
unsentimental female lips. The picture drawn by Thackeray is soon thrown into question 
by a glance at the lively presence of humour and satire in Brontë’s writings. But it is 
perhaps more important to examine the senses in which it is true to say that she had 
little time for laughter, and to question why she so indignantly took Thackeray to task. 
Brontë’s burning love of truth and austere position on flippancy are countered at many 
points in her novels by her sense of humour, but we should look, too, to the social 
conditions that produced this ambivalence, this stand-off between the honest, earnest 
heart and the sly, smirking intellect.  
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 Thackeray, ‘The Last Sketch’, p. 486.   
4
 George Smith would recall Brontë’s ‘discomposure’ when Thackeray teased her in public on one 
occasion (Brontë herself observed ‘the smile on several faces’ when he did so). Whenever they met, 
according to Smith, Brontë’s ‘heroics roused Thackeray’s sense of humour.’ See Margaret Smith’s notes, 
Letters, II (pp. 300-1, 563). 
261 
 
 In Chapter One, I argued that impulsive, unrestrained laughter in the early to 
mid-nineteenth century was encouraged and enjoyed (theoretically at least) to an 
underestimated extent, in contrast to the later Victorian wariness (or weariness) over the 
merits and desirability of such laughter. This change in attitudes can be linked to 
developments in comic theory and literary values – the ‘change from the pre-eminence 
of amiable humour to that of comedy of the intellect’, as Martin describes it.5 Bowen 
identifies the 1850s as a ‘watershed in Victorian comic writing’, observing that there is 
‘a sharp, indeed epochal, contrast to be drawn between the major fiction before the mid-
century ... and after ... The second half of the century’s fiction is notably darker, more 
pessimistic, and less funny.’6 This darker humorous tone is present in the ‘superb comic 
undercuttings’ of novels including Villette.7 But as well as reflecting the turn away from 
jolly optimism and comic resolutions, Brontë’s novels give an early indication of the 
accompanying cultural shift towards darker views of laughter itself. Brontë’s is an 
isolated but loud voice of scepticism regarding positive attitudes to laughter in the first 
half of the century. What her novels demonstrate, moreover, is the far-reaching 
influence of such attitudes – their shaping power not only over humorous literature, but 
over dominant conceptions of social conformity and, most pressingly, gender identity. 
 Laughter’s thematic importance in the novels of Thackeray and Dickens testifies 
to the significance which it held for writers other than Brontë, as a means of providing 
insight into character. But while Thackeray and Dickens might seem more obvious 
subjects for a study of laughter in the era, it is Brontë’s suspicious, often unsmiling 
stance that has made her the most fruitful starting point for unravelling the ideological 
threads that held together the cultural approval of laughter. For what Brontë’s novels 
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 Martin, The Triumph of Wit, p. 17.  
6
 Bowen, ‘Comic and Satirical’, p. 266.  
7
 Ibid., pp. 278-9.  
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bring to light is a gap between the ideal and the real, between the popular conception of 
shared, universal laughter and the individual perception of divisive, coercive laughter. 
The ‘insights’ provided by laughter tended to split character into type – healthy or 
unhealthy, moral or deviant, insider or outsider – functioning to normalise social 
cohesion through social pressure (no-one likes to be left out; no-one likes to be laughed 
at). As a woman, for whom (generally) moral and emotional conformity was expected 
to a far greater extent, and for whom (personally) the experience of physical and social 
vulnerability was acutely real, Brontë was far better placed than the nation’s ‘humorists’ 
to explore these sobering undercurrents. Her novels reveal the constraining effects of 
the cultural elevation of ‘natural’ or ‘healthy’ emotional expression – the role of 
laughter in social regulation, the didactic links between good cheer and good conduct – 
and in doing so they challenge assumptions about the essentially liberal, or liberating 
nature of laughter. At the same time, they challenge the way in which repression – 
especially in the context of Victorian patriarchy – is typically conceptualised.8 This 
thesis has stressed the privileged place accorded to laughter in early Victorian culture, 
but also revealed the strict criteria on which this seemingly permissive stance depended. 
If the shift towards curtailing and moderating laughter – the later Victorian turn to 
seriousness – entailed an attempted suppression of the body and its impulses, we should 
nonetheless recognise what had been suppressed and prohibited before, through the 
rhetorical devaluation of individual and intellectual expression. 
 ‘Today’, observes Indira Ghose, ‘laughter automatically triggers positive 
associations: pleasure, relaxation, and a response to humour.’9 I would add that laughter 
is positively associated not only with comedic relaxation but with the more edgy 
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 In Parvulescu’s terms, for instance (p. 5), the ‘enemy’ against which laughter must ‘revolt’ is ‘a certain 
kind of seriousness ... Historically, seriousness, in its official tone and respectable dress, has intimidated, 
demanded, prohibited, oppressed.’  
9
 Ghose, p. 1.  
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pleasures of satire. But through attending to laughter ranging from hearty guffaws to 
smiles that, like Frances Henri’s in The Professor, are ‘much-meaning, though not very 
gay’, this thesis has opened up the definition of laughter, looking beyond its immediate 
connotations and its presence in humorous contexts. In doing so I have demonstrated its 
pervasiveness in the nineteenth-century imagination, and its role in consolidating 
specifically early Victorian ideals, by demanding emotional expression and demonising 
emotional withdrawal. I have shown, moreover, that these expectations were gender-
determined: while women were valued and judged according to the warmth of their 
hearts, the pressure on men to display spontaneity was at odds with the pressure to 
display self-command. Representations of laughter thus bring into sharp focus the 
competing and contradictory ideologies of gender in the Victorian period, highlighting 
the ways in which the instinctive body was positively foregrounded in the interests of 
social control, before the emphasis shifted to containment and discretion.  
 Given the similar pervasiveness and the similar assumptions about laughter that 
prevail in modern (Western) culture, however, I would like to close by considering the 
wider import of the points that this thesis has raised.
10
 More particularly, how do 
laughter and smiles work to consolidate the gender divide that still cuts through 
normative roles and behaviour? In the Foucauldian analysis of Sandra Lee Bartky: 
Feminine faces, as well as bodies, are trained to the expression of deference. Under 
male scrutiny, women will avert their eyes or cast them downward; the female gaze 
is trained to abandon its claim to the sovereign status of seer ... Women are trained to 
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 For laughter’s centrality to today’s culture, see Chapter One (note 7). But I mean also to refer to 
laughter’s prevalence on a social (and ahistorical) level, in the sense that it is something we do all the 
time. As Robert R. Provine has found, laughter is ‘sprinkled through’ or ‘punctuates’ everyday speech. 
Reporting that ‘only 10% to 20% of pre-laugh comments are even mildly humorous’, Provine stresses 
that an ‘exclusive focus on humor deflects consideration of the broader and deeper roots of laughter in 
human vocal communication and social interaction.’ See ‘Yawns, laughs, smiles, tickles, and talking’, in 
The Psychology of Facial Expression, ed. by James A. Russell and José Miguel Fernández-Dolz 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 158-75 (pp. 166-8). See also Provine, Laughter: A 
Scientific Investigation (New York: Penguin, 2001).  
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smile more than men, too. In the economy of smiles, as elsewhere, there is evidence 
that women are exploited, for they give more than they receive in return ... In many 
typical women’s jobs, graciousness, deference, and the readiness to serve are part of 
the work; this requires the worker to fix a smile on her face for a good part of the 
working day, whatever her inner state.
11
 
Bartky’s observations relate mostly to how women’s movements, expressions and body 
image are habitually restricted and constrained through self-policing – fixed, like the 
smiles on their faces. But discipline as characterised by Foucault extends to the ‘inner 
state’ as well as the surface of the face; as this thesis has emphasised, the body (in the 
name of ‘naturalness’) may be required to relax and expand as often as it is confined 
and contained. Smiles in this sense are not simply (en)forced through affective labour, 
but expressive of internalised feminine traits. Shirley’s ‘not ill-natured, but significant’ 
smile aggressively affirms her status as a ‘seer’ who refuses to look at the world with 
‘mild, dim eyes.’ But laughter, alternatively, may express the same automatic 
subservience that is communicated when women avert their eyes – as when the 
knowing, supposedly covert yet direct displays of amusement that accompany Frances’s 
‘conquering glance’ are replaced by soft, shy, and downward-looking smiles.12  
 At one point in Gender Trouble, Butler describes the ‘explosive’ laughter that 
exposes artificial social constraints, evoking ‘the laugh of Medusa, which, Hélène 
Cixous tells us, shatters the placid surface constituted by the petrifying gaze.’ Butler 
contrasts this scornful laughter directed at authority with ‘the fear of being laughed at.’13 
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 Bartky, p. 135.  
12
 Bartky’s observation that women ‘give more than they receive in return’ is borne out by Provine’s 
research, which shows that those in subservient social positions laugh (as well as smile) more than those 
in positions of dominance, with women laughing more frequently than men in social situations. Thus 
subservience may be conveyed through upward as well as ‘downward-looking’ smiles. See Laughter, pp. 
29-30 (see also pp. 33-5).  
13
 Butler, Gender Trouble, pp. 102-3.  
265 
 
But she does not tie these comments in with her analysis of ‘gender attributes and acts, 
the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification’ – 
laughter’s general effects are noted by Butler but not included within the discussion of 
how ‘gender reality is created through sustained social performances.’14 Nor does she 
connect the fear of being laughed at with the effects of the ‘petrifying gaze’, just as 
Bartky makes no connection between women’s readiness to avert their gaze, and their 
readiness to smile. Clearly, there are significant links to be made here: between the 
disciplinary effects of the gaze and of the laugh (registered in Shirley as Helstone’s 
‘sarcastic, keen eye’); and between these forms of discipline and the forms of 
submission, the smiling affects that they produce. It is an accepted truth that laughter 
wields corrective social power – that we act in the ways we do to fit in, to avoid 
humiliation. But what about the power of laughter as itself an ‘act’, a style of behaviour 
or ‘social performance’? Butler recognises the broader ‘shattering’ work done by 
laughing at existing norms (‘laughter in the face of serious categories is indispensible 
for feminism’), but what about the ‘serious’, physical faces of laughter?15 The move by 
which the objectified woman ‘returns the glance, reverses the gaze, and contests the 
place and authority of the masculine position’ is clearly akin to the process by which 
women refuse to be the ‘object’ of laughter, instead reversing or returning the laugh, 
contesting authority, laughing back at power.
16
 But the notion of ‘laughing back’ too 
easily slides into critical abstraction – into an understanding of laughter whereby its 
subversive properties are indistinguishable from those of humour. Just as nebulous ideas 
of anonymous surveillance are attached (through literary personifications of 
panopticism) to the image of a pair of piercing eyes, so the social operation of ridicule 
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 Ibid., p. 141.  
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 Ibid., viii.  
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 Ibid., vii.  
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should be understood as embodied, as residing in the lips. A full account of laughter’s 
despotic hold on daily life would involve careful consideration not only of who mocks 
who but at how men and women laugh and how they are expected to laugh; not only 
how we are controlled or constrained by laughter, but how we are defined by it; how 
laughter may defy ridicule or ‘shatter the surface of the penetrating gaze’, but also how 
it forms part of that ‘surface’, or how it may display conformity in preference to 
spectacle.  
 Rather than untangling these problems theoretically, I have instead demonstrated 
their centrality in Brontë’s novels, where the interconnections between different kinds 
of laughter are rigorously (and earnestly) explored. Brontë records male mockery of 
women, but also the merriment that renders women vulnerable to that mockery; the 
smiles through which Jane alternately expresses and represses ‘herself’; the exposure to 
laughter that subdues Caroline, while driving Shirley to avoid feminine forms of 
expression; the sensitivity to laughter that ‘makes a man’ of Crimsworth, or a woman of 
Paul. The gendered modes of laughter that pervade these novels sometimes define the 
‘natural’ self in spite of the self, or they may veil, refuse or re-gender that self; they 
impact on the conduct of others, but they also constitute conduct, and thereby constitute 
character. In taking a pathognomic approach, tracing the changing physiognomies of 
Brontë’s characters (instead of focusing on interactions that revolve around an active 
interpreter and passive subject), this thesis has made visible the patterns of mockery and 
mirth that underwrite transferrals of knowledge and power in Brontë’s fiction – casting 
laughter, as it were, into the pathway of the gaze. Highlighting the discursive 
background to these turns of expression – the ways in which they are inflected by 
contemporary beliefs about humour, satire, health and morality – I have argued that they 
have much to tell us about nineteenth-century ideology and assumptions. In Shirley’s 
impassioned complaint that the rights of women are dismissed with a jest, in Lucy’s 
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drier complaint that happiness is not a potato, we see the pressure exerted by both 
jesting and happy faces; the moral and medical insistence on good nature works 
alongside the satirical policing of social conformity. But Brontë’s insights into these 
mechanisms of entrapment also transcend contextual factors, inviting closer scrutiny of 
the masks and faces of any society, for clues to the ways in which laughter infiltrates 
everyday behaviour, identities and relationships. 
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